JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge: Essential facts necessary for adjudication of this petition are that the petitioners and proforma respondent No. 8 claimed that their predecessor-in-interest late Sh. Panchhi Ram was tenant under the then owners of land as entered against Khata Khatauni No. 8/9, Kite-5, measuring 10.5 bighas and the land as entered against Khata No. 20, Khatauni No. 27, Kite 6, measuring 10.15 bighas, total measuring 21 bighas, situated at Mauja Khalini, Shimla, Tehsil and District Shimla. The Halqua Patwari, by order of Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Shimla, entered mutation No. 94 on 23.08.1979. The Kanungo of the area verified this mutation on 01.11.1979. The mutation was then attested by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade on 30.11.1979 and Sh. Panchhi Ram was held to be owner in possession of the land. The respondents No. 2 to 7 filed a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) on 08.10.2003 against the order, dated 30.11.1979. The delay was condoned by the learned Financial Commissioner on 18.07.2005. The revision petition was allowed by the learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) on 22.08.2006. 2. This writ petition is directed against the order, dated 22.08.2006, passed by the learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Himachal Pradesh. 3. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously argued that the order, dated 22.08.2006, was barred by delay and laches. He then contended that delay of 27 years in filing the revision petition has not been explained satisfactorily. He has supported the order, dated 30.11.1979. According to him, the learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) has not taken into consideration the judgment, dated 27.10.1959, rendered by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Mahasu in case No. 35/1 of 1958, judgment, dated 28.10.2003, rendered by the learned Sub Judge, 1st Class (1), Shimla in Civil Suit No. 24/1 of 1997. He further contended that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was tenant and the proprietary rights upon him have been conferred automatically after coming into force the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act w.e.f. 21.02.1974. 4. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for respondents No. 2 and 3 has vehemently argued that the order, dated 30.11.1979 is without jurisdiction, since the same has been passed by the AC 2nd Grade instead of AC-1st Grade. He then contended that the mutation has been attested in violation of the mandatory provisions of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and the Rules framed thereunder. He then contended that the mutation has been attested in violation of the mandatory provisions of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and the Rules framed thereunder. He also contended that the owners were not present at the time when the attestation was carried out by the authorities concerned. He further contended that no proprietary rights could be conferred upon the tenants where the land was owned by the State. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records carefully. 6. Respondents No. 2 and 3 have filed a civil Suit in the Court of learned Sub Judge, 1st Class (1), Shimla on 28.04.1997 for declaration with consequential relief of possession and permanent prohibitory injunction. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class (1), Shimla has framed the following issues on 25.07.2002: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the possession of the suit land and the property, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the mutation No. 94, sanctioned on 30.11.1979 in respect of suit land conferring proprietory rights on Panchi Ram and defendants No. 1 to 5 is illegal, null and void, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the revenue entries on the basis of aforesaid mutation is also null and void, as alleged ? OPP 4. Whether the sale deed or transfer deeds executed by Panchi Ram or by defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour of the defendants No. 6 to 13 are wrong, null and void, as alleged? OPP 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of mandatory injunction? OPP 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction? OPP 7. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPDs. 8. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPDs. 9. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action?OPD 10. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction, if so, what is correct valuation? OPDs. 11. Relief.” 7. Learned Sub Judge, 1st Class (1), Shimla while returning findings on issues No. 2,3 and 8 has held that the mutation attested vide Ex. DW1/V on 30.11.1979 was void abinitio, since it was attested by the AC 2nd Grade. He also held that since the order passed vide Annexure DW1/V was without jurisdiction, there was no limitation involved in challenging this mutation. 8. DW1/V on 30.11.1979 was void abinitio, since it was attested by the AC 2nd Grade. He also held that since the order passed vide Annexure DW1/V was without jurisdiction, there was no limitation involved in challenging this mutation. 8. Now, as far as issues No. 1 and 4 are concerned, learned Sub Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession of the suit land. He has referred to the judgment rendered by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Mahasu vide judgment, dated 27.10.1959, Ex.-DW1/A. Sh. Panchhi Ram, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners and respondent No.8 was held to be a tenant over the suit land since 1939. Learned Sub Judge, 1st Class (1), Shimla while deciding issues No. 5 and 6, has held that since the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit land, they were not entitled to the relief of injunction. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class (1), Shimla, H.P. dismissed the suit on 28.10.2003. The petitioners have assailed the judgment of the learned Sub Judge, dated 28.10.2003 by filing Civil Appeal No. 76-S/13 of 2005/04 before the learned District Judge (F), Shimla. He dismissed the same on 21.11.2006. Plaintiffs have also filed an appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 28.10.2003, before the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, bearing Civil Appeal No. 147-S/13 of 2005/04. The same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla, H.P. on 27.08.2009. The copies of the judgment, rendered by the learned Sub Judge, 1st Class (1), Shimla in Civil Suit No. 24/1 of 1997 on 28.10.2003, copy of the judgment, dated 21.11.2006, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 76-S/13 of 2005/04 and copy of the judgment, dated 27.08.2009, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 147-S/13 of 2005/04, have been placed on record by the petitioners. 9. What emerges from the previous litigation between the parties, is that though Sh. Panchhi Ram was declared to be tenant over the suit land, but the mutation attested on 30.11.1979 was held to be without jurisdiction. Respondents No. 2 and 3 have filed a revision petition against the mutation, dated 30.11.1979 before the Financial Commissioner (Appeals). It was barred by limitation. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed alongwith the revision petition. Respondents No. 2 and 3 have filed a revision petition against the mutation, dated 30.11.1979 before the Financial Commissioner (Appeals). It was barred by limitation. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed alongwith the revision petition. The learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) condoned the delay on 18.07.2005 by observing that since the order, dated 30.11.1979 was void abinitio, the question of limitation was not involved and the matter was required to be heard on merit. Consequently, the revision petition was admitted for hearing. Learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) has passed the order on 22.08.2006. 10. The anchorsheet of respodnents No. 2 and 3 before the learned Financial Commissioner was that the order of mutation passed on 30.11.1979 was without jurisdiction. According to Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3, the mutation could only be attested by A.C. 1st Grade and not by A.C. 2nd Grade. He has also drawn the attention of the Court to Annexure P-1. It is evident from Annexure-P1 that the mutation has been attested by AC 2nd Grade. The Financial Commissioner has also taken into consideration that the owners were not present at the time when the mutation was attested by the A.C. 2nd Grade. Learned Financial Commissioner has noticed that in copy of mutation sheet, initially it was recorded on 30.11.1979 that some of the owners were dead, but this line had been scratched out and the mutation has been attested on the same date. The Court has also seen the original record at pages No. 49/50. In fact, there is an overwriting by the A.C. 2nd Grade in order, dated 15.11.1979. The petitioner has also filed a copy Annexure-P1, whereby the order, dated 01.11.1979, 23.08.1979 and 15.11.1979 have been passed. Surprisingly, in the copy filed by the petitioner Annexure P-1, there are no cuttings. The Court deprecates the practice adopted by the petitioners. The petitioners ought to have filed the correct copy of Annexure P-1 on record, which was available before the Financial Commissioner. The order of attesting the mutation has been passed behind the back of the owners. The owners ought to have been heard before the mutation was attested. There is no tangible evidence placed on record that the owners of the land/legal heirs or representatives were informed of the date of attestation of mutation. The order of attesting the mutation has been passed behind the back of the owners. The owners ought to have been heard before the mutation was attested. There is no tangible evidence placed on record that the owners of the land/legal heirs or representatives were informed of the date of attestation of mutation. Thus, there is violation of the principles of natural justice, which renders the order, dated 30.11.1979 void abinitio. The mutation could only be attested by the AC 1st Grade under Chapter IX of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. There is a detailed procedure, the manner in which the attestation has to be carried out as per Rules 28 and 29. The Patwari is required to enter the mutation of ownership in the mutation register in favour of the non-occupancy tenants, on whom the proprietary right under rule 27 vested and the Revenue Officer thereafter is required to attest the mutation in the presence of the parties. The procedure prescribed under the H.P. Land Revenue Act, i.e., Sections 22 and 23 is also required to be followed, which in the present case has not been followed. It is established from Annexure P-1 that the owners were not present at the time of attestation of the mutation. According to the mutation, though the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners has been conferred with proprietary rights qua the private land, but the proprietary rights have also been conferred of the Government land, which was not permissible as per the Amendment Act 6 of 1988. 11. A Division Bench of this Court in State of H.P. Vs. Chander Dev and others, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 728 has held that proviso added by Amendment Act 6 of 1988 will have retrospective effect and the rights of the State as land owner automatically vested on tenants before the amendment Act No. 6 of 1988 were taken away by proviso added by the amendment Act. The Division Bench has held as under: “22. The thrust of the argument of Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Advocate, is that it is well recognised rule of interpretation that in the absence of express words or appropriate language from which retrospective application may be inferred, an amendment which is not procedural in nature and affects substantive rights is always deemed to be prospective in nature. There is no quarrel with this proposition of law. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Advocate, is that it is well recognised rule of interpretation that in the absence of express words or appropriate language from which retrospective application may be inferred, an amendment which is not procedural in nature and affects substantive rights is always deemed to be prospective in nature. There is no quarrel with this proposition of law. There is also no dispute with regard to the proposition canvassed by Mr. Verma that under the Act as it stood before, its amendment the rights of the land owners (including the State) vested in the tenant(s) free from all encumbrances automatically from the date of notification of the publication of the rules. Reference in this behalf may be made to Daulat Ram etc. Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh etc. (1978) 7 ILR 742. In the present case the legislature in its wisdom specifically made the proviso retrospectively applicable. Sub Section (3) of Section 1 of the Amendment Act clearly lays down the amendments the amendments would come into force from the date of commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The proviso which has been inserted is deemed to have been inserted from the date when the Act came into force. The rules were framed later on. By virtue of the amendment being given retrospective effect the proviso is deemed to have been incorporated in the Act prior to the framing of the Rules. Therefore, on the date when the rules came into existence, non-occupancy tenant under the Government could have been granted proprietary rights. Once the legislature has clearly laid down that the amendment taking away substantial rights shall have retrospectively application, the court cannot violate the plain and simple language of the amendment Act and make it prospective in nature. On the one hand, the learned Judge deciding Dinesh Kumar’s case held that the amendment is retrospective, but on the other hand went on to hold that the intention of the legislature did not appear to be to take away the vested rights of the tenant. With due respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to subscribe this view. We are of the view that the latter judgment delivered by Justice Kamlesh Sharma must be held to be per incuriam in view of the fact that it did not notice the earlier judgment delivered by Justice Devinder Gupta.” 12. With due respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to subscribe this view. We are of the view that the latter judgment delivered by Justice Kamlesh Sharma must be held to be per incuriam in view of the fact that it did not notice the earlier judgment delivered by Justice Devinder Gupta.” 12. This aspect should have also been taken into consideration by the learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) while deciding the revision petition, since amendment No. 6 has already come into force. In the instant case, learned Civil Court has also held, as noticed above that the mutation could not be attested by the A.C. 2nd Grade. Ultimately, learned Financial Commissioner has accepted the revision and the order of the Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade, dated 30.11.1979, conferring proprietary rights of land in favour of Shri Panchhi Ram, was set aside. The case was remanded to the Land Reforms Office, Shimla to conduct a thorough enquiry into the matter and proceed thereafter in accordance with law. The order passed by the learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) is within the legal parameters. There is neither any perversity nor any procedural impropriety in the order, dated 22.08.2006. 13. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners has also argued that the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) could not entertain the revision petition after a gap of 27 years. In the instant case, the respondents have also moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act alongwith revision petition. This application was allowed by the learned Financial Commissioner by a very reasoned order on 18.07.2005. The order of A.C. 2nd Grade, dated 30.11.1979 was without jurisdiction. It was passed in negation of the mandatory provisions of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and Rules 26 to 29 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Rules, 1975. The A.C. 2nd Grade has absolutely no jurisdiction to confer proprietary rights upon the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. This order could only be passed by the A.C. 1st Grade upon whom the power has been conferred under Section 86 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the learned Financial Commissioner has no jurisdiction to hear the revision petition. This order could only be passed by the A.C. 1st Grade upon whom the power has been conferred under Section 86 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the learned Financial Commissioner has no jurisdiction to hear the revision petition. It is clear from the plain language of Section 114 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 that with respect to all matters dealt with under Chapter IX, the Financial Commissioner has the same power to call for examine and revise the proceedings of the Land Reforms Officer, or the Collector or the Commissioner as provided in Section 65 of the Act. The order, dated 30.11.1979, passed by the A.C. 2nd Grade was without jurisdiction and the same has rightly been interfered with by the learned Financial Commissioner. Normally, the power of revision is to be exercised within a reasonable period, but in those cases where there are glaring illegalities, the power of revision can be exercised at any time to advance the cause of justice. 14. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector and others Vs. P. Mangamma and others (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 488 have held that a reasonable period would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. Their Lordships have held as under: “5. A reasonable period would depend upon the factual circumstances of the concerned case. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The Court/ authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question. 6. In State of Gujarat v. Pate/ Raghav Natha and Ors. ( AIR 1969 SC 1297 ) it was observed that when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in view by the Division Bench. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in view by the Division Bench. Additionally, the points relating to applicability of the Prohibition Act, and even if it is held that the Act was applicable, the reasonableness of the time during which action should have been initiated were also not considered. It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a child's toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the decision of the judge usually determines what is "reasonable" in each particular case; but frequently reasonableness "belong to the knowledge of the law, and therefore to be decided by the Courts". It was illumi-natingly stated by a learned author that an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying to count what is not number and measure what is not space. It means pr/ma facie in law reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. [See Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Anr. ( AIR 1987 SC 2316 ) arid Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P.) Ltd. and Anr. ( AIR 1989 SC 973 )]. As observed by Lord Romilly M.R. in Labouchere v. Dawson (1872) L.R. 13 Eg. Ca. 325) it is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must have the particular facts of each case established before you can ascertain what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” 15. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2007) 5 Supreme Court Cases 211 have held that the Revisional authority must consider extent of delay and whether revision was filed within reasonable time, intervening circumstances and subsequent events so as to conclude whether revisional jurisdiction should be exercised or not. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2007) 5 Supreme Court Cases 211 have held that the Revisional authority must consider extent of delay and whether revision was filed within reasonable time, intervening circumstances and subsequent events so as to conclude whether revisional jurisdiction should be exercised or not. Their Lordships have further held that the Revisional jurisdiction of State Govt. cannot only be exercised by it suo motu but can also be invoked by a party aggrieved. Their Lordships have also held that though no period of limitation is prescribed, but revisional jurisdiction must be invoked within a reasonable time and what would amount to reasonable time would depend upon fact and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “22. Section 34 of the Act confers on Government revisional jurisdiction. It reads thus; 34. Revision by State Government._The State Government may, on its own motion, call for and examine the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under the provisions of this Act and against which no appeal has been preferred under Sec. 12 or Sec. 30 or Sec. 33 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such procedure and pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit; Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. 23. The learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation submitted that the Act does not confer right to file revision upon a person aggrieved. The State alone is empowered to exercise revisional power. The counsel submitted that such power can be exercised by the State Government on its own motion (suo motu) calling for and examining the records of any order passed under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself of the legality and propriety of such order. It is, therefore, implicit that a party cannot invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. 24. We are, however, unable to uphold the said contention. It is true that Section 34 enables the State Government to exercise revisional powers suo motu. That, however, does not mean that a party cannot invoke such jurisdiction. It is, therefore, implicit that a party cannot invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. 24. We are, however, unable to uphold the said contention. It is true that Section 34 enables the State Government to exercise revisional powers suo motu. That, however, does not mean that a party cannot invoke such jurisdiction. A revision can also be filed by party aggrieved and it can invite the attention of the Revisional Authority as to illegality or impropriety of any order passed under the Act. The revision filed by the land-owners, therefore, could not be held to be not maintainable. 31. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the Revisional Authority was duty bound to take into account the length of delay, intervening circumstances and subsequent events from 1977 to 1995 and to consider whether the powers should have been exercised or not. Since no such exercise has been undertaken, the order suffers from legal infirmity and must be quashed. 16. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry and others Vs. Govt. of A.P. and others (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 221 have held that the judgment , decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as non est and nullity, whether by court of first instance or by the final court. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. Their Lordships have further held that the principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. Their Lordships have further held that when the basis, on which the said officer proceeded to determine surplus land, was found to be non-existent and non est, the State Govt. was justified in setting aside the order in exercise of the suo motu revisional power. Their Lordships have held as under: “17. Having given anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the parties, in our opinion, no case has been made out by the appellants for interference with the order passed by the High Court allowing the applications and recalling earlier order. The High Court has considered the matter in detail. The case of land- owners was that advance possession was taken over by Port Trust Authorities in August, 1972. The High Court has considered the matter in detail. The case of land- owners was that advance possession was taken over by Port Trust Authorities in August, 1972. The subsequent facts and letter by Chief Engineer of Port Trust in 1985 clearly revealed that it was not so. Possession of land was never with the land owners and was not given to Port Trust Authorities. From the record it is clear that neither the land-owners nor the Port Trust Authorities were in actual or physical possession of land, but it was occupied by tenants and disputes were also going on between the tenants and land owners. Therefore, the basis on which the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling proceeded to decide the matter was non-existent and non est. 19. We are further of the view that the State Government, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was right in exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. Mr. Venugopal is indeed right in submitting that even though no period of limitation is prescribed for exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the State Government suo motu, such power must be exercised within a reasonable time [vide State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, (1969) 2 SCC 187 ]. But taking into account the facts and circumstances in their entirety and in particular, a letter of Chief Engineer, Visakhapatnam Port Trust of December 19, 1985, it cannot be said that the power had not been exercised within a reasonable period. It is also pertinent to note that the subsequent development shows as to how some of the Officers of the Port Trust were parties to fraud said to have been committed by land-owners. In this connection, the respondents are right in inviting our attention to a letter dated August 21, 1989 by the Port Trust Authorities to the Commissioner of Land Reforms stating therein that the Government intended to exercise suo motu power under Section 34 of the Act but there was no necessity to reopen proceedings and suitable directions were required to be issued to District Collector, Visakhapatnam to pass an award in respect of land sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. In view of these developments, in our opinion, the High Court was fully justified in recalling the earlier order. 22. In view of these developments, in our opinion, the High Court was fully justified in recalling the earlier order. 22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order _by the first Court or by the final Court_ has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. 26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. 38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent Court of Law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the applicant/plaintiff which is upheld by all the courts including the final Court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss Special Leave Petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order. 39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and nonest and cannot be allowed to stand. 39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and nonest and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as nonest by every Court, superior or inferior. 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Durga Das Vs. Collector and others (1996) 5 Supreme Court Cases 618, Sankalchan Jaychandbhai Patel and others Vs. Vithalbhai Jaychandbhai Patel and others (1996) 6 Supreme Court Cases 433, State of U.P. Vs. Amar Singh and others (1997) 1 Supreme Court Cases 734, Balwant Singh and another Vs. Daulat Singh and others (1997) 7 Supreme Court Cases 137 and Mahila Bajrangi and others Vs. Badribai and another (2003) 2 Supreme Court Cases 464 have held that mutations do not confer any title. Their Lordships have further held that these entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue. 18. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Besru Vs. Shibu1999 (1) Shim. L.C. 343 has held that the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade has no jurisdiction to attest the mutations and the same was declared to be void abinitio. Learned Single Judge has considered Rules 28 and 29 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Rules, 1975 as well as Sections 22 and 23 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act. The learned Single Judge has held as under: “9. Rule 28 of the Rules provides that mutation is to be attested in the presence of the parties and Rule 29 provides that a dispute under sub-section (4) of Section 104 of the Act shall be decided by the land Reforms Officer in his capacity as an Assistant Collector1st Grade in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act or the H.P. Land Revenue Act, as the case may be, though the inquiry held by him would be summary inquiry. In the H.P. Land Revenue Act, which applies to the present case. In the H.P. Land Revenue Act, which applies to the present case. Sections 20 to 23 provide for summoning persons for the purpose of any business before a Revenue Officer and the mode of service of summons. Under Section 21 thereof, it is stated that summons issued by a Revenue Officer shall, if practicable, be served personally upon the person to whom it is addressed or failing him, his recognized agent, or in case it is refused by affixation on the last known address or by sending the same by registered post of proclamation, etc. etc. 10. Admittedly, in the present case no attempt was made by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade to serve the plaintiff in accordance with law. As such, the mutation is void ab initio being violative of the principles of natural justice. It can be held so far another reason that it was not passed by the competent authority. From Rule 29 of the Rules, it is clear that only Assistant Collector of the 1st Grade was the competent Land Reforms Officer to hold inquiry under Section 104 of the Act. It is further fortified by the Notifications dated 27th/29th September, 1995 whereby all the Tehsildars in Himachal Pradesh were conferred with powers of Assistant Collector of 1st Grade for purposes of Chapter X of the Act under which Section 104, pertaining to acquisition of proprietary rights by the tenants, fails. By another Notification of the same date, Tehsildars conferred with the powers of Assistant Collector 1st Grade were appointed Land Reforms Officers for carrying out the purposes of Chapter X of the Act within their respective jurisdiction with immediate effect. So far the present case is concerned, from the perusal of mutation, it is clear that it was attested by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade who had no jurisdiction to do so. Had the plaintiff been served in accordance with law and the competent authority held proper inquiry, the mutation conferring proprietary rights on the defendants would not have been passed in view of the Bar under sub-section (8)(a) of Section 104 of the Act.” 19. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. No costs.