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2013 DIGILAW 1802 (RAJ)

Gee Diamond Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex. S. T. , Jaipur

2013-10-04

AJAY RASTOGI, J.K.RANKA

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - Heard finally with the consent of counsel for the parties. 2. This Excise Appeal is directed against the order dated 15-7-2013 passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (for short, ‘CESTAT’) whereby the CESTAT, while disposing of the application for stay filed by the appellants, directed the appellants to deposit an amount of Rs. 4 crores (Rupees four crores only) and also an amount of Rs. 10 lakhs (Rupees ten lakhs) within six weeks as a pre-deposit as against a total demand of Rs. 6,26,62,091/- + 6,26,62,091 + 50,00,000/- + 50,000/-, in total Rs. 13,03,74,182/- (Thirteen crores three lakhs seventy four thousands one hundred eighty two only), however, the respondent granted a credit of Rs. 7,32,368/-, being Cenvat credit and, therefore, the total outstanding remained at Rs. 12,96,41,817/- (Twelve crores ninety six lakhs forty one thousand eight hundred seventeen only) and it was further directed that if the appellants deposit the aforesaid amount of Rs. 4 crores & Rs. 10 lakhs, within six weeks then the balance of the disputed demand shall remain stayed till disposal of appeal. 3. Brief facts of the case, as emerging from the face of record, are that the appellants are engaged in manufacturing of M.S. Ingots classified under Chapter-72 of the Central Excise Tariff Act and registered with the Central Excise Department from the year 2004. They are using M.S. Scrap and Sponge Iron, which, after carrying out manufacturing process and deployment of labour, is converted into final product. On the basis of intelligence gathered by the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence, Jaipur that the assessee-appellant had indulged in large scale evasion of Central Excise, a search was carried out at the unit of the appellants on 23-12-2009 wherein a ‘Panchnama’ was drawn and incriminating documents were found and seized by the authorised officers. Simultaneous follow up searches were also carried at the raw material supplier, Dharamkanta owner, dealers, transporters etc. and it was noticed that the appellants were indulged in large scale evasion of Central Excise duty by way of clandestine production of excisable goods and removal of the same without payment of excise duty. A detailed show cause notice was issued to the appellants by the Addl. and it was noticed that the appellants were indulged in large scale evasion of Central Excise duty by way of clandestine production of excisable goods and removal of the same without payment of excise duty. A detailed show cause notice was issued to the appellants by the Addl. Director General on 15-2-2012 detailing therein the manner in which the respondent-department was on the basis of incriminating documents collected, and on the basis of statements of various persons and after collecting and analysing the material came to the conclusion that the accused-appellant has been indulging in large scale evasion of excise, in the show cause notice each and every aspect was referred to by the Addl. Director General and the matter was forwarded to the Commissioner of Central Excise for final order. The Commissioner, who has jurisdiction to pass order in the instant case, also issued show cause notice to the appellant and after analysing the material, was of the view that eight trucks were found parked in the premises owned by the appellants and on an enquiry one Shri. Pawan Kumar Bansal presented purchase bills only in respect of six trucks and two trucks, bearing No. RJ14 2G 6644 and RJ14 2G 7271 were loaded with Kabari Scrap, weighing 17.09 MT and 28.55 MT respectively, which, according to the respondent-Commissioner, were procured from local markets without bills. The respondent-Commissioner has also referred to the statements recorded of Shri. Pawan Kumar Bansal, Supervisor; Shri. Gopal Singh, Labour Supervisor; Shri. Sandeep Kumar, Chemist; Shri. Krishna Kant Agrawal, Authorised Signatory of M/s. Jai Ambika Dharamkanta, Bagru, Jaipur; Shri. Arun Kumar, General Manager and also of Shri. Sanjay Kumar Agarwal, Director and several other persons. The material, so collected, was again confronted to the appellant and after analysing the material on record, the Commissioner, in the aforesaid order dated 14-2-2013, confirmed u/sec. 11A(2) of the Central Excise Act that he (Commissioner) was able to prove that there was a strong case made out against the appellants of clandestinely clearing of 18947.704 MT of M.S. Ingots valued at Rs. 52,26,61,848/- (Fifty two crores twenty six lakhs sixty one thousand eight hundred forty eight only) and thus found that the appellants evaded Central Excise duty amounting to Rs. 6,26,62,091/- and held that the said amount is recoverable from the appellants by invoking the proviso to Section 11A(1)/11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. 52,26,61,848/- (Fifty two crores twenty six lakhs sixty one thousand eight hundred forty eight only) and thus found that the appellants evaded Central Excise duty amounting to Rs. 6,26,62,091/- and held that the said amount is recoverable from the appellants by invoking the proviso to Section 11A(1)/11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. In addition to the said amount, penalty of like (equal) amount was also imposed and a further amount of Rs. 50 lakhs was imposed as penalty on Shri. Sanjay Kumar Agarwal, Director and an amount of Rs. 50,000/- on Shri. Arun Kumar, Manager. Thus, a total demand of Rs. 12,96,41,817/- (Twelve crores ninety six lakhs forty one thousand eight hundred seventeen only) was created. 4. Against the said order, the appellants preferred an appeal as also moved an application for waiver of pre-deposit of duty and penalty and grant of stay under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act before the CESTAT on 26-4-2013 and the order impugned, as referred to above, was passed by the CESTAT on the said stay application after hearing both the parties directing to deposit an amount of Rs. 4 crores + 10 lakhs as a pre-deposit and subject to deposit of the said amount the appeal would be heard on merits and balance of the disputed demand would be stayed till disposal of appeal by CESTAT. 5. Shri. Sameer Jain, ld. counsel for the appellants submitted that the respondent has not provided necessary material on the basis of which such a huge evasion of Central Excise has been alleged to be found and he submitted that it is a baseless allegation without any material and contrary to the material on record. He further submitted that thousands of papers were found during the course of the search, however, only some of the documents were provided and an inference has been drawn on the basis of the said papers that the appellants evaded the excise duty to this extent. He submitted that the entire order passed by the respondent-Commissioner is based on surmises and conjectures, assumptions and presumptions and on such assumptions, a paper demand has been created. He submitted that the entire order passed by the respondent-Commissioner is based on surmises and conjectures, assumptions and presumptions and on such assumptions, a paper demand has been created. He further submitted that there is utter violation of the principles of natural justice; as during the course of hearing before the respondent, it was desired again and again that the material, on which the respondent is placing reliance, may be provided so as to pin-pointedly reply, however, the respondent neither provided the said material nor gave any response of the repeated requests made by the appellants. He further submitted that the respondent had recorded statements of so many persons/entities and without providing a copy of such statements or/and right of cross examination, the said material has been used which cannot be used against the appellant and such huge excise duty could not have been levied. He submitted that the appellants were in a position to prove by acceptable evidence the entire material/documents collected at the back of the appellants. He also submitted that a huge amount of Rs. 4 crores + Rs. 10 lakhs has been directed to be deposited by the CESTAT and the appellants are unable to deposit the said illegal excise duty demand. He submitted that there is an undue hardship being faced by the appellants as they have no liquid fund to pay. He also drew attention of this Court to Anx. 5 i.e. the Bank Account with Canara Bank where the appellants are having overdraft facility to show that the appellant has no liquid surplus funds. He, however, submitted that the interest of the revenue would be safeguarded by moving an application or/and an undertaking that the appellant will not dispose of any of the properties owned by the appellant. He drew attention of this Court to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Benara Valves Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, reported in 2006 (204) E.L.T. 513 (S.C.) who had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act and while considering undue hardship and safeguarding the interest of revenue, it held that the amount deposited by the appellant in the said case to the tune of Rs. 34 lakhs against Rs. 34 lakhs against Rs. 2,05,31,762/- was sufficient and further directed that the appellant in the said case will not be directed to deposit any other amount over and above the said amount and even directed that the appellant in the said case shall be heard without requiring further deposit. He also relied upon judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Lakshman Exports Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, reported in 2002 (143) E.L.T. 21 (S.C.) ; judgment of this Court in the case of PGO Processors Private Limited v. Commissioner, C.Ex., reported in 2000 (122) E.L.T. 26 (Raj.) ; judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Basudev Garg v. Commissioner of Customs, reported in 2013 (294) E.L.T. 353 (Del.) . 6. Shri. Ajay Shukla, ld. counsel for the respondent-Revenue, on the contrary, submitted, that it is a unique case where the respondent-Commissioner has been able to prove the excise duty evasion to the tune of over Rs. 52 crores and after detailed analysis of thousands of papers during the course of search as also after going through statements of various employees working for the appellants as well as the Director of the appellant who admitted about such papers. He further submitted that the respondent was able to even nab Dharamkanta owner where the goods which had been clandestinely removed were weighed at Jai Ambika Dharamkanta and the statement of its owner. He also submitted that adequate material was provided and ample opportunity was granted to the appellants but on one premise or the other, they did not give proper explanation and demanded other documents without even offering any explanation on the documents earlier provided to them. He submitted that detailed enquiry was made and after affording adequate opportunity, the appellants have been found involved in evasion of excise duty to the extent of over Rs. 52 crores and removal of the said goods which has been proved by the respondent-Commissioner. He also submitted that the appellants have not been able to make out any case for staying of the demand. He submitted that the demand is more than 13 crores and only about ⅓ has been directed to be deposited by the CESTAT and the order passed by the CESTAT is just and proper rather the Revenue is aggrieved with the said order. He submitted that the demand is more than 13 crores and only about ⅓ has been directed to be deposited by the CESTAT and the order passed by the CESTAT is just and proper rather the Revenue is aggrieved with the said order. He further submitted that not a single penny has been deposited by the appellant during the last more than six months. He further submitted that the appellants have not been able to prove by acceptable evidence or justification that they are unable to deposit the said amount. He further submitted that the interest of the respondent-department cannot be safeguarded as all the assets, owned by the appellants, are already mortgaged with the Bank and unless the appellants deposit the said amount as also furnish adequate security for the rest of the amount, no interim relief need be granted to them. Counsel for the respondent also relied upon judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Indu Nissan Oxo Chemicals Ind. Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., reported in 2007 (13) SCC 487 = 2008 (221) E.L.T. 7 (S.C.) and other authorities. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record including the order impugned. 8. At the outset, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 35F of the Central Excise Act which reads as under:- “Where in any appeal under this Chapter, the decision or order appealed against relates to any duty demanded in respect of goods which are not under the control of Central Excise authorities or any penalty levied under this Act, the person desirous of appealing against such decision or order shall, pending the appeal, deposit with the Adjudicating Authority the duty demanded or the penalty levied : Provided that where in any particular case, the Commissioner (Appeals) of the Appellate Tribunal is of opinion that the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied would cause undue hardship to such person, the Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Appellate Tribunal, may dispense with such deposit subject to such conditions as he or it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the interest of revenue.” 9. Section 35F of the Central Excise Act contemplates deposit of the duty demanded or the penalty levied pending the appeal filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal as the case may be. The word “shall” appearing under Section 35F makes it clear that such a pre-deposit is mandatory, however, the first proviso to Section 35F gives a discretionary power to the appellate authority to dispense with such deposit subject to such condition so as to safeguard the interest of the revenue, if in its opinion the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied would cause undue hardship to the appellant. However, in case the appellant does not move an application under Section 35F, then the entire duty demanded as held by the assessing officer/Commissioner is required to be deposited. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again considered as to what would be “undue hardship” as well as “safeguarding the interest of revenue.” While the ld. counsel for the appellants drew attention of this Court to the judgment of Benara Valves Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that in so far as undue hardship is concerned, it is a matter within the special knowledge of the applicant for waiver and has to be established by him. A mere assertion about undue hardship would not be sufficient. It was noted, relying on the judgment of S. Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka and Ors., reported in AIR 1994 SC 923 , that under Indian conditions, the expression “undue hardship” is normally related to economic hardship. “Undue” means something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant or is very disproportionate to it. “Undue hardship” is caused when the hardship is not warranted by the circumstances. For a hardship to be ‘undue’, it must be shown that the particular burden to have to observe or perform the requirement is out of proportion to the nature of the requirement itself. The word “undue” adds something more than just hardship. It means, an excessive hardship or a hardship greater than the circumstances warrant. 11. For a hardship to be ‘undue’, it must be shown that the particular burden to have to observe or perform the requirement is out of proportion to the nature of the requirement itself. The word “undue” adds something more than just hardship. It means, an excessive hardship or a hardship greater than the circumstances warrant. 11. The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court, in the case of Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore v. United Telecom Ltd., reported in 2006 (198) E.L.T. 12 (Kar.) , has held as under:- “The concept of undue hardship in the context of taxing statutes and occurring in a provision like the pre-deposit provision under Section 129E can only be linked to the financial hardship that the assessee faces if the assessee has to comply with the pre-deposit requirement and cannot be anything else. Unless an assessee pleads the financial hardship for the compliance of pre-deposit and the assessee in fact is unable to pay the pre-deposit amount in reality also, there is no undue hardship as contemplated in the proviso to Section 129E”. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Anr. v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay [ 1989 (39) E.L.T. 178 (S.C.)] , while considering the provisions of Section 129 of the Customs Act, has held as under:- “These observations cannot be applied to the facts of this case. Here we are concerned with the right given under Section 129A of the Act as controlled by Section 129E of the Act, and that right is with a condition and thus a conditional right. The petitioner in this case has no absolute right of stay. He could obtain stay of realisation of tax levied or penalty imposed in an appeal subject to the limitations of Section 129E. The proviso gives a discretion to the authority to dispense with the obligation to deposit in case of “undue hardships”. That discretion must be exercised on relevant materials, honestly, bona fide and objectively. Once that position is established it cannot be contended that there was any improper exercise of the jurisdiction by the Appellate Authority. In this case it is manifest that the order of the Tribunal was passed honestly, bona fide and having regard to the plea of ‘undue hardship’ as canvassed by the appellant. There was no error of jurisdiction or misdirection”. 13. In this case it is manifest that the order of the Tribunal was passed honestly, bona fide and having regard to the plea of ‘undue hardship’ as canvassed by the appellant. There was no error of jurisdiction or misdirection”. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court again, in a later judgment Indu Nissan Oxo Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (supra), while considering the scope of Section 35F, as in the present case, after analysing various judgments, held that even if there is financial hardship, the same cannot be a ground to dispense with pre-deposit and balance of convenience is not on appellant and observed as under:- “9. We shall deal with first the issue relating to the question of stay/dispensation of pre-deposit in respect of sick industry. In Metal Box India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai : 2003 (155) E.L.T. 13 (S.C.) , this Court had clearly observed as follows:- Mr. Rana Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that in view of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short ‘the Sick Industries Act’), the appellant need not deposit the amount, as ordered by the Tribunal, as protection is available to the appellant under the said provision. We are afraid, we cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for reasons more than one. First, this aspect was not the subject-matter of the order under challenge and, secondly, Section 22 of the Sick Industries Act provides relief in regard to the proceedings which relate to (a) winding up of the industrial company; (b) execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company; (c) the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof, and (d) proceeding in regard to suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company. Payment of pre-deposit covered under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 does not fall under any of the above-mentioned categories in Section 22 of the Sick Industries Act.” 10. Principles relating to grant of stay pending disposal of the matters before the concerned forums have been considered in several cases. It is to be noted that in such matters though discretion is available, the same has to be exercised judicially. 11. Principles relating to grant of stay pending disposal of the matters before the concerned forums have been considered in several cases. It is to be noted that in such matters though discretion is available, the same has to be exercised judicially. 11. The applicable principles have been set out succinctly in Silliguri Municipality and Ors. v. Amalendu Das and Ors. : [1984] 146 ITR 624 (SC) , Samarias Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Samuel and Ors. : [1985] 2 SCR 24 and Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. : AIR 1985 (SC 330 ) . 12. It is true that on merely establishing a prima facie case, interim order of protection should not be passed. But if on a cursory glance it appears that the demand raised has no leg to stand, it would be undesirable to require the assessee to pay full or substantive part of the demand. Petitions for stay should not be disposed of in a routine matter unmindful of the consequences flowing from the order requiring the assessee to deposit full or part of the demand. There can be no rule of universal application in such matters and the order has to be passed keeping in view the factual scenario involved. Merely because this Court has indicated the principles that does not give a license to the forum/authority to pass an order which cannot be sustained on the touchstone of fairness, legality and public interest. Where denial of interim relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury or shake a citizens’ faith in the impartiality of public administration, interim relief can be given. 13. Section 129E of the Act reads as follows : 129E. Deposit, Pending Appeal, of Duty and Interest Demanded Or Penalty Levied. - Where in any appeal under this Chapter, the decision or order appealed against relates to any duty and interest demanded in respect of goods which are not under the control of the customs authorities or any penalty levied under this Act, the person desirous of appealing against such decision or order shall, pending the appeal, deposit with the proper officer the duty and interest demanded or the penalty levied. Provided that where in any particular case, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal is of opinion that the deposit of duty and interest demanded or penalty levied would cause undue hardship to such person, the Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Appellate Tribunal may dispense with such deposit subject to such conditions as he or it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the interests of revenue. 14. Two significant expressions used in the provisions are “undue hardship to such person” and “safeguard the interests of revenue”. Therefore, while dealing with the application twin requirements of considerations i.e. consideration of undue hardship aspect and imposition of conditions to safeguard the interest of revenue have to be kept in view. 15. As noted above there are two important expressions in Section 129E. One is undue hardship. This is a matter within the special knowledge of the applicant for waiver and has to be established by him. A mere assertion about undue hardship would not be sufficient. It was noted by this Court in S. Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka and Ors. [1993] 2 SCR 715 that under Indian conditions expression “Undue hardship” is normally related to economic hardship. “Undue” which means something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant, or is very much disproportionate to it. Undue hardship is caused when the hardship is not warranted by the circumstances. 16. For a hardship to be ‘undue’ it must be shown that the particular burden to have to observe or perform the requirement is out of proportion to the nature of the requirement itself, and the benefit which the applicant would derive from compliance with it. 17. The above position has been highlighted in Benara Valves Ltd. and Ors. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Anr. : 2006 ECR 314 (SC) . Though the said case related to dispute under the Customs Excise Act, 1944 (in short the ‘Excise Act’) the parameters are the same. 18. We do not find any infirmity in the order directing deposit of Rupees two crores as affirmed by the High Court. The appellant is granted three months time to deposit the amount fixed by the CESTAT. If it is not deposited within the aforesaid time, the appeal before the CESTAT shall stand dismissed”. 14. 18. We do not find any infirmity in the order directing deposit of Rupees two crores as affirmed by the High Court. The appellant is granted three months time to deposit the amount fixed by the CESTAT. If it is not deposited within the aforesaid time, the appeal before the CESTAT shall stand dismissed”. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Monotosh Saha v. Special Director, Enforcement Directorate and Another reported in AIR 2008 SCW 6004 = 2009 (229) E.L.T. 492 (S.C.) observed as under:- Two significant expressions used in the provisions are “undue hardship to such person” and “safeguard the realisation of penalty”. Therefore, while dealing with the application twin requirements of considerations i.e. consideration of undue hardship aspect and imposition of conditions to safeguard the realisation of penalty have to be kept in view. 15. Even though the said decision was made while dealing with the order of pre-deposit contemplated under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, still the analogy made therein can be applied to Section 35F of the Central Excise Act also. Thus, from the reading of the above decision of the Apex Court, the twin test viz., the undue hardship and safeguarding the interest of the revenue are to be applied to each and every case where waiver of pre-deposit is sought for. In the very same decision, it is also observed by the Apex Court that undue hardship is a matter within the special knowledge of the applicant for waiver and has to be established by him. Equally, it is also observed that the Tribunal has to bring into focus about the other aspect relating to imposition of condition to safeguard the realisation of penalty. 16. The Madras High Court, in the case of Fayshaw Apparels v. ATFE, New Delhi reported in 2011 (270) E.L.T. 519 (Mad.) held that interim order of dispensation of deposit should not be passed, merely by establishing a prima facie case and only where it appears that the penalty imposed has no legs to stand or it would be undesirable to ask the appellant to pay the full or part of the penalty, the appellate Tribunal can dispense with the condition of pre-deposit of penalty. It is also observed therein that the courts will have to keep in view the interest of the revenue of the State/Government Exchequer while considering the application of dispensation of pre-deposit. 17. It is also observed therein that the courts will have to keep in view the interest of the revenue of the State/Government Exchequer while considering the application of dispensation of pre-deposit. 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court even in a case where assessee offered filing of bank guarantee (because bank guarantee in so far as the safety and security of the amount is concerned, is as good as liquid cash and the department-Revenue can very well encash the same) came down heavily in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Others, reported in AIR 1985 SC 330 = 1985 (19) E.L.T. 22 (S.C.) and observed as under:- “Even assuming that the company had established a prima facie case, about which we do not express any opinion, we do not think that it was sufficient justification for granting the interim orders as was done by the High Court. There was no question of any balance of convenience being in favour of the respondent-Company. The balance of convenience was certainly in favour of the Government of India. Governments are not run on mere Bank Guarantees. We notice that very often some courts act as if furnishing a Bank Guarantee would meet the ends of justice. No governmental business or for that matter no business of any kind can be run on mere Bank Guarantees. Liquid cash is necessary for the running of a Government as indeed any other enterprise. We consider that where matters of public revenue are concerned, it is of utmost importance to realise that interim orders ought not to be granted merely because a prima facie case has been shown. More is required. The balance of convenience must be clearly in favour of the making of an interim order and there should not be the slightest indication of a likelihood of prejudice to the public interest. We are very sorry to remark that these considerations have not been borne in mind by the High Court and interim order of this magnitude had been granted for the mere asking. The appeal is allowed with costs”. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court again, in the case of Empire Industries Ltd. and Ors. We are very sorry to remark that these considerations have not been borne in mind by the High Court and interim order of this magnitude had been granted for the mere asking. The appeal is allowed with costs”. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court again, in the case of Empire Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1986 SC 662 = 1985 (20) E.L.T. 179 (S.C.) , had in fiscal matters came down heavily on grant of interim orders or in accepting bank guarantee and accordingly observed as under:- “Good deal of arguments were canvassed before us for variation or vacation of the interim orders passed in these cases. Different Courts sometimes pass different interim orders as the Courts think fit. It is a matter of common knowledge that the interim orders passed by particular Courts on certain considerations are not precedents for other cases which may be on similar facts. An argument is being build up nowadays that once an interim order has been passed by this Court on certain factors specially in fiscal matters, in subsequent matters on more or less similar facts, there should not be a different order passed nor should there be any variation with that kind of interim order passed. It is submitted at the Bar that such variance creates discrimination. This is an unfortunate approach. Every Bench hearing a matter on the facts and circumstances of each case should have the right to grant interim orders to such terms as it considers fit and proper and if it had granted interim order at one stage, it should have the right to vary or alter such interim orders. We venture to suggest, however, that a consensus should be developed in the matter of interim orders. If we may venture to suggest, in fiscal matters specially in cases involving indirect taxes where normally taxes have been realised from the consumers but have not been paid over to the exchequer or where taxes are to be realised from consumers by the dealers or others who are parties before the Court, interim orders staying the payment of such taxes until final disposal of the matters should not be passed. It is a matter of balance of public convenience. Large amounts of taxes are involved in these types of litigations. It is a matter of balance of public convenience. Large amounts of taxes are involved in these types of litigations. Final disposal of matters unfortunately in the present state of affairs in our Courts takes enormously long time and non-realisation of taxes for long time creates an upsetting effect on industry and economic life causing great inconvenience to ordinary people. Governments are run on public funds and if large amounts all over the country are held up during the pendency of litigations, it becomes difficult for the governments to run and it becomes oppressive to the people. Governments’ expenditures cannot be made on bank guarantees or securities. In that view of the matter as we said before, if we may venture to suggest for consideration by our learned brethren that this Court should refrain from passing any interim orders staying the realisations of indirect taxes or passing such orders which have the effect of non-realisation of indirect taxes. This will be healthy for the economy of the country and for the Courts”. 19. This Court in the case of M/s. Savitri Concast Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Anr. (DB Excise Appeal No. 39/2012), decided on 21-12-2012 has held as under:- “In similar circumstances, a Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court also rejected the writ petition, directed against the interim order passed on the stay application, in Shree Cement Ltd. v. The Commissioner (Appeals-II) & Ors. (supra), decided on 21-2-2012. Order dated 21-2-2012 is also reproduced as under:- “By way of filing this writ petition, interim order dated 29-12-2011 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals-II), Customs & Central Excise under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act has been questioned. The question involved was that whether the appellants are entitled for credit to the extent of input/input service used in the production of electricity which was not captively consumed for manufacture of final product or for other purpose within the factory but was sold to other different legal entity out of the factory production of appellants as held by the Adjudicating Authority. Considering the fact that supply of electricity was not within factory, we find the order to be justified. Even otherwise, no irreparable injury is going to be caused by dispensing with deposit of amount of Cenvat credit of Rs. 53,17,767/- and Rs. Considering the fact that supply of electricity was not within factory, we find the order to be justified. Even otherwise, no irreparable injury is going to be caused by dispensing with deposit of amount of Cenvat credit of Rs. 53,17,767/- and Rs. 90,93,961/- availed by petitioner as well as 50% of the amount of penalty imposed under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, which is Rs. 8,50,000/- in case of Appellant No. 1 and Rs. 14,50,000/- in case of Appellant No. 2, within thirty days of receipt of the order and on deposit of the aforesaid amount, recovery of interest and rest of the amount of penalty will remain stayed till disposal of the appeal. We find finding of fact recorded by the Adjudicating Authority to be prima facie appropriate. No ground for interference in the impugned order is made out. However, as prayed by the counsel for petitioner, we extend the time to comply with the order by fifteen days from today. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Stay application is also dismissed.” 20. Keeping in view the above aspects, we have to consider the submissions raised by counsel for the appellants and we come to the conclusion that all the facts were within the knowledge of the appellants and/or its Director and/or its employees vis-a-vis all incriminating documents were found in the possession of the appellants/Director/employees and such aspects certainly need to be considered at the appellate stage and the CESTAT in the order impugned, after considering the facts placed on record and submissions made by both the sides, prima facie, has come to the conclusion that no undue hardship would be caused to the appellants if the amount of Rs. 4 crores + Rs. 10 lakhs is deposited by the appellants and simultaneously would safeguard the interest of the Revenue-respondent. The CESTAT granted an opportunity initially of hearing on 1-7-2013 to counsel for the appellants to get proper instructions from the appellants as to the quantum of pre-deposit that shall be made by the appellants at the interim stage to protect the interest of revenue. However, when the impugned order was passed on 15-7-2013, the CESTAT has stated that there is no instructions as to the proposal aforesaid and accordingly the CESTAT proceeded afresh to hear the matter and to pass the impugned order. Thus, ample opportunity was granted by the CESTAT to the appellants. However, when the impugned order was passed on 15-7-2013, the CESTAT has stated that there is no instructions as to the proposal aforesaid and accordingly the CESTAT proceeded afresh to hear the matter and to pass the impugned order. Thus, ample opportunity was granted by the CESTAT to the appellants. The CESTAT has also considered, while passing the order impugned, about the factors stated by counsel for the appellants and has, prima facie, come to the conclusion that the respondent had thoroughly analysed the material recovered from Jai Ambika Dharamkanta, records of Dharamkanta and slips recovered there-from, do prove the nexus about the clandestine clearance and removal of the goods made by the appellants in collusion with others and which was based with Dharamkanta weighment slips of goods of the appellants. It has been further observed that even the Director, in the statement recorded under Section 14, demonstrated that weighment slip containing details of Truck No. RJ 05 G 2289 and RJ 21 G 1014 related to the appellants, which were used for clandestine removal of goods. It has also been observed by the Commissioner/CESTAT that raw material supplied, as appearing in para of the adjudication order also proves that the supplies were not recorded by the appellant and ultimately, the CESTAT has come to the conclusion that prima facie it appears that a premeditated design was made to defraud the revenue. We are also not convinced with the arguments advanced by counsel for the appellant by merely submitting that the appellants have an overdraft facility (OD limit) with the Bank. Neither the appellants have placed their balance sheet as on 31-3-2013 as well as profit and loss account or statement of affairs say as on the date of filing of this appeal or other material or evidence so as to come to the conclusion that the appellants do face undue hardship in depositing the aforesaid amount as directed by the CESTAT. 21. We are also convinced with the submission of counsel for the respondent that all the assets are already pledged/mortgaged with the Banks and, therefore, the interest of revenue cannot be safeguarded merely by the submission of counsel for the appellant that the appellants will not dispose of the assets, to be sold or alienated. When the same are already mortgaged with the banks and bank would have first charge as rightly submitted by counsel for the respondents. When the same are already mortgaged with the banks and bank would have first charge as rightly submitted by counsel for the respondents. We have already observed the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Indu Nissan Oxo Chemicals Ind. Ltd. (supra) and in our view, even if there is financial hardship, the same cannot be a ground in isolation to dispense with the condition of pre-deposit amount. 22. The Appellate Tribunal need not to consider each and every aspect or ground raised in detail and answer for the purpose of disposing of the interim application for waiver of the pre-deposit and in fact Section 35F requires the Appellate Tribunal to find out as to whether the grievance of the appellant to deposit the duty demanded or the penalty levied would cause undue hardship and for that purpose only prima facie case is to be considered. 23. In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, we are not persuaded with the arguments advanced by counsel for the appellants and accordingly we do not find any merit in the instant appeal and no question of law also emerges out of the impugned order and the appeal being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. However, in the interest of justice, the appellants are granted further one month’s time to deposit the amount fixed by the CESTAT. If the said amount is deposited by the appellants within the time granted, as aforesaid, the appeal would be considered by the CESTAT on merits and if it is not deposited within the aforesaid time, the appeal before the CESTAT shall stand dismissed. It is needless to mention that any observation, made by us herein above while passing the order impugned herein, will not influence the CESTAT while considering the appeal by the appellants independently and the CESTAT shall consider the same uninfluenced by any of the observations made by us herein in accordance with law.Appeal dismissed. *******