Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—The Management Committee, Shri Dadu Mahavidyalaya & Chhatrawas, the petitioner-defendant-objector, is aggrieved by the order dated 16.2.2013 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) & Metropolitan Magistrate (East), Jaipur Metropolitan whereby the learned Magistrate has rejected the objections raised by the petitioner to the execution of the decree. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-decree holder, Bhanwar Lal Kumawat, had filed a civil suit challenging his termination order dated 30.6.1975 passed by the petitioner. By judgment and decree dated 16.8.1983, the termination order was set aside and the plaintiff-respondent's termination was declared to be illegal as being violative of the principles of natural justice. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 16.8.1983, the petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge challenging the setting aside of the termination order, the reinstatement of the plaintiff and the direction issued by the learned trial court directing the petitioner to pay the backwages to the plaintiff. However, after establishment of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, the said appeal was transferred to the learned Tribunal. By judgment dated 19.9.1995, the learned Tribunal partly allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner, but confirmed rest of the judgment and decree dated 16.8.1983. Thereafter on 15.11.2006, the plaintiff initiated execution proceedings. During pendency of the execution proceedings, the petitioner filed an application, inter alia, raising an objection about the maintainability of the execution proceedings ostensibly on the ground that the execution proceedings were hit by limitation. However, by order dated 16.2.2013, the learned Magistrate dismissed the petitioner's application. Hence, this revision petition before this court. 3. Mr. R.B. Mathur, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, the original decree was passed by the learned trial court on 16.8.1983. According to the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for execution of a decree is twelve years. Yet the plaintiff did not start the execution proceedings till 15.11.2006. Hence, clearly the execution proceedings have been initiated beyond the period of limitation. 4. Secondly, during pendency of the appeal before the learned Tribunal, there was no stay granted in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, the decree passed by the learned trial court was in operation. Hence, the plaintiff was free to initiate the execution proceedings during the period that the appeal was pending before the learned Tribunal. 5. 4. Secondly, during pendency of the appeal before the learned Tribunal, there was no stay granted in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, the decree passed by the learned trial court was in operation. Hence, the plaintiff was free to initiate the execution proceedings during the period that the appeal was pending before the learned Tribunal. 5. Thirdly, the learned Tribunal has merely interfered with the payment of the backwages. But it has not interfered with the plaintiff's reinstatement. Therefore, the part of the decree with regard to the plaintiff's reinstatement was never touched by the learned Tribunal. Therefore, that part of the decree continued to exist while the appeal was pending before the learned Tribunal. Despite the part of the decree being in effect from 1983 onwards, the plaintiff still did not file execution of this particular part of the decree within the limitation period of twelve years. Therefore, the execution proceedings are hit by limitation. 6. Lastly, since only part of the decree has been modified, only this particular portion of the decree has merged with the modified judgment/ order passed by the learned Tribunal. But rest of the decree has continued to exist, has continued to be operational, has continued to be in force ever since it was granted in the year 1983. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Rajesh Raj Kumawat, the learned counsel for the respondents, has vehemently opposed the stand taken by Mr. Mathur. He has raised the following pleas before this court: firstly, the petitioner had not challenged only part of the decree; but had challenged the complete decree. Therefore, the issue with regard to legality or illegality of the termination order was also subjudice before the learned Tribunal. 8. Secondly, even if there were no stay in favour of the petitioner, in deference to appellate court, the plaintiff did not initiate any execution proceedings. 9. Thirdly, once the original decree was modified by the judgment dated 19.9.1995, the period of limitation would commence from the said date, and not from 16.8.1983. Since the execution proceedings were initiated on 15.11.2006, the proceedings were well within the limitation period of twelve years. In order to buttress his contention, the learned counsel has relied on the case of Akkayanaicker vs. A.A.A. Kotchadainaidu & Anr. (2004(2) WLC (SC) Civil 788). Therefore, the learned counsel has supported the impugned order. 10. Since the execution proceedings were initiated on 15.11.2006, the proceedings were well within the limitation period of twelve years. In order to buttress his contention, the learned counsel has relied on the case of Akkayanaicker vs. A.A.A. Kotchadainaidu & Anr. (2004(2) WLC (SC) Civil 788). Therefore, the learned counsel has supported the impugned order. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the case law cited at the Bar and examined the impugned order. 11. Admittedly, the plaintiff's services were terminated in 1975. The judgment and the decree was passed by the trial court in 1983. Immediately the petitioner had filed their appeal before the District Judge. As mentioned above, the petitioner had challenged the setting aside of the termination order, the direction of reinstatement and the direction to pay full backwages to the plaintiff. Thus, obviously, the petitioner had challenged the complete decree, and not part thereof. The decree was modified in 1995. Even if the original decree of 1983 were not stayed by the District Judge and subsequently by the Tribunal, considering the fact that the decree was under challenge, it cannot be held that the limitation period would commence from the date of the original decree. 12. Article 136 of the Limitation Act is as under:- 136. For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court. Twelve years Where the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring period, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. 13. The aforesaid article provides period of twelve years for execution of any decree other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction, or order of any civil court. It further clearly lays down that the period of limitation shall be twelve years. Thus, the twelve years shall commence from the date when the decree or the order become enforceable. The words “the decree or the order become enforceable” are the most important words of this provision. It further clearly lays down that the period of limitation shall be twelve years. Thus, the twelve years shall commence from the date when the decree or the order become enforceable. The words “the decree or the order become enforceable” are the most important words of this provision. The word “execution” is derived from the Latin word “ex sequi”, meaning to follow out, follow to the end, or perform. It is equivalent to the French word “executer”. All the three words, namely ex sequi, executer and execution mean carrying out some act or course of conduct to its completion. 14. In the case of Overseas Aviation Engg. (GB) Ltd. Re ((1962) 3 All ER 12), Lord Denning had interpreted the word “execution” as the process for enforcing or giving effect to the judgment of the court. It is said to be completed when the judgment debtor gets the money or other thing awarded to him by the judgment. Lord Denning had quoted Kekewich, J. in the case of Blackman vs. Fysh ((1892) 3 Ch 209) wherein Hon'ble Justice Kekewich had opined that execution means the “process of law for the enforcement of a judgment-creditor's right and in order to give effect to that right”. It was further clarified that when an execution was had by means of a common law writ, such as fieri facias or elegit, it was legal execution; when it was had by means of an equitable remedy, such as appointment of a receiver, then it was equitable execution. But in either case it was “execution” because it was the process for enforcing or giving effect to the judgment of the court. 15. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, the word “enforce” means “to give force or effect to; to compel obedience to”. The word “enforcement” has further been defined as “the act or process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate or command”. In the Corpus Juris Secundum, the word “enforce” has been described as under:- “Enforce.- In general, to cause to be executed or performed, to cause to take effect, or to compel obedience to, as to enforce laws or rules; to control; to execute with vigor; to put in execution; to put in force, also to exact, or to obtain authoritatively. In the Corpus Juris Secundum, the word “enforce” has been described as under:- “Enforce.- In general, to cause to be executed or performed, to cause to take effect, or to compel obedience to, as to enforce laws or rules; to control; to execute with vigor; to put in execution; to put in force, also to exact, or to obtain authoritatively. The word is used in a multiplicity of ways and is given many shades of meaning and applicability, but it does not necessarily imply actual force or coercion. As applied to process, the term implies execution and embraces all the legal means of collecting a judgment, including proceedings supplemental to execution.” 16. Thus, Article 136 clearly stipulates that the period of twelve years would begin to run from the date on which the decree or order become enforceable. 17. The issue before this court is whether the decree or the order became enforceable from 1983 or from 1995 when the original decree was modified by the appellate court? Needless to say, once an original decree passed by the trial court is modified by the appellate court, the judgment and decree of the trial court merge with the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court. The theory of merger envisages that the original judgment/ order passed by the trial court merges in totality and not in piecemeal manner. For, even if part of the original judgment and decree is modified, the unmodified part of the original judgment and decree is confirmed by the appellate court. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate court has merely modified a part of the judgment and decree of the trial court and hence, unmodified part continued to exist from 1983 onwards, such an argument is clearly untenable. 18. In the case of Akkayanaicker (supra), the question raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the period of twelve years prescribed for limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act would begin from the date of the original decree, or from the date of the amended decree? The Apex court opined that in case of amendment, the original decree no longer retains its form and what is sought to be executed is the amended decree. The word “enforceable” has to be construed with reference to the decree that is sought to be enforced. The Apex court opined that in case of amendment, the original decree no longer retains its form and what is sought to be executed is the amended decree. The word “enforceable” has to be construed with reference to the decree that is sought to be enforced. The said judgment is a complete answer to the legal issue raised before this court. 19. As mentioned above, the judgment and decree dated 16.8.1983 was amended by the judgment and decree dated 19.9.1995 passed by the learned Tribunal. Therefore, the decree which the plaintiff was seeking to enforce was the judgment and decree dated 19.9.1995 and not the judgment and decree dated 16.8.1983. Hence, the period of limitation would commence from the judgment and decree dated 19.9.1995. Since the execution proceedings were initiated on 15.11.2006, obviously the execution proceedings commence within the period of limitation of twelve years. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was certainly justified in dismissing the objections raised by the petitioner. 20. For the reasons stated above, this petition is devoid of any merit. The same is, hereby, dismissed. The stay application is also dismissed.