Ram Prakash and Others v. Board of Revenue, U. P. At Lucknow and Others
2013-07-03
RAN VIJAI SINGH
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Ran Vijai Singh, J.— Heard Sri Shailendra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned standing counsel for the State respondents and Sri Jugal Kishore Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2 to 13. This writ petition has been filed for issuing a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders dated 19.7.2004 and 6.8.2010. Vide order dated 19.7.2004 Reference No. 168 LR of 1994-95 (Mathura Prasad vs. Sukku and others) made by the Additional Commissioner was dismissed in default by the learned Member Board of Revenue whereas vide order dated 6.8.2010 petitioners' restoration application seeking recall of the order dated 19.7.2004 has been rejected. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioners does not propose to file rejoinder affidavit to which learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 2 to 13 has no objection. With the consent of the parties the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that it appears as reference was made in Revision No. 397/93 Mathura Prasad Vs. Shukhu and others by Additional Commissioner Kanpur Division Kanpur which was numbered as Reference No. 168 LR of 1994-95 (Mathura Prasad vs. Sukku and others). The revision was filed by the father of the petitioners. He was pursuing the matter through his counsel but unfortunately he died in the year 2002 to be more specific on 27.10.2002. The petitioners who are the sons of late Mathura Pradad were unaware of the proceeding of the reference. The said reference was dismissed in default on 19.7.2004. The petitioners have come to know about said order only through the Lekhpal on 9.6.2007. After coming to know about the aforesaid order, a restoration application was filed on 26.6.2007 by the petitioners. The application has been rejected by the learned Member Board of Revenue vide order dated 6.8.2010. While rejecting the application, the learned Member has observed that according to the record, the petitioners/applicants have shown two dates of knowledge of the order dated 19.7.2004. One date happens to be 9.6.2007 and another 18.6.2007 which are contradictory. It is also recorded that from the perusal of the order-sheet dated 29.8.2003, it is apparent that the revisionist had knowledge of the next date i.e. 3.12.2003.
One date happens to be 9.6.2007 and another 18.6.2007 which are contradictory. It is also recorded that from the perusal of the order-sheet dated 29.8.2003, it is apparent that the revisionist had knowledge of the next date i.e. 3.12.2003. Thereafter, another date was fixed on 27.1.2004, on which date, counsel for the revisionist has sought time and on that, next date was fixed on 19.7.2004. On this date, the revision was dismissed in default. The learned Member opined that the restoration application has been filed on misconceived ground for the simple reason that two dates of knowledge of the order dismissing the case in default has been stated by the applicants/petitioners and further, the date fixed in the revision was in the notice of the revisionist' counsel and their absence was deliberate. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that once the petitioners came with the case that they have come to know the order dated 19.7.2004 in the year 2007 may be on 9.6.2007 or 18.6.2007 there was no occasion for the present petitioners to know about the dates fixed in the revision in the years 2003 and 2004 and the learned Member has erred in dismissing the restoration application. Refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Jugal Kishore Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioners themselves were not sure about the date of the order dismissing the case in default as from the perusal of the record, two dates of knowledge have been shown one 9.6.2007 and another 18.6.2007. Otherwise also, counsel was appearing in the case and had been seeking time. Further there is no explanation as to why counsel has not appeared on the date fixed i.e. 19.7.2004 which was fixed in the presence of the counsel of the revisionist on his request. In his submissions, the restoration application has been filed on misconceived ground, therefore no infirmity can be attached with the impugned order and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. The petitioners' case has throughout been that they had no knowledge about the pendency of the reference after the death of their father.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. The petitioners' case has throughout been that they had no knowledge about the pendency of the reference after the death of their father. They have only come to know about the order dismissing the case in default only through Lekhpal on 9.6.2007 and immediately thereafter an application has been filed for recall of the order dated 19.7.2004. The respondents neither in the counter affidavit nor before the learned Member Board of Revenue have come up with the case that the petitioners' father had not died in the year 2002. This is also not their case that after the death of the father of the petitioners, the petitioners were substituted in the revision/reference. This has also not been stated that the counsel who had appeared in the revision was engaged by the petitioners. In absence of these material, only thing which can be presumed is that after the death of the petitioners' father the counsel who was appearing in the reference had been appearing and perhaps he was also unaware of the death of the father of the petitioners and this cannot be improbable as the petitioners' father was living in Village Nison, District Kanpur Dehat and the reference was pending at Lucknow. Since the date of the death of the father of the petitioners has not been denied, therefore apparently the order dated 19.7.2004 has been passed against the dead person and the appearance of the counsel after the death of the petitioners' father was unauthorized, as the counsel was engaged by the father of the petitioners and once the petitioners' father died, the engagement ceases to operate and the counsel had no authority to appear in the case and even if he had appeared, his appearance is of no avail as it is settled law that the order against the dead person is nullity. The Apex Court in the case of Leelawati Bai Vs. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1957, Pae 521 has held that the order passed against the dead person is a complete nullity. In A.I.R. 2001, Supreme Court, 2003, Amba Bai and others Vs.
The Apex Court in the case of Leelawati Bai Vs. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1957, Pae 521 has held that the order passed against the dead person is a complete nullity. In A.I.R. 2001, Supreme Court, 2003, Amba Bai and others Vs. Gopal and others, the Apex Court has held as under: "As the judgment in the Second Appeal was passed without the knowledge that the appellant had died, the same being a judgment passed against the dead person is a nullity." In T.Gnanavel and T.S.Kanagaraj and another reported in 2009(75) ALR 515, the Apex Court has taken the same view by observing as under:- "19. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the High Court had rightly intercepted the provision of Order XXII, Rule 4(4) of the C.P.C. and accordingly held that the decree passed by the Trial Court on20th of December, 2002, in O.S. No.3946 of 1999 was a nullity in the eye of law as the defendant had died during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale and no exemption was sought at the instance of the plaintiff/appellant to bring on record the heirs and legal representatives of the defendant before the judgment was pronounced." This Court also in the cases of Aziz Mohammad (Dead)through Lrs. And another Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, 2008 (104) RD, 470 and Raj Narain and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur and others, 2009(106) RD 98 and Subhash Chandra and another vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and others 2012 (117) R.D. 413 has held that order passed against the dead person is a nullity Otherwise also, the purpose of establishment of the Courts is to impart the substantial justice to the parties and not to scuttle the process of justice on technicalities. The learned Member has observed that the petitioners were not sure about the date of the knowledge of the order dated 19.7.2004 as at one place, they have mentioned that they have come to know about the order dated 19.7.2004 on 9.6.2007 and at another place they have stated that they came to know the same on 18.6.2007. In my opinion, this will not substantially affect the merit of the restoration application.
In my opinion, this will not substantially affect the merit of the restoration application. So far as the other observation of the learned Member with regard to the knowledge of the date fixed in the revision is concerned, it has nowhere been recorded in the order that the counsel who had appeared was engaged by the petitioners and the petitioners were party in the revision, therefore the basis of presumption of the knowledge of the date is totally misconceived. The learned Member was dealing with the restoration application and he ought to have taken the liberal view, even if the persons had knowledge about the dates and committed default in arguing the case while considering the restoration application and deciding the same on merit. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. ( JT 1987 (1) SC 537 = 1987 (2) SCR 387 ) has held that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. In view of foregoing discussions, orders impugned cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same deserves to be quashed. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 6.8.2010 as well as 19.7.2004 are hereby quashed. The reference is restored to its original number. Since the reference is very old, the learned Member Board of Revenue, Lucknow shall decide the aforesaid reference expeditiously if possible within six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order of this Court without granting any unnecessary adjournments to the learned counsel for the parties. _____________