Oral Judgment: (Z.A. Haq, J.) 1. Heard Shri Narnaware, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Rane, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent no.1, and Shri Mohgaonkar, learned Counsel for respondent no.2. 2. The petitioner has challenged the decision of the respondent no.1 -Scrutiny Committee invalidating the caste certificate certifying that he belongs to "Mahar" - Scheduled Caste. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Junior Security Officer on 1/6/2009 in the post reserved for Scheduled Caste candidate. Pursuant to invalidation of the caste certificate of the petitioner, his services came to be terminated with effect from 23/7/2013. The termination of services of the petitioner is only on the ground that his caste certificate is invalidated. 4. The respondent no.1 - Scrutiny Committee has concluded that though the petitioner belongs to "Mahar" -Scheduled Caste, he has not submitted any document pertaining to the period prior to 1950 to substantiate that he or his family members were permanent residents of Maharashtra State. According to respondent no.1 - Scrutiny Committee, in the written explanation submitted by the petitioner, he has stated that his father was born in Madhya Pradesh and he came to Maharashtra in 1965 or 1966 and as per Government Resolution, the persons, who were permanent residents of Maharashtra State prior to 1950 are only entitled for the benefits. 5. Shri Narnaware, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has raised various grounds. He has contended that the ancestors of the petitioner were residents of Tinkheda, Taluq Saunsar, District Chhindwara in Madhya Pradesh and in any case, the petitioner was entitled for the benefits of Scheduled Caste as the benefits would continue despite bifurcation of the erstwhile State as per the States Reorganization Act, 1956. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sudhakar Vithal Kumbhare vs. State of Maharashtra and others { (2004) 9 SCC 481 )} and has submitted that the facts in the present case are almost identical to the facts in the case of Sudhakar Vithal Kumbhare (cited supra) and in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said case, the petitioner is entitled for the benefits as a Scheduled Caste candidate. In the said judgment, the Apex Court has concluded as follows : "5) But the question which arises for consideration herein appears to have not been raised in any other case. In the said judgment, the Apex Court has concluded as follows : "5) But the question which arises for consideration herein appears to have not been raised in any other case. It is not in dispute that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have suffered disadvantages and been denied facilities for development and growth in several States. They require protective preferences, facilities and benefits inter alia in the form of reservation, so as to enable them to compete on equal terms with the more advantaged and developed sections of the community. The question is as to whether the appellant being a Scheduled Tribe known as Halba/Halbi which stands recognized both in the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as in the State of Maharashtra having their origin in Chhindwara region, a part of which, on States' reorganization, has come to the State of Maharashtra, was entitled to the benefit of reservation. It is one thing to say that the expression "in relation to that State" occurring in Article 342 of the Constitution of India should be given an effective or proper meaning so as to exclude the possibility that a tribe which has been included as a Scheduled Tribe in one State after consultation with the Governor for the purpose of the Constitution may not get the same benefit in another State whose Governor has not been consulted; but it is another thing to say that when an area is dominated by members of the same tribe belonging to the same region which has been bifurcated, the members would not continue to get the same benefit when the said tribe is recognized in both the States." "In other words, the question that is required to be posed and answered would be as to whether the members of a Scheduled Tribe belonging to one region would continue to get the same benefits despite bifurcation thereof in terms of the States Reorganization Act. With a view to find out as to whether any particular area of the country was required to be given protection is a matter, which requires detailed investigation having regard to the fact that both Pandhurna in the district of Chhindwara and a part of the area of Chandrapur at one point of time belonged to the same region and under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 as it originally stood the tribe Halba/Halbi of that region may be given the same protection. In a case of this nature, the degree of disadvantages of various elements which constitute the input for specification may not be totally different and the State of Maharashtra even after reorganization might have agreed for inclusion of the said tribe Halba/Halbi as a Scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra having regard to the said fact in mind." 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the Apex Court in para (22) of the judgment in Dalbir Singh and others vs. State of Punjab { (1979) 3 SCC 745 } has laid down as follows : ".... It is not everything said by a Judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. In the leading case of Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Havnes (L.R. 1959 AC 743) it was laid down that the ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problems raised by the facts as found, upon which the decision is based. ..." The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the present case is covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sudhakar Vithal Kumbhare (cited supra) and the law laid down therein has to be applied to the case of the petitioner. 8. Ms. Rane, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent no.1, has submitted that the petitioner having failed to prove that he had been permanent resident of the Maharashtra State since prior to 1950, he is not entitled to avail the benefits as a Scheduled Caste candidate. 8. Ms. Rane, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent no.1, has submitted that the petitioner having failed to prove that he had been permanent resident of the Maharashtra State since prior to 1950, he is not entitled to avail the benefits as a Scheduled Caste candidate. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Shweta Santalal Lal vs. State of Maharashtra and others {( 2010 (2) Mh.L.J. 904 )}. In that judgment, the question, which fell for consideration, is as follows : "Whether a person who was not ordinarily resident as on the date of the relevant Presidential Notification in the area that now constitutes the State of Maharashtra will be entitled to the benefit of reservation in the State?" While deciding the question as framed for consideration, the Full Bench has concluded that the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from any locality, which has been divided upon re-organization of States, though such Castes or Tribes are also recognized as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the newly formed State, are not entitled to benefits of reservation in the State of migration, but would be entitled to the benefits only in the State of origin. The learned Assistant Government Pleader relying on the above referred Full Bench judgment, has submitted that the petitioner is not entitled for the benefits of Scheduled Caste candidate and the writ petition has to be dismissed. 9. The Apex Court in para (12) of the judgment in State of Orissa and others vs. MD. Illiyas { (2006) 1 SCC 275 } has laid down as follows : "12) .. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates : (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates : (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts : (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. (See State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem, the Earl of Halsbury, L.C. observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be the exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides." The Apex Court in para (18) of its judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. M. Radha Krishna Murthy { (2009) 5 SCC 117 } has considered the words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents and has recorded as follows : "18) The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus : 'Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.' * * * 'Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 10. In our view, earlier Chhindwara where the ancestors of the petitioner had been permanently residing and Nagpur where the petitioner and his family are now permanently residing, had been parts of the C.P. and Berar before reorganization of the States. After reorganization of the States, Chhindwara became part of the Madhya Pradesh State and Nagpur became part of the Maharashtra State. After reorganization of the States, Chhindwara became part of the Madhya Pradesh State and Nagpur became part of the Maharashtra State. These peculiar facts are considered by the Apex Court in the case of Sudhakar Vithal Kumbhare (cited supra) and it is held that such persons whose Caste/Tribe is recognized in both the States, are entitled for the benefits of reservation. We are of the opinion that in view of the peculiar facts of the present case, as in the case of Sudhakar Vithal Kumbhare (cited supra), the petitioner will be entitled for the benefits as a Scheduled Caste candidate as it is not disputed that "Mahar" has been recognized as Scheduled Caste in the Madhya Pradesh State and it is recognized as Scheduled Caste in the Maharashtra State also. 11. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The order of the Scrutiny Committee dated 11/8/2011 so also the termination order dated 23/7/2013 issued by the respondent no.2 are quashed and set aside. It is declared that the petitioner belongs to "Mahar" -Scheduled Caste and is entitled for all the benefits in the State of Maharashtra. The respondent no.1 - Scrutiny Committee is directed to issue a Certificate accordingly to the petitioner within two weeks. The respondent no.2 is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith. Needless to state that the petitioner would not be entitled for the salary from the date of termination till today. However, the petitioner would be entitled to continuity of service for all purposes including the promotional and pensionary benefits. 12. The rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.