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2013 DIGILAW 1779 (RAJ)

Bhanwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2013-10-03

VINEET KOTHARI

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner/plaintiff, Bhanwar Singh, has filed this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 15.02.2013 (Annex.15) passed by learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Pilibanga, whereby the learned trial court in a suit filed by the petitioner/plaintiff for declaration on the basis of a 'Patta' dated 06.01.1974 issued by the Gram Panchayat- Dheer Desar, allowed the application filed by the private respondents under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC for impleading them as party-defendant in the aforesaid suit. 3. Mr. V.K. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner/plaintiff was granted temporary injunction by the learned trial court in the suit vide order Annex.8 dated 05.02.2011, against which even appeal filed by the Municipal Board, Pilibanga, was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track, No.1, Hanumangarh, and the respondent-Municipal Board was restrained from holding any auction in favour of private respondents. He further submitted that even though no right has vested in the private respondent as yet because merely giving of bids by them with respect to land in question, does not create any right in their favour and, therefore, their impleadment in the suit filed by the petitioner/plaintiff is wrong and the learned trial court has erred in allowing their impleadment while allowing applicant's application under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC. 4. On the other hand, Mr. H.S. Sidhu and Mr. P.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents urged that the 'Patta' issued in favour of petitioner/plaintiff is wrong and the Municipal Board, Pilibanga is contesting the suit, however, in view of temporary injunction granted in favour of petitioner/plaintiff, the status quo with respect to land in question is being maintained and subject to the decision of the present suit, the rights under the Bids given by the private respondents, will be determined later on by the Municipal Board and, therefore, their impleadment in the suit, is justified and cannot be questioned by the petitioner/plaintiff. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of the Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of the Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 and submitted that the scope of interference with the interlocutory orders passed by the learned trial court is very limited and unless there is a glaring mistake or mis-carriage of justice in the orders passed by the courts below, the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, cannot be invoked to correct even it were any error here or there in the interlocutory orders. They, therefore, submitted that the present writ petition filed by the petitioner/plaintiff deserves to be dismissed. In the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 6. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Singh. and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 , wherein, vide para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that since the temporary injunction has already been granted in favour of petitioner/plaintiff, therefore, the rights of the present petitioner/plaintiff have been adequately protected by the learned trial court. As far as the question of impleadment of the private respondents is concerned, since they are claiming their right under the auction held by the Municipal Board, Pilibanga, which is contesting the title of the present petitioner/plaintiff claiming that the 'Patta' in question was not valid, and rights of the private respondents will also abide by the decision of the suit, therefore, they cannot be said to be strangers to the present suit and they deserves to be heard in the matter. The interlocutory order passed by the learned court below impleading the private respondents as party-defendants do not require any interference by this Court under the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. The upshot of the above discussion is that the present writ petition is found to be breft of any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned parties and the learned court below forthwith.Petition dismissed. *******