Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqi,J. These two writ petitions have been filed by the landlord and tenants with a prayer to issue writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 31.05.2012, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Court No.13, Lucknow in Rent Appeal No.4 of 2010 and the judgment and order dated 22.12.2005, passed by learned Prescribed Authority (Civil Judge, Senior Division), Mohanlalganj, Lucknow in P.A. Case No.38 of 2003. 2. Admittedly, Rameshwar Prasad was landlord of the disputed premises who died on 05.12.2002, leaving behind two sons namely Rajesh Rastogi, Rakesh Rastogi and two daughters Pushpa Rastogi and Sangeeta Rastogi. The opposite parties before the learned Prescribed Authority under U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 were the tenants. Out of four legal representatives of the deceased-landlord, Rajesh Rastogi moved application for release of the building on the ground of personal requirement as he is a Chartered Accountant, who wishes to establish his office-cum-chamber in the disputed premises. It was also pleaded that he is jobless. It is also admitted that the tenants were running a partnership business in the name and style of M/s Amarnath Ajay Kumar. Learned Prescribed Authority rejected the prayer for release, against which the landlord preferred rent appeal no.4 of 2010 which was also dismissed on the sole ground that the landlord has not impleaded the firm of which the tenants were partners. Due to this reason both the parties have preferred separate writ petitions. 3. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and gone through the records. 4. The applicant (landlord) pleaded in his application that his father has executed will in his favour dated 30.11.2002 and, as such, he is the sole landlord. The tenants pleaded that the applicant is co-owner and Rakesh Rastogi, Smt. Pushpa Rastogi and Sangeeta Rastogi are also co-owners. Prior to filing of this release application the applicant filed Regular Suit No.220 of 2005 on the basis of will deed executed by his father which was decreed and the applicant was declared to be its owner. The tenants disputed the factum of sole ownership of the applicant and the learned Prescribed Authority has framed point of determination on this score. This plea was also argued and counter argued before this Court, which is of no avail. The admitted position is that the building is under tenancy and the opposite parties before the learned Prescribed Authority were admittedly tenants. This plea was also argued and counter argued before this Court, which is of no avail. The admitted position is that the building is under tenancy and the opposite parties before the learned Prescribed Authority were admittedly tenants. It is well settled that one co-owner may file an application for release or prosecute a litigation against the tenants and all owners, co-owners are not required to be necessarily impleaded in a suit or proceedings for eviction/release, based upon relationship of landlord and tenants. 5. A full Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Dass and another Vs. Ist Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others, 1987 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases,281 after considering the Rule 15(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings ( Regulation of Letting , Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 has held as under:- "So far as the applicability of this Rule to the present case is concerned, there is not problem. Murlidhar Sah who has brought the action for eviction of the premises in question is undoubtedly the landlord. He was signed the application . He alone is competent to sign the application. However, we may point out that the requirement of Rule 15(2) that an application for release of premises owned by co-owners should be signed by all co-owners would be invalid. One co-owner is competent to maintain an action for eviction of the tenant of the entire premises, since he can be considered as a landlord within the meaning of Section 3 (j) of the Act. One co-owner alone would be competent to sign such an application." 6. Moreover prior to said full Bench, Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Sriram Pasricha Vs. Jagannath and others, 1977 Allahabad Rent Cases 83 has held as under :- " It is therefore, clear that the rule that a co-owner may maintain an action to eject a trespasser without joining other co-owners in such action can have no application where a co-owners in such action can have no application where a co-owners seek to evict a tenant who is in possession of the property after determination of the lease. " 7. Thereafter in the case of Laxmi Devi Vs. Iind Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others , 1988(1) Allahabad Rent Cases, 463 this Court has held as under:- " In a Full Bench case of Gopal Dass and others Vs. Ist Addl. " 7. Thereafter in the case of Laxmi Devi Vs. Iind Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others , 1988(1) Allahabad Rent Cases, 463 this Court has held as under:- " In a Full Bench case of Gopal Dass and others Vs. Ist Addl. District Judge, Varanasi , reported in 1987(1) ARC 281, it was held : " In view of these decisions, there can, therefore, be little doubt as to the maintainability of the action of eviction brought by one co- owners without impleaidng the other co-owner." it was also observed that - "However , we may point out that the requirement of Rule 15(2) that an application for release of premises owned by co-owners should be signed by all co-owners would be invalid. One co-owner is competent to maintain an action for eviction of the tenant of the entire premises , since he can be considered as a landlord within the meaning of Section 3(j) of the Act . One co-owner alone would be competent to sign such an application." 8. In Ram Paricha Vs. Jagannath and others, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2335 it was observed at 2339 as follows: "Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of property is not its owner, he owns every part of the composite property alone with others and it cannot be said that he is only a partowner or a fractional owner of the property . The position will change only when partition takes place. It is , therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord co-owner of that premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants." 9. In Rang Nath V. State of U.P. and others, reported in 1984 ALJ 455: 1984(1) ARC 642 it was held that a suit for eviction filed under Section 21 of the Act by one of the co-owner -landlord along is maintainable . The same view has also been taken in the case of Smt. Vatsala Nayar Vs.Vandana Tandon and others reported in 1988 (1) ARC 57. The same view has also been taken in the case of Smt. Vatsala Nayar Vs.Vandana Tandon and others reported in 1988 (1) ARC 57. Thus, in view of the decision above, it is amply clear that the application filed by the petitioner Smt. Laxmi Devi for the release of the accommodation under Section 21 (1) (a) is clearly maintainability." 10. Same view again reiterated by this Court in the cases of Ram Gopal Sharma Vs. Ist Additional District Judge, Meerut and others , 1993 (11) LCD 372 and Vijay Bhatt Vs. Shri Julian Abraham and another , 2004 (3) ARC 519. 11. Recently by this Court in the case of Sarika Kedia v. Additional District Judge, Deoria, 2009 (77) ALR 549 after placing reliance of the Full Bench Judgment of Gopal Dass ( Supra) held as under:- "The primary question regrading release application by one of the co-landlords is concerned in a proceeding under Section 21 of the Act , is competent enough to institute the release application all alone impleading other-co-landlords as proforma opposite parties as it is the instant case . One perusal of the Full Bench decision, it is clear that a release application filed by one of the co-owners is maintainable even if the other co-owners are not impleaded . Secondly requirement of Rule 15(2) of U.P. Urban ( Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction ) Act, 1972 was held to be invalid." 12. It is borne out of the argument laid by the parties that the other brother of the landlord Rajesh Rastogi is in America and his sister Pushpa Rastogi and Sangeeta Rastogi are married and due to this fact the applicant was advised by his counsels to file a suit for declaration so as to enable him to file a release application which is an absurdity on the part of the legal brain who has counseled him to do so. Factum of ownership is foreign to the scope of proceedings under Section 21 of U.P. No.13 of 1972. The applicant was fully competent to move an application for release and, any adjudication on this score amounts to wasting of courts' precious time, which are already overburdened. The relevant question relate to bonafide requirement of the disputed premises and comparitive hardship. 13. The applicant was fully competent to move an application for release and, any adjudication on this score amounts to wasting of courts' precious time, which are already overburdened. The relevant question relate to bonafide requirement of the disputed premises and comparitive hardship. 13. Before deciding these issues, the attention of this court was drawn towards the observations made by learned Appellate Court that in spite of the fact that the landlord has a bonafide requirement of the disputed premises and comparative hardship lies in favour of the landlord yet application is not maintainable for want of impleadment of firm as a party. In the last and concluding para consisting of three lines the learned Appellate Court has made this observation and rejected the application for release without determining the legal impact and legal requirements. 14. The word "partnership" is defined in Section 4 of Indian Partnership Act as under:- "4. Definition of" partnership"," partner"" firm" and" firm name". Partnership" is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually" partners" and collectively" a firm", and the name under which their business is carried on is called the" firm name"." 15. In Puran Chand v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1959 ALJ 343, it was held that a firm does not have the legal status of a person. It is merely a convenient name or label for the person or the persons who owns it and as such the firm is incapable of making a contract or being a tenant. Similar view was taken in M/s Govind Ram Mewa Ram v. II Additional District Judge, 1982 (1) Alld. Rent Cases 84, that a firm cannot be a tenant and the proprietor or the partners of the firm, as the case may be, are the tenants. The same view has already been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Malabar Fisheries Co. Ltd. v. I.T. Commissioner Kerala, AIR 1980 SC 176 . 16. Rent Cases 84, that a firm cannot be a tenant and the proprietor or the partners of the firm, as the case may be, are the tenants. The same view has already been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Malabar Fisheries Co. Ltd. v. I.T. Commissioner Kerala, AIR 1980 SC 176 . 16. Now, the clouds are over and it is established that the tenants-applicant was competent to move an application for release under Section 21 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 against the tenants and there was no requirement of law to implead partnership firm as opposite party whose partners have been sued. 17. It is also not disputed between the parties that the applicant is a Chartered Accountant. The tenants are carrying on business of kirana in the disputed premises. 18. The learned Courts below have discussed the evidence which proves that the applicant is a Chartered Accountant with effect from 25.08.1998. The applicant before the learned Prescribed Authority has specifically alleged that he has to establish his chamber and business centre to function as Chartered Accountant. It has not been disputed that the applicant is a Chartered Accountant. On the other hand the tenants have pleaded that the applicant is running "Shivam Dancing Ball Snooker and Billiards Parlour" but no evidence whatsoever has been led on this score. There is no iota of evidence on record nor has been discussed by the two Courts below, that the applicant does not bonafidely require disputed premises for office-cum-chamber and, as such, it is abundantly proved that applicant requires the disputed property in a bonafide manner for carrying on his livelihood. 19. The other question relate to comparative hardship. The tenants have other accommodations at their disposal. They have an accommodation in the form of godown in Rastogi Tola, Raja Bazar in the area of 2500 sq. feet and another accommodation in an area of 2000 sq. feet. They have two other shops at Subhash Marg which are being used as godown and another shop at 45, Subhash Marg, Lucknow. They are running their business in the name and style of two different firms. 20. Learned Prescribed Authority has dealt with the entire bunch of accommodations available at the disposal of the tenants who are running their business with different firm names. They are running their business in the name and style of two different firms. 20. Learned Prescribed Authority has dealt with the entire bunch of accommodations available at the disposal of the tenants who are running their business with different firm names. In spite of this fact, the tenants have not made any attempt to get alternative accommodation in case the release application is allowed. The balance of comparative hardship also lies in favour of the landlord. At this stage, I may mention here that the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the point of comparative hardship in the case of Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 . While holding this the Hon'ble Apex court has relied upon its earlier decision in Muttu lal v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 . 21. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 353 , has held as under:- "The rent controller should not proceed on the assumption that the landlord's requirement is not bona fide. When the landlord shows a prima facie case a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide is liable to be drawn. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without giving possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlords, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 22. The following observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above said case are very relevant:- "When a landlord asserts that the requires his building for his own occupation the "Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facts case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bonafide. It is often said by/Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. It is often said by/Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafide of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 23. In Siya Devi (Smt.) v. Ist. A.D.J. & another, 2011 (3) ARC 788, this Court has also dealt with the matter by which correct law has been applied. In Avinash Chandra and Ors. v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and Ors. 2008 (1) ARC 812 ,G.K. Devi v. Ghanshyam Das, AIR 2000 SC 656 , Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai, AIR 2002 SC 2572 , Chandrika Prasad v. Umesh Kumar Verma, AIR 2002 SC 108 and Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkune, AIR 2002 SC 200 . this Court has held that Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in a number of cases that neither it is necessary for the landlord to show prior experience of a particular business nor it is necessary to show that the landlord has sufficient financial capacity to start the proposed business. In this case the learned Single Judge has relied upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in 24. On point of comparative hardship, the Hon'ble Apex court has held in B.C. Bhutada v. G.R. Mundada, AIR 2003 SC 2713 , that as far as comparative hardship is concerned tenant did not show effort made by them to search alternative accommodation, hence, question of comparative hardship has to be decided against them. 25. On the totality of facts, discussions made and findings arrived at by the learned Prescribed Authority are obviously perverse. The learned Additional District Judge has rightly held that landlord bonafidely requires the disputed premises and comparative hardship lies in his favour. But, the learned Appellate Court has erred in rejecting the application on the ground on non-impleadment of the firm. The said finding is obviously erroneous, in law. The learned Additional District Judge has rightly held that landlord bonafidely requires the disputed premises and comparative hardship lies in his favour. But, the learned Appellate Court has erred in rejecting the application on the ground on non-impleadment of the firm. The said finding is obviously erroneous, in law. There is no need for this Court to remand the matter as it would be a miscarriage of justice in delaying the disposal of the release application beyond the expectations of the legislature which is provided under Rule 15 (2) of the Rules framed under U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 that the release application, as far as possible should be decided within two months. There are a catena of decisions of this Court as well as of the Hon'ble Apex Court which have also been discussed in Bewa Shakurey @ Kamrul Nisha and Ors. v. Additional District Judge, Lucknow and Ors., 2007 (2) ARC 248. The net result is that the application of the landlord deserves to be allowed. 26. On the basis of discussions made above, both the writ petitions are disposed of in such a fashion that the release application is allowed and the tenants are directed to vacate the disputed premises within 30 days from today. It is provided under Sub Section (6) of Section 21 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 that "on the expiration of a period of 30 days from the order of release the tenancy of the tenant shall stand determined in its entirety." In view of this provision, this court cannot sit over legislature by providing more time than provided by the legislature, in expressed terms. ________________