JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner/tenant being aggrieved by the order dated 18.04.2006 (Annex.1) passed by learned Rent Tribunal, Pali in Case No.24/05- Panchayat Churigaran Samaj Seva Samiti & Anr. v. Abdul Sakur & Anr., by which the learned Rent Tribunal has decided the preliminary issue No.7 against the petitioner/tenant, Abdul Sakur. The said Issue was whether the suit property in question, a residential house, belonged to Wakf Board or the plaintiff/respondent society, known as "Panchayat Churigaran Samaj Seva Samiti", of which the plaintiff No.2, Nasaruddin S/o Najamuddin, is the President. 3. While issuing notices in the present writ petition, a coordinate bench of this Court had stayed the further proceedings before the learned Rent Tribunal, Pali on 24.05.2006. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant, Mr. Sanjeev Johari, vehemently submitted that according to Notification Annex.5 dated 23.09.1965 (list of assets of the Wakf Board), the suit property in dispute i.e. 'Masjid Pakki Churigaran, Shop 6, Houses Kham 5, Well one, Bazar Ghuti', is essentially a Wakf property under the Wakf Act, 1995, and therefore, even though the rent-note was executed in favour of petitioner's mother, Smt. Rehmat Bai on 01.01.1984 for Rs. 500/- per month by the respondent/applicant-Society but it is not the owner of the suit property. He, therefore, submitted that Rent Tribunal has erred in deciding the issue No.7 against the present petitioner/tenant and prayed that the present writ petition of tenant deserves to be allowed. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Sajjan Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/landlord society, urged that it is well settled that the question of title is not relevant in the eviction matters and the very purpose of trial under the Rent Control Act, 2001, has been frustrated in the present case by raising the issue and even though the learned Tribunal decided the issue rightly in favour of plaintiff-society, which is the registered owner of the said premises and even the rent-note was executed in favour of mother of the present petitioner, Smt. Rehmat Bai on 01.01.1984 by the very same society, therefore, the petitioner/tenant cannot deny the title of the plaintiff/respondent and the present writ petition lacks any merit and deserves to be dismissed. 6. He relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. 6. He relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 and in the case of Jai Singh. and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 . 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the preliminary issue decided by the learned Rent Tribunal by the impugned order dated 18.04.2006 is a faultless order and same does not require any interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Such interlocutory orders deciding the preliminary issue unless found to be perverse cannot be interfered with in the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. The question of title is not relevant and tenant cannot set up an adverse title of third party, namely, Wakf Board, in the present case in the trial of eviction suit filed by the landlord-society. Admittedly, the rent note in question in favour of mother of the petitioner was executed by the plaintiff/society itself. Therefore, prima-facie, it was entitled to seek eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises as the grounds to be established by it as per the provisions of the Rent Control Act, 2001. 8. In view of the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, having been stayed for last more than 7 years, the trial has not proceeded an inch. This Court does not find any sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order in limited and narrow scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) has held that the scope of interference with the interlocutory orders passed by the learned trial court is very limited and unless there is a glaring mistake or mis-carriage of justice in the orders passed by the courts below, the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, cannot be invoked to correct even it were any error here or there in the interlocutory orders. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "62. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 10. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. (supra), in para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 11. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. (supra), in para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 11. The upshot of the above discussion is that the present writ petition filed by the petitioner/tenant is found to be bereft of any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. It is expected that the learned Rent Tribunal, Pali to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from today. No costs. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned parties and the learned court below forthwith.Petition Dismissed. *******