JUDGMENT : Amol Rattan Singh, J. This petition was filed, invoking jurisdiction of this Court, u/s 482, Cr.P.C. in order to seek quashing of the complaint filed by the respondent herein against the petitioner, in respect of an offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The petitioner also challenges the summoning order issued by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Gurgaon, dated 8.11.2012, after preliminary evidence was led, by which the learned trial Court found, prima facie, sufficient grounds to proceed under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has tried to project to the effect that, the cheque was given as a security to the respondent for a loan taken by the petitioner, though, according to the petitioner, the said loan had already been returned and the matter fully and finally settled between the parties. The loan is stated to have been returned, in cash, on 30.6.2012. 3. The respondent herein, i.e. the complainant before the trial Court, had served a legal notice as required u/s 138(b) of the Act of 1881, in response to which the petitioner had gave a reply stating that the cheque was issued by way of a security and not in discharge of any liability, that liability already having been discharged by return of the loan. 4. No receipt with regard to return of the loan has been annexed with the petitioner, nor, in fact, even any proof of the loan having been taken, has been shown. 5. Mr. Rajesh Arora, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, has primarily addressed arguments on the issue that since the cheque was returned by the Bank, not on grounds of insufficient funds but on account of instructions having been given by the petitioner to stop payment thereof, hence the provisions of Section 138 of the Act of 1881 were not invokable, as the necessary ingredients for an act to constitute an offence under the aforesaid provisions did not exist. 6. At the time when notice was issued, learned Counsel of the petitioner had relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jugesh Sehgal Vs. 6. At the time when notice was issued, learned Counsel of the petitioner had relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jugesh Sehgal Vs. Shamsher Singh Gogi, (2009) 14 SCC 683 , to submit that even in a case where, after issuance of the cheque, the signatory of the cheque had closed his account and the cheque was consequently dishonoured, the provisions of Section 138 could not be invoked, as there was no insufficiency of funds reported by the Bank. 7. Upon query put to learned Counsel at the initial stage itself, he had, however, replied that there was, as a matter of fact, insufficiency of funds also in the account, though that was not the reason for the return of the cheque, as already stated hereinabove. 8. In response to notice issued, Mr. Sarfraj Hussain, Advocate, put in appearance for the respondent and relied upon other judgments of the Supreme Court, to submit that just because a person orders stoppage of payment of cheque to the Bank, would not mean that the provisions of Section 138 of the Act could not be invoked. 9. Mr. Sarfraj Hussain cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 , wherein, after citing the law on the issue, specifically from Goa Plast (P) Ltd. Vs. Chico Ursula D'Souza, (2004) 2 SCC 235, Their Lordships held as under: 9. Ordinarily in cheque bouncing cases, what the Courts have to consider is whether the ingredients of the offence enumerated in Section 138 of the Act have been met and if so, whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory presumption contemplated by Section 139 of the Act. With respect to the facts of the present case, it must be clarified that contrary to the trial Court's finding, Section 138 of the Act can indeed be attracted when a cheque is dishonoured on account of stop payment' instructions sent by the accused to his Bank in respect of a post-dated cheque, irrespective of insufficiency of funds in the account. This position was clarified by this Court in Goaplast Pvt. Ltd. Vs. This position was clarified by this Court in Goaplast Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shri Chico Ursula D'Souza and Another, (2003) 3 SCC 232 , wherein it was held: Chapter XVII containing Sections 138 to 142 was introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object of inculcating faith in the efficacy of Banking operations and giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business transactions. These provisions were intended to discourage people from not honouring their commitments by way of payment through cheques. The Court should lean in favour of an interpretation which serves the object of the statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility and acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely. The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated cheque. In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of Section 138. A contrary view would render Section 138 a dead letter and will provide a handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal obligations undertaken by them through their own acts which in other words can be said to be taking advantage of one's own wrong. 10. Thus, it is obvious that simply because a person draws a cheque and then subsequently stopped payment of the cheque, he cannot be absolved of liability u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, unless, of course, on merits he could prove before the trial Court that the stoppage of payments was for valid reasons and not in discharge of liability, etc. 11. As regards the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, i.e. Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi (supra), that judgment can be distinguished on facts alone. 11. As regards the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, i.e. Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi (supra), that judgment can be distinguished on facts alone. In that case, it was found that the cheque in question, which was purportedly issued by the accused, was from an account not maintained by him, but by someone else. 12. Consequently, it was held that the basic ingredient of Section 138 of the Act was missing, inasmuch as, the provision itself states that "where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him (emphasis supplied here) with a Banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the Bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that Bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and...." 13. Thus, in my opinion, there is no parity between the case cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner and the present case and, as such, in view of the authoritative pronouncement on the issue of the liability of the accused in the cases of Rangappa and Goa Plast (supra), to the effect that even there is a stoppage of payment of cheque, the person issuing the cheque cannot escape liability, unless he disapproves the same for other reasons, such as, the cheque itself having been issued in discharge of liability, etc. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed and the interim order directing the trial Court to adjourn the matter to a date beyond that given by this Court, is vacated. The trial Court would, consequently, proceed as per the merits of the case.