JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This is defendant’s appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “C.P.C.”). 2. Heard Sri Rajiv Joshi, learned counsel for appellants and perused the record. None appeared on behalf of respondents despite the case having been called in revised. 3. The sole substantial question of law formulated by this Court on 18.4.1978, while hearing appeal under Order 41 Rule 11 C.P.C. is whether the suit in question was barred by time. 4. Subsequently, this Court added five more substantial questions of law by order dated 25.11.2010 and the same are: “(b) Whether the findings recorded in Original Suit No. 7 of 1965 to the effect that there was no house situated in the village Behari, which could fit in the boundaries given in sale certificate (Ext-1) became final and operates as res-judiciata between the parties. (c) Whether the lower appellate Court misinterpreted and misconstrued the sale certificate (ext-1) as boundaries as disclosed in it did not tally with the house in dispute referred in paragraph-10 of written statement and contrary findings recorded are perverse and based on misreading of evidence (Commissioner’s reprot). (d) Whether there were any necessities for the defendant to file cross objection challenging the particular finding against him when the ultimate decree itself was in his favour. (e) Whether right of the purchaser in public auction and validity of sale under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 could be seen by the Civil Court in view of bar created by Section 27 of the said Act when entire proceedings are void and fictitious. (f) Whether the plaintiffs have to prove the sale under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 seeking declaration of rights on the basis of same.” 5. This appeal has arisen from Original Suit No. 177 of 1972 instituted by plaintiff respondent Nos. 1 to 6. During pendency of this appeal, plaintiff respondent No. 3 and sole defendant appellant died and were substituted by their legal heirs. 6. Plaintiff respondents had sought eviction of defendant appellant from the property in dispute and handing over possession thereof to plaintiffs, besides mesne profits and damages etc. 7. 1 to 6. During pendency of this appeal, plaintiff respondent No. 3 and sole defendant appellant died and were substituted by their legal heirs. 6. Plaintiff respondents had sought eviction of defendant appellant from the property in dispute and handing over possession thereof to plaintiffs, besides mesne profits and damages etc. 7. The plaint case set up is that the disputed house situated at Village Bihari, Pargna Khatauli, district Muzaffar Nagar was auctioned on 27.12.1957 by Custodian, Evacuee Property and purchased by Jamaiyat Ram, father of plaintiffs No. 1, 2 and 4 to 6, and husband of plaintiff No. 3. Sale certificate was issued in favour of Jamaiyat Ram on 27.7.1962. Jamaiyat Ram died in 1971. The property in dispute devolved on his legal heirs, i.e., plaintiffs. Possession of defendant on the property in dispute is unauthorised and illegal. He has no right to continue therewith. 8. The defendant contested the suit and denied any right of plaintiffs on the property in dispute. It is said that defendant does not possess any property which belongs to or own by Jamaiyat Ram. He also disputed alleged auction purchase and said that he is in possession of property in dispute, being owner, for the last more than 12 years, and, from the period of his ancestors. He also referred to O.S. No. 7 of 1965 instituted by Jamaiyat Ram for ejectment and recovery of rent against defendant, which, ultimately failed, having been dismissed on 20.7.1965 by Trial Court and appeal was dismissed on 3.2.1966. The aforesaid judgement would operate res judicata and the suit in question, therefore, was not maintainable. 9. The Trial Court (hereinafter referred to as “T.C.”) dismissed the suit, vide judgment and decree dated 1.2.1977, holding that plaintiffs failed to prove that disputed house is same which was owned by them and claimed to be house No. 1. Besides, suit was also found barred by time, inasmuch as, defendant proved that he was residing in disputed premises since prior to 1.8.1959, and the suit having been filed on 24.3.1972, was apparently barred by time. 10. On appeal, the LAC (hereinafter referred to as as “LAC”) however, reversed the decree, allowed plaintiffs’ Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1977 and decreed the suit. 11. 10. On appeal, the LAC (hereinafter referred to as as “LAC”) however, reversed the decree, allowed plaintiffs’ Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1977 and decreed the suit. 11. It is not in dispute that earlier Jamaiyat Ram instituted Original Suit No. 7 of 1965, seeking ejectment of defendant appellant from the premises in dispute, and, for recovery of Rs. 144/-as arrears of rent and mesne profit. Defendant denied any relationship of landlord and tenant between him and plaintiff. He also disputed claim of plaintiff about ownership of house and said that neither the property belonged to Custodian nor was auctioned by him. The suit was dismissed and the LAC, vide judgment dated 3.2.1966, while affirming trial Court’s judgment, held that plaintiff failed to prove relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 12. I propose to take up questions No. (e) and (f), first, for the reason that LAC has non-suited the appellant on the question raised with respect to legality of auction of disputed property as evacuee property, by placing reliance on Section 27 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1954”). 13. LAC has held that Section 27 of Act, 1954 attaches finality to an order made by an officer or authority under the said Act and further declares that it shall not be called in question in any Court and, therefore, the auction proceedings which have culminated in sale-deed, cannot be called in question, by defendant in the suit, as the same has attained finality in favour of plaintiffs. He has supported his view by a decision of Delhi High Court in Riaz Ahmad v. Union of India, AIR 1974 Del. 151 and Apex Court’s decision in Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab and others v. Jafran Begum, AIR 1968 SC 169 . He has said that the sale-certificate issued by the Custodian has been filed, it will be presumed that sale was properly conducted. 14. The Defence set up by appellant in his written statement while assailing alleged auction is that it is forged and fictitious. He has said that the sale-certificate issued by the Custodian has been filed, it will be presumed that sale was properly conducted. 14. The Defence set up by appellant in his written statement while assailing alleged auction is that it is forged and fictitious. Para 12 of written statement, if read with the assertions made in para 13, it show defendant’s claim that he is in possession of property in dispute since before the abolition of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act, No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1951”) and under Section 9 of the said Act, the property has vested in defendant. In other words, defendant never admitted that property was an evacuee property and hence there was no question of its auction, as claimed by plaintiffs, and that is how defendant-appellant have challenged the same. 15. Trial Court formulated five issues and Issue No. 1 thereof reads as under: ^^D;k tek;rjke fookfnr edku dk ekfyd Fkk\^^ English Translation by the Court: “Whether Jamayatram was the owner of house in dispute?” 16. Plaintiffs’ case for ownership is founded on the sale-certificate issued by Custodian but it could have conferred ownership right upon plaintiffs only when the property in dispute could have been shown to be an “evacuee property” so as to attract Section 27 of Act, 1954 and not otherwise. In other words, in order to attract Section 27 of Act, 1954 it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show that an order under Act, 1954 has been passed by Custodian which has attained finality. The sale-certificate by itself cannot be said to be an order of Custodian. To analyze the aforesaid aspect, it would be appropriate to have a glance over relevant statutory provisions as also the exposition of law, if any available. 17. Section 27 of Act, 1954, which has been relied by LAC, reads as under: “27. Finality of orders.-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer or authority under this Act, including a managing corporation, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.” (emphasis added) 18. I find that dealing with evacuee property, there came to be enacted five statutes. 19. I find that dealing with evacuee property, there came to be enacted five statutes. 19. First one was United Provinces Evacuee (Administration of Property) Ordinance, 1947 (U.P. Ordinance No. XI of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as “U.P. Ordinance, 1947”) promulgated by Governor on 6.10.1947. Section 1 (3) thereof provides that, at the first instance, the aforesaid Ordinance shall apply to the Districts of Dehradun and Saharanpur but Provincial Government may by notification in official Gazette, apply it to such other areas as may be specified. The term “Evacuee” and “Evacuee property” are defined in Section 2 (b) and (c) which read as under: “(b) “Evacuee” means a person whose place of residence is in the United Provinces and who has departed therefrom on account of communal disturbances and includes a person whom the Provincial Government or an officer, authorised in that behalf by the Provincial Government may declare to be an evacuee. (c) “Evacuee property” means all property, whether movable or immovable, which belongs to or was occupied by an evacuee and has been abandoned either temporarily or permanently, or otherwise left uncared for by him, and includes the interest of an evacuee in any business, firm or company whether incorporated or not, but does not include actionable claims and choses in action except in relation to any undertaking or business of which the Custodian assumes possession or control;” 20. Section 4 thereof provides that Custodian shall survey or cause to be surveyed “evacuee property” and thereafter vide Section 5 he was supposed to take possession of “evacuee property” and all measures which he considers necessary or expedient for preserving such property. Section 4 thereof reads as under: “4. The Custodian shall survey or cause to be surveyed evacuee property and for this purpose may- (i) enter or cause any person to enter upon any land or on any premises used for the purpose of dwelling, or business; and (ii) inspect or cause to be inspected any books or documents belonging to or under the control of any person.” 21. Section 11 of U.P. Ordinance, 1947 makes provision for restoration of property to the owner and reads as under: “11. Section 11 of U.P. Ordinance, 1947 makes provision for restoration of property to the owner and reads as under: “11. (1) The owner of any evacuee property in the possession or control of the Custodian shall, upon application to the Custodian, be entitled to restoration thereof, and on payment of such excess, if any, of expenditure over receipts in respect of such property as appears from the Custodian’s account books, and the fee leviable under Section 10;” Provided that the Custodian shall give at least 15 days’ public notice of such application by proclamation in the locality and by affixation on the property and in any other method he may consider suitable, and where the application is opposed he may after such enquiry concerning the title of the applicant as he may consider necessary, refuse to deliver possession, and in such case shall direct the claimant to establish his title in a Civil Court and subject to any order which may be passed by the Court in any such suit, the Custodian shall continue to supervise and hold the property as if any application for its restoration has not been made: Provided further that where the applicant claims as heirs to an evacuee owner, the Custodian may refuse to restore possession, unless the applicant produces a succession certificate or letters of administration or probate of a will from a competent Court: Provided further that every lease validly granted by the Custodian shall have effect, as against the owner, until determined by lapse of time or operation of law. (2) The delivery of possession of the property by the Custodian to any person under sub-section (1) shall be full discharge of the Provincial Government or the Custodian from all liability in respect of the property, but shall not prejudice any rights in respect of the property which any other person may be entitled to enforce against the person to whom possession is delivered.” 22. Then came, United Provinces Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1948 (U.P. Act No. X of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as “U.P. Act, 1948”) which received assent of Governor on 5.2.1948 and published in U.P. Gazette, Part VII-A, dated 28.2.1948. The aforesaid Act repealed and replaced U.P. Ordinance, 1947. The provisions were almost pari materia to U.P. Ordinance, 1947, therefore, are not being dealt with here in detail. The aforesaid Act repealed and replaced U.P. Ordinance, 1947. The provisions were almost pari materia to U.P. Ordinance, 1947, therefore, are not being dealt with here in detail. However, it is reiterated that Section 1 (3) continued as such stating that at the first instance the it shall apply to the Districts of Dehradun and Saharanpur but Provincial Government may by notification in official Gazette apply it to such other areas as may be specified. 23. The next was United Provinces Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949) (hereinafter referred to as “U.P. Ordinance, 1949”) which was published in U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 24.6.1949. Section 1 (2) states that Ordinance shall apply to the whole of United Provinces and vide Section 40, U.P. Act, 1948 was repealed. The term “evacuee” and “evacuee property” were defined in Section 2 (c) and (d) which read as under: “(c) “evacuee” means any person.- (i) who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, leaves or has on or after the 1st day of March, 1947, left any place in the United Provinces for any place outside the territories now forming part of India, or (ii) who is resident in any place now forming part of Pakistan and is for that reason unable to occupy, supervise or manage in person his property in the United Provinces or whose property in the Province has ceased to be occupied, supervised or managed by any person or is being occupied, supervised or managed by an unauthorised person, or (iii) who has, after the 1st day of March, 1947, acquired in any manner whatsoever any right to, interest in or benefit from any property which is treated as evacuee under any law for the time being in force in Pakistan; (d) “evacuee property” means any property in which an evacuee has any right or interest or which is held by him under any deed of trust or other instrument, but does not include- (i) any movable property in his immediate physical possession; (ii) any property belonging to a joint-stock company, the registered office of which was situate in Pakistan before the 15th day of August, 1947, and continues to be so situate after the said date; 24. Section 5 of U.P. Ordinance, 1949 stated that subject to the provisions of the Ordinance, all evacuee property situate in the United Provinces shall vest in the Custodian. Section 6 contemplates publication in the Official Gazette or in such other manner, as may be prescribed, evacuee properties which have vested in the Custodian. The aforesaid Ordinance was repealed by Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1950”) wherein “evacuee property” has been defined in Section 2 (d) and (f). I reproduce only Section 2 (f) which reads as under: “(f) “evacuee property” means any property of an evacuee (whether held by him as owner or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or as a tenant or in any other capacity), and includes any property which has been obtained by any person from an evacuee after the 14th day of August, 1947, by any mode of transfer which is not effective by reason of the provisions contained in Section 40, but does not include- (i) any ornament and any wearing, apparel, cooking vessels or other household effects in the immediate possession of an evacuee. (ii) any property belonging to a joint stock company, the registered office of which was situated before the 15th day of August, 1947, in any place now forming part of Pakistan and continues to be so situated after the said date.” (emphasis added) 25. Section 7 (1) of Act, 1950 requires that the Custodian, where is of opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of this Act, he may, after causing notice thereof to be given in such manner as may be prescribed to the persons interested, and after holding such enquiry in the matter as the circumstances of the case permit, pass an order declaring any such property to be evacuee property. Then Section 7 (3) contemplates a notification by the Custodian either in the Official Gazette or its publication in such other manner as may be prescribed about all properties declared by him to be “evacuee property” under Sub-section (1). 26. Section 8 (1) of Act, 1950 then provides: “8. Then Section 7 (3) contemplates a notification by the Custodian either in the Official Gazette or its publication in such other manner as may be prescribed about all properties declared by him to be “evacuee property” under Sub-section (1). 26. Section 8 (1) of Act, 1950 then provides: “8. Vesting of evacuee property in the Custodian.—(1) Any property declared to be evacuee property under Section 7 shall be deemed to have vested in the Custodian for the State,- (a) in the case of the property of an evacuee as defined in sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of Section 2, from the date on which he leaves or left any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India; (b) in the case of the property of an evacuee as defined in sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of Section 2, from the 15th day of August, 1947 ; and (c) in the case of any other property, from the date of the notice given under sub-section (1) of Section 7 in respect thereof.” 27. Sub-sections (2), (2A), (3) and (4) are not material for our purposes in the present case. 28. In exercise of powers under Section 56 of Act, 1950, Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1950”) have also been framed and Rule 6 thereof contemplates a notice to be served under Section 7 (1) of Act, 1950 on persons interested in the property proposed to be declared evacuee property in From-1. 29. From a bare reading of Section 7 and 8 conjointly, in my view, a Custodian is under obligation to make a declaration under Section 7 that the property is evacuee property and after such declaration there has to be a publication thereof under Sub-section (3) without which a property shall not vest in the Custodian. The Custodian gets power to take possession of any such property which vests in him under Section 8 of Act, 1950 and has become evacuee property. 30. There is an insertion of Section 7-A vide Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “Amendment Act, 1954”) with effect from 7.5.1954. The Custodian gets power to take possession of any such property which vests in him under Section 8 of Act, 1950 and has become evacuee property. 30. There is an insertion of Section 7-A vide Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “Amendment Act, 1954”) with effect from 7.5.1954. The consequence of the said provision is, if the Custodian had not taken any proceedings under Section 7 of Act, 1950, to declare a property as evacuee property before 7.5.1954, and no proceedings were pending on 8th May, 1954, a property could not have been declared evacuee property under Act, 1950, since the power of Custodian to do so thence stood terminated by virtue of Section 7-A of Act, 1950. 31. In order to answer Issue-1, in my view, it was for the plaintiffs to show, by producing relevant notification or documentary evidence, that the Custodian had taken proceedings and declared the disputed property to be evacuee property in accordance with Section 7 of Act, 1950 or that such proceedings had been initiated earlier and were pending on 7.5.1954. However, no such document is on record except the sale-certificate which was issued by Custodian after auction sale in 1957, but that is something which the Custodian had acted under Act, 1954. Under Act, 1950, Section 24 could have been invoked by a person aggrieved against an order passed under Section 7 by filing an appeal and Section 27 of Act, 1950 confers power of revision on the Custodian General to review all or any order passed by Custodian if it is not found to be legal or proper. If no such order is passed, such occasion shall not arise. Therefore, existence of such order and notification was must. 32. Then come Sections 28 and 46 of Act, 1950 which bar jurisdiction of the Court. It is, however, clear that under the aforesaid provisions, the jurisdiction of Civil Court would be barred only where there is a declaration about the property in dispute as evacuee property by Custodian, after taking proceedings under Section 7 of Act, 1950. 33. A Full Bench of this Court in Khalil Ahmad Khan v. Malka Mehar Nigar Begum, AIR 1954 All 362 , held, if there is no adjudication by Custodian himself about a property being an evacuee property, the provisions under Act, 1950 barring jurisdiction of Civil Court will not be attracted. 33. A Full Bench of this Court in Khalil Ahmad Khan v. Malka Mehar Nigar Begum, AIR 1954 All 362 , held, if there is no adjudication by Custodian himself about a property being an evacuee property, the provisions under Act, 1950 barring jurisdiction of Civil Court will not be attracted. This judgment was approved by Apex Court in Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab and others v. Jafran Begum (supra). 34. Then comes Act, 1954. Section 2(c) defines “evacuee property” and reads as under: “(c) “evacuee property” means any property which has been declared or is deemed to have been declared as evacuee property under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 ; (31 of 1950 ).” (emphasis added) 35. Section 12 of Act, 1954 confers power upon Central Government to acquire evacuee property for rehabilitation of displaced persons. The necessary pre-requisite to attract Section 12 of Act, 1954 is that it must be an evacuee property as defined in Section 2 (c) of Act, 1954. Similarly, under Section 20, the Managing Officer may transfer any property out of compensation pool only if the property has been declared under Section 7 of Act, 1950 to be evacuee property by Custodian or it must be evacuee property under the deeming provisions of any law which may be applicable to the case of the evacuee. In other words, only that property could be acquired under Section 12 and form part of compensation pool which satisfies the definition of evacuee property in Section 2 (c) of Act, 1954 and not otherwise. 36. The Court in Khalil Ahmad Khan (supra) further said that a sale-certificate by itself would not mean or can be construed an order passed by Custodian under Act, 1954 so as to attract bar under Section 27 thereof. 37. The import of Sections 7 and 8 came to be considered in Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra and others, AIR 1980 SC 1206 , wherein, the Court said that from a conjoint reading of Sections 7 and 8, it is clear that making of a declaration after inquiry under Section 7 that the property is evacuee property, is a sine qua non for giving Custodian, dominion over the property. If no proceeding is taken under Section 7, there can be no vesting of property in the Custodian. If no proceeding is taken under Section 7, there can be no vesting of property in the Custodian. The Court further held that whenever an issue is raised that a property is not an “evacuee property”, it would be obligatory on the plaintiff to prove that property in question is an evacuee property inasmuch as, the Custodian has taken proceedings and declared suit property to be evacuee property in accordance with Section 7 of Act 1950 or that such proceedings had been initiated earlier and were pending on the 7.5.1954. The mere fact that Rehabilitation Authorities purporting to act under Act, 1954, issued sale certificate to him, would not be sufficient. Thereafter the Court referred to Sections 20 and 46 of Act 1950 with respect to bar of Civil Court and held, where the Custodian never declared property as “evacuee property” after taking proceedings under Section 7 of Act 1950, bar created by the aforesaid provision shall not apply. The Court said that the action of Custodian with respect to management of the property would be immaterial, inasmuch as, he is first to decide whether the property in question is an “evacuee property” or not, only then against such a decision of Custodian, bar of Civil Court would be attracted. But if there is no such adjudication by the Custodian himself, the bar of Civil Court is not at all attracted. The above provisions were explained in paras 29 and 30 of the judgment as under: “ 29. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 46 postulate that at the time when the question whether or not a property is evacuee property comes for adjudication the power of the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act of 1950 to determine that question is subsisting. That is to say, if at the point of time when the question arises, the power of the authorities constituted under this Act to adjudicate that question stands terminated or extinguished by the operation of Section 7A of 1954, none of the clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 46 will bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine that question which had not been decided by the custodian during the period, he had the power to determine it. 30. 30. Section 28 has no application to the facts of the instant case because no order made by any of the authorities mentioned in that section is being called in question. Section 46, also, does not come in the way because no proceedings under Section 7 of the 1950 Act to declare the suit house as evacuee property were taken by the Custodian against Qazi Abdul Rashid. No notification under sub-section (3) of Section 7 published in the official Gazette has been placed on the record. Nor was it shown that any proceedings initiated under Section 7 of the Act to declare it evacuee property were pending on May 7, 1954, and the question of saving those proceedings under the proviso to Section 7A does not arise.” (emphasis added) 38. In para 36 of the judgment, the Court also said, that, only such property can be transferred by competent authority under Section 20 which has been declared under Section 7 to be “evacuee property”, or it is an “evacuee property” under the deeming provisions, but where the property was never “evacuee property” as defined in Section 2(c) of Act 1954, it does not legally form part of compensation pool and, therefore, cannot be disposed of under Section 20 or the Rules framed under the Act 1954. Emphasizing on the words “under this Act” occurring in Section 27, the Court said that those orders which are not made by any officer or authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act, but outside the provisions of this Act, in excess of jurisdiction, can be called in question in the Civil Court. It may be noted that the language of Section 27 is not as wide as that of Section 46 of the 1950 Act. 39. In the present case, the defendant appellant specifically pleaded that the suit property did not tally with the boundaries of disputed building which was in possession of defendant appellant and there existed three residential houses, all in possession of defendant appellant, boundaries whereof were given in para 10 of written statement, and, it was specifically pleaded that none of those is owned by plaintiff i.e.,Jamaiyat Ram. The very auction was also challenged and in para 13 it was specifically pleaded that at the time of abolition of Zamindari, property in dispute was in possession of defendant appellant which clearly means that there was no occasion for disputed building to become “evacuee property” under the Act 1950. 40. On this aspect no issue was framed by Court below though it was a substantial and material issue, necessary to be considered so as to sustain the claim of plaintiff respondent as a purchaser of alleged “evacuee property”. In my view, unless the property in question answers the definition of “evacuee property” and is shown to be covered by Section 7 of Act 1950, the mere fact that an auction proceeding was initiated by authority concerned, would be of no consequence. 41. Besides, when defendant appellant disputed the sale and purchase of house(s), in occupation of defendant, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove that it was the very house which was subjected to auction and purchase by plaintiffs. It was not appropriate for LAC to assume it a mere inaccuracy in mention of boundary, particularly when, the property as described in sale certificate was not shown to be the same as per the existing boundaries at the time of adjudication. The LAC in observing that there is some mistake in description has proceeded on its own conjectures and surmises instead of referring to any evidence, so as to justify the above inference. Questions No. (e) and (f), therefore, are returned by holding that bar under Section 27 would apply only when there is an order declaring property to be an evacuee property under Section 7 of Act, 1950 and satisfies the definition of evacuee property under Section 2 (c) of Act, 1954. If there is no proceeding under Section 7 of Act, 1950, and the property in dispute does not satisfy the definition of evacuee property, Section 27 shall not apply. That is how the claim set up by plaintiffs over the disputed property founded on a mere sale-certificate issued by Custodian is to be considered. In absence of any evidence to show declaration/notification under Section 7 of Act, 1950, Section 27 of Act, 1954 would not come in the way. In view of above discussion questions (e) and (f) are answered in favour of defendant-appellant. 42. In absence of any evidence to show declaration/notification under Section 7 of Act, 1950, Section 27 of Act, 1954 would not come in the way. In view of above discussion questions (e) and (f) are answered in favour of defendant-appellant. 42. Now coming to Questions (b), (c) and (d), it cannot be doubted that the onus lies upon plaintiffs to prove that the disputed property is the same over which they are claiming right of ownership. If there is a discrepancy with the basic document, i.e., sale-certificate giving boundaries, it cannot be ignored by saying that there is a mistake. Unless there is credible evidence of corresponding period to show that property taken by Custodian and formed compensation pool was the same which is the disputed property, and, comparing the same with the boundaries given in the sale-certificate, the two can be identified to be one and the same, the subsequent Commissioner’s report etc., in my view, would not be of much assistance, and, on that basis, the boundaries disclosed in sale-certificate cannot be treated to be altered or modified. Similarly the question of cross-objection would arise only when the defendant is seeking a relief in his favour, but if he is not seeking any relief, for the purpose of assailing certain findings in a judgment which is otherwise in his favour, he need not file any cross-objection and can always support decree by challenging the finding against him in the Appellate Court. On this aspect, I am fortified from an authority of Apex Court in S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore and others, AIR 2007 SC 989 , wherein the Court categorically said that Order 41 Rule 22 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “Code, 1908”) shall not apply where a finding is against a party in whose favour ultimate decree has been passed. The Court said that a respondent in an appeal is entitled to support the decree of Trial Court even by challenging any of the finding that might have been rendered by Trial Court against him. For supporting the decree passed by Trial Court, it is not necessary for a respondent in the appeal, to file a memorandum of cross-objection challenging a particular finding rendered by Trial Court against him when ultimate decree is in his favour. For supporting the decree passed by Trial Court, it is not necessary for a respondent in the appeal, to file a memorandum of cross-objection challenging a particular finding rendered by Trial Court against him when ultimate decree is in his favour. The memorandum of cross-objection is needed only if the respondent claims any relief which had been negatived to him by Trial Court in addition to what he has already been given by the decree under challenge. 43. The questions, thus, are answered in favour of defendant holding that there was no necessity for the defendant to file cross-objection challenging the particular finding in a judgment where decree is otherwise in his favour and, on the contrary, he can support the said judgment by challenging the said finding in an appeal filed by other side. In the present case, since the Issue No. 1 has been decided by LAC by erroneously resorting to Section 27 of Act, 1954, in my view, the matter requires further consideration. In this regard, if necessary, it would be open to LAC to frame an additional issue, permit the parties to adduce evidence and thereafter decide the same. 44. With the aforesaid directions, appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and decree dated 21.2.1978 passed by LAC in Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1977 is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to LAC to treat the appeal pending and decide it afresh, in the light of observations and directions made above, and in accordance with law, expeditiously, and, in any case, within six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. 45. No order as to costs. —————