JUDGMENT Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—The present writ petition arises out of proceedings for release initiated by the respondents-landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (for short the Act) against the tenant-petitioner herein, in respect of the residential accommodation being house No. 103/107, Colonelganj, district Kanpur Nagar. 2. The respondents-landlord sought release of the premises on the ground they were co-owners/landlord and had purchased the same from the erstwhile owner by means of a registered sale-deed dated 27.2.1990 and the fact was duly informed to the tenant vide notice dated 22.7.1993. It was pleaded that the petitioner was tenant in the said premises consisting of two rooms, varandah, Courtyard, latrine, bathroom and kitchen on the ground floor and two rooms and balcony on the first floor at a monthly rent of Rs. 11/-. It was further pleaded that family of respondent No. 1, consisting of himself, wife, one son aged about 24 years and three daughters aged about 19, 16 and 12 years respectively, were living in a tenanted accommodation consisting of one room and varandah at a monthly rent of Rs. 300/-; family of respondent No. 2 consisting of himself, wife, one daughter aged about 25 years and two sons aged about 22 and 12 years respectively, were living in a tenanted accommodation consisting of one room in house No. 117/25, Geeta Nagar, Kanpur at a monthly rent of Rs. 500/-; family of respondent No. 3 consisting of himself, wife and one son aged about 5 years, alongwith the family of respondent No. 4, were living in one room in house No. 103/71, which was in the tenancy of their uncle. 3. Proceedings were contested by the petitioner-tenant by filing a written statement alleging that the need set up by the landlord is frivolous and they do not need any accommodation for their personal use. It was further pleaded that no notice under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was served and, as such, the release application was not maintainable. Trial Court vide order dated 9.6.2010 held that the accommodation in question was bona fidely required by the landlord and comparative hardship was also greater and, accordingly, allowed the release application. Tenant went up in appeal, which was also dismissed. 4. Trial Court vide order dated 9.6.2010 held that the accommodation in question was bona fidely required by the landlord and comparative hardship was also greater and, accordingly, allowed the release application. Tenant went up in appeal, which was also dismissed. 4. The first argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that six months’ notice, as required under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, was not given, hence, release application was not maintainable and the Prescribed Authority wrongly and illegally held that since the proceedings were initiated after expiry of period of three years, as such, six months’ notice was not required. It has further been submitted that the application filed by the respondents-landlord before appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. to take on record six months’ notice dated 29.4.1994 was illegally allowed by the appellate Court and on the basis of the same, it was wrongly and illegally held that six months’ notice was served on the tenant-petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the impugned judgments are vitiated, inasmuch as both the Courts have not considered, the question of satisfying the need by partial release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord, which is mandatory. 6. In reply, it has been submitted by Shri Manish Tandon appearing for the respondents that six months’ notice contemplated by proviso to Section 21 (1) was sent to the tenant on 21.4.2004, which was served. The postal receipt was filed in evidence before the prescribed authority, however, the copy of the notice could not be brought on record due to mistake of the counsel and, as such, it was filed as additional evidence at the appellate stage under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. The appellate Court, in the facts and circumstances, rightly allowed the copy of the notice to be taken on record as additional evidence. It is further submitted that both the Courts have recorded a concurrent finding on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship in favour of the landlord and, thus, the petition is concluded by findings of act and the impugned orders do not require any interference. 7. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 8. It is further submitted that both the Courts have recorded a concurrent finding on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship in favour of the landlord and, thus, the petition is concluded by findings of act and the impugned orders do not require any interference. 7. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 8. In order to appreciate the argument raised by the learned counsel for the respective parties in respect of six months’ notice, it may be relevant to quote the relevant portion of the proviso to Section 21 (1) (a), which reads as under. “provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years.” 9. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision goes to show that an application for release on the grounds mentioned in Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act in respect of a building, in a case where the building was in occupation of a tenant since before its purchase, there is a prohibition on the new landlord to seek release within three years from the date of the purchase and that too, after a notice of six months, which can be given even before the expiry of a period of three years. 10. Prescribed Authority relying upon the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Pramod Kumar and others v. Additional District Judge, Hapur, held that since the release application was filed after three years, six months’ notice was not required. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that judgment of this Court in the case of Pramod Kumar (supra) is based on the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan v. Md. Safi and others, 2001 (8) SCC 540 . 12. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that judgment of this Court in the case of Pramod Kumar (supra) is based on the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan v. Md. Safi and others, 2001 (8) SCC 540 . 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that view taken by this Court in the case of Pramod Kumar (supra) relied upon by the Prescribed Authority is directly in conflict of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Martin & Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional District Judge and others, 1998 (1) SCC 372. In the case of Pramod Kumar (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court relying upon the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan (supra) held that if an application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) is filed after a period of three years from the date of purchase, six months’ notice, as contemplated in the proviso to the said section not required. 13. First proviso to Section 21 came up to consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Martin & Harris Ltd. (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court framed following three questions for consideration. (i) Whether the respondents-landlord’s application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was not maintainable in view of the proviso to said Section as it was filed before the expiry of three years from the date of purchase of the suit premises by the respondent. (ii) Whether the said application was not maintainable on the additional ground that it was filed prior to the expiry of six months from the date on which notice was given by the respondent to the appellant as required by the very same proviso. (iii) Whether the bona fide requirement of the respondent-landlord did not survive in view of the subsequent event, namely, that respondent’s wife had acquired an undivided interest in the adjoining part of the building in which the suit premises were situated and wherein the respondent-landlord was staying with his wife. 14. (iii) Whether the bona fide requirement of the respondent-landlord did not survive in view of the subsequent event, namely, that respondent’s wife had acquired an undivided interest in the adjoining part of the building in which the suit premises were situated and wherein the respondent-landlord was staying with his wife. 14. In so far as the first two questions are concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court while analysing the provision, held that no application filed by the landlord is to be entertained by the Prescribed Authority on the grounds mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has expired since the date of purchase of the property by the landlord, when the building which is purchased, is having a sitting tenant. However, drawing a distinction between the words ‘entertain’ and ‘institution’, it was held that when the case is taken up for consideration on merits of the grounds under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, three years’ period should have been elapsed from the date on which the purchase was made. In paragraph 9 of the report, it was held has under. “A mere look at the aforesaid provision of the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act shows that no application filed by the landlord is to be entertained by the prescribed authority on grounds mentioned in clause (a) unless a period of three years has expired since the date of purchase of the property by the landlord when the building which is purchased is having a sitting tenant. It is not in dispute between the parties that the appellant was a sitting tenant since 1966 in the said building when it was purchased by respondent-landlord on 30th June 1985, It is, of course, true that respondent-landlord moved an application for possession, against the appellant both under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act and also under Section 21(1-A) of the Act. However, so far as the ground under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act is concerned the application was filed before the expiry of three years from the date of such purchase. It was in fact filed within seven months from the date of purchase of the premises. The moot question is whether the very filing of such application was barred by the provisions of the said proviso. It was in fact filed within seven months from the date of purchase of the premises. The moot question is whether the very filing of such application was barred by the provisions of the said proviso. It must be kept in view that the proviso nowhere lays down that no application on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) could be ‘instituted’ within a period of three years from the date of purchase. On the contrary, the proviso lays down that such application on the said grounds cannot be ‘entertained’ by the authority before the expiry of that period. Consequently it is not possible to agree with the extreme contention canvassed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that such an application could not have been filed at all within the said period of three years. The statutory scheme of Section 21(1) contra-indicates such a contention. Sub-Section (1) of Section 21 lays down that ‘the prescribed authority may on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists.....’ Section 21(1) deals with grounds mentioned not only in clause (a) but also in clause (b). The proviso to Section 21(1) bars entertainment of the application only on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) thereof, it is easy to visualise that an application for possession may be filed by the landlord not only invoking grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) but even other grounds mentioned in that sub-section. Therefore, the stage at which the Court has to consider whether grounds mentioned in clause (a) are made out by the plaintiff or not will be reached when the Court takes up the application for consideration on merits. It has to be kept in view that application for possession filed under Section 21(1) of the Act are not placed for admission before the Prescribed Authority. Once they are filed they are to be processed for being decided on merits after issuing notices to the parties concerned. It has to be kept in view that application for possession filed under Section 21(1) of the Act are not placed for admission before the Prescribed Authority. Once they are filed they are to be processed for being decided on merits after issuing notices to the parties concerned. Therefore, when the application reaches final hearing on merits the authority has to sift the grounds on which the application is based and if it finds that the application is based, amongst others, on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) it has be ascertain whether three years’ period has expired since the day of the purchase of the said property by the plaintiff-landlord and if the period of three years is found to have expired then the grounds mentioned in clause (a) would become alive for consideration of the authority. If not, said grounds would not be entertained for consideration. Thus the word ‘entertain’ mentioned in the first proviso to Section 21 (1) in connection with grounds mentioned in clause (a) would necessarily mean entertain the ground for consideration for the purpose of adjudication on merits and not at any stage prior thereto as tried to be submitted by learned senior counsel, Shri Rao, for the appellant. Neither at the stage at which the application is filed in the office of the authority nor at the stage when summons is issued to the tenant the question of entertaining such application by the prescribed authority would arise for consideration. This conclusion also flows from the statutory scheme discernible from the third proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. It is seen that the said proviso uses the similar terminology to the effect that such application under Section 21(1)(a) shall not be entertained under contingencies contemplated by various sub-clauses of the said proviso. This conclusion also flows from the statutory scheme discernible from the third proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. It is seen that the said proviso uses the similar terminology to the effect that such application under Section 21(1)(a) shall not be entertained under contingencies contemplated by various sub-clauses of the said proviso. These provisions clearly show that while entertaining the application for possession under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act the Court has to find out, on evidence led before it, as to what is the purpose of the charitable trust and also whether the residential building is sought for occupation for business purposes or whether the tenant of residential premises, if he is a member of armed forces has got a certificate to the effect that he is serving under special conditions mentioned in Section 3 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 or whether he has died by enemy action while so serving and the proceedings are being filed against his heirs. All these questions of fact will have to be considered while entertaining the application under clause (a) of Section 21 (1) of the Act as laid down by the third proviso. It is obvious that said stage would be reached only when the prescribed authority takes up the application for consideration on merits of the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) which are pressed in service by the landlord for getting possession. Even that apart there is an internal indication in the first proviso to Section 21(1) that the Legislature has made a clear distinction between ‘entertaining’ of an application for possession under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act and `filing’ of such application. So far as the filling of such applications is concerned it is clearly indicated by the Legislature that such application cannot be filed before expiry of six months from the date on which notice is given by the landlord to the tenant seeking eviction under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. The words, `the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application’, would naturally mean that before filing of such applications or moving of such application before the prescribed authority notice must have preceded by at least six months. The words, `the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application’, would naturally mean that before filing of such applications or moving of such application before the prescribed authority notice must have preceded by at least six months. Similar terminology is not employed by the Legislature in the very same proviso so far as three years’ period for entertaining such application by the prescribed authority is concerned. Therefore, it must necessarily mean that when the prescribed authority is required to entertain an application on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) a stage must be reached when the Court applies its judicial mind and takes up the case for decision on merits concerning the grounds for possession mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act. Consequently on the very scheme of this Act it cannot be said that the words ‘entertain’ as employed by the Legislature in the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act would mean institution of such proceedings before the prescribed authority or would at least mean taking cognisance of such an application by the prescribed authority by issuing summons for appearance to the tenant-defendant. It must be held that on the contrary the term ‘entertain’ would only show that by the time the application for possession on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) is taken up by the prescribed authority for consideration on merits, at least minimum three years’ period should have elapsed since the date of purchase of the premises by the landlord.” 15. With regard to the question No. 2, it was held that six months’ notice to vacate the premises before filing the release application under Section 21 (1) was mandatory, though it could be waived by the tenant. In paragraph 11, it was held as under. “So far as this point is concerned it must be held on the clear language of the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act that application for possession under Section 21(1) (a) had to be filed by the landlord concerned not earlier than expiry of six months from the date of issuance of the notice by the landlord. “So far as this point is concerned it must be held on the clear language of the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act that application for possession under Section 21(1) (a) had to be filed by the landlord concerned not earlier than expiry of six months from the date of issuance of the notice by the landlord. On the facts of the present case it cannot be disputed that when the notice was issued on 20th September, 1985 the application for possession could not have been filed by the respondent invoking the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act, at least till 20th March 1986. While the application was filed in January 1986. To that extent it can be said that the application was premature. The provision in this connection has to be treated to be mandatory.” 16. The provision of giving six months’ notice to the tenant to vacate the premises contained in the proviso again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan (supra). In the said case, it was held that six months’ notice was not required to be given, if proceedings are initiated after more than three years of purchase. 17. In paragraph 10 of the report, it was held as under. “Keeping in mind the object of the Act to provide safeguards to the tenant, the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act was added to ensure that the unscrupulous litigants do not transfer properties only for the purposes of creating grounds for eviction of the tenant in occupation thereof. The aforesaid proviso, however, was not intended to put any restriction upon the owners of the property not to transfer it under any circumstances. To ensure that the sale transaction was valid and not mala fide, a statutory bar was created vide aforesaid proviso for the transferee to seek the eviction of the tenant with respect to such purchased property. The proviso mandates that no application shall be entertained by the Prescribed Authority on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act unless a period of three years had elapsed since the date of such purchase. The proviso mandates that no application shall be entertained by the Prescribed Authority on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act unless a period of three years had elapsed since the date of such purchase. It further provides that no application under the said clause shall be entertained unless the landlord had given a notice to the tenant not less than six months before the filing of such application and such notice may be given even before the expiration of a period of three years. The object of the service of the notice is to furnish information to the tenant about the requirement of the landlord in order to enable him to search for an alternative accommodation or to find out as to whether the scale made by his erstwhile owner was a genuine and bona fide or not. The proviso and the notice contemplated under it was never intended to be permanent clog on the rights of the purchaser. The period contemplated for not initiating the eviction against the tenant on the ground as specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act was intended to be for a period of three years and in no case for more than three years and six months. Any proceedings initiated for release of building under occupation of tenant on the aforesaid ground after the period contemplated under the aforesaid proviso does not require the service of aforesaid notice of six months.” 18. Thus, there was a conflict in the ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Martin & Harris Ltd. (supra) and Anwar Hasan Khan (supra). However, this need not detain this Court, inasmuch as the said conflict was noticed by the Hon’ble Apex Court itself and the reference was made for adjudication by a larger Bench in the case of Nirbhay Kumar v. Maya Devi and others, 2009 (3) AWC 2233. 19. After analysing the two conflicting decisions, the larger Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court approved the view expressed in the decision of Martin & Harris Ltd. (supra). In paragraphs 6 and 7, it was held as under. “6. A three years period becomes relevant when there is a change of ownership. This three years period is a sort of moratorium intended for the tenant’s protection. In paragraphs 6 and 7, it was held as under. “6. A three years period becomes relevant when there is a change of ownership. This three years period is a sort of moratorium intended for the tenant’s protection. It is to be noted that the crucial expression in the proviso is “and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years”. In other words notice can be given either before or after the three years period. After expiry of the three years period the protection given to the tenant from being evicted has no further relevance. Thereafter, it is only the question of notice. 7. Above being the position, the decision in Martin & Harris Ltd.’s case (supra) expressed the correct view. Unfortunately, the said decision does not appear to have been placed before the Bench which heard Anwar Hasan Khan’s case (supra).” 20. The legal position clarified by the Hon’ble Apex Court in this regard as it stands now is that an application for release on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21, though can be filed within three years from the date of purchase of the property, but such period of three years should have elapsed on the date when the grounds on which release is being sought, are tested on merits, failing which the release application is liable to be dismissed as premature and six months’ notice to vacate the premises, is mandatory, though it can be given even before the expiry of the period of three years. 21. Thus, the view taken by the Prescribed Authority relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Pramod Kumar (supra) that no six months’ notice is required to be given, in a case where three years period from the date of purchase has expired, cannot be held to be correct in view of the clarification of the legal position by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nirbhay Kumar (supra). 22. In the case in hand, the Prescribed Authority did not enter into the question whether six months’ notice to vacate the premises was given or not, as he misled himself to hold that such notice was not required since the proceedings for release were initiated after expiry of period of three years from the date of purchase of the house in question. 23. 23. It is also not in dispute that copy of notice was not filed by the landlord in evidence before the Prescribed Authority, though postal receipt was there. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. was filed before the appellate Court to take on record the copy of notice as additional evidence. The application was moved on the ground that copy of notice could not be filed before Prescribed Authority on account of mistake of the counsel and when this fact was discovered at appellate stage, it was filed as additional evidence. The appellate authority finding that allegations with regard to notice being sent, was made in paragraph 6 of the application made under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act and receipt dated 29.4.1994 of the registered post was on record, and the document was necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute between the parties, vide order dated 23.8.2012 allowed the application. 24. Although the order dated 23.8.2012 has not been challenged by the petitioner in this petition, still I have considered the same on merits. Having gone through the order (filed as Annexure 10 A), I am of the considered view that since the document was necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute between the parties, and could not be filed before the Prescribed Authority due to inadvertent mistake of the counsel, though the fact of issuing such notice was pleaded in the application and the postal receipt was filed in evidence, the appellate Court committed no mistake in accepting the same as additional evidence. 25. Appellate Court after considering the evidence has further held that six months’ notice was duly sent through registered post to the tenant on 29.4.1994 at his address, and thus, there was presumption of service. There is no material on record, either before the Court below or even before this Court, to contradict the presumption of service of notice on the tenant, nor learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant could point out any during the course of arguments. Thus, the finding in this regard rendered by the Court below cannot be faulted with. 26. This view stands fortified by the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Madan & Co. Thus, the finding in this regard rendered by the Court below cannot be faulted with. 26. This view stands fortified by the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Madan & Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, ARC 1989 (2) 381, wherein it has been observed as under : “All that a landlord can do to comply with this provision is to post a prepaid registered letter (acknowledgement due or otherwise) containing the tenant’s correct address. Once he does this and the letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it. It is then presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the post office, the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorised by him. Such a person may either accept the letter or decline to accept it. In either case, there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on, and receipt by the addressee. The difficulty is where the postman calls at the address mentioned and is unable to contact the addressee or a person authorised to receive the letter. All that he can then do is to return it to the sender. The Indian Post Office Rules do not prescribe any detailed procedure regarding the delivery of such registered letters. When the postman is unable to deliver it on his first visit, the general practice is for the postman to attempt to deliver it on the next one or two days also before retuning it to the sender. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make enquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee; he is not expected to detain the letter until the addressee chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorised to affix the letter on the premises because of the addressee’s absence. His responsibilities cannot, therefore, be equated to those of a process server entrusted with the responsibilities of serving the summons of a Court under Order V of the C.P.C. The statutory provision has to be interpreted in the context of this difficulty and in the light of the very limited role that the post office can play in such a task. If we interpret the provision as requiring that the letter must have been actually delivered to the addressee we would be virtually rendering it a dead letter. The letter cannot be served where, as in this case, the tenant is away from the premises for considerable time. Also, an addressee can easily avoid receiving the letter addressed to him without specifically refusing to receive it. He can so manipulate matter that it gets returned to the sender with vague endorsement such as “not in station”, addressee has left” and so on. It is suggested that a landlord, knowing that the tenant is away from station for some reasons, could go through the motions of posting a letter to him which he knows will not be served. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. But, as against this, if a registered letter addressed to a person at his residential address does not get served in the normal course and is returned, it can only be attributed to the addressee’s own conduct. If he is staying in the premises, there is no reason why it should not be served on him. If he is compelled to be away for some time, all that he has to do is to leave necessary instructions with the postal authorities either to detain the letters addressed to him for some time until he returns or to forward them to the address where he has gone or to deliver them to some other person authorised by him. In this situation, we have to chose the more reasonable, effective, equitable and practical interpretation and that would be to read the word “served” as “sent by post”, correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word “receipt” as the tender of the letter by the postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. No other interpretation, we think, will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a registered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant.” 27. No other interpretation, we think, will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a registered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant.” 27. On an analysis of facts of the case and the law, the irresistible conclusion is that proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for the release of the accommodation was initiated by the respondents/landlord after three years of purchase and after giving six months’ notice to vacate and, hence, the conditions specified by first proviso to Section 21 (1) (a) stand fulfilled and mischief for non-compliance thereof does not stand attracted. 28. Next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules. It is contended that since the two authorities have failed to consider whether the need of the landlords could be satisfied by only releasing a part of the tenement, which was incumbent upon them to do so, the matter ought to be remanded back for such consideration. 29. The argument has only been advanced to be rejected. 30. Rule 16 (1) (d) enjoins upon the Court to consider as to whether the tenant’s needs could be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and landlord’s need would be served by releasing a part. However, such consideration is to be made in the background of the facts of every case and there can be no general principle. Admittedly, the accommodation in dispute consists of two rooms, verandah, Courtyard, latrine, bathroom and kitchen on the ground floor and two rooms and balcony on the first floor. The family of landlords, at the time of moving the application, consisted of 13 adult members and 5 minors. In so far as landlord/respondent No. 1 is concerned, Prescribed Authority has held that he has constructed a residential house at Mirzapur Khandja, Kalyanpur, District Kanpur Nagar, hence, his need is not to be considered. Even if the family of respondent No. 1 is excluded, there were 8 adult members and 4 minors, who also must have attained adulthood by now further adding to the need. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that they are living in separate small tenanted accommodation. Even if the family of respondent No. 1 is excluded, there were 8 adult members and 4 minors, who also must have attained adulthood by now further adding to the need. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that they are living in separate small tenanted accommodation. The family of tenant, according to his own case, consists of himself, his wife, two sons, out of which one is married, in all 5 adult members. Besides he has three married daughters who keep visiting alongwith their family. 31. Partial release should not be directed mechanically, but in the circumstances where it would serve the purpose of both the landlord as well as tenant. Looking to the size of the family of the landlords and the tenant and accommodation available, a partial release would not serve the purpose of either parties, as both would be deprived from comfortable living. The facts of this case, thus, do not warrant consideration of any partial release as it would be futile and meaningless serving no purpose. 32. On the question of bona fide need, both the Courts below have concurrently held that need of landlord/respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 is bona fide and pressing and they would suffer greater hardship. The glaring fact that accommodation in question was purchased by them for personal use and landlord/respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are living in tenanted accommodation, is in itself sufficient to establish the bona fide and genuine need. Prescribed Authority has recorded a categorical finding that though the tenant has denied that landlord Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are living in tenanted accommodation and stated that landlord/respondent No. 2 has acquired the house No. 17/8/13, Kakadeo, Kanpur and landlord No. 3 is living in his ancestral house No. 103/11, but failed to adduce any evidence in support thereof. This finding of the Prescribed Authority has been affirmed by the appellate Court. 33. With regard to comparative hardship, both the Courts have held that landlord would suffer greater hardship. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that twice the application for allotment was moved before the Rent Control Authorities, which were of no avail, still the Courts below have held that tenant did not make any effort to find any alternative accommodation and the finding is vitiated. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that twice the application for allotment was moved before the Rent Control Authorities, which were of no avail, still the Courts below have held that tenant did not make any effort to find any alternative accommodation and the finding is vitiated. Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding that one application for allotment was moved in 2007 and the other in 2009, and though the proceedings are pending since 1999 as such, there was no serious effort made by the tenant. There appears to be no infirmity in the said finding. An application for allotment made 8 years after filing of release application without disclosing details of proceedings thereon, is in itself sufficient indication of the fact that allotment application was made during the pendency of release proceedings for the purpose of creating evidence to demonstrate that efforts have been made, without there being any actual and serious effort. 34. Apart from above, there is another factor. No doubt, whenever a decree for eviction is passed against a tenant, he shall suffer hardship, but the same by itself cannot constitute hardship of greater degree so as to refuse landlord a decree of eviction. The owner of a residential accommodation cannot be denied eviction and compelled to live poorly in a tenanted accommodation merely to enable the tenant to live comfortably on the ground that he shall suffer hardship. The degree of hardship, in such situations, would be much greater for the landlord. 35. The findings on bona fide genuine need and comparative hardships have been recorded by the two Courts below taking into consideration the evidence and material on record. It is well established that finding on issues of bona fide need and comparative hardships are findings of fact. Equally well-settled is the proposition that this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not interfere with findings of fact, unless it is demonstrated that they are vitiated by manifest error of law, or are patently perverse or based on non-consideration or misreading of any material piece of evidence. 36. Learned counsel for the petitioner, during the course of arguments, has failed to point out that the findings recorded by Prescribed Authority and affirmed by appellate authority are vitiated for any of the aforementioned reasons. 37. The writ petition, thus, lacks merits and, accordingly, stands dismissed. 38. 36. Learned counsel for the petitioner, during the course of arguments, has failed to point out that the findings recorded by Prescribed Authority and affirmed by appellate authority are vitiated for any of the aforementioned reasons. 37. The writ petition, thus, lacks merits and, accordingly, stands dismissed. 38. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. —————