JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan, J.:- The suit of the quondam minor on attaining majority challenges the compromise decree entered on his behalf by his guardian on the ground that the guardian had been negligent in his act in entering into a compromise that gave up his viable claims to the property. The trial court dismissed the suit and the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court. The plaintiff is the appellant before this Court. 2. The plaintiff was the son of Som Parkash @ Som Datt. He had sold the property in suit to the defendants-purchasers on 11.10.1954 for the consideration of Rs. 1100/-. The plaintiff was born on 24.05.1955. A suit had been filed on his behalf challenging the sale during his minority through his maternal grandfather on the ground that he was a child in womb and he had competency to challenge the transaction as invalid and not supported by family necessity. The suit had been decreed and in appeal filed by the purchaser, a compromise had been entered into on his behalf where the guardian grandfather received Rs. 600/- and the Court recorded the same and allowed the appeal and upheld the sale in favour of the purchaser. The decree was passed in appeal on 14.08.1958. The plaintiff had attained majority on 24.05.1973 and he filed a suit on 23.04.1976 i.e. within three years from the date of his attaining majority challenging the compromise as invalid and made by the negligence of the grandfather. The plaintiff lost in both the courts below. 3. On the issue of whether the plaintiff could be treated to be a person in womb to make a claim, there is sufficient case law that allows for a child in womb to lay a claim to the property as though he was already born, if he was born alive. In Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh and others Vs. Mallapa Chanbasappa AIR 1964 SC 510 , the Supreme Court held, while considering the issue of a challenge to a sale that even a child in the womb but subsequently born alive would be competent to challenge an alienation of gift as void ab initio. There are decisions of other Courts as well cited before me but I am not referring the case laws, for I take the position of law as well established. There are decisions of other Courts as well cited before me but I am not referring the case laws, for I take the position of law as well established. Considering the fact that the child was born on 24.05.1955, he must have conceived on 11.10.1954 when the sale was made. It was indeed on this basis that earlier suit had been filed and a decree had also been granted. I, therefore, would hold that the plaintiff had a competency to institute the suit to challenge the sale made by the father. The suit was also within time. 4. The most crucial issue, however, would be whether there had been any negligence on the part of the maternal grandfather that was established at the time of trial. 5. Learned counsel points out that there was nothing brought out on record that there was any certificate from the lawyer at the time when the decree was passed on compromise certifying that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor. The provisions relating to the certificate of the guardian under Order 32 Rule 7 CPC has come through a legislative change only by insertion of Act 104 of 1976 by Clause (1A) and there existed no such similar clause earlier. The counsel however would argue that there were Punjab and Haryana High Court Amendment Rules 3 to 6 providing for a particular manner of appointment of a guardian. I have gone through the provisions. The provisions do not make any serious deviation from the core provisions of the Civil Procedure Code itself that a guardian who is appointed must be a person who shall not hold any interest adverse to the minor. If there was father alive at that time, the notice to father would alone require to be given before a guardian is appointed. In this case, the father was still alive was not in dispute and the father himself was a party. Evidently, the grandfather who was acting on the behalf of minor was surely a person, who had competence to act as guardian and therefore, I will find no provision of law that would hold the plaintiff to argue that the grandfather was not competent. 6. Evidently, the grandfather who was acting on the behalf of minor was surely a person, who had competence to act as guardian and therefore, I will find no provision of law that would hold the plaintiff to argue that the grandfather was not competent. 6. The issue of negligence must be seen only from the context of whether the grandfather who was successful in securing a decree at the Court of First Instance had any issue of law or there was any apprehension for losing property to enter into a compromise giving up the right of the property and settling for mere a monetary compensation of Rs. 600/- which was less than the consideration which was received for sale of the property for Rs. 1100/-. 7. I have seen through the judgment of the trial Court in the suit instituted on behalf of the plaintiff when he was minor by maternal grandfather Ram Lal. The specific prayer in the suit was for cancellation of the sale deed executed by the father on 14.10.1954. Since he was a child in the womb, the question was whether he had a locus standi to file the suit and since he was challenging the sale executed by the father, the relevant issue also was whether the property belonged to the joint family. On both issues, the Court found in favour of the plaintiff. The Court had documents before it to come to a sure conclusion that the property had been ancestral property and the plaintiff had a right to the property by birth. The key issue, therefore, was whether the sale had been made for legal necessity and for consideration. The Court found that the consideration of Rs. 1100/- had been received before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration. The Court accepted the contention of the purchaser that the sale consideration had been fully paid. While examining whether there was any necessity for transaction of the sale, the trial Court had observed that there was no necessity spelt out in the document nor was any evidence available for effecting the sale. The Court, therefore, held that the necessity had not been proved and there was also no benefit to the joint family by selling the property. It was this decree which was in appeal in C.A. No.28 of 1959 where there had been a compromise. The Court, therefore, held that the necessity had not been proved and there was also no benefit to the joint family by selling the property. It was this decree which was in appeal in C.A. No.28 of 1959 where there had been a compromise. There was an application filed for recording the compromise and the Court while passing an order has observed thus:- “.......The main question in this appeal is whether the suit property is joint Hindu family property and the sale is for consideration. There are good chances of the appeal succeeding, because it is a moot point whether the suit property is joint family property. In the event of appeal succeeding, the minor respondent likely to be burdened with the costs of the appeal. According to his compromise Rs. 600/- are to be paid to the minor plaintiff and in exchange of that amount, he would relinquish his claim.....” 8. The Court was, therefore, passing an order stating that it would be appropriate to accord sanction for a compromise where in the event of the appeal succeeding, the minor would be burdened with costs and therefore, Rs. 600/- which was offered to be paid to the guardian of the minor was appropriate and just and it was for the benefit of the minor. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would contend that the Court can interfere on proof of gross negligence of the guardian in a suit instituted by the quondam minor. There cannot be any objection to the fact that even a decree which was obtained could be assailed by a minor on attaining majority. I will not, therefore, reproduce any case law which is cited before me that such a suit was competent. The issue, however, is the proof of gross negligence by guardian. Learned counsel refers me to Hayat Bibi Vs. Mohabat Khan and others AIR 1933 Lahore 468 where the Court was considering the compromise against recorded custom by which property belonging to minor was given to widow and held that it was not to be in the benefit of the minor. If we must apply it to this case, the attempt must be to show that the sale which had been effected by the father without necessity was not valid in law and therefore, any compromise effected by the guardian which was against the established law was not valid. If we must apply it to this case, the attempt must be to show that the sale which had been effected by the father without necessity was not valid in law and therefore, any compromise effected by the guardian which was against the established law was not valid. In Hardeo Baksh Singh Vs. Bharath Singh AIR 1935 Oudh 287, the Court was considering a compromise where there was pointed irregularity in the appointment of guardian for the date fixed for deciding the matter. I will not find any reason to apply this law, for it was not as if the Court was not considering the reasons over the compromise. I have extracted the portion of the order of the Appellate Court where it has observed that if the appeal were to go against the minor, it would mulct him in costs and instead the minor was actually receiving some cash consideration. A still later judgment from the Mysore High Court in Bore Gowda and another Vs. B.Nagaraju and another AIR 1969 Mysore 8 merely set out the law that it was possible for a minor on attaining majority to assail a compromise decree as not binding. The Court observed that the question whether on admitted facts gross negligence on the part of the guardian in conducting the case on behalf of the minor was made out was a question of law which the High Court could interfere with. In the same judgment, however, the High Court also observed that when the guardian was an illiterate person and engaged a qualified lawyer if the lawyer failed to raise a point of law which may have been raised by him, it could not be held that the guardian had been grossly negligent in conduct of the case. 10. There have been other decisions as well and to me the most notable decision is of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Iftkhar Hussain Khan Vs. Beant Singh minor through his maternal uncle Prabh Dyal AIR 1946 Lah 233. The issue had been brought before a Full Bench on a reference to settle differing views of other High Courts and for authoritative pronouncement of the Lahore High Court on the issue of whether a minor could avoid a decree which had been passed against him on the ground of gross negligence on the part of his guardian. The issue had been brought before a Full Bench on a reference to settle differing views of other High Courts and for authoritative pronouncement of the Lahore High Court on the issue of whether a minor could avoid a decree which had been passed against him on the ground of gross negligence on the part of his guardian. The negligence which was examined by the Court was to see if there was anything to show that the guardian completely gave up the minor’s rights and did so deliberately. The Court also observed an earlier ruling of the Lahore High Court in Nawab Singh Vs. Gurbakhsh Singh AIR 1925 Lah. 116 that even mere failure on the part of the guardian ad litem to defend a suit or to an appeal from a decree would not be taken at all times as inference of gross negligence since it was possible that there may be a good case against the minor and the guardian must have thought of not incurring additional expenses in defending the suit. It said that gross negligence which may be interpreted as culpable neglect of the interests of a minor, on the part of his guardian ad litem would alone entitle the minor to the avoidance of proceedings undertaken against him. It may be such negligence as leads to the loss of a right if the plaintiff had resisted with due care must have been successfully asserted. The negligence that the Courts, therefore, were examining was such serious negligence that the guardian was merely allowing for a walk over for his opponent. A still later Division Bench ruling of this Court in Gurcharan Singh Vs. Amar Singh and others AIR 1972 Pb. 194 was referring to the effect of compromise decree where the guardian was entering into a compromise with the vendees allowing for a suit which was instituted to enforce a right of pre-emption was allowed to be dismissed. In that case the suit had been filed for possession against the vendees on the usual allegations that the land was ancestral and there was no legal necessity. After the compromise decree a fresh suit for pre-emption had been filed which was decreed against the vendees. The minor sons had brought another suit through the grandfather as a guardian for possession of the land on the same grounds as were alleged by them in the first suit. After the compromise decree a fresh suit for pre-emption had been filed which was decreed against the vendees. The minor sons had brought another suit through the grandfather as a guardian for possession of the land on the same grounds as were alleged by them in the first suit. In Garimella Annapurnayya Vs. Munsunuri Venkatasubrahmanyam and others AIR 1925 Mad 1285, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court was considering the meaning of gross negligence in the context of failure to take technical plea. The suit involved a challenge to a gift said to have been executed in favour of the plaintiff’s adoptive mother. The Court observed that the issue is not whether the gift is invalid but the real issue was whether the plaintiff’s next friend acted bona fide in consenting to take two acres of land and a house site instead of conducting the litigation. 11. Applying the principles of law brought through the above decisions in a suit to set aside a compromise decree brought about by the guardian as not binding, it is not sufficient to show that the sale effected by the father was not binding on him. What was essential was whether the guardian acted bona fide on behalf of the minor to receive a fiscal compensation instead of proceeding against the property. The father had sold the property for Rs. 1100/- when the child was still in the womb. The Court had found that the entire consideration had also been paid before the Sub Registrar and there was no question of doubting the actual passing of consideration. The plaintiff’s case succeeded only on a finding by the trial Court that notwithstanding the actual passing of consideration, there was no sure proof of any legal necessity. Legal necessity is applied by the Court for justifying or annulling a sale which is in some sense a term of art. When the father had received the consideration and when a suit was being prosecuted soon after birth of the child, the grand father was going after a property which had already been lost to the family. When the guardian was settling for receipt of cash consideration, he was receiving literally more than half the consideration which had been received by the father. When the guardian was settling for receipt of cash consideration, he was receiving literally more than half the consideration which had been received by the father. The child on birth was litigating against his father citing him as a defendant and if the maternal grandfather was, therefore, settling it with the purchaser, I will not find that the guardian was bartering the child’s interest without any responsibility. Litigation then, as it is now, is never a cozy affair. It drains the resources of the family. It takes time and the correctness of decisions are susceptible to challenge at various tiers of the judicial hierarchy. The conclusion of the proceeding in favour of the minor did not settle all disputes. If the Court examined the prospect of the appeal being allowed and found that it would even involve the minor in expenditure and when the Court was, therefore, allowing the compromise, it recorded the fact that it will still be beneficial. I do not think that a grandfather who settles for money instead of property even though he had been successful at the trial Court could be stated to be in any way acting in gross negligence. There is at least nothing stated against the grand father himself as a person who had walked away with the money. The case had been pending for more than five decades after the initial sale had taken place. I considered for a while the effect of what would happen if I were to accept the contentions of the plaintiff. The effect would be only revival of appeal of what had been filed in the year 1959 and held for adjudication before the District Court at Karnal. To revive an appeal nearly 54 years after the case was disposed of would only involve the plaintiff in further expenses. I do not think it will be worthwhile to allow for such a prospect at this length of time. 12. I will find no reason to interfere with the decision already taken and hold that there had been no gross negligence of the guardian for interference. The points of law raised are answered as above and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit as entered by the Courts below are affirmed in second appeal. The second appeal is dismissed. There shall be, however, no direction as to costs. ----------------