JUDGMENT : Jayant Patel, J. The petitioner by this petition has challenged the order dated 19.04.1994 passed by the District Collector and its conformation thereof by the State Government whereby the Entry No.801 is cancelled. 2. The short facts of the case are that as per the petitioner vide Registered Sale deed dated 17th June, 1980, the husband of the petitioner and father of petitioner Nos.2 and 3 had purchased the land bearing Survey No.229 Paiki. The entry of sale was mutated in the Revenue Record on 19th June, 1980 vide No.801 in Village Form No.6. The permission was applied to change the use of the land for non-agricultural purpose for quarrying of stones and such permission came to be granted in 1983. As per the petitioner, the use of the land pursuant to the said permission for quarrying of stones was actually made and the use of the land was being made for such purpose. It appears that thereafter, the Mamlatdar and ALT initiated the proceedings under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tenancy Act') on the ground that the land is purchased by a person who was not having any agricultural land within the peripheral area of 8 kms and the land purchased was non-cultivable land. In the said proceedings, the Mamlatdar and ALT vide order dated 26th September, 1989 in Tenancy Case No. 33/89/84-C found that the land is used for nonagricultural purpose, pursuant to the order of the Taluka Development Officer dated 24.12.1982 and the land is actually used for quarrying of stones and, therefore, it can not be considered as the agricultural land and consequently the Mamlatdar dropped the proceedings. No action was taken and as per the petitioner, thereafter, the application was made for permanent use of the land for quarrying of stones and the same also came to be granted vide order dated 03.04.1991. 3. As per the petitioner, the District Collector in purported exercise of the power under the Bombay Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') took up the matter in Suo-motu Revision against the Revenue Entry No.801 dated 19.06.1980, on the ground that the purchaser was not the agriculturist and he had no agricultural land within the peripheral area of 8 kms. from the land in question. from the land in question. The District Collector, thereafter, vide order dated 19.04.1994 set aside the entry. The petitioner carried the matter before the State Government in revisional jurisdiction and the State Government did not interfere with the order of the District Collector dated 20.11.1995. It is under these circumstances, the present petition before this Court. 4. I have heard Mrs. Ketty A. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Rakesh R. Patel, learned AGP for the State Authorities. 5. The pertinent aspect is that for the alleged breach of the Tenancy Act, the proceedings were already initiated by the Mamlatdar and ALT and ultimately, he had found that the proceedings deserve to be dropped. Therefore, the Competent Authority under the provisions of Tenancy Act had already decided that there was no necessity to initiate the proceedings for the alleged breach of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. The District Collector in exercise of the power under the Code could not be said to have jurisdiction. Had it been a case where the Competent Authority under the Tenancy Act had not at all initiated the proceedings, the matter might stand on different footing. Even in such circumstances also, at the most the District Collector, by making note in the entry, may refer the matter to the appropriate authority for initiation of the proceedings, if otherwise permissible in law but in any case, he will have no jurisdiction to finally decide as to whether there was any breach of the provisions of the Tenancy Act or not. In the present case, the Competent Authority under the Tenancy Act had finally Ruled and it was found that the proceedings for breach of the Tenancy Act were not required to be taken. Thereafter, once the Competent Authority under the Tenancy Act had already exercised the power, it was not open to the District Collector to exercise the power under the Code and then to set aside the entry on the alleged ground of breach of the Tenancy Act. 6. Apart from the above, it also appears that there is a long delay in initiation of the proceedings even under the Code by the District Collector. 6. Apart from the above, it also appears that there is a long delay in initiation of the proceedings even under the Code by the District Collector. The entry was mutated in the Revenue Record on 19.06.1980 whereas the District Collector has initiated the proceedings only in the year 1993, therefore, there is a delay of about 13 years in initiation of the proceedings under the Code. If the reasonableness of the period is considered, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the period was reasonable and on the contrary, it can be said that the exercise of the power for initiation of the proceedings was beyond reasonable period. The same is coupled with the aspect that during the period of delay, the rights of the party are substantially altered inasmuch as, the land was converted for non-agricultural use, and it was actually put for non-agricultural use after permission of the Competent Authority and subsequently such use was made permanently for quarrying of the stones. If such facts and circumstances are considered, it can be said that the initiation of the proceedings by the District Collector and ultimately, the final order passed under the Code was beyond reasonable period and the action could not be sustained. 7. It appears that the State Government in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction against the order of the Collector, has lost sight of the aforesaid two important aspects of the case and, therefore, the order of the State Government also cannot be sustained. 8. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussion, the impugned order passed by the District Collector at Annexure-E and its conformation thereof by the State Government at Annexure-F deserve to be quashed and set aside, hence, they are quashed and set aside. 9. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs. Petition allowed.