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2013 DIGILAW 183 (RAJ)

Bhagwat Singh v. State

2013-01-22

SANDEEP MEHTA

body2013
Hon'ble MEHTA, J.—The instant miscellaneous petition has been filed by the petitioner complainant against the order dated 9.5.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Rajsamand in revision whereby he has allowed the revision petition filed by the respondent No. 2 and quashed the order dated 25.9.2006 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Deogarh whereby cognizance had been taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate against the respondent No.2 for the offence under Sec. 341, 323 and 504 IPC. 2. Succinctly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent No. 2 who at the relevant time was posted as Excise Inspector Circle Deogarh, acting on a source information and after being accorded the proper authorisation, conducted an excise raid at the house of one Anop Singh on 6.5.2002. Anop Singh managed to make good his escape and illicit liquor was recovered from his house. 3. The family members of Anop Singh assaulted the respondent No. 2 whilst he was discharging his official duty and accordingly two F.I.Rs. were filed one in the Excise Department being F.I.R. No.12 under the Excise Act dated 6.5.2002 against Anop Singh for the offences and the other being the F.I.R. No. 111/2002 registered at P.S. Deogarh for the offences u/Secs. 354, 323, 341, 504 IPC against the petitioner Bhagwat Singh and the other family mem-bers of Anop Singh who had obstructed the public servant from discharg-ing his official duties (Excise Inspector Rajendra Bhanavat respondent No.2). After investigation. Anop Singh was charge sheeted for the offences under Sec.16/54 and 19/54 of the Rajasthan Excise Act. in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate on 10.7.2002. On the same day he pleaded guilty and accordingly he was convicted for the above offences and was let off on probation. 4. In relation to the F.I.R. No. 111/2002 a charge was filed by the police against Bhagwat Singh, Prem Singh, Babu Singh and Kamla for the offences under Sections 332, 353, 336 read with Section 34 I.P.C. 5. Bhagwat Singh in the meantime filed an F.I.R. against the respondent No. 2 being F.I.R. No. 112/2002 wherein he alleged that the respondent No. 2 forcibly entered into the house of Anop Singh and caused injuries to Kamla, Prem Singh and Babu Singh and also misbehaved with Kamla. Bhagwat Singh in the meantime filed an F.I.R. against the respondent No. 2 being F.I.R. No. 112/2002 wherein he alleged that the respondent No. 2 forcibly entered into the house of Anop Singh and caused injuries to Kamla, Prem Singh and Babu Singh and also misbehaved with Kamla. The police after investigation of the F.I.R. came to the conclusion that the F.I.R. which was filed by Bhagwat Singh was as a matter of fact a counter blast to the two F.I.Rs referred to above filed against Anop Singh and Bhagwat Singh and others. Proceedings under Section 182 I.P.C. was proposed against Bhagwat Singh. On the notice of the F.R. given, Bhagwat Singh submitted a protest petition and examined himself and certain other witnesses in support of the protest petition. The learned Magistrate by the order dated 25.9.2006 proceeded to summon the respondent No. 2 for the offences under Sections 341, 323 and 504 IPC. Respondent No. 2 Rajendra Bhanawat challenged the order issuing process by filing a revision and the Revisional Court after a thorough examination of the material available on record came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 2 whilst acting in the discharge of his official duty as the Excise Inspector had conducted a lawful raid at the house of Anop Singh. While the raid was being conducted the Inspector was assaulted by the family members of the Anop Singh and was thus obstructed from performing his official duty. The F.I.R. No. 111/2002 filed in this regard resulted into a charge-sheet being filed against Bhagwat Singh and others for the offences under Sections 332, 353, 335/34 IPC. Likewise, it was also considered that in the case under the Excise Act which was registered against Anop Singh, he pleaded guilty and was therefore convicted for the offence. The learned Revisional Court was thus of the opinion that all the acts which were complained of, against the respondent were done by him during the performance and discharge of his official duties and hence he was entitled to the umbrella of protection under Section 73 of the Rajasthan Excise Act as well as under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The revision was accordingly allowed by the order dated 9.5.2007. Now the complainant Bhagwat Singh has approached this Court by way of instant miscellaneous petition against the order passed by the revisional court. 6. Now the complainant Bhagwat Singh has approached this Court by way of instant miscellaneous petition against the order passed by the revisional court. 6. Assailing the order passed by the Revisional Court whereby the Court has quashed the proceedings going on against the respondent No. 2 by exercising the revisional jurisdiction, Mr. V.N. Kalla, learned counsel for the petitioner complainant submits that at the stage of taking cognizance only the existence of a prima facie case is to be seen. He submits that as there is a specific allegation of the complainant and the other witnesses that the petitioner assaulted and caused injuries to Smt. Kamla and other family members of Anop Singh while conducting the excise raid, the order passed by the learned trial Court issuing process was just and proper and the Revisional Court has interfered in the said order without any justification. He places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Raj Kishor Roy vs. Kamleshwar Pandey reported in 2002 Cr.L.R. (SC) 673 in support of his contentions and submits that at the stage of cognizance only prima facie case is to be seen, and that the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. can only be considered when the case is being finally decided. 7. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 Mr. Ranjeet Singh as well as the learned P.P. have opposed the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is pointed out that the factum of the respondent acting in the discharge of his official duty is the admitted case of the complainant as well. It is submitted that out of the two prosecutions against the complainant party; one has resulted in the conviction of Anop Singh and in the second case also charge sheet has been filed against the petitioner Bhagwat Singh and others for obstructing the respondent No. 2 whilst he was discharging his official duty. Learned counsel submits that the judgment on which the counsel for the petitioner relies upon is distinguishable on facts and hence it submitted that no interference is called for in the order passed by the revisional court. 8. Heard and considered the arguments advanced at the bar. Perused the record and the impugned orders. Learned counsel submits that the judgment on which the counsel for the petitioner relies upon is distinguishable on facts and hence it submitted that no interference is called for in the order passed by the revisional court. 8. Heard and considered the arguments advanced at the bar. Perused the record and the impugned orders. The undisputed factual scenario which is manifest from the record is that the Respondent No. 2, Excise Inspector was conducting an excise raid in the discharge of his official duty when the incident is said to have taken place. Even Bhagwat Singh in his F.I.R. has mentioned that the members of the raid party were conducting a raid when the incident took place. The police during the course of investigation has collected the documents pertaining to the seizure of the illicit liquor from the house of Anop Singh. The judgment of the trial Court convicting Anop Singh for the offence under Section 16/54 and 19/54 of the Excise Act is also available on record. Likewise, the charge-sheet filed in pursuance to the investigation of the F.I.R. No. 111/2002 (filed by the respondent Rajendra Bhawant) whereby the offences under Sections 332, 353, 336 and 34 of the IPC have been found established against Bhagwat Singh and others has also been placed on record. Therefore, the fact that the incident took place whilst respondent No. 2 was discharging his official duty as the Excise Inspector is undisputed and uncontroverted from the record. Even in the enquiry statements of the complainant and his witnesses, they have admitted that the incident took place when the raid was being conducted. 9. The Apex Court had an occasion to consider a similar situation in the case of "Costaro Fernandes vs. State at the instance of D.S.P. C.B.I. Bombay" reported in AIR 1996 SC 1383 = 1996 AIR SCW 992 were in customs officer whilst discharging his duties charged and killed a smuggler who was trying to escape from the efforts of the officer to apprehend him with contraband gold. The Apex Court considered the scope of protection available under Section 155 of the Customs Act and observed as below:- "A valiant and dutiful custom officer risked his life to fight the mighty under-world of smugglers; unarmed and single-handedly. And see! he succeeded after not chase on his motorcycle-smuggler being in a car. The result was smuggling of gold worth Rs. And see! he succeeded after not chase on his motorcycle-smuggler being in a car. The result was smuggling of gold worth Rs. 8 crores was prevented. The reward? He has been made to face a prosecution under Section 302 of the IPC at the behest of the CBI, who is brought hurriedly and for undisclosed reasons to investigate, inasmuch as in the scuffle which had taken place between the appellant-official and the suspected smuggler, during the course of which a big-sized knife (dagger) carried by the run way was used, the smuggler died, because of the injuries sustained at the hand of the appellant, who had as many as 22 injuries on his person. 7. The CBI says the injuries were self-inflicted. The CBI has taken this stand because, according to it, the appellant had a ulterior motive in killing the deceased, which was to share reward relating to recovery of smuggled gold worth Rs.28 lacs. The reward had, however, become due in 1984 and the present occurrence had taken place on 16.5.1991. How farfetched is the imputed motive? The High Court itself has disbelieved this and has really criticised the CBI for suggesting the same. This is, however, not all. As the further case of the CBI is that no records were placed before it to show that the appellant had prior information of smuggling, following which the smuggler was chased. Another material used against the appellant is, his so-called abscondence. 8. None of the aforesaid has legs to stands, as would appear from what is being stated later. A biased investigation of the type of hand from the CBI has indeed painted us, because people of this country has still high hopes from it, which would get dashed if bias creeps in its investigation on. But then, the deceased was no ordinary mortal, as he was a brother of one time Chief Minister of Goa; and the occurrence had taken place in Goa. 9. What finds the appellant before this Court is denial of the protection made available by Section 155 of the Customs Act, 1962 (the Act). But then, the deceased was no ordinary mortal, as he was a brother of one time Chief Minister of Goa; and the occurrence had taken place in Goa. 9. What finds the appellant before this Court is denial of the protection made available by Section 155 of the Customs Act, 1962 (the Act). The section has provided: "Section 155, Protection of action under the Act.-(1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Central Government or any officer of the Government or a local authority for anything which is done, or intended to be done in good faith, in pursuance of this Act or the rules or regulations. (2) No proceeding other than a suit shall be commenced against the Central Govt. or any office of the Government or a local authority for anything purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act without giving the Central Government or such officer a month's previous notice in writing of the intended proceeding and of the cause thereof, after the expiration of three months from the accrual of such cause." 10. As Section 155 has nexus with performance of official act, let it be seen what has been empowered by the Act on a person like the appellant. This is spelt out by Section 106 of the Act reading as below. "Section 106. Power to stop and search conveyances.- (1) Where the proper officer has reason be believe that any aircraft, vehicle or animal in India or any vessel in India or within the Indian customs waters has been, is being, or is about to be, used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any goods which have been smuggled, he may at any time stop any such vehicle, animal or vessel or, in the case of an aircraft, compel it to land, and- (a) rummage and search any part of the aircraft, vehicle of vessel; (b) examine and search any goods in the aircraft, vehicle or vessel or on the animal. (c) break open the lock of any door or package for exercising the powers conferred by Clauses (a) and (b), if the keys are withheld. (c) break open the lock of any door or package for exercising the powers conferred by Clauses (a) and (b), if the keys are withheld. (2) Where for the purposes of sub-sec.(1)- (a) it becomes necessary to stop any vessel or compel any air craft to land, it shall be lawful for any vessel or aircraft in the service of the Government while flying her proper flag and any authority authorised in this behalf by the Central Government to summon such vessel to stop or the aircraft to land, by means of an international signal, code or other recognised means, and thereupon such vessel shall forthwith stop or such aircraft shall forthwith land; and if it fails to do so, chase may be given thereto by any vessel or aircraft as aforesaid and if after a gun is fired as a signal the vessel fails to stop or the aircraft fails to land, it may be fired upon; (b) it becomes necessary to stop any vehicle or animal, the proper officer may use all lawful means for stopping it, and where such means fails, the vehicle or animal may be fired upon." 11. Let it be seen why the protection of Section 155 has been denied and why CBI insists that this section has no operation. The first premises of denial is that there is no material to show if the appellant was really engaged in any official work inasmuch as there is no writing showing prior information relating to attempted smuggling. This, however, is an obvious untenable stand inasmuch as from the impugned order it is clear that on the day of occurrence itself it was told within a few hours to the local police, which had come at the scene around 2 p.m. while the occurrence was around 12.30 p.m. that the appellant had been working "on some tip-off about smuggling of gold." In this connection Shri Bobde appearing for the appellant, has drawn our attention to a complaint filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Margoa, being subject matter of Criminal Case No. 1/C/94/A by the Union of India through the Assistant Collector of Customs (PO). Marmagao, against 8 accused persons in which there is a clear statement in para 3 that pursuant to information received by the Custom Department in May, 1991 regarding the landing of contraband gold, the Custom Officer, Shri Costao Fernandes, the appellant herein, was keeping vigilance of the said area. The further averment in paragraph 4 is that about 11 a.m. Shri Costao received information regarding some movement sufficient to suspect landing of gold and whereupon he immediately rushed to he site. 12. Addl. Solicitor General, Shri Altaf Ahmad, submits that this is the stand of Union of India through its Customs Department in some other case, whereas in the present case the CBI could not be satisfied during investigation about any such prior information. The mildest observation we would make in this context is that the CBI has exposed inasmuch as the Department's stand relating to prior information has not found place for the first time in the complaint, but was so mentioned on 16th May 1991 itself, and within few hours, by one Shri L.R. Naik. Superintendent of Custom, Revenue Intelligence. Marmagoa, who informed about the same to P.S.I. Mohan Naik who was the police officer who bad received the telephone call at about 1.10 p.m. on 16th from Head constable, R.G. Prabhu giving the information that brother of Churchill Alemao (who was once a Chief Minister of Goa) has been murdered. This shows that the Custom Department has not cooked up this story subsequently. 13. To boost up his case, the CBI has further stated that after the occurrence the appellant was not available, for two days, i.e. he was absconding, which shows his guilty mind. It is true that the appellant had surrendered before the police on 18th, but that was because he became mortally afraid of his life after what had happened on 16th; and so, surrender before the police was to seek protection. Where is the guilty mind then? 14. Coming to the case of self-infliction wounds, the same is sought to be brought home by the Addl. Solicitor General by referring to the "Hurt Certificate", which has noted that on the appellant being examined on 18th May, 22 injuries were found on his person. Where is the guilty mind then? 14. Coming to the case of self-infliction wounds, the same is sought to be brought home by the Addl. Solicitor General by referring to the "Hurt Certificate", which has noted that on the appellant being examined on 18th May, 22 injuries were found on his person. The learned counsel refers us to column 5 of this certificate dealing with "Duration of each hurt" and submits that as the duration was of 24 hours, the same could show that the injuries were received on 17th, and not on 16th. This establishes a case of self-infliction of injuries contends the counsel. He, however, missed the mark"-" put before 24 hours, which shows that the time was more than 24 hours. So this part of CBI's case also falls to the ground. 15. Faced with the position that the wounds were not self-inflicted and the killing could have been, indeed was in self defence, the submiss-ion is that protection of Sec.155, nonetheless, is not available because killing of a smuggler is not a part of the official duty, which alone is protected by this section. It is laboured hard to impress that the official duty, in the present case, was confined to stop the movement of the vehicle and no further. After the vehicles got stopped, the submission is, that the act in performance of official duty was over and the appellant could not have scuffled with the deceased leading to the latter's death. We cannot agree inasmuch as on 16th itself it was stated at the spot by some watchers to the police officer who came there that the appellant was "trying to grab the ignition key" of the vehicle which was being driven by the deceased. This shows that the appellant was trying to prevent the mobility of the vehicle. If while engaged in such an act, the appellant was assaulted, and 22 times at that, with an instrument like knife causing bruises, abrasions, incised wounds on various parts of body like cheek, chest, back, shoulder, arm, leg and thigh, he could not have allowed himself to be killed, but had to defend himself by retaliation. The killing was thus not divorced from the performance of the duty enjoined by Section 106 of the Act. 16. The killing was thus not divorced from the performance of the duty enjoined by Section 106 of the Act. 16. Shri Bobde has brought to our notice in this connection the decision of this Court in Bhappi Sen vs. Rampal Sen, 1981 Supp 1 SCC 12: ( AIR 1982 SC 779 ) in which protection of Section 108 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1986, which is in pari materia with Section 155 of the Act, was made available to custom officials who had fired at the inmates of a raided jewellery shop causing gun shot wounds to the son of the appellant, which had been done as three persons of the custom party had received head injuries caused by blunt weapon. The learned counsel submits that the same view merits to be taken in this case. Addl. Solicitor General, however urges that the observation made by the Court in paragraph 7 shows that it did not fully approve the quashing of the complaint by the High Court by giving the benefit of Section 108. But, the relevance and importance of the judgment is that protection of Section 108 was not denied even when, while engaged in duty of search, bodily harm had been caused to the other side, when the same had become necessary in self-defence. 17. Addl. Solicitor General has another submission to make. The same is that being faced with an organised under world of smugglers, the appellant should have remembered that "discretion is the best part of valour." If the appellant would have don so, he would hav perhaps saved his skin, but could not have saved the larger interest of the society and nation, which does lie in preventing smuggling. The appellant showed valour not in taking to heels, but in fighting. We have all praise for such an officer and we would not allow him to be prosecuted, much though the smugglers would want it to be so, indeed the appellant is being persecuted not prosecuted, as the action smacks of revenge seeking to take his life because he has taken the life of a smuggler, of course, one close to political high ups of Goa. Let this not be countenanced. Let this head hunting be not permitted. 18. The prosecution against the appellant is therefore, quashed. The appeal stands allowed accordingly. Appeal allowed. 10. The facts of the case at hand are almost identical. Let this not be countenanced. Let this head hunting be not permitted. 18. The prosecution against the appellant is therefore, quashed. The appeal stands allowed accordingly. Appeal allowed. 10. The facts of the case at hand are almost identical. In the instant case also the respondent No. 2 was acting in the official duty whilst conducting the search for illicit liquor. He was obstructed and assaulted while acting in the performance of his duties. Despite that he recovered the illicit liquor from the house of Anop Singh. The protection which was given to the customs officer in the case of Costao Fernandes (supra) was based on Section 155(1) of the Customs Act, the said provision is almost pari-materia to the Section 73 of the Excise Act which reads as below:- "Section 73. Bar of certain suits.-No suit prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against the State Government or against any officer or person for any thing in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act." 11. The protective umbrella of sanction has to be extended for shielding such public servants from frivolous prosecutions when the acts complained of are done by the public servants while acting in the discharge of his official duty. If the frivolous prosecutions of the public servants who are discharging their functions and duties in the official capacity are allowed to continue, then this will be nothing short of a design aimed at demoralizing them and for creating hurdles in the path of the public servants so that they are dissuaded from performing their official duties fearlessly. The Apex Court has expressed its displeasure about such prosecutions being permitted to be continued in the case of Costao Fernandes (supra). 12. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the Revisional Court has committed no error in quashing the order taking cognizance passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate against the respondent No. 2. 13. Accordingly, the miscellaneous petition being bereft of merit is dismissed.