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2013 DIGILAW 1727 (RAJ)

Banshilal Kumawat v. State of Rajasthan

2013-09-25

ATUL KUMAR JAIN

body2013
JUDGMENT Hon'ble JAIN, J.—In 2000 Cri.L.J. Supreme Court 746(1) Kanti Bhadra Shah and another vs. State of West Bengal, it was held that there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing of charge. It was held that "Already burdened trial court should not be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the Court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write a detailed order at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail paced progress of proceedings in trial court would further be slowed down. Detailed orders need not be written at the stage of framing of charge itself is prima facie and order that the trial judge has formed the opinion, upon considering the police report and other documents and after hearing both sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. Magistrate is required to record his reasons for discharging the accused but there is no such requirement if he frames charges." 2. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanti Badhra Shah's case (supra) further observed that "in the present case as the Metropolitan Magistrate has chosen to frame the charge, the High Court, when moved by the accused for quashment of the charge, could have re-examined the records to consider whether the charge framed was sustainable or not. If the High Court decides to quash the charge it is open to the High Court to record the reasons thereof. Impugned order of the High Court is one of setting aside the charge without stating any reason. But the direction to the Magistrate to consider the materials once again and then to frame a charge for the same offence (if the Magistrate reaches the opinion that there is ground for presuming the commission of offence) is simply to repeat what the Metropolitan Magistrate had done once at the first instance. To ask him to do the same thing over again is adding an unnecessary extra work on the trial court. Be that as it may, the State has not challenged the order of the High Court. Hence, we are not a position to set aside the impugned order of the High Court. To ask him to do the same thing over again is adding an unnecessary extra work on the trial court. Be that as it may, the State has not challenged the order of the High Court. Hence, we are not a position to set aside the impugned order of the High Court. We leave the order as such by making the aforesaid observations. We leave it to the Metropolitan Magistrate to exercise his functions under Section 239 or 240 of the Code as he deems fit in the light of the observations made above." 3. Ruling of Kanti Bhadra Shah (supra) perfectly applies to the present bunch of three revision petitions. In all the three matters Special Judge (N.D.P.S. Cases), Chittorgarh, had passed an order to frame the charge against accused Banshilal Kumawat under different Sections of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. In all the three matters, accused had moved revision petitions earlier also before a co-ordinate Bench of this Court and his Cr. Revision Petitions No. 740/2012, 739/2013 and 738/2012 had been decided by this Court respectively by orders dated 8.1.2013, 12.12.2012 and 8.1.2013. The three revisions had been allowed by this Court and the impugned orders were quashed qua the petitioner and the trial court was directed to pass a fresh order on the question of charges qua the petitioner after providing an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. 4. The trial court had no choice and perhaps it could not have changed its earlier stand and in all the three cases again charges were framed against the accused Banshilal Kumawat and this time it was written in the order by which charges were framed that charges are being framed on the basis of what has been said by co-accused to the Investigating Officer. 5. It is settled position of law that simply on the basis of suspicion, charges cannot be framed. It is equally true that charge can be framed on the basis of grave suspicion but in the cases in hand, no question of grave suspicion had arisen during investigation one accused says something to the Investigating Officer and that statement is not even recorded by the Investigating Officer then only on the basis of that alleged oral conversation between I.O. and one accused, the another co-accused cannot be charged for possession of contraband items under N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. 6. 6. In the cases in hand, some quantity of poppy husk was recovered from co-accused and present petitioner Banshilal has been made accused on the basis of the statement of co-accused and he has been charged under Section 8/29 of NDPS Act, 1985 in all the three cases which are respectively the Sessions Case Nos. 60/11, 59/11 and 61/11 pending in the Court of Special Judge, NDPS Cases, Chittorgarh. 7. I have perused all the charge-sheet papers. The learned Public Prosecutor has also not been able to attract my attention to any iota of evidence against accused Banshilal in all the three files and hence the accused petitioner Banshilal in these three criminal revisions deserves to be discharged from the charges of Section 8/29 of NDPS Act, 1985. 8. Thus, all the three criminal revisions namely 453/13, 462/13 and 463/13 deserve acceptance which are hereby accepted and the impugned orders dated 13.6.2013, 13.6.2013 and 13.6.2013 in these three files mentioned earlier are hereby quashed. Stay petitions, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly. Three copies of this order be sent to the lower court immediately.