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2013 DIGILAW 182 (AP)

Shaik Adam Sharif v. Area Marketing Manager, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.

2013-03-13

C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY

body2013
Judgment : This Writ Petition is filed for a Mandamus to declare the action of respondent Nos.1 and 2 in selecting respondent No.3 for appointment as Retail Outlet Dealer of Somavarappadu Village, Tallur Mandal, Prakasam District, as illegal and arbitrary. I have heard Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2, and Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.3. In pursuance of the notification dated 15.04.2012 issued by the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (for short ‘BPCL’), the petitioner applied for appointment as Retail Outlet Dealer in respect of the abovementioned location. Respondent No.3 also submitted his application there for. After completing the selection process, the BPCL has selected respondent No.3 as the Retail Outlet Dealer. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed this writ petition. At the hearing, the only ground pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent No.3 being a practicing advocate, is ineligible for being appointed as a dealer. In support of this submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on Rule 71 of the Rules of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh, 1973 (for short ‘the Rules’). Sri O. Manohar Reddy and Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents, opposed the above submission and contended that the guidelines issued by the Oil Companies have not rendered the professionals, such as lawyers, ineligible for being appointed as Retail Outlet Dealers. The learned counsel have further stated that even in case of employees, Clause 16 of the application provided for an undertaking to be given by the selected candidate to resign the employment before issuance of letter of intent for the dealership. They have also submitted that Rule 71 of the Rules only envisages that if an enrolled advocate accepts a full or part-time service or employment or is engaged in any trade, business or profession, disqualifying him from admission, he shall forthwith inform the Bar Council of such service or employment or engagement and that he will cease to practice as an advocate. The learned counsel submitted that under the said Rule, at the most, his appointment as the retail outlet dealer may render respondent No.3 as ineligible to practice as an advocate and that the same will not bar the BPCL from appointing respondent No.3 as a Retail Outlet Dealer. The learned counsel submitted that under the said Rule, at the most, his appointment as the retail outlet dealer may render respondent No.3 as ineligible to practice as an advocate and that the same will not bar the BPCL from appointing respondent No.3 as a Retail Outlet Dealer. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. As Rule 71 of the Rules is the bone of contention, it is necessary to consider the same and it is reproduced hereunder: "Every person applying to be admitted as an advocate shall in his application make a declaration that he is not in full or part-time service or employment and that he is not engaged in any trade business or profession. But in case he is in such full or part-time service or employment or is engaged in any trade, business or profession he shall in the declaration disclose full particulars of his service, employment or engagement. He shall also undertake that if, after his admission, as an advocate he accepts full or part time service or employment or is engaged in any trade, business or profession disqualifying him from admission, he shall forthwith inform the Bar Council of such service or employment or engagement and shall cease to practice as an advocate." As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a lawyer shall not engage himself in a full time employment, trade or business, as such activities will come in the way of his professional duties. It is with this view that Rule 71 of the Rules is envisaged by the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The question however is whether Rule 71 of the Rules prevents respondent No.3 from being appointed as a Retail Outlet Dealer ?The purport of the Rule 71 of the Rules is that in the event an Advocate accepts full or part-time service or employment or is engaged in any trade, business or profession disqualifying him from admission, he shall forthwith inform the Bar Council of such service or employment or engagement. The consequence of the Advocate engaging himself in full or part-time employment or trade or business is also postulated by Rule 71 of the Rules. It provides that in such event, he shall cease to practice as an Advocate. The consequence of the Advocate engaging himself in full or part-time employment or trade or business is also postulated by Rule 71 of the Rules. It provides that in such event, he shall cease to practice as an Advocate. Therefore, while there is no specific bar under Rule 71 of the Rules for an Advocate to engage himself in an employment or business, the inevitable consequence of such activity is his ceasing to be an Advocate. I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is implied from Rule 71 of the Rules that an Advocate is disqualified to undertake employment and engage himself in any trade or business. As noted herein before, if he does so, he ceases to be as an Advocate. The BPCL is therefore not precluded from appointing respondent No.3 as its dealer. At the worst, respondent No.3 would suffer from the peril of being disqualified for continuing as an Advocate, while the converse is not true. No other point has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. For the abovementioned reasons, I do not find any illegality in the BPCL in selecting respondent No.3 for appointment as Retail Outlet Dealer. The Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of the Writ Petition, W.P.M.P.No.4658 of 2013 filed by the petitioner for interim relief, is disposed of as infructuous.