Judgment :- 1. This Second appeal is focussed animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 02.11.1998 passed in A.S.No.83 of 1997 by the Sub Court, Tiruvallur, thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 14.10.1996 in O.S.No.150 of 1986 passed by the District Munsif Court, Tiruvallur. 2. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. Despite printing the name of the respondent, there is no representation on his behalf. 4. In a few broad strokes, the picture that conjures up in my mind from the averments as found set out in the plaint, could summarily and succinctly be set out thus: (a) The first plaintiff is the wife of the second defendant and mother of the first defendant and the second plaintiff is the daughter of the first plaintiff. They belong to scheduled caste community. The Government of Tamil Nadu through its Collector, Chengalput, conferred house site pattas to each of the defendants as well as the first plaintiff in respect of the property described in the schedule of the plaint as under: "Schedule of Property House site in No.82, Punnapattu village, Tiruvallur Sub District and Tiruvallur Taluk, Chengalpattu District. Plot No.6-A measuring about three cents in S.No.71/2, measuring east to west 97' links and north to south 35 links. Boundaries: Bounded on the north by Plot No.6-C on the east by S.No.70, on the south by Plot No.6-B and on the west by Plot No.18." Ever since the grant of patta, the first plaintiff had been in possession and enjoyment of the said area by putting up a hut thereon. However, the defendants started giving her trouble which made her to leave that hut and start staying with her daughter, the second plaintiff in Ayalur Harijan colony. When the first plaintiff wanted back the suit property, the defendants refused to hand over the same. The first plaintiff died on 21.07.1996 pending litigation. However, even before that, she executed a Will in favour of her daughter bequeathing the suit property in her favour. (b) Per contra, the defendants filed the written statement challenging and impugning the averments/allegations in the plaint. The first plaintiff had no right over the suit property and she was also not living in that suit property under the alleged patta issued in her favour. (b) Per contra, the defendants filed the written statement challenging and impugning the averments/allegations in the plaint. The first plaintiff had no right over the suit property and she was also not living in that suit property under the alleged patta issued in her favour. The defendants have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than 12 years' and they acquired title also over the suit property. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 5. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. 6. Up went the trial, during which the second plaintiff/Mohanavathy examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.Ws.2 to 4 and marked Exs.A1 to A3; and the first defendant/Punniyakoti examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.W.2 and Exs.B1 to B13 were marked. 7. Ultimately the trial Court dismissed the suit, as against which the appeal was filed for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate court confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the suit. 8. Challenging and impugning the judgments and decrees of both the fora below, this Second Appeal has been focussed on various grounds and also suggesting various substantial questions of law. 9. My learned Predecessor framed the following substantial questions of law. "(1) Whether the findings of the courts below regarding the genuineness of the will are not based on evidence on record and an error of jurisdiction to compare the signatures in the vakalath and the will? (2) Whether the judgment of the courts below are vitiated as they have misconceived the real question they had to try? (3) Even if the will is held not proved to be genuine, is not the second plaintiff entitled to a share and a declaration granted to that extent? (extracted as such) 10. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs would pyramid his argument, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (a) The first plaintiff during her life time got patta in her favour as revealed by Ex.A1. (b) The relationship between the parties is an admitted one. There was estrangement between the husband and wife, so to say, between the first plaintiff and the second defendant, and the first defendant being their son, supported his father/D2 and as such, the first plaintiff was put to trouble. (b) The relationship between the parties is an admitted one. There was estrangement between the husband and wife, so to say, between the first plaintiff and the second defendant, and the first defendant being their son, supported his father/D2 and as such, the first plaintiff was put to trouble. (c) Both the Courts below committed serious error in not appreciating the true purport of the patta as well the Will executed by the first plaintiff in favour of the second plaintiff. Preponderance of probabilities are speaking in favour of the genuinesness of the Will. Inasmuch as the first plaintiff's husband and son were not in good terms that only actuated, accentuated, propelled and impelled her to execute the Will in favour of the second plaintiff, her daughter who was looking after her welfare throughout. (d) The Courts below on flimsy ground disbelieved the Will because it is an unregistered one. Simply because one witness stated that the Will was written in three sheets, when in fact the Will was found written in two sheets, the Courts below disbelieved the same. P.W.3, the Scribe and P.Ws.2 and 4 the attestors cogently deposed before the Courts about the Will. However, the Courts below of its own accord doubted the signatures found in the Will by making comparison with the first plaintiff's signature found in the Vakalat. As such, the learned counsel for the second plaintiff would pray for setting aside the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below and for decreeing the suit. 11. All the substantial questions of law are taken together for discussion as they are inter linked and inter woven with one another. 12. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, Ex.A1 is the patta issued under Form XIX under the Special Scheme, which would exemplify and demonstrate, portray and parody that the first plaintiff was conferred with patta in respect of the suit property on 29.11.1973. Whereas, the suit has been filed on 07.04.1986 for declaration of title and for recovery of possession not from any stranger but from the first plaintiff's husband and son. 13. A mere running of the eye over the terms and conditions as found embodied in Ex.A1, would evince and demonstrate that the property was meant for being enjoyed by the very allottee and that for ten years it should not be encumbered or alienated. 13. A mere running of the eye over the terms and conditions as found embodied in Ex.A1, would evince and demonstrate that the property was meant for being enjoyed by the very allottee and that for ten years it should not be encumbered or alienated. In fact, there is no doubt over the fact that there was estrangement between the first plaintiff and her husband/D2. P2 was looking after P1, while so, pendente lite, before P1's death, she executed Ex.A3, the certified copy of the Will which was filed in one other suit O.S.No.159 of 1986 pending in the District Munsif Court, Tiruvallur. The very Ex.A3 - the certified copy itself would show that it was issued by copying it from the original, available in the records in O.S.No.159 of 1986. As such, non production of the original Will was adequately stood explained in this case. 14. As many as four persons attested the Will even though two persons are sufficient for attesting a Will. The propounder of the Will also examined P.W.2/Subramani and P.W.4/Kattan, the attesting witnesses to prove the genuineness of the Will strictly in accordance with Sections 68 and 69 of the Indian Evidence Act. The plaintiff also on her side examined the Scribe, namely Sambandapillai/P.W.3. I have gone through the depositions of all the three witnesses and I could see no material contradictions. Indubitably and indisputably, the witnesses on the plaintiffs' side to prove the Will, were examined long after the emergence of the Will and the lower Courts were not justified in picking holes in their depositions on the ground that they were not so specific in specifying the number of sheets for writing the Will. Preponderance of probabilities would govern the adjudication in civil cases. To the risk of repetition and pleonasm, but without being tautologous, I would like to point out that the first plaintiff in all probabilities would have executed the Will pendente lite when she was not in good terms with the defendants. As a prudent lady the first plaintiff would not have simply thought of dying without executing a Will and thereby enabling the defendants to inherit her property. As such, there was valid reason on her part for diverting the normal course of inheritance at the instance of the first plaintiff. 15. As a prudent lady the first plaintiff would not have simply thought of dying without executing a Will and thereby enabling the defendants to inherit her property. As such, there was valid reason on her part for diverting the normal course of inheritance at the instance of the first plaintiff. 15. The Court below were not justified in comparing the disputed signature of the first plaintiff in the Will Ex.A3, with that of the signature of the first plaintiff in the vakalat. 16. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2008) 4 SCC 530 [Thiruvengadam Pillai vs. Navaneethammal and another]; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "16. When there is no doubt that court can compare the disputed handwriting/signature/finger impression with the admitted handwriting/signature/finger impression, such comparison by court without the assistance of any expert, has always been considered to be hazardous and risky. When it is said that there is no bar to a court to compare the disputed finger impression with the admitted finger impression, it goes without saying that it can record an opinion or finding on such comparison, only after an analysis of the characteristics of the admitted finger impression and after verifying whether the same characteristics are found in the disputed finger impression. The comparison of the two thumb impressions cannot be casual or by a mere glance. Further, a finding in the judgment that there appeared to be no marked differences between the admitted thumb impression and disputed thumb impression, without anything more, cannot be accepted as a valid finding that the disputed signature is of the person who has put the admitted thumb impression. Where the court finds that the disputed finger impression and admitted thumb impression are clear and where the court is in a position to identify the characteristics of fingerprints, the court may record a finding on comparison, even in the absence of an expert's opinion. But where the disputed thumb impression is smudgy, vague or very light, the court should not hazard a guess by a casual perusal.” 17. The decision in Murari Lal and Lalit Popli should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. The decision in Murari Lal and Lalit Popli should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and admitted finger impressions. Further, even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal. 19. The trial court had analysed the evidence properly and had dismissed the suit by giving cogent reasons. The first appellate court reversed it by wrongly placing onus on the defendants. Its observation that when the execution of an unregistered documentput forth by the plaintiff was denied by the defendants, it was for the defendants to establish that the document was forged or concocted, is not sound proposition. The first appellate court proceeded on the basis that it is for the party who asserts something to prove that thing; and as the defendants alleged that the agreement was forged, it was for them to prove it. But the first appellate court lost sight of the fact that the party who propounds the document will have to prove it. In this case the plaintiff came to court alleging that the first defendant had executed an agreement of sale in his favour. The first defendant having denied it, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the first defendant had executed the agreement and not on the first defendant to prove the negative. The issues also placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the document to be true. No doubt, the plaintiff attempted to discharge his burden by examining himself as also scribe and one of the attesting witnesses. The issues also placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the document to be true. No doubt, the plaintiff attempted to discharge his burden by examining himself as also scribe and one of the attesting witnesses. But the various circumstances enumerated by the trial court and the High Court referred to earlier, when taken together, rightly create a doubt about the genuineness of the agreement and dislodge the effect of the evidence of Pws. 1 to 3. We therefore of the view that the decision of the High Court, reversing the decision of the first appellate Court, does not call for interference." 17. There is also one other decision rendered by me reported in 2008 (3) CTC 470 [Ganapathy Thevar v. Shanmuga Thevar]; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "14. .......The Court cannot assume the role of an expert in comparing the disputed handwriting with that of the admitted ones. No doubt, the Court as per Section 73 of the Evidence Act, in certain circumstances could exercise its power with caution. In such an event, it is the bounden duty of the Court to specify clearly as to what are the salient features based on which the finding is arrived at. 15. It is common knowledge that the science of analysing the questioned documents contemplates certain principles and theories. Here, both the Courts below were not objective in analysing the impugned handwriting. 16. No carte blanche is given to any Court to simply compare the disputed handwriting with that of the admitted handwritings and arrive at a subjective satisfaction about the similarities and dissimilarities. There should have been reasons set out for arriving at such conclusion, but here, both the Courts below have not resorted to such a procedure. The subjective satisfaction of both the Courts below cannot be taken in favour of the defendant." 18. A mere running of the eye over the said precedents would show that Courts are not normally expected to invoke the power under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, in exceptional cases if the Court thinks that without the assistance of an expert the Court itself could compare, then in that case, the Court should necessarily play the role of an expert and apply the principles found enshrined in the Treatise relating to comparison of disputed signatures. However, in exceptional cases if the Court thinks that without the assistance of an expert the Court itself could compare, then in that case, the Court should necessarily play the role of an expert and apply the principles found enshrined in the Treatise relating to comparison of disputed signatures. But in this case, no such exercise was undertaken by the for a below. 19. I also recollect the adage: "Witnesses might lie, but circumstances would not lie." 20. Here the circumstances coupled with the cogent evidence of the witnesses, would amply establish the genuineness of the Will and both the Courts below committed serious error in disbelieving the same. 21. The question of adverse possession in favour of the defendants is a well neigh impossibility in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2007) 6 SCC 59 (P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy and others vs. Revamma and others). An excerpt of it would run thus: "10. In that context it is relevant to refer to JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom wherein the European Court of Human Rights while referring to the Court of Appeal judgment JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v.Graham made the following reference: "Lord Justice Keene took as his starting point that limitation periods were in principle not incompatible with the Convention and that the process whereby a person would be barred from enforcing rights by the passage of time was clearly acknowledged by the Convention (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). This position obtained, in his view, even though limitation periods both limited the right of access to the Courts and in some circumstances had the effect of depriving persons of property rights, whether real or personal, or of damages: there was thus nothing inherently incompatible as between the 1980 Act and Article 1 of the Protocol". 11. This brings us to the issue of mental element in adverse possession cases – intention. ..... 14. Importantly, intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. 11. This brings us to the issue of mental element in adverse possession cases – intention. ..... 14. Importantly, intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialise. 18. On intention, Powell v.McFarlane is quite illustrative and categorical, holding in the following terms: "If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to possess ('animus possidendi')" * * * If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made in perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner. * * * In my judgment it is consistent with principle as well as authority that a person who originally entered another's land as a trespasser, but later seeks to show that he has dispossessed the owner, should be required to adduce compelling evidence that he had the requisite animus possidendi in any case where his use of the land was equivocal, in the sense that it did not necessarily, by itself, betoken an intention on his part to claimthe land as his own and exclude the true owner. * * * What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one's own name and on one's own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow". (emphasis supplied) 19. Thus, there must be intention to dispossess. (emphasis supplied) 19. Thus, there must be intention to dispossess. And it needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and the plaintiff has an opportunity to object. After all adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of waiving (wilful) or omission (negligent or otherwise) of the right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the paper-owner of the land. Adverse possession statutes, like other statutes of limitation, rest on a public policy that does not promote litigation and aims at the repose of conditions that the parties have suffered to remain unquestioned long enough to indicate their acquiescence." A plain reading of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court would clearly indicate that even if a person is in possession of a particular party for any number of years, automatically the presumption in favour of prescription will not enure to the benefit of the possessor. 22. Here the husband and the son of the first plaintiff had attempted to plead adverse possession, which cannot even by phantasmagorical thoughts be canvassed as a genuine one. In fact, the written statement bespeaks and betokens that adjacent to the property, the sites allotted by the Government in favour of the defendants, are situated and they illegally occupied the site allotted to the first plaintiff and started giving trouble to her. In such a case, I am at a loss to understand as to how the principle of adverse possession could be pressed into effect as against the plaintiffs. Hence in these circumstances, I am of the considered view that the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are to be set aside. 23. On balance, (1) The first substantial question of law is answered to the effect that the findings of the Courts below regarding genuineness of the will are not based on evidence on record. (2) The second substantial question of law is answered to the effect that the courts below misconceived the real question in controversy. (3) The third substantial question of law is answered to the effect that both the Courts below wrongly held as though the Will as contained in Ex.A3 was not proved. (2) The second substantial question of law is answered to the effect that the courts below misconceived the real question in controversy. (3) The third substantial question of law is answered to the effect that both the Courts below wrongly held as though the Will as contained in Ex.A3 was not proved. Accordingly, the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are set aside and the suit is decreed as prayed for declaring the title of the second plaintiff over the suit property and that the defendants should hand over vacant possession of it to the second plaintiff. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The decree shall follow accordingly.