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2013 DIGILAW 1701 (MAD)

Manonmani Sundarraj v. Jalal Hajee Abdul Karim Sahib Trust rep. by its Secretary and Managing Trustee, J. A. Rahman

2013-04-18

G.RAJASURIA

body2013
Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is focussed by the defendants, animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 16.04.2010 passed by the learned V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in A.S.No.448 of 2008 confirming the judgment and decree dated 17.12.2007 passed by the learned I Assistant Judge, City Civil Court in O.S.No.6327 of 2005. 2. The parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. Compendiously and concisely, the relevant facts, absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus: (a) The plaintiff, filed the suit for evicting the defendants describing and projecting them as the tenants of the vacant land and that they raised super structures of their own. b) Whereas the defendants contested the suit on various grounds including the one that they acquired prescriptive title over it, by their adverse possession from time immemorial. They dispute the very identity of the suit property itself. In fact the defendants attempted to project the case that the land, in which they have been in possession and enjoyment belong to them as they acquired it by adverse possession. c) Issues were framed by the trial court. d) Up went the trial, during which, on the plaintiff's side P.W.1 was examined and Exs.A1 to A9 were marked. On the defendants' side, DW3-Manoharan examined himself as DW1 and Exs.B1 to B3 were marked. e) Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the suit by giving a finding that Section 106 notice as per the Transfer of Property Act was not properly given. Whereupon, the plaintiff did not file any appeal. However, the defendants preferred the first appeal for the purpose of getting erased the findings as against the defendants as though they did not prove their adverse possession and also on the ground that the trial court did not consider the other pleas raised by them. The first appellate court dismissed their appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. 4. The first appellate court dismissed their appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. 4. Challenging and impugning the judgments and decrees of both the fora below this second appeal has been preferred by the defendants on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law: a) Whether at the outset the judgment and decree of the first appellate court below is vitiated in law for not framing points for determination and not considering the issue of maintainability of the suit, non disclosure of cause of action and bar of limitation specifically raised in the pleadings and in the written submissions filed by the appellant? b) Whether the judgment and decree of the lower courts holding the existence of lessor-lessee relationship between the predecessor of appellants and respondent Trust based on unproved documents marked Exs.A4, A5, A6 and A7 is valid under law? c) Whether based on documents marked Exs.A4, A5, A6 and A7 any attornment of tenancy between the predecessor of the appellants and the respondent Trust could be validly inferred under law? d) In the absence of attornment of tenancy between the respondent and the appellants after the demise of their predecessor in the year 1979 and in the absence of evidence of payment of rents, whether the concurrent finding as to the existence of lessor-lessee relationship by the courts below is liable to be set aside as perverse? e) In any event, whether the suit is barred by limitation even on the assumption of existence of lessor-lessee relationship? f) Whether the judgment and decree of the courts below are vitiated under law for decreeing the suit even in the absence of disclosure of cause of action qua the reliefs and the suit property? (extracted as such) 5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants. 6. f) Whether the judgment and decree of the courts below are vitiated under law for decreeing the suit even in the absence of disclosure of cause of action qua the reliefs and the suit property? (extracted as such) 5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants. 6. At the time of entertaining the second appeal when this court posed the question to the learned counsel for the appellants as to why the defendants' strained their every nerve in filing the first appeal and also this second appeal, when the original suit filed by the plaintiff itself was dismissed on some grounds, the learned counsel for the defendants' would make the submission that all the defendants' pleas were rejected by the courts below; however, the plaintiff suit was dismissed only on the ground that the termination notice issued under Section 106 of the TP Act was not proper. Whereupon, according to him the plaintiff also filed a separate suit after issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and in the process of resisting the new suit, the same defendants might face difficulties because the pleas, which they took already in the present suit in O.S.No.6327 of 2005 were rejected and therefore only the present second appeal has been focussed. 7. I would like to dispel from the mind of the defendants their apprehension by spotlighting and indicating that once the main suit itself of the plaintiff was dismissed, the prayers in O.S.6327 of 2005 became an inexecutable one and in the new suit, there is no question of pressing into service res judicata or estoppel. When such is the legal position, the defendants' need not have filed the appeal and also this second appeal. 8. By way of disambiguating the ambiguity, I would like to point out that in the pending fresh suit filed by the plaintiff, the defendants are at liberty to raise all the pleas legally permissible in their favour and any findings given at the time of dismissal of the suit in the earlier suit by the court concerned would not be an embargo. 9. With the above observation, this second appeal is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.