JUDGMENT Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.: - The petitioners have challenged the order dated 26.3.2010 (Annexure P-3), passed by the Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur Canal Circle-respondent No.1, whereby he has upheld the order dated 25.1.2010 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Divisional Canal Officer, Hari Ke Canal Division, Ferozepurrespondent No.2, ordering the restoration of a watercourse under Section 30 (FF) of the Northern India and Canal Drainage Act, 1873 (for short ‘the Act’). Facts first. 2. Respondent No.3 moved an application alleging that the petitioners have dismantled the watercourse, which was running at the site and sought restoration thereof at outlet No. 4700/R. The watercourse was ordered to be restored vide order dated 24.12.2008. However, the appeal of the petitioners was allowed by respondent No.1, vide order dated 25.8.2009 and the case was remanded back to the Divisional Canal Officer for fresh decision. Pursuant to the remand order, Divisional Canal Officer-respondent No.2 again ordered restoration of the watercourse, vide his impugned order dated 25.1.2010 (Annexure P-2). 3. Dissatisfied with the order passed by respondent No.2, petitioners filed appeal before respondent No.1, which was also dismissed, vide order dated 26.3.2010 (Annexure P-3). Thus, feeling aggrieved against the above said orders, the petitioners have approached this Court by way of instant writ petition, invoking its writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of Certiorari, for quashing the impugned orders. 4. While issuing notice of motion on 19.5.2010, this Court passed the following order. “Notice of motion for 15.7.2010. At the asking of this Court, Mr. Kamaljit Singh Sidhu, Advocate, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.3. Operation of the impugned orders dated 25.1.2010 and 26.3.2010 (Annexure P-2 and P-3) shall remain stayed till further orders. 5. In compliance of the above said order, joint written statement was filed on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 whereas a separate reply was filed on behalf of respondent No.3. Thereafter, on 8.1.2013 following order was passed by this Court:- “The short issue involved in the present petition is whether the water course, which has been ordered to be restored, was ever sanctioned by the competent authority and thus, was in existence. Learned counsel for the State seeks time to file an appropriate affidavit in this regard. On his request, adjourned to 13.2.2013. Learned counsel for the State seeks time to file an appropriate affidavit in this regard. On his request, adjourned to 13.2.2013. Divisional Canal Officer, Hari Ke Canal Division, Ferozepur-respondent No.2 is directed to file his own affidavit pointing out as to whether the water course in question was ever sanctioned by the competent authority. The relevant order sanctioning the water course, if any, be also placed on record.” 6. In compliance of the above said order dated 8.1.2013, Divisional Canal Officer-respondent No.2 filed an affidavit dated 1.2.2013. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that watercourse shown from point A to B in the site plan (Annexure P-1), was only the personal watercourse of the petitioners, which had never existed at the site either as a sanctioned watercourse or a watercourse by way of prescription or by way of an agreement between the parties. He next contended that respondent No.2 has committed serious error of law, while ordering restoration of watercourse from point A to B, without recording any finding that this watercourse was existing and running at the site as a watercourse of any one type out of three types of watercourses i.e. (a) sanctioned by law, (b) sanctioned by agreement between the parties or (c) a watercourse which has been prescribed by easement. He concluded by submitting that since the authorities ordered restoration of the watercourse in question, without recording any such finding, as required under Section 30 FF of the Act, the impugned orders were, on the face of it, without jurisdiction. He prays for allowing of the writ petition and for setting aside the impugned orders. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submits that the impugned orders were factually correct and legally justified. The watercourse in question would be deemed to be sanctioned in view of the approval of scheme of Chakbandi, as per Annexures R-1 and R-2. Learned counsel for respondent No.3, while supporting the contentions raised by learned counsel for the state, submits that the impugned orders were rightly passed by the respondent canal authorities. He further submits that no prejudice was caused to the petitioners because of the impugned orders. Finally, he prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Learned counsel for respondent No.3, while supporting the contentions raised by learned counsel for the state, submits that the impugned orders were rightly passed by the respondent canal authorities. He further submits that no prejudice was caused to the petitioners because of the impugned orders. Finally, he prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, after careful perusal of record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition deserves to be accepted for more than one reasons, which are being recorded hereinafter. 10. A combined reading of the impugned orders would show that the impugned orders are non speaking inasmuch as no finding has been recorded either by respondent No.1 or by respondent No.2, before passing their respective impugned orders, restoring the watercourse in question to the effect that the watercourse was falling in one of the above said three categories. The respondent canal authorities were under legal obligation to record reasons in support of their orders, however, they have failed to do so. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to hold that the impugned orders cannot be sustained. 11. During the course of arguments, when learned counsel for the respondents were asked by the Court, to refer to the relevant record, including the additional affidavit, to show that the watercourse in question was, as a matter of fact, one out of the three types of watercourses, viz (a) sanctioned by law, (b), sanctioned by agreement between the parties or (c) a watercourse which has been prescribed by easement, learned counsel for the respondents had no answer. 12. The contention raised by learned counsel for the State that watercourse would be deemed to be a sanctioned one, in view of the temporary approval of scheme of the Chakbandi, is misplaced and without any substance. What has been temporarily approved, vide order dated 16.4.1996 (Annexure R-2), is only the scheme of Chakbandi of different outlets, including outlet No. 4700/R, but it would not mean that watercourse from point A to B also gets automatically sanctioned. The reason is that it would be beyond the scheme and scope of the Act. 13. What has been temporarily approved, vide order dated 16.4.1996 (Annexure R-2), is only the scheme of Chakbandi of different outlets, including outlet No. 4700/R, but it would not mean that watercourse from point A to B also gets automatically sanctioned. The reason is that it would be beyond the scheme and scope of the Act. 13. Further, from a bare perusal of the admitted site plan (Annexure P-1), it is clear that the watercourse in dispute from point A to B was on the dividing line of killa N. 7/1 and 14/2 of khasra No. 48. Both these pieces of land in killa No. 7/1 and 14/2 are admittedly owned by the petitioners. Thus, it becomes crystal clear that even if there was a watercourse of the petitioners from point A to B and they have dismantled the same, they have committed no illegality. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents could not point out from relevant record that the watercourse from point A to B, in the site plan (Annexure P-1), was either a sanctioned one or by way of prescription or by way of an agreement. Further, while passing the impugned orders, neither the Divisional Canal Officer nor the Superintending Canal Officer, have recorded any finding that the watercourse from point A to B was falling in either of the above said three categories. 15. It is the requirement of law under Section 30 (FF) of the Act that a positive finding has to be recorded by the competent canal authorities that the watercourse was existing and running at the site as one out of the above said three types of watercourses. Until and unless such a positive finding is recorded, referring to the relevant record, the allegedly dismantled watercourse cannot be ordered to be restored under Section 30 (FF) of the Act. The contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents is further falsified from the order dated 24.2.2010 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Divisional Canal Officer, vide which he accepted the appeal of the petitioners against the order dated 14.3.2007, sanctioning a warabandi on this very watercourse. 16. The contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents is further falsified from the order dated 24.2.2010 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Divisional Canal Officer, vide which he accepted the appeal of the petitioners against the order dated 14.3.2007, sanctioning a warabandi on this very watercourse. 16. Interestingly, the Divisional Canal Officer passed the impugned order dated 25.1.2010 (Annexure P-2), ordering restoration of the watercourse from point A to B and just within a period of one month, while passing another order dated 24.2.2010 (Annexure P-4), regarding warabandi, he has recorded the contention on behalf of the private respondents that watercourse was sanctioned ahead of point A on the boundary line of killa No. 7/1 and 14/2 of khasra No.48. The private respondents have not even claimed that the watercourse from point A to B on the dividing line of killa No. 7/1 and 14/2 was also a sanctioned one. Thus, respondent No.2 has seriously contradicted himself, while passing these orders (Annexure P-2 and P-4). Since this material aspect of the matter has been altogether ignored by the Superintending Canal Officer also, the impugned orders are not only contrary to the fact situation obtaining at the site, but the same are contrary to the relevant provisions of law, as well. 17. The view taken by this Court also finds support from a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jagar Singh versus Superintending Canal Officer and others, 1972 PLJ 147. The relevant observations, which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:- “The view we have taken on the matter finds support from the decision of the Lahore High Court in Hukman v. Emperor, AIR 1921 Lahore 327. This decision has held the field and reference need only be made to Moola Singh v. Surendra Singh, AIR 1960 Allahabad 656, wherein a large number of decisions taking the same view have been collated. It is true that the Lahore decision dealt with the provisions of section 70, but broadly speaking the ambit of that section and section 30-FF is pare materia. For instance, section 70(1) Talks of alteration, enlargement or obstruction whereas section 30-FF(1) also talks of alteration, enlargement, and obstruction. It is true that the Lahore decision dealt with the provisions of section 70, but broadly speaking the ambit of that section and section 30-FF is pare materia. For instance, section 70(1) Talks of alteration, enlargement or obstruction whereas section 30-FF(1) also talks of alteration, enlargement, and obstruction. Section 70 fell for interpretation as early as 1921 in the Lahore High Court and it was ruled that it only contemplates three types of watercourses, that is, - (a) sanctioned by law; (b)sanctioned by agreement between the parties; and (c) which have been prescribed by way of easement. It was also held that if any person takes water through another man’s land, the other man has the right to stop the flow of water through his land thereby committing no offence within the meaning of section 70. It is only when water is stopped in the case of watercourse of the three types already mentioned, that section 70 will come into play. Therefore, a watercourse which does not answer the description of the watercourse set out above would surely fall outside the ambit of section 70 and so also section 30-FF. Section 30-FF has been brought on the statute book long after section 70 was judicially interpreted and we must proceed on the basis that the farmers of section 30-FF knew how section 70 had been interpreted and wherever they have used the same language in section 30-FF, that must bear the same interpretation and none other. 7. The correctness of the above view can further be demonstrated by referring to an instance where an unauthorised watercourse is dug by a party and he draws water from the canal in that watercourse. Surely, it cannot be countenanced that such a watercourse would fall within the ambit of section 30-FF. If that be so, we do not see where to draw the line, for in that event, all illegal watercourses would fall within the ambit of Section 30-FF and there would be no way out to curb that illegality because the illegality would have the sanction of law inasmuch as it can be perpetuated by resort to section 30-FF.” 18. If that be so, we do not see where to draw the line, for in that event, all illegal watercourses would fall within the ambit of Section 30-FF and there would be no way out to curb that illegality because the illegality would have the sanction of law inasmuch as it can be perpetuated by resort to section 30-FF.” 18. The law laid down in Jagar Singh’s case (supra) has been consistently followed by this Court including in the cases of Joginder Singh vs. The Sub Divisional Canal Officer, Ghaggar Water Services, Sub Division Tohana, 2003 (2) RCR (Civil) 768 and Yadwinder Singh versus Superintending Canal Officer and others, decided by a Division Bench vide order dated 26.2.2004 passed in CWP No. 289 of 2003. 19. Respectfully following the law laid down in three Division Bench judgments of this Court referred to hereinabove, it is unhesitatingly held that the impugned orders cannot be sustained. No other argument was raised. 20. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, it is held that the impugned orders are contrary to the relevant statutory provisions of the Act as well as law laid down by this Court. Consequently, the impugned order dated 26.3.2010 (Annexure P-3) passed by the Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur Canal Circle respondent No.1 and the order dated 25.1.2010 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Divisional Canal Officer, Hari Ke Canal Division, Ferozepur-respondent No.2, are hereby set aside. Resultantly, the instant writ petition stands allowed. ---------0.B.S.0------------