JUDGMENT: Heard Mr. V. Menezes, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, Mr. V. P. Thali, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 3 and 4 and Mr. J. Vaz, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 5 to 10. None for the remaining respondents. 2. The above appeal challenges an order passed by the learned Civil Judge Senior Division, Mapusa, in Special Civil Suit No. 3/2011 dated 08.02.2012 whereby an application for temporary injunction filed by the appellants came to be dismissed. 3. Mr. V. Menezes, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has assailed the impugned order on the ground that pursuant to the sale deed executed by the appellants in favour of the respondent no.1 there were specific restrictions imposed in the said deed with regard to the nature of the business which could be conducted by the respondent no.1. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has further pointed out that it was also specifically stated therein that in case of any transfer of the property to any third party, such condition would continue to be in operation. The learned counsel further pointed out that in breach of the said condition the respondent no.1 has sold the suit premises in favour of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 and according to him, the business activity which is intended to be carried out in the suit premises would create nuisance to the inhabitants of the building. The learned counsel further pointed out that the learned Judge while passing the impugned order has come to the conclusion that an activity which would create pollution to the persons occupying the building is forbidden in the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent no.1. The learned counsel further pointed out that merely because the relief which has been sought by the appellants was in a general manner and encompassing any business activity being carried out in the suit premises, the learned Judge has refused the application for temporary injunction. The learned counsel further pointed out that the respondent nos. 3 and 4 are carrying the business activity by using sulphuric acid and other chemicals which would create nuisance and pollution to the inhabitants of the building. The learned counsel further pointed out that the respondent nos. 3 and 4 are carrying the business activity by using sulphuric acid and other chemicals which would create nuisance and pollution to the inhabitants of the building. The learned counsel further pointed out that the learned Judge has further held in the impugned order that as the activity has not yet started in the suit premises, it was open to the appellants to complaint that the activity which was intended to be carried out by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 would create nuisance. The learned counsel further pointed out that the Pollution Control Board has given a certificate stating inter-alia that the acid may be used by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 and according to him this itself suggest that the business activity would create nuisance. The learned counsel further pointed out that in the meanwhile in view of the findings of the learned Judge in the impugned order, the appellants have filed an application for amendment on 11.02.2013 by giving more specific particulars in support of their allegations and also modified the relief in the suit and as such the deficiencies found by the learned Judge in the impugned order on that count no longer survive. The learned counsel as such submits that the impugned order be quashed and set aside or in the alternative liberty be given to the appellants to file a fresh application after the said application for amendment is decided by the Trial Court. 4. On the other hand, Mr. V. Thali, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 3 and 4 has supported the impugned order. The learned counsel has pointed out that there can be no blanket restrictions for the transfer of the property by the purchaser to any third party. The learned counsel further pointed out that the learned Judge while passing the impugned order has categorically come to the conclusion that the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 cannot be said to be illegal. The learned counsel further pointed out that after passing the impugned order, the respondents have already obtained the requisite permission from the statutory authorities and as such the findings of the learned Judge that the said respondents do not have such permission no longer survive. 3 and 4 cannot be said to be illegal. The learned counsel further pointed out that after passing the impugned order, the respondents have already obtained the requisite permission from the statutory authorities and as such the findings of the learned Judge that the said respondents do not have such permission no longer survive. The learned counsel further pointed out that the learned Judge has prima facie come to the conclusion that only activities such as running of the business of bar and restaurant or activities which would create nuisance have been forbidden by the said sale deed. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Judge has prima facie come to the conclusion that only activity which would cause nuisance to the appellants has been forbidden. The learned counsel further pointed out that there is no material on record to suggest that the activity being carried out by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 is causing any nuisance in the vicinity or to the appellants, and as such the question of granting any injunction as prayed for by the appellants does not arise. The learned counsel further pointed out that there are even other shops adjoining the suit premises which are carrying out similar activities and as such the appellants are not entitled to single out the respondent nos. 3 and 4 with regard to the alleged grievance. The learned counsel as such submits that the above appeal be dismissed. 5. Mr. J. Vaz, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 5 to 10 has supported the submissions of Mr. V. Menezes, learned counsel appearing for the appellants. 6. I have considered the submissions and with the assistance of the learned counsel I have also gone through the records as well as the impugned order. The learned Judge while passing the impugned order has come to the conclusion that the appellants have prima facie failed to establish that they have prima facie case to grant an injunction. Though the learned Judge has made some observations with regard to the activities which are being carried out by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 in the suit premises, but however the learned Judge found that the material on record was not sufficient for the Court to come to a prima facie definite conclusion that such activities would create nuisance. Though the learned Judge has made some observations with regard to the activities which are being carried out by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 in the suit premises, but however the learned Judge found that the material on record was not sufficient for the Court to come to a prima facie definite conclusion that such activities would create nuisance. The learned judge has taken note of the fact that at this stage the activity which was intended by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 in the suit premises has not yet started. The learned Judge has further found that as no activity was started, it was not open to the appellants merely on the basis of apprehension to seek a relief of temporary injunction. The learned Judge also took note of the fact that the relief sought by the appellants in the suit was very wide and was not restricting to the clauses found in the sale deed executed by the appellants in favour of the respondent no.1. On this ground and the other reasons stated in the impugned order, the learned Judge has come to the conclusion that the appellants were not entitled for the temporary injunction. 7. Considering the stage at which the said application came to be disposed of, I find that on mere apprehension the appellants are seeking a restraint order against the respondent nos. 3 and 4. But however, the activities which are intended to be carried out by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 have not yet been started. Hence, the learned Judge was justified to pass the impugned order as no material of alleged nuisance was produced by the appellants. But however, it is not in dispute that now the respondent nos. 3 and 4 have already started such activities in the suit premises and further that the appellants have filed an application for amendment to cure the deficiencies pointed out by the learned Judge while passing the impugned order. No doubt, the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties were not in a position to confirm whether the application for amendment is granted or not but however, having regard to the circumstances as pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties the activities have now started in the suit premises by the respondent nos. 3 and 4, the apprehension of the appellants can now be examined. 3 and 4, the apprehension of the appellants can now be examined. Thus, I find it appropriate to dispose of the above appeal by giving liberty to the appellants to file a fresh application for temporary injunction by making specific averments with regard to their claim of nuisance and in case such application is filed, the learned Judge shall dispose of the application after hearing the parties in accordance with law. The impugned order passed by the learned Judge will not come in the way of the appellants to file such a fresh application. The learned Judge would have to consider whether the appellants are in a position to establish their claim that the activities being carried out by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 are contrary or in breach of the terms of clause 3(d) read with clause (4) of the Memorandum of Understanding as claimed by the appellants in the sale deed dated 14.07.2009. No doubt, the contention of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 that such clause is not tenable or a nullity would also have to be examined by the learned Judge after hearing the parties in accordance with law. However, it cannot be disputed that irrespective of the existence of such clause, nuisance by itself is otherwise actionable if the appellants establish such aspect as claimed by them. 8. Subject to the above, I find no case is made out by the appellants for interference in the impugned order. Hence, the above appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.