JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner. Ganesha Ram S/o Khinva Ram, Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat-Parewadi, Kuchaman City, Nagaur, has approached this Court by way of present writ petition for quashing the suspension order Annex. 2 dated 5-9-2013, whereby the petitioner was placed under suspension under Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short, 'Act of 1994'). 2. The allegation against the petitioner as given in impugned order is that the petitioner, Ganesha Ram while acting as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Parewadi, has demanded and taken the bribe of Rs. 25,000/- from the complainant, Sh. Om Prakash Jat, for which an FIR No. 342/2013 has been registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau against him on 31-7-2013 under Sections. 7, 13(l)(d)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which is pending investigation with the concerned investigating agency. The petitioner was also arrested. 3. By the impugned order the petitioner has been placed under suspension with immediate effect and has been restrained from participating in the activities of the Gram Panchayat-Parewadi, during the pendency of the suspension. The said order has been passed by the Deputy Secretary of the Gramin Vikas and Pachayati Raj Department of the Government of Rajasthan. Simultaneously, on the same day, another notice (Annex-1) dated 5-9-2013 under the 22 of the Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 had been served upon the petitioner along with the charge-sheet enclosed there with calling upon him to furnish his explanation with respect to said allegation in terms of Rule 22 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'Rules of 1996') on or before 20-9-2013. The petitioner has apparently not produced the said annexed charge-sheet with the notice before this court and has withheld the same, or he has furnished any such explanation so far to the respondent and instead has approached this Court by way of present writ petition, which is filed in this Court on 23-9-2013 for quashing of the said notice and suspension order. 4. Mr. Sudheer Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the suspension of the Sarpanch cannot be made unless the criminal trial can be said to be pending in the Court of law as per the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994. 4. Mr. Sudheer Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the suspension of the Sarpanch cannot be made unless the criminal trial can be said to be pending in the Court of law as per the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994. He also submitted that an opportunity of hearing of one month is required to be given as per Rule 22 of the Rules of 1996, which deals with 'Procedure of Enquiry', before taking any action under sub-section(1) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994 for removal from the post of Sarpanch and, therefore, without giving an opportunity of hearing, as required by Rule 22, the petitioner cannot be placed under suspension. He relied upon a decision of co-ordinate bench of this Court at Jaipur Bench in the case of Hansraj Gujar v. State of Rajasthan, (SBCWP No. 12698/2012, decided on 13-2-2013) in which it has been held that where the State Government relying upon only criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude unless the said trial is pending in a competent Court of law i.e. where the Challan has been filed, the trial cannot be said have been commenced before that and, therefore, the suspension order cannot be passed. He also relied upon an interim order dated 25-2-2013 passed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in SBCWP No. 1925/ 2003, Chunnilal v. State of Rajasthan staying the operation of suspension order dated 13-2-2013 in that case. The petitioner has sought following relief(s) in the writ petition : "It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the present writ petition may kindly be allowed and by an appropriate writ order or direction: 1. The order dated 5-9-2013 (Anx. 2) issued by the respondent No. 2 placing the petitioner under suspension kindly be quashed. 2. Any other appropriate order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit may be passed in favour of appellant. 3. The writ petition may kindly be allowed with costs." 5. It is considered appropriate to quote the Annex. The order dated 5-9-2013 (Anx. 2) issued by the respondent No. 2 placing the petitioner under suspension kindly be quashed. 2. Any other appropriate order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit may be passed in favour of appellant. 3. The writ petition may kindly be allowed with costs." 5. It is considered appropriate to quote the Annex. 1 notice and the Annex.2, impugned suspension order, both dated 5-9-2013, which read as under : " jktLFkku ljdkj xzkeh.k fodkl ,oa iapk;rh jkt foHkkx dzekad ,Q&3 ( 15 ) tkap@ijkfo@Hk0fu0 C;wjks@ukxkSj@13@2865 t;iqj] fnukad 5-9-2013 Jh x.ks'kkjke ljiap xzke iapk;r ijsoM+h iapk;r lfefr dqpkeu flVh ftyk ukxkSj fo"k; %& vkids fo:) yxk;s x;s vkjksiksa dk Li"Vhdj.k izLrqr djus ckcr vkids fo:) yxk;s x;s vkjksiksa dh lwph layXu djrs gq, v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ dks ;g fy[kus ds funsZ'k gq, gS fd D;ksafd vkids fo:) yxk;s x;s vkjksiksa ds laca/k esa jktLFkku iapk;rh jkt fu;e 1996 ds fu;e 22 ds mifu;e 2 ds vUrxZr tkap izkjEHk dh tk;sA viuk fyf[kr mRrj fnukad 20-9-2013 ;k mlds iwoZ fuf'pr :i ls fHktok nsA ;fn mlds lkFk dksbZ nLrkost ;k fjdkMZ Hkh viuh lQkbZ ls izLrqr djuk pkgs rks Hkst ldrs gSA ;fn vkidk fyf[kr mRrj fnukad 20-09-2013 rd izkIr ugha gqvk rks vkids mRrj dh izrh{kk ugha dj vkxkeh dk;Zokgh dj yh tk;sxhA layXu & vkjksi i= voj lfpo ( tkap ) izfrfyfi%& fodkl vf/kdkjh] iapk;r lfefr dqpkeu flVh ftyk ukxkSj dks ,d vfrfjDr izfr layXu dj ys[k gS fd uksfVl rkehy djk;s tkus ds rqjUr ckn rkehy uksfVl bl foHkkx dks mDr fnukad ls iwoZ fuf'pr :i ls fHktokus dk d"V djsA ;fn vkjksi ?kj ij ugha rks uksfVl mlds vkokl ij nks ekSrchj O;fDr;ksa fd lkeus pLik djok nsA voj lfpo ( tkap )"Annexure-2 " jktLFkku ljdkj xzkeh.k fodkl ,oa iapk;rh jkt foHkkx ( iapk;rh jkt ) dzekad ,Q&3@15 tkap@ijkfo@Hkz0fu0 C;wjks@ukxkSj@13@286 t;iqj] fnukad 05-09-2013 vkns'k Jh x.ks'kkjke] ljiap] xzke iapk;r] ijsoMh iapk;r lfefr dqpkeu flVh ftyk ukxkSj ifjoknh Jh vkse izdk'k tkV fuoklh ijsoM+h rglhy dqpkeuflVh] ftyk ukxkSj ls 35000@& :i;s dh fj'or dh ekax dj jkf'k izkIr djus ij Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks] ukxkSj }kjk jaxs gkFkksa fxjQ~rkj fd;s tkus ij muds fo:) /kkjk 7 ( 13 ) ( 1 ) Mh@13 ( 2 ) ih0lh0 ,DV 1988 esa Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks] t;iqj esa vijk/k la[;k 342@2013 ,Q0vkbZ0vkj0 ntZ dj fu;ekuqlkj rQ~rh'k tkjh gSA ljiap Jh x.ks'kkjke xzke iapk;r ijsoMh dk mDr d`R; nqjkpj.k ,oa in ds nq:i;ksx djus dh Js.kh esa vkrk gSA vr% jkT; ljdkj Jh x.ks'kkjke] ljiap] xzke iapk;r ijsoMh] iapk;r lfefr dqpkeuflVh ftyk ukxkSj dks jktLFkku iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 dh /kkjk 38 ( 4 ) ds rgr rqjUr izHkko ls ,rn~}kjk ljiap in ls fuyfEcr fd;s tkus ds vkns'k iznku djrh gS rFkk vkns'k iznku djrh gS fd mDr ljiap fuyEcu dky esa iapk;r ds fdlh dk;Z vFkok dk;Zokgh esa Hkkx u ysaosA vkKk ls voj lfpo ( tkap ) izfrfyfi%& fuEu dks lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d dk;Zokgh gsrq izsf"kr gS%& 1- fof'k"B lgk;d] ekuuh; iapk;rh jkt] jkT;ea=h egksn; dks lwpukFkZA 2- laHkkxh; vk;qDr] vtesjA 3- ftyk dysDVj] ukxkSjA 4- eq[; dk;Zdkjh vf/kdkjh] ftyk ifj"kn] ukxkSj dks izsf"kr dj ys[k gS fd ljiap xzke iapk;r ijsoMh ds in dk pktZ fu;ekuqlkj vU; dks fnyokdj foHkkx dks rqjUr lwfpr djsA 5- fodkl vf/kdkjh] iapk;r lfefr] dqpkeuflVh ftyk ukxkSj dks izsf"kr dj ys[k gS fd ljiap xzke iapk;r ijsoMh ds in dk pktZ fu;ekuqlkj vU; dks fnyokdj foHkkx dks rqjUr lwfpr djsA 6- mi egkfujh{kd iqfyl&f}rh;] Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks] jktLFku] t;iqj dks muds i= dzekad Hkz0fu0 C;wjks@v0'kk0@3@13@2193&94 fnukad 02-08-2013 ds dze esa izsf"kr dj ys[k gS fd mDr eqdnes esa vuqla/kku 'kh?kz iw.kZ dj izdj.k vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr gsrq fHktokus dk Je djsA 7- Jh x.ks'kkjke ljiap xzke iapk;r ijsoM+h] iapk;r lfefr dqpkeuflVh] ftyk ukxkSjA 8- jf{kr@vkns'k i=koyhA voj lfpo ( tkap )" 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the provisions of the Act and Rules and, so also, documents placed on record and judgments cited at the Bar. 7. Section 38 of the Act of 1994. is reproduced hereunder for ready reference : "Section 38. Removal and suspension. (1) The State Government may, by order in writing and after giving him an opportunity of being heard and making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary, remove from office any member including a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, who (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such; or (b) is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or any disgraceful conduct; Provided that any enquiry under this subsection may, even after the expiry of the term of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned be initiated or, if already initiated before such expiry, be continued thereafter and in any such case, the State Government shall, by order in writing, record its findings on the charges leveled. (2) The chairperson or the deputy chairperson removed under sub-section (1) may at the discretion of the State Government also be removed from the membership, if any of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned. (3) The member or the chairperson or the deputy chairperson removed under sub-Section (1) or against whom findings have been recorded under the proviso to that sub-section, shall not be eligible for being chosen under this Act for a period of five years from the date of his removal or, as the case may be, the date on which such findings are recorded. (4) The State Government may suspend any member including a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under sub-Section (1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a Court of law and such person shall stand debarred from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned while being under such suspension. Provided that the State Government may also suspend any Panch on the recommendation of the Ward Sabha or a Sarpanch on the recommendation of the Gram Sabha, but the State Government shall do so only when a resolution to that effect passed by a Ward Sabha, or a Gram Sabha as the case may be, is referred by the State Government to the Collector for convening a special meeting of the Ward Sabha or the Gram Sabha, as the case may be, for finally ascertaining the wishes of the members and the members present in the meeting so convened by the Collector and presided over by his nominee, reaffirm the resolution seeking suspension of the Panch or the Sarpanch, as the case may be, by a majority of two thirds of the members present and voting. Provided further that no resolution' seeking suspension of the Panch or Sarpanch shall be moved or passed before the completion of a tenure of two years by a Panch or a Sarpanch, as the case may be. (5) The decision of the State Government on any matter arising under this section, shall, subject to any order made under Section 97, be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law." Section 97. Power of revision and review by Government.- (1) The State Government may, either of its own motion or on an application from any person interested call for and examine the record of a Panchayati Raj Institution or of a Standing Committee or subcommittee thereof in respect of any proceedings to satisfy itself as the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein or as to the regularity of such proceedings and, if in any case, it appears to the State Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. Provided that the State Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless such party has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. (2) The State Government may stay the execution of any such decision or order prejudicial to any party, pending the exercise of its powers under sub-Section (1) in respect thereof. Provided that the State Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless such party has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. (2) The State Government may stay the execution of any such decision or order prejudicial to any party, pending the exercise of its powers under sub-Section (1) in respect thereof. (3) The State Government may, of its own motion or on an application received from any person interested, at any time, within ninety days of the passing of an order under sub-Section (1), review any such order if it was passed by it under any mistake, whether of fact or of law, or in ignorance of any material fact. The Provisions contained in the proviso to sub-Sections. (1) and (2) shall apply to a proceeding under this sub-section." 8. The relevant extract of Rule 22 of the Panchayati Rules of 1996 is also reproduced hereunder for ready reference: "Rule. 22. Procedure of enquiry. (1) Before taking any action under sub-Section (1) of Section 38, where on its own motion or upon any complaint the State Government may ask the Chief Executive Officer or any other officer to get a preliminary enquiry done and to send his report to the State Government within one month. (2) If, upon consideration of the report received as aforesaid or otherwise, the State Government is of the opinion that action under sub-Section (1) of Section 38 is necessary, the State Government shall frame definite charge and shall communicate them in writing to the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson or Member of the Panchayati Raj Institution together with such details as may be deemed necessary. He shall be required to submit a written statement within one month admitting or denying the allegations, giving his defence, if any and whether he desires to be heard in person". 9. A closer scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions of the Act of 1994 and Rules of 1996, clearly show that while sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 38 deal with removal from the office of any member including a Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, sub-section (4) of Section 38 deals with suspension of any such member. 9. A closer scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions of the Act of 1994 and Rules of 1996, clearly show that while sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 38 deal with removal from the office of any member including a Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, sub-section (4) of Section 38 deals with suspension of any such member. The sub-section (1), obviously requires a preliminary enquiry with an opportunity of being heard being given to the concerned delinquent and enquiry to be held on definite charges before final act of removal from the public office or such removal order is passed against such person. Sub-section (2) of Section 38 envisages removal from Membership itself, while sub-section (3) puts a further ban of five years after such removal on being re-elected. Sub-section (4) of Section 38, independently empowers the State Government to suspend any such member, does not envisage any punitive order against such person. It is only to prevent such person from holding a public office temporarily and not to allow him to participate in the functioning of that public office; and that power to suspend him as such is granted to the State Government under sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act, at any stage of enquiry as the suspension is not a punishment before enquiry. The two contingencies of departmental enquiry and criminal trial by a competent Court are two independent things and one does not depend upon the other nor the contours of two are intermixed. Crime and misconduct have different connotations in law. 10. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner based upon the decision of a co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Hansraj Gujar (supra), on the construction of words 'pending trial in Court of law' misses, the second word 'OR', employed in this sub-section (4), which bifurcates the provision of sub-section (4) into two parts, namely, (i), 'against whom an enquiry has been initiated under sub-section' (1), or (ii) 'against whom any criminal proceeding in regard to an offence of moral turpitude is pending trial in the Court of law'. Thus, while suspension can be made of any member of Panchayati Raj Institution against whom, an enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) or against him any criminal proceedings are pending trial in the Court of law, even though no such enquiry has been initiated against him on departmental basis. Under sub-section (1) of Section 38 of the Act, both proceedings obviously can proceed simultaneously, viz. departmental enquiry and criminal trial as both these proceedings against the said person for the same alleged offence operate in different fields under different laws. It is well settled that suspension from the office is not a punishment but preventing the man from discharging his public functions any further till the conclusion of (i) departmental enquiry and/or, (ii) criminal trial resulting in his favour. 11. In the present case, the petitioner was admittedly served with a notice along with the charge-sheet also for initiation of the enquiry under Section. 38(1) of the Act of 1994 and for that purpose alone, the notice (Annex. 1) dated 5-9-2013 under Rule 22(2) of the Rules of 1996 has been served upon him. There is no challenge laid to the said notice Annex. 1 or the charge-sheet served upon the petitioner in the writ petition. Thus, enquiry stands initiated against him under the notice Annex. 1 dated 5-9-2013. No mandatory time gap between such initiation of enquiry under Section 38 (1) and the order of suspension under Section 38 (4) is envisaged in the scheme of the Act or the Rules of 1996. Since, it cannot be said here as was the situation obtaining in the Hansraj Gujar's case, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner that without initiating enquiry against the petitioner under Section. 38(1) of the Act of 1994, solely on the basis of criminal trial itself, the suspension order has been passed, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the said decision, is off the mark here. The said case is, therefore, found to be distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts, of the present case. 12. Even though the impugned suspension order (Annex.2) dated 5-9-2013 suspending the petitioner from the position of Sarpanch is passed on the same date i.e. on 5-9-2013, on which, the Annex. 1 notice read with Rule 22 of the Rules of 1996 is given, but the Annex. 12. Even though the impugned suspension order (Annex.2) dated 5-9-2013 suspending the petitioner from the position of Sarpanch is passed on the same date i.e. on 5-9-2013, on which, the Annex. 1 notice read with Rule 22 of the Rules of 1996 is given, but the Annex. 2 dated 5-9-2013, suspension order, does not refer to the notice (Annex. 1) of the same date initiating such preliminary enquiry. However, that does not make it a case of suspending the petitioner solely on the basis of criminal trial, for which, in the present case only FIR No. 342/2013 has been registered and is pending investigation; and admittedly, no Challan has been filed in the competent Court for trial yet and therefore, it could be said that the criminal trial is 'not pending' against the petitioner thereby enabling the State Government to invoke the second part of Section 38 (4) of the Act. The fact remains that enquiry has under Section. 38(1) of the Act has also been commenced by the State Government simultaneously by issuing the notice with charge-sheet vide Annex. 1 on the same date 5-9-2013 and the State Government is entitled to invoke the first part of Section 38 (4) for suspending the petitioner under sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act without referring to second part of the said provision. 13. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the impugned suspension order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or contrary to the judgment, referred to above, in the case of Hansraj Gujar (supra) of the co-ordinate bench of this Court. It may also be pointed out that in the case of Hansraj Gujar (supra), the learned Single Judge took note of the fact in the penultimate para of the said judgment that "perusal of the impugned order does not indicate that the respondents have in any manner initiated any enquiry against the petitioner on the own." This puts his case apart from the present case. The learned Single Judge gave the direction in the operative portion of the judgment that 'however, the respondents are directed to expedite the completion of enquiry against the petitioner and conclude the same within a period of six months". This, with great respect, appears to be an obiter. It is only to expedite the enquiry or the criminal trial both against the petitioner there. 14. This, with great respect, appears to be an obiter. It is only to expedite the enquiry or the criminal trial both against the petitioner there. 14. Be that as it may, the said judgment does not deal with issues raised herein above and dealt with by this Court presently, viz. as to whether the power to suspend is available to the State Government immediately upon the initiation of enquiry under sub-section (1) of Section 38 of the Act by issuing appropriate notice for the same under Rule 22 of the Rules 1996, which the Court has found that it is so possible and there is no mandatory time gap between the two acts, namely, (i) initiation of enquiry by the notice under Rule 22 in terms of Section 38( 1); and (ii) suspension of Sarpanch or member of Panchayati Raj Institution concerned. The enquiry against the present petitioner stands initiated by serving a charge-sheet upon him along with the notice dated 5-9-2013. The preliminary enquiry as well as the final enquiry has the originating point in the Notice Annex. 1 dated 5-9-2013 served along with the charge-sheet, which annexed charge-sheet has not been produced before this Court for the reasons best known to the petitioner. The simultaneous initiation of preliminary enquiry and final enquiry by the same notice served along with the charge-sheet is not prohibited in law. 15. The opportunity of hearing envisaged under Rule 22 of one month is apparently given for preliminary enquiry before the final enquiry on the definite charges before the act of removal of such elected representative from the office of Sarpanch or in the capacity of member of Panchayati Raj Institution under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994. The enquiry admittedly stands initiated with the serving of charge-sheet with Annex. 1 Notice under Section 22 of the Rules of 1996. No such requirement of giving a prior notice or opportunity of hearing before passing of the suspension order is provided for in Section 38(4) or is otherwise envisaged in the scheme of the Act and the Rules as suspension is not considered as a punitive order at all and it is only a preventive measure and operates independently any stage of the enquiry, preliminary or final. Here, the petitioner also has an alternative remedy available to him by way of revision under Section 97 of the Act against the said decision of this Court as quoted above, and for that reason also, there is nothing to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court in the present case. It would be premature to interfere in writ jurisdiction. 16. In the case of Jan Mohd. & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in (1992) 1 WLN 415 : ( AIR 1993 Raj 86 ) , the Division Bench of this court dealing with provisions of Section 63(3) and (4) of Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, before its repeal or replacement by Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 relying upon Full Bench decision in the case of Bhuralal v. State, (1988) 1 RLR 945 , but overruling Single Bench decision in the case of Ajmer Singh Yadav v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) RLR 16 , about immediate suspension upon initiation of enquiry, upholding such right of State Government and observing that Full Bench had approved the view of learned single Judge in the case of Radhey Shyam v. State, AIR 1985 Raj 65 , held as under:- "13. An order of suspension passed under Section 17(4A) is in the nature of an interim order pending final adjudication and since the continuance of a Panch, Sarpanch or Upsarpanch during the pendency of the enquiry proceedings may cause irreparable damage, pre-decisional opportunity to be heard cannot be afforded to him and he can only be afforded post-decisional opportunity to be heard. Although, the Act and the Rules do not expressly provided for such a post-decisional opportunity after passing the order of suspension, the Panch, Sarpanch or Upsarpanch who has been suspended has a right to make an appropriate representation seeking a review of the order of suspension and asking the State Government to rescind the said order after he has submitted his reply to the show cause notice issued to him under sub-rule (2) of Rule 26. Even in the absence of such a representation, it is incumbent upon the State Government to consider the question as to whether the order of suspension should be continued or rescinded after the reply of the Panch, Sarpanch or Upsarpanch to the show cause notice issued under sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 is received and if from the said reply, it appears that there is no substance in the charges that have been leveled or that the misconduct is of not such a serious magnitude as to warrant the suspension of the Panch, Sarpanch or Upsarpanch from the office to which he has been duly elected, the State Government should immediately review the order of suspension." Further, in paras 63 to 64 of the judgment of Jan Mohd.'s case, ( AIR 1993 Raj 86 ) (supra), the Division Bench concluded as under : "63. It has been held by this Court in Ugamsee Modi's case, ILR 1966 (16) Raj 415 (supra) that in view of the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 63 of the Act, it is incumbent on the Govt, to offer an opportunity of explanation to the Chairman before it can frame charges against him and refer them for inquiry to the District Judge under subsection (2). Thus, giving of an opportunity of explanation before framing of the charges is a mandatory provision. It has never been the intention of the legislature that two opportunities should be provided one before passing the order of suspension and the other before framing of the charges. That will certainly result in duplicity. We feel inclined to accept this submission of Mr. Udawat, the learned Addl. Advocate General that it has not been the intention of the legislature to grant any pre-decisional hearing to the holder of a public office before he is suspended. That will certainly result in duplicity. We feel inclined to accept this submission of Mr. Udawat, the learned Addl. Advocate General that it has not been the intention of the legislature to grant any pre-decisional hearing to the holder of a public office before he is suspended. What is required is that before he is suspended, a preliminary enquiry should be held by the responsible officer and after the report is received and the State Government applies its mind and comes to the conclusion that a further probe is essential for the removal of the holder of electoral public office then it has to issue a notice under Section 63(2) of the Act to show cause why definite charges be not framed and all these charges should not be referred to a Judicial Officer and simultaneously, that delinquent holder of Public Office can also be suspended. Before suspending him, it is not at all Essential that a pre-decisional hearing should also be granted to him to show cause why he may not be suspended before the proposed enquiry because giving of such a notice would result in grave harm or injustice because till he is suspended, the delinquent officer against whom charges are prima facie established has a right to hold his public office and to take part in the proceedings of the Municipal Board/Council and thereby, the interest of the Institution would suffer adversely. In this view of the matter, we hold that the decision in Ajmersingh Yadav's case (supra) does not lay down the correct law and, therefore, it stands overruled to that extent. 64. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are firmly of the view that the proceedings against a Chairman or Member of the Municipal Board commence when the preliminary enquiry report submitted to the Government is considered by the Government and the Government applies its mind to it and comes to the conclusion that a further probe in the matter is essential. For the removal of the holder of an elected public office that is Chairman or Member of the Municipal Board, if the Govt, decides to issue a notice to the incumbent under Section 63(2) of the Act to the delinquent Chairman or the Member of the Municipal Board to show cause why definite charges be not framed against him and be referred to a Judicial Officer, that is the stage where the proceedings start against the Chairman or the Member of the Municipal Board and the State Govt, has power to suspend the Chairman or a Member of a Municipal Board simultaneously when it decides to issue him a notice of show cause under Section 63(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. The suspension of a Chairman or a Member of,a Municipal Board pending enquiry being an interim measure the suspension does not result in civil or evil consequences and.it,is not penal in character. Enough safeguards have been provided in the Section so that no arbitrary, capricious or mala fide suspension may take place. However, we will like to add a word of caution that the holders of these elective public posts cannot be equated with Govt, servants and, therefore, before a holder of an elected post is suspended, the Government must have sufficient reasons to do So. Care should be taken that such suspensions should not be arbitrary and the suspensions of such elected representatives should not be brought about for political motives or consideration. 65. We accordingly, hold that the sub-section (4) of Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act is neither unfair, unreasonable, nor unjust and it is not arbitrary or ultra vires of the Constitution i.e. Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. We further hold that Ajmer Singh Yadav's case which it has been held that obtaining of the explanation and its consideration is essential i.e. that it is a condition precedent for bringing about the suspension of the Chairman or Member of the Municipal Board does not lay down the correct law and hence, it is overruled. The relief of revocation of the suspension cannot be granted in favour of the petitioners." 17. The relief of revocation of the suspension cannot be granted in favour of the petitioners." 17. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bhura Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in 1988 (1) RLR 945 , held as under : "Drawing up of the statement of the charges and issuance of a show cause notice is expedient in the interest of justice, before passing an order of suspension so that the State Government may not unnecessarily delay the drawing up of the statement of the charges and sending the show cause notice after passing the order of suspension. In the view of the Full Bench, sufficient safeguards have also been provided by Rule 21(3), because after the service of the show cause notice, the delinquent Panch or Sarpanch may submit his reply or representation and after considering the same, the State Government may feel satisfied then it would proceed to drop the enquiry and also revoke the order of suspension. But even after the receipt of the representation or reply from the delinquent Sarpanch or Panch, the State Government feels dissatisfied, it may proceed to appoint an enquiry officer to make an enquiry into the charges. Thus, the proper stage at or after which an order of suspension under Section 17(4A) could be passed by the State Government is when the stage of rule 21(2) is reached and a copy of the statement of the charges prima facie proved against the delinquent Panch or Sarpanch along with a notice to show cause is sent to him." Thus the said law laid down clearly shows that suspension as an interim measure does not require any pre-decisional hearing and it is not punitive or penal in nature involving any civil or evil consequence. The suspension can be made once the charge-sheet is served and enquiry is initiated. It may be further added here that with the increasing number of Corruption cases in Panchayati Raj Institutions, taking such immediate interim measure of suspension to prevent further loss of public funds and erosion of institutional integrity, such steps even with the initiation of preliminary enquiry may be necessary and may be given judicial imprimatur lest the stigmatic or tainted elected representatives may have the advantage in the meanwhile of the delay caused by them or system itself and as they say, have the devil's last laugh. In the present case, even a definitive charge-sheet has been served upon the petitioner in view of grave charges of corruption by way of demanding and taking a bribe. 18. Taking up the issue of electoral reforms, and while striking down Section 8(4) of Representative of the People Act, 1951, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment of 10th July, 2013 as ultra vires and holding that Parliament could not defer the date of disqualifications upon conviction of a sitting MP, MLA, and it will have immediate effect unless the conviction itself is stayed by the Appellate Court, in Lily Thomas v. U.O.I. & Ors., (2013) 7 SCC 653 : ( AIR 2013 SC 2662 ) , held in paras 32 to 34 : (paras 19 to 21 of AIR) as under : "32. The result of our aforesaid discussion is that the affirmative words used in Article 102(l)(e) confer power on Parliament to make one law laying down the same disqualifications for a person who is to be chosen as Member of either House of Parliament or as a Member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State and for a person who is sitting Member of a House of Parliament or a House of the State Legislature and the words in Article 101 (3)(a) of the Constitution put express limitations on such powers of Parliament to defer the date on which the disqualifications would have effect. Accordingly, sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which carves out a saving in the case of sitting Members of Parliament or State Legislature from the disqualifications under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act or which defers the date on which the disqualification will take effect in the case of a sitting Member of Parliament or a State Legislative is beyond the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution. 33. Looking at the affirmative terms of Articles 102( 1 )(e) and 191(1 )(e) of the Constitution, we hold that Parliament has been vested with the powers to make law laying down the same disqualifications for person to be chosen as a Member of Parliament or a State Legislature and for a sitting Member of a House of Parliament or a House of a State Legislature. We also hold that the provisions of Articles 101 (3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution expressly prohibit Parliament to defer the date from which the disqualification will come into effect in case of a sitting Member of Parliament or a State Legislature. Parliament, therefore, has exceeded its powers conferred by the Constitution in enacting sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution. 34. We do not also find merit in the submission of Mr. Luthra and Mr. Kuhad that if a sitting Member of Parliament or the State Legislature suffers from a frivolous conviction by the trial Court for an offence given under Sub-section (1), (2) or (3) of Section 8 of the Act, he will be remediless and he will suffer immense hardship as he would stand disqualified on account of such conviction in the absence of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang (1995) 2 SCC 513 , has held that when an appeal is preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") the appeal is against both the conviction and sentence and, therefore, the appellate Court in exercise of its power under Section 389(1) of the Code can also stay the order of conviction and the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code can also stay the conviction if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code." The Courts have to thus protect zealously the action against the corrupt elected representatives rather than being swayed by the technicalities of mandatory gap between the preliminary enquiry report, framing of definitive charges, and commencement of regular enquiry. Suspension of elected Sarpanch may provide the immediate relief to the concerned public upon such corrupt practices being put down with all firmness. 19. A learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Smt. Archna Bohra v. State of Rajasthan, (1998) 1 WLC 245 , in paras 3 and 4 held as under : "3. Suspension of elected Sarpanch may provide the immediate relief to the concerned public upon such corrupt practices being put down with all firmness. 19. A learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Smt. Archna Bohra v. State of Rajasthan, (1998) 1 WLC 245 , in paras 3 and 4 held as under : "3. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the petitioner has been suspended without any opportunity of being heard and the suspension order is liable to be quashed in view of the provisions of the Act, 1994 which provides a reasonable opportunity being given to a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is wholly fallacious on the premises that the present case is not a case of removal but it is a case of suspension. There is no manner of doubt that before passing order of removal a duty is cast upon the authorities concerned to afford reasonable opportunity of being heard. Since the order impugned in the present writ petition is not an order of removal, the provisions of Section 38( 1) of the Act 1994 cannot be attracted. As far as the suspension is concerned, the Legislature has not provided any opportunity of being heard before passing order in exercise of power conferred under Section 38(4) of the Act 1994 and the recital made in the impugned order is very emphatic that the suspension order has been passed in exercise of power conferred under Section 38(4) of the Act 1994. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner being wholly devoid of merit deserves to be rejected. 4. The other limb of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that assuming the impugned order is legal but in view of the fact that only Rs. 08/- is alleged to have been embezzled by the petitioner. The suspension order should not have been passed for the embezzlement of petty amount. Perusal of Annexure-4 indicates that in view of the embezzlement of a petty amount the enquiry officer did not recommend for initiating the criminal proceedings against the petitioner and it is only on that account the lenient view has been taken by the enquiry officer in not recommending the prosecution of the petitioner " 20. Perusal of Annexure-4 indicates that in view of the embezzlement of a petty amount the enquiry officer did not recommend for initiating the criminal proceedings against the petitioner and it is only on that account the lenient view has been taken by the enquiry officer in not recommending the prosecution of the petitioner " 20. Explaining the fine differences between 'misconduct' and mere 'error of judgment' on the part of an elected representative, and while quashing the removal order under the Municipal Law of Maharashtra on the ground of Chairman not holding the meeting of Council in timely manner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad & Ors., reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1339 ) held as under : "The expression 'misconduct' has to be understood as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, unlawful behaviour, willful in character. It may be synonymous as misdemeanor in propriety and mismanagement. Further, the expression 'misconduct' has to be construed and understood in reference to the subject-matter and context wherein the term occurs taking into consideration the scope and object of the statute which is being construed. Misconduct is to be measured in terms of the nature of misconduct and it should be viewed with the consequences of misconduct as to whether it has been detrimental to the public interest. An action which is detrimental to the prestige of the institution may also amount to misconduct. Acting beyond authority may be a misconduct. When the office-bearer is expected to act with absolute integrity and honesty in handling the work, any misappropriation, even temporary, of the funds etc. constitutes a serious misconduct, inviting severe punishment. However, conclusions about the absence or lack of personal qualities in the incumbent do not amount to misconduct holding the person concerned liable for punishment. Mere error of judgment resulting in doing of negligent act does not amount to misconduct. But, in exceptional circumstances, not working diligently may be a misconduct. In a particular case, negligence or carelessness may also be a misconduct." 21. Mere error of judgment resulting in doing of negligent act does not amount to misconduct. But, in exceptional circumstances, not working diligently may be a misconduct. In a particular case, negligence or carelessness may also be a misconduct." 21. Upholding a suspension order under Section 63(4) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Hem Raj Jain v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in (2003) 4 WLC (Raj) 32 held in paras 23 to 25, as under : "23. Thus, it is held that if after application of mind to the preliminary enquiry report Annex. R/2 dated 10-6-2002 submitted by the Regional Dy. Director and after issuing show cause notice Annex. 1 dated 15-7-2002 to the petitioner and after considering the reply of the petitioner Annex.2 dated 26-8-2002 to the show cause notice Annex. 1, the State Government came to the conclusion that further probe was essential and ordered for holding judicial enquiry against the petitioner and simultaneously passed impugned suspension order Annex. 3 against the petitioner in exercise of power under Section 63(4) of the Act of 1959, no illegality or irregularity has been committed by the State Government (respondent No.l) in passing the impugned suspension order Annex. 3 against the petitioner. It may be that framing of the actual charges may take place later, but there was nothing to prevent the State Government from taking action to suspend him on those allegations under sub-section (4) of Section 63 of the Act of 1959. 24. Hence, in view of the above, the argument that since on the date when the impugned suspension order Annex. 3 dated 26-11-2002 was passed, no charge-sheet was served on the petitioner, therefore, the impugned suspension order Annex. 3 is bad in law, stands rejected. 25. It may be stated here that in cases of passing suspension order, principles of natural justice are not applicable and, therefore, if before passing the impugned suspension order Annex. 3, the petitioner was not given any notice or opportunity of hearing, that impugned suspension order Annex. 3 does not become invalid on that ground as he would get chance in the disciplinary proceedings and thus, such order would not be termed as unfair, unreasonable, unjust or arbitrary." 22. 3, the petitioner was not given any notice or opportunity of hearing, that impugned suspension order Annex. 3 does not become invalid on that ground as he would get chance in the disciplinary proceedings and thus, such order would not be termed as unfair, unreasonable, unjust or arbitrary." 22. Similarly, in the case of Chhagan K. Rathi v. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 2000 Raj 238 , another single Bench stated thus "It is not the legislative intent under subsection (2) of Section 63 that before passing suspension order under Section 63(4) of the Act charges as per provisions of Section 63(2) are to be framed and sent to the petitioner or the District Judge. The stage and question of framing of the charge under Section 63(2) comes only and arises when explanation to the show cause notice issued under Section 63(1) is received and when the reference to the judicial officer for judicial inquiry is issued and for purposes of Section 63(4) i.e. for suspending the Chairman or the Member of the Municipality like the petitioner, framing of the charge-sheet is not a condition precedent. The conditions precedent are stated above and the same having been fulfilled and complied with by the State Govt, for purposes of Section 63(4) of the Act, the suspension of the petitioner does not deserve to be revoked as it being not contrary to provisions of Section 63(2) or 63(4) of the Act. Thus, on the facts, it cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the Govt, in making the order was unjustified or malicious or arbitrary." 23. Emphasising the need to take immediate steps in such cases to save Panchayats from being ruined, where charges of corruption were leveled against the Sarpanch, like in the present case, upholding the suspension order and holding that enquiry stands initiated with the issuance of charge-sheet, a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Jagdish Chandra v. The State of Rajasthan & 0rs reported in (2000) 1 WLN 639 , held in paras 3, 8 to 10 as under : "3. It is true that the enquiry was initiated against the petitioner on 27-3-1998 (Annex. 1) by the Chief Executive Officer and the State Government issued notice dated 3-2-1999 (Annex. 3) Along with charge-sheet after considering the undated reply of the petitioner (Annex. 2). It is true that the enquiry was initiated against the petitioner on 27-3-1998 (Annex. 1) by the Chief Executive Officer and the State Government issued notice dated 3-2-1999 (Annex. 3) Along with charge-sheet after considering the undated reply of the petitioner (Annex. 2). It is also true that the petitioner submitted his reply to the notice and charge-sheet on 26-3-1999 (Annex. 4), It is also true that after nearly 7 months, the petitioner is placed under suspension. Ordinarily, the suspension should be resorted to as early as possible but it depends upon facts of each case. In the instant case, the Chief Executive Officer had initially initiated preliminary enquiry in March, 1998 for as many as 9 serious charges of misappropriation, corruption etc. The same was replied on 27-3-1998 by the petitioner. It is true that some time was taken by the State Government for issuing notice and submitting charge-sheet against the petitioner but from the notice and charge-sheet, it appears that as many as 19 charges of serious nature of corruption, misappropriation and misusing his powers as Sarpanch were leveled. After considering the reply of the petitioner, the State Government was not satisfied, therefore, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 14-10-1999 i.e. after about 7 months' of the receipt of the reply of the petitioner. Considering the gravity of the charges leveled against the petitioner, 7 months period in this case cannot be said to be long period on which the suspension order can be quashed. 8. The impugned order of suspension dated 14-10-1999 (Annex. 5) is very much clear where there is a reference to the above-mentioned Section 38(4) of the Act which clearly shows that the enquiry is already initiated against the petitioner and the very fact of issuance of the charge-sheet shows that the enquiry was already initiated. 9. I may state that learned counsel Mr. Singhvi has tried to rely upon only two paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Bajrang Lal's case but if we read the entire judgment as a whole, then it clearly appears that the Division Bench of this Court has upheld the suspension order in that case by observing that: "It should not be forgotten that institution of Panchayats in Rajasthan requires careful and thorough supervision. The suspension of a Sarpanch under particular circumstances of a case may be considered necessary or desirable to save the Panchayat or its funds from being ruined or misappropriated. The elaborate procedure noted above is safeguard against the whimsical, capricious or irrelevant exercise of powers of suspension by the State. After a preliminary report has been submitted and a prima facie case is made out against the delinquent elected officer, the State Government, after considering the merits of the case, is required to decide whether a charge-sheet is to be served on the holder of the effective office or not and if it finds that a prima facie case has been established and further considers that his continuance in office would not be in the public interest or in the interest of the Panchayat fund or the working of the Panchayat, the Government should be left free to exercise its control and if the case warrants a temporary removal of such an incumbent, then, after careful scrutiny of the preliminary report submitted before it, to suspend him." 10. I respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in Bajrang Lal's case. At the cost of repetition, I may state that the suspension of the present Sarpanch under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case was necessary and also desirable so as to save the Panchayat and its funds from being ruined or misappropriated." 24. Thus, this Court is clearly of the opinion that enquiry stood initiated with the issuance of notice Annex. 1 dated 5-9-2013 under Section 38(1) of the Act read with Rule 22 with a charge-sheet served upon the petitioner, which remains unchallenged in the present writ petition; and the suspension of Sarpanch under Section 38(4) of the Act as an interim measure is not punitive and is not vitiated. The said suspension order is upheld and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 25. Consequently, in view of above discussion, this Court does not find force in the present writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned parties forthwith.Petition dismissed. *******