JUDGMENT : C.L. Soni, J. 1. This Appeal, under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of original defendant No. 3 against whom as also against other defendants respondent No. 1 original plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 846/1984 seeking declaration and permanent injunction. 2. The brief facts of the case are as under : The plaintiff was appointed as Primary Teacher in Primary School run by defendant No. 4 and there was one condition in his appointment that he shall be required to undergo training. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant No. 4 ordered the plaintiff to undergo training against which the plaintiff made representation to grant exemption from undergoing the training. The plaintiff has further averred in the plaint that in the month of June 1971, the plaintiff was again asked to go for training but, since the plaintiff was suffering sickness, he was not in a position to go for training and applied for exemption from training which was not accepted by the Principal of the School. The plaintiff has further averred that because of his sickness he was entitled to exemption from undergoing the training. The plaintiff has alleged that the action of defendant No. 4 of not granting exemption was not bonafide and the same was against the rules and regulations. The plaintiff has further alleged that the defendant No. 4 then passed order dated 16th July 1971 directing the plaintiff to go for training where it was provided that in default of the plaintiff not going for training his services shall stand terminated automatically. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff then was not permitted to report for training and despite the fact that there was no order of termination, the plaintiff was treated to have been terminated automatically. Such action on the part of the defendants No. 3 and 4 is illegal, unconstitutional and malafide and the same is required to be quashed and set aside. The plaintiff has therefore prayed to declare the said action as illegal and unconstitutional and to treat the plaintiff to have continued in service. 3. The suit of the plaintiff was resisted by defendant No.1 and 3. The defendant No.1 is the State of Gujarat and defendant No. 3 is District Education Committee. The plaintiff has therefore prayed to declare the said action as illegal and unconstitutional and to treat the plaintiff to have continued in service. 3. The suit of the plaintiff was resisted by defendant No.1 and 3. The defendant No.1 is the State of Gujarat and defendant No. 3 is District Education Committee. The suit was resisted on the ground that the plaintiff was required to undergo training compulsorily and for two times, orders were passed for training of the plaintiff but the plaintiff did not comply with such orders and therefore, the plaintiff had no right to continue in service as Primary Teacher. After the order dated 16th July 1971 was passed the plaintiff did not report for training and thus lost his right in service. It is further stated by the defendants that the action of the defendants of not permitting the plaintiff to join the duty was not punitive but it was the plaintiff who did not go for training thus lost his right to continue in service and therefore as per the order dated 16th July 1971 the plaintiff was relieved from service. The defendants further stated that in passing such order, relieving the plaintiff from service the defendant could not have been said to have acted illegally or against the constitutional provisions. 4. On the basis of the pleadings the learned Trial judge framed issues at Exh. 21 which is as under : (1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the impugned order is illegal, inoperative, invalid and without jurisdiction? (2) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is permanent servant? (3) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is entitled to continue in service? (4) Whether this suit is legally tenable without statutory notice? (5) What order and decree? 5. On appreciation of evidence, learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the order passed by the defendants relieving the plaintiff from service was in breach of principles of natural justice and therefore such order was illegal, unconstitutional and void abinitio. The learned Trial Judge therefore allowed the suit declaring the order dated 16th July 1971 as null and void and further declared the plaintiff to be in continuous service as Primary Teacher without any break. The learned Trial Judge therefore allowed the suit declaring the order dated 16th July 1971 as null and void and further declared the plaintiff to be in continuous service as Primary Teacher without any break. The Learned Trial Judge also declared the plaintiff entitled for backwages for three years prior to filing of the suit and further directed defendant No. 4 to reinstate the plaintiff in service. Against the above judgment and decree passed by the learned trial judge defendant No. 3 - District Education Primary Committee preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 68/1996. Learned Appellate Judge recorded that since, plaintiff filed purshis at Exh. 15 in the Appeal declaring that if the defendant No. 4 was ready and willing to pay 50% of the backwages immediately preceding three years period then he was willing to waive his right of remaining 50% of the backwages voluntarily, and signed by all advocates concerned the appeal was to be disposed of accordingly. Learned Appellate Judge then examined the merits of the case and observed that learned Trial judge was reasonably satisfied that the termination order passed against the plaintiff was not in consonance with the provisions of Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules as also not according to the rules. Learned Appellate Judge then came to the conclusion that it was not a case of simple termination of the service of the plaintiff but the termination of plaintiff's service was by way of penalty and therefore, there was clear breach of rules and of the provisions under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Learned Appellate Judge further recorded that termination order of the plaintiff was since, without holding any departmental inquiry the same was arbitrary and contrary to Rule 5(1) read with Rule 7 of Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. On such conclusion Learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and declared the plaintiff entitled to 50% backwages on the basis of purshis Exh. 15 submitted by the plaintiff and directed the appellant District Primary Education Committee to pay 50% amount of backwages immediately preceding three years from the date of institution of the suit. The District Education Officer the defendants No. 4 was directed to do the needful for reinstatement of plaintiff in service. 6. It is this judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Judge which is under challenge before this Court. The District Education Officer the defendants No. 4 was directed to do the needful for reinstatement of plaintiff in service. 6. It is this judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Judge which is under challenge before this Court. This Appeal was admitted vide order dated 4th October 2000 on the following substantial question of law : (1) Whether the lower Appellate Court has erred in holding that the suit was not barred by the period of limitation. (2)Whether the Lower Court has erred in holding that the impugned order of termination of service of the plaintiff was punitive in nature. (3) Whether the Lower Appellate Court has erred in holding that the provisions contained in the Gujarat Panchayat Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules were attracted in case of termination of service of the plaintiff and the order of termination of service having been made in contravention of the said Rules is null and void. (4) Whether the Lower Appellate Court has erred in holding that the order of termination of service of the plaintiff was not termination simplicitor and that the provisions contained in Article 311 of the Constitution were applicable to the facts of the case. 7. I have heard learned advocates for the parties. Mr. Mishra appearing for the appellant submitted that the plaintiff was relieved from service by order dated 16th July 1971. The plaintiff thought it fit to file the suit in the year 1984 challenging the said order on the ground that the plaintiff was entitled for exemption from training and the order relieving him from service was null and void. Mr. Mishra submitted that the suit of the plaintiff suffers from delay and latches and the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in such suit filed at a belated stage. 8. Mr. Mishra submitted that the Courts below have also committed serious error in holding that the order of termination of service of the plaintiff was punitive. He pointed out that the plaintiff was under obligation to go for training and inspite of the order asking the plaintiff to go for training, the plaintiff did not go for training and thus violated the condition of appointment as Primary Teacher and thereby the plaintiff lost his right to continue in service. 9. Mr. He pointed out that the plaintiff was under obligation to go for training and inspite of the order asking the plaintiff to go for training, the plaintiff did not go for training and thus violated the condition of appointment as Primary Teacher and thereby the plaintiff lost his right to continue in service. 9. Mr. Mishra pointed out that twice the plaintiff voluntarily did not go for training and he automatically lost his right to continue as a Primary Teacher and there was no necessity of holding departmental inquiry against the plaintiff because the order dated 16th July 1971 relieving the plaintiff, was passed because the plaintiff did not go for training. 10. Mr. Mishra further submitted that there is no question of application of provision of Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 because the termination of the plaintiff was not penal in nature. Mr. Mishra submitted that the plaintiff having slept over his right for more than 13 years in filing the suit, the Courts below were not justified in declaring the above said order as null and void. Mr. Mishra thus urged to allow this appeal on the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admitting this Appeal. 11. As against the above arguments, learned advocate Mr. R N Shah appearing for respondent No 1 submitted that the plaintiff was regular employee in the school run by the appellant and there was no condition provided in the appointment order for undergoing the training. Mr. Shah submitted that it was a separate order whereby the plaintiff was asked to go for training to which the plaintiff had made representation by pointing out his sickness. Mr. Shah submitted that even if the plaintiff was not granted exemption from appearing in the training, the services of the plaintiff could not have been put to an end abruptly. Mr. Shah further submitted that in any case when the services of the plaintiff were required to be terminated, the appellant was required to follow legal procedure under Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Mr. Shah pointed out that the plaintiff was otherwise entitled to be served with notice and also entitled to have full opportunity to defend himself against the action of terminating his services but the plaintiff's services were put an end without following any procedure of law. Mr. Shah pointed out that the plaintiff was otherwise entitled to be served with notice and also entitled to have full opportunity to defend himself against the action of terminating his services but the plaintiff's services were put an end without following any procedure of law. He, therefore submitted that Courts below have committed no error in declaring the order dated 16th July 1971 as null and void. Mr. Shah also submitted that the suit of the plaintiff did not suffer from delay and latches because after the plaintiff was relieved from service the plaintiff had made many attempts to convince the authorities to permit the plaintiff to go for training and to resume duty as Primary Teacher. 12. He submitted that even otherwise for challenging the void order of termination of service of the plaintiff, limitation would not come in the way of the plaintiff in filing the suit. He thus urged to dismiss the appeal as none of the substantial questions of law arise in the appeal for consideration of this Court. 13. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and having perused the judgment and decree passed by Courts below with the records and proceedings, it appears that the plaintiff was appointed as Primary Teacher on 9th July 1966. The appointment order is produced at Exh. 36. The appointment order reveals that the plaintiff was required to give undertaking to the effect that as and when the plaintiff was asked to go for training the plaintiff would be bound to go for such training and if the plaintiff refused to go for such training it would be open for the department to relieve the plaintiff. This undertaking is part of the appointment order. The plaintiff has examined himself at Exh. 35. In his cross-examination the plaintiff has admitted that he had given such undertaking as per the appointment order. Therefore, the appointment of the plaintiff as Primary Teacher was subject to condition of compulsory training by the plaintiff as and when the plaintiff was so asked by department. Consequences of refusal to go for training were also accepted by the plaintiff by way of his own undertaking. As per the appointment order read with undertaking of the plaintiff, it was very clear that if the plaintiff refused to go for training the plaintiff was to be relieved from service without any further procedure to be followed. 14. Consequences of refusal to go for training were also accepted by the plaintiff by way of his own undertaking. As per the appointment order read with undertaking of the plaintiff, it was very clear that if the plaintiff refused to go for training the plaintiff was to be relieved from service without any further procedure to be followed. 14. Exh. 24 is the order dated 16th July 1971 wherein it is stated that three opportunities to appear in the training were given to the plaintiff and the plaintiff had not made out any grounds for exemption from training. The plaintiff was therefore, asked by the said authority to immediately report for duty as the plaintiff was required to go for training. It was made very clear in the said order to the plaintiff that if the plaintiff did not resume duty for the purpose of training, the plaintiff shall be relieved from service. 15. It appears that after the plaintiffs were given three opportunities to appear for training and after his request for exemption was turned down the plaintiff was asked to resume duty for the purpose of attending the training. Still however, the plaintiff did not join the training and therefore, the services of the plaintiff stood terminated. In view of the above facts it cannot be said that the order terminating the services of the plaintiff was punitive. It was simpliciter an order relieving the plaintiff from service as the plaintiff lost his right to continue in service on account of not joining for the training. Since, the order terminating the service of the plaintiff was not passed by way of penalty, no inquiry was required to be held against the plaintiff. Therefore, the Courts below have materially erred in holding that the order dated 16th July 1971 terminating the service of the plaintiff was null and void. In fact when plaintiff had himself admitted that his appointment order was subject to undergoing training for which he himself had given undertaking, and since, the plaintiff has failed to comply with such undertaking and did not go for training without any reasonable cause, no illegality could be found in the order terminating the service of the plaintiff. 16. The plaintiff was otherwise also not entitled to any relief in his suit which was filed at belated stage. 16. The plaintiff was otherwise also not entitled to any relief in his suit which was filed at belated stage. There is no dispute about the fact that the plaintiff was relieved from service by order dated 16th July 1971 and the plaintiff filed suit in the year 1984 assailing the order of terminating his service. The plaintiff has not made out any ground in the suit as to why he took 13 years in approaching the Civil Court against the above order dated 16th July 1971. The Courts below have held that since the order terminating the service of the plaintiff was null and void, limitation would not come in the way of the plaintiff in challenging such order in the Civil Court. In my view the Courts below have erred in holding that the suit of the plaintiff was within time limit. It is required to be noted that the plaintiff was conscious of the fact that he was under obligation to go for training by virtue of his own undertaking. The plaintiff in fact asked for exemption from going to training and before that the plaintiff was given three opportunities to join the training. The plaintiff was therefore conscious about the consequences to be followed for not joining the training. Now if the plaintiff suffered the consequences of relieving him from service by order dated 16th July 1971, the plaintiff could not have slept over his right to challenge such order for a period more than 13 years. 17. In the case of State Bank of India v. BS Agriculture Industries (I), reported in (2009) 5 SCC page 121, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the plea of limitation being a jurisdictional fact need not be pleaded, and the Court is bound to take into consideration such plea of limitation. 18. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samity, Manglor v. Pahal Singh reported in (2007) 12 SCC pg 193. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that the delay and latches defeats the equity. 19. In State of Orissa v. V. Chandra Sekhar Mishra reported in (2002)10 SCC 583 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Tribunal was not justified in entertaining the challenge to the order of termination after a period of 14 years. 20. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that the delay and latches defeats the equity. 19. In State of Orissa v. V. Chandra Sekhar Mishra reported in (2002)10 SCC 583 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Tribunal was not justified in entertaining the challenge to the order of termination after a period of 14 years. 20. In the case of Union of India and another v. S.S. Kothiyal and Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 682 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the party does not take his own remedy and delayed such remedy, is responsible for such delay and latches and not entitled to any relief. 21. In the present case the evil consequences for the plaintiff had already started when the plaintiff was relieved from service in the year 1971 and the plaintiff was therefore required to file suit within reasonable period of time, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above cases. Since, the plaintiff was himself responsible for delay and latches, the plaintiff could not be made entitled to any relief in the suit. 22. In the light of above principles of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, in my view the suit of the plaintiff suffered from delay and latches and the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the said suit. Therefore the Courts below were not justified in granting any relief in such suit of the plaintiff which was filed at much belated stage. The substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of this appeal are thus answered accordingly. In the result, the Appeal is allowed, judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are hereby quashed and set aside. Appeal allowed.