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2013 DIGILAW 185 (HP)

Nanki Devi And Sita Ram v. Lachhman

2013-03-18

RAJIV SHARMA

body2013
JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma J. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 06.07.2005, passed by the learned District Judge, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh in Civil Appeal No. 55 of 2003. 2. 'Key facts' necessary for adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff' for the sake of convenience) had filed a declaratory suit with alternative relief of permanent prohibitory injunction and for possession also to the effect that the plaintiff and the appellants-defendants (hereinafter referred to as 'the defendants' for the sake of convenience) are joint owners in possession of the suit land to the extent of half share and that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants defendants, namely, Munshi Ram (hereinafter referred to as 'the defendant' for the sake of convenience) in connivance with the Revenue Officer A.C.1st Grade, got the possession of the entire land recorded in his favour as owner in possession vide order, dated 24.08.1992. Thereafter, the order of the Collector, dated 31.03.1993, is also null and void and shall have no effect on the right of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, they are joint owners in possession qua the suit land and the defendant never remained in exclusive possession of the suit land, but on the basis of false and frivolous manipulated wrong entries in connivance with revenue official, the defendant is claiming himself to be exclusive owner of the suit land. 3. The suit filed by the plaintiff was resisted and contested by the defendant. It is denied that the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land to the extent of half share. It is further averred that on 15.04.1965, the plaintiff shifted to Samlah Village with his family and inherited the property of Shri Chuhru Ram, who had executed a will in favour of the plaintiff. The property which the plaintiff inherited through the will is stated to be equal to the property of the suit land and the plaintiff lost his share in the suit land after he shifted to village Samlah to the house of his maternal uncle. The plaintiff tried to take forcible possession of the suit land on 13.01.1975, but he could not succeed. According to the defendant, he is in peaceful, open and continuous possession and has become owner by way of adverse possession. The plaintiff tried to take forcible possession of the suit land on 13.01.1975, but he could not succeed. According to the defendant, he is in peaceful, open and continuous possession and has become owner by way of adverse possession. He has supported the orders passed by the A.C. 1st Grade and the Sub-Divisional Collector. 4. The plaintiff has also filed the replication and has re-affirmed and reasserted the averments contained in the plaint. 5. It is also necessary for the completion of facts that the defendant has also filed a Civil Suit on 30.06.1995 against the plaintiff for declaration qua the suit land, which was registered and assigned Civil Suit No. 98/1 of 1995. The plaintiff has filed written statement to the suit filed by the defendant. The Civil Suit filed by the defendant bearing No. 98/1 of 1995 was treated as Counter Claim to the suit filed by the plaintiff bearing Civil Suit No. 95/1 of 1995 on 30.06.1995. The Counter Claim was tagged with Civil Suit No. 95/1 of 1995. Learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh framed the issues on 23.12.1997 and 23.12.2002. The suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed and he was declared to be joint owner in possession of the suit land along with the defendant to the extent of half share and was entitled for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant. The orders of A.C. 1st Grade as well as Collector were declared null and void. 6. The defendant preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh against the judgment, dated 30.04.2003. The same was dismissed on 06.07.2005. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. 7. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the learned Courts below have failed to give its findings on all issues in view of the provisions of Order 20, Rule 5 of C.P.C. and the judgment passed by this Hon'ble Court in RSA No. 281 of 2001 as well as the law laid down by this Hon'ble Court and the Apex Court? 2. Whether the learned Courts below are right in deciding the issue No. 9: whether the suit is barred by limitation, as alleged?" 8. Mr. J.R. Poswal, learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has not given findings on each issue. 2. Whether the learned Courts below are right in deciding the issue No. 9: whether the suit is barred by limitation, as alleged?" 8. Mr. J.R. Poswal, learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has not given findings on each issue. He also contended that the learned trial Court has not given any finding on the question of adverse possession. He also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. 9. Mr. Ashwani Pathak, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings carefully. 11. Since both the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid the repetition of discussion of evidence. 12. Mr. J.R. Poswal, learned counsel for the appellants has been permitted to advance the arguments in order to do complete justice between the parties beyond the substantial questions of law framed by putting the opposite side on notice. 13. The learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh has framed the following issues on 23.12.1997 and 23.12.2002: "1. Whether the plaintiff is co-owner in possession of the suit land to the extent of = share as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the order dated 24.8.92 passed by learned A.C. 1st Grade Bilaspur and order dated 31.2.1995 passed by Collector Sub Division Bilaspur are null and void, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs entitled to the relief of injunction against the defendant as alleged? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of possession of half share of the suit land in alternative as alleged? OPP 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 6. Whether the act and conduct of the plaintiff are bar to the present suit? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi and cause of action to file the suit as alleged? OPD. 8. Whether the suit is liable to be stayed under Section 10 C.P.C., as alleged? OPD. 9. Whether the suit is barred by limitation as alleged? OPD. 9-A Whether the counter-claimant/defendant is entitled for permanent prohibitory injunction as alleged? OPD. 9-B Whether the defendants are entitled for adverse possession in alternative as prayed for? OPD. 10. OPD. 8. Whether the suit is liable to be stayed under Section 10 C.P.C., as alleged? OPD. 9. Whether the suit is barred by limitation as alleged? OPD. 9-A Whether the counter-claimant/defendant is entitled for permanent prohibitory injunction as alleged? OPD. 9-B Whether the defendants are entitled for adverse possession in alternative as prayed for? OPD. 10. Whether the plaintiff has no right in the suit land and the defendant has prayed owner in possession of the suit land by way of adverse possession as alleged?OPD. 11. Relief. 14. Learned trial Court has returned findings on all the issues, including the question of adverse possession. Learned trial Court has held that since the plaintiff was never dispossessed from the suit land, there was no question of any ouster. It was not pointed out by the defendant when he occupied the suit land for the first time. He has not done any overt acts over the suit land to prove his hostile animus. In cross-examination, the defendant and his witnesses have admitted that both the brothers, i.e., the plaintiff and defendant inherited the property jointly from their father. It was not disputed that the plaintiff was also co-sharer in the suit land to the extent of half share on the basis of the oral as well as ocular evidence. The defendant has failed to prove the ingredients of adverse possession. Learned trial Court has returned its findings on issues No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9-A and 10, issues No. 5 and 8, issues No. 7, 6 and 9 separately. Learned 1st Appellate Court has also discussed the issue of adverse possession at length. 15. Mr. J.R. Poswal, learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court on issues No. 1 to 4 and upheld by the learned 1st Appellate Court, are contrary to the facts. According to him, the defendant has led tangible evidence to establish that the plaintiff has left village Neelan in the year 1965 after relinquishing his share in his favour by way of family settlement. 16. Plaintiff has appeared as RPW-1. According to him, his father has expired in 1947. The parties have inherited the suit land in equal shares and also came in possession. According to him, the land has been partitioned about eight years ago and since then the parties are in possession of their respective share. 16. Plaintiff has appeared as RPW-1. According to him, his father has expired in 1947. The parties have inherited the suit land in equal shares and also came in possession. According to him, the land has been partitioned about eight years ago and since then the parties are in possession of their respective share. The statement of RPW-1 has been supported by RPW-2, Kanahya Ram and RPW-3, Chhotu Ram. The plaintiff has placed on record the copies of Jamabandies for the year 1964-65, Ex.-PE, for the year 1970-71, Ex. PF, for the year 76- 77, Ex.-PG, for the year 1981-82, Ex.-PH, for the year 1986-87, Ex.-PJ, for the year 1996-97, Ex.-PK. He has also placed on record Khasra Girdawaries from Kharif-1965 to Ravi-2000, Ex.- PL to Ex.-PP, copy of Jamabandi for the year 1991-92 as well as abstract of family register, Ex.-PB, copy of Khasra Girdwari of Kharif-1992 to Ravi-1994, Ex. PC, attested copy of order of A.C. 1st Grade, dated 30.03.1993 and Ex. PD, copy of order of Collector, dated 31.03.1993 and Ex. PW-2/A, copy of F.I.R. In all the copies of Jamabandis, the plaintiff and defendant, have been recorded as joint owners in possession of the suit land. These entries have remained uninterrupted till the filing of the suit. The revenue record amply proves that both the brothers, i.e., plaintiff and defendant were co-owners in possession of the suit land. 17. According to DW-1, the plaintiff is his real brother and the name of his maternal uncle is Churu Ram, who is residing in village Samlah of District Ropar. He own 33 bighas of land in that village. It has further come in his statement that both the brothers inherited 32 bighas land from their father, who has expired 52 years back. He has further testified that in the month of Baisakh, his maternal uncle came to his village and requested that one of the brothers should reside with him. Thereafter, it was mutually decided between the brothers that the plaintiff will settle in Village Samlah and another in Village Neelan. Thereafter, the plaintiff has permanently settled in village Samlah. It has come in the cross-examination of the defendant that after the death of their father, both the brothers have been recorded as co-sharers. He has also admitted that the plaintiff is entitled to half share of his father's property. 18. Thereafter, the plaintiff has permanently settled in village Samlah. It has come in the cross-examination of the defendant that after the death of their father, both the brothers have been recorded as co-sharers. He has also admitted that the plaintiff is entitled to half share of his father's property. 18. DW-2, Shri Fateh Deen has deposed that about 35 years back, he came to the house of Munshi Ram, where Sh. Churu Ram was also present. It was settled that one of the sons would remain with him. Thereafter, it was decided that Munshi Ram will settle in Village Neelan and Lachhman will be given land by Shri Churu Ram. According to him, thereafter Lachman, i.e., plaintiff has relinquished his share in favour of his brother. In his cross-examination, he could not give the date, month and year in which this settlement was arrived at. He has also admitted that after the death of their father, both the brothers came in possession of the suit land. 19. DW-3, Sh. Prem Singh has stated that the plaintiff is residing with his family in the house of Churu Ram. According to him, an agreement was entered between the brothers, upon which the plaintiff settled in village Samlah and the defendant started looking after the land in village Neelan. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that the mutation of inheritance of their father has been sanctioned in favour of the parties. He has also admitted that the land is joint till now. He has also admitted that the parties have partitioned the suit land in family partition. According to him, the plaintiff was owner of half share of the suit land. 20. In view of the discussions made herein above on the evidence led by the parties, the defendant could not prove that the plaintiff has relinquished his share in village Neelan and the joint status of the parties has come to an end. 21. Mr. J.R. Paswal, learned counsel for the appellants has also argued that the plaintiff has relinquished his share of the property in village Neelan and he has settled in village Samlah. The revenue entries duly establish that the name of the plaintiff was entered with the defendant as co-owner. These entries have been changed only on the basis of order passed by the A.C. 1st Grade vide Ex.-PC. The revenue entries duly establish that the name of the plaintiff was entered with the defendant as co-owner. These entries have been changed only on the basis of order passed by the A.C. 1st Grade vide Ex.-PC. The case of the plaintiff before both the Courts below was that no notice was issued to him when the defendant has moved an application for correction of revenue record. It has come on the record that though the notice was issued to the plaintiff, but he could not be served. Thereafter, on 16.07.1992, he was ordered to be served for 10.08.1992. According to Ex. D-I, the plaintiff was not present in the house at the time when the process server has visited the house, but the notice was affixed outside the house of the plaintiff. This was not proper service as per law. The substituted service can only be resorted to by the Court when it is satisfied that there is reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way, the Court can order the summons to be served by affixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous place in the Court-house, and also upon some conspicuous part of the house (if any) in which the defendant is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, or in such other manner as the Court thinks fit as per Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22. The substituted service was required to be ordered strictly in letter and spirit of Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There has to be the satisfaction of A.C. 1st Grade that the defendant was keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding the service. This aspect has also been overlooked by the Collector while passing order, Ex.-PD. Since the plaintiff has never been served notice in accordance with law, the order passed by the A.C. 1st Grade, Ex.-PC, dated 24.08.1992 and the order passed by the Collector, Ex.-PD, dated 31.03.1993, were nullity and not binding upon the plaintiff. 23. Issue No. 9 was framed to the effect whether the suit was barred by limitation. Since the plaintiff has never been served notice in accordance with law, the order passed by the A.C. 1st Grade, Ex.-PC, dated 24.08.1992 and the order passed by the Collector, Ex.-PD, dated 31.03.1993, were nullity and not binding upon the plaintiff. 23. Issue No. 9 was framed to the effect whether the suit was barred by limitation. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class has returned a finding that since the orders passed by the A.C. 1st Grade and Collector were void, the suit was within limitation. The question of limitation has not been raised by the appellants before the learned District Judge, Bilaspur. Learned District Judge, Bilaspur has specifically stated in paragraph No. 34 of the judgment that no other point was urged or argued by the defendant before him in appeal. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant has argued that issues No. 1 to 4 and 9- A and 9-B have not been correctly decided by the learned Trial Court. 24. The learned Single Judge in Kuldip Rai v. Sharan Singh and others, AIR 1989 Punjab and Haryana, 319 has held that it is obligatory for Court to record its satisfaction that defendant is avoiding service or service cannot be effected by ordinary way before ordering substituted service. The learned Single Judge has held as under: "7. Before ordering substituted service the Court should be satisfied that the conditions on which alone it can be ordered exist, namely, that the defendant is keeping out of the way to avoid service or that for any other reason service cannot be effected in the ordinary way. The interim orders reproduced supra do not indicate that there was any material before the Court on the basis of which it could record its satisfaction that the respondents were keeping out of the way to avoid service or that for any other reason service cannot be effected in the ordinary way. Before resorting to the provisions of Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the Code"), it is obligatory for the Court to record its satisfaction as enjoined under the statute. The substituted service cannot be ordered in routine manner. The perusal of the interim orders does not justify issuance of order for substituted service. It indicates lack of applicability of judicial mind to the facts of the case. The substituted service cannot be ordered in routine manner. The perusal of the interim orders does not justify issuance of order for substituted service. It indicates lack of applicability of judicial mind to the facts of the case. Moreover, it was obligatory for the respondent landlord to prove that the newspaper through which substituted service was ordered was in daily circulation in the locality in which the petitioner was last known to have actually and voluntarily resided, carried on business or personally worked for a gain. Once it is disputed that there was no valid service, it is for the respondent to establish that the petitioner was validly served and valid service presupposes service in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The landlord failed to establish the prerequisites enjoined by Clause 1-A of R.20 of O.r of the Code. The following observations in S.V.P. Chockalingam Chettiar v. V.C. Rajarthnam, AIR 1964 Mad 415 can be usefully referred to (at p. 416 of AIR):- "Rule 20 of O.5, Civil Procedure Code provides for substituted service, the main purpose of it is to bring it to the notice of the person to whom it is intended. Substituted service cannot be regarded as an idle formality to be gone through. The Code intends it as a substitute to actual personal service. Unfortunately the learned Subordinate Judge appears to have though that as substituted service had been ordered by the Court and effected, the question of the sufficiency of it will no longer arise. That however, is not the correct way of approaching the question. A valid substituted service of a notice should conform to the conditions prescribed in Order 5, Rule 20 , Civil Procedure Code. It it does not conform to that rule, service will have to be regarded as not in accordance with law and therefore not sufficient." Accordingly, I hold that the petitioner applicant was not validly served and the order directing that ex parte proceedings be taken against him is bad at law." 25. In G. Shanmukhi v. Utakur Venkatarami Reddi and another, 1957 Andhra Pradesh 1, the Full Bench has explained the term "duly served" as under: "8. Order 5 deals with the issue of summons to the defendant in order to apprise him of the institution of the suit against him so that he might appear and answer the claim. In G. Shanmukhi v. Utakur Venkatarami Reddi and another, 1957 Andhra Pradesh 1, the Full Bench has explained the term "duly served" as under: "8. Order 5 deals with the issue of summons to the defendant in order to apprise him of the institution of the suit against him so that he might appear and answer the claim. Rule 9 of that Order prescribes direct service on the defendant or upon an agent empowered to accept service on his behalf. Sub-rule (3) thereof provides alternatively for service by registered post prepaid for acknowledgement. Rule 12 directs that wherever it is practicable, service shall be made on the defendant in person, unless he has an agent empowered to accept service, in which case service on such agent would be sufficient. Rules 13 and 14 enact that summons may be served on a manager or agent of the defendant who carries on any business or work for him, if the suit relates to such business or work, or an agent of the defendant in charge of any immovable property, if the suit seeks a relief respecting it. In a case where the defendant is absent and has no agent empowered to accept service, service may also be made on any adult male member of the family of the defendant who is residing with him, as provided by R. 15. The summons is either to be delivered or tendered to the defendant, his agent or an adult member of his family. Where they refuse to sign an acknowledgement of service, the procedure to be followed is prescribed by R. 17, while R. 18 describes the procedure to be adopted when the summons has been actually served on any one of them. Where they refuse to sign an acknowledgement of service, the procedure to be followed is prescribed by R. 17, while R. 18 describes the procedure to be adopted when the summons has been actually served on any one of them. Then follows R. 20 which provides for substituted service in these terms: "20 (1) Where the Court is satisfied that there is reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way, the Court shall order the summons to be served by affixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous place in the court-house, and also upon some conspicuous part of the house (if any) in which the defendant is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, or in such other manner as the Court thinks fit. " (2). Service substituted by order of the Court shall be as effectual as if it had been made on the defendant personally." It is manifest that these several modes of service attempt to reconcile the need for bringing home to the defendant knowledge of the suit with the practical necessity of proceeding as early as possible with its trial. Where these rules of service are observed, there would generally be good reason for supposing that the defendant became aware of the institution of the suit, through it does not necessarily follow that he actually did. It is possible that even in a case of personal service or service upon an agent etc., there may be mistaken identity, and the person served may not be the defendant or his agent. The defendant when he come to know of the suit or the decree passed therein may in such a case approach the point out that he has not been 'duly' served. It is seen that in the case of substituted service, there are two conditions prescribed before it satisfied either (1) that there is reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or (2) that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way. The satisfaction of the Court in each of these cases is brought about by representations of the plaintiff usually made by an affidavit. The satisfaction of the Court in each of these cases is brought about by representations of the plaintiff usually made by an affidavit. If, of course, the defendant has been deliberately keeping out of the way and substituted service is ordered in such a case, it certainly would be 'due service.' A party cannot close his eyes and complain that he is unable to see. But, if on the other hand the defendant is not really keeping out of the way at all and the Court is only induced to believe that he is, by the one-sided representation of the plaintiff, it is clear that the service that is then substituted cannot be regarded as "due" service. Therefore when the question arises as to whether in a particular case, substituted service obtained from the Court is or is not "due" service, it will have to be determined by ascertaining whether the representations made to the Court by the plaintiff were not true, that is to say, whether the defendant could be presumed in the circumstances, to have or had actual knowledge. Of course, substituted service will not be directed unless the Court is satisfied as to the existence of one or the other conditions specified in the rule. But a mere note upon the record to that effect is not conclusive against the defendant though in the absence of any other practicable alternative the Court must proceed upon the footing, for the time being, that the service is a effectual as personal service. This effectuality is only for the purpose of enabling the Court to go on with the suit. But, its effectuality against the defendant depends solely on whether he really avoided service or whether as a matter of fact he came to know of the suit otherwise. These facts will have to be determined by the Court to which application is made to set aside an ex parte decree. 11. As already indicated, I find myself in agreement with the views of Reilly J. as expressed in Gyanammal v. Abdul Hussain Sahib (E). In my opinion, substituted service may or may not be 'due' service according to the circumstances of the case. It is open to the defendant to establish that he never avoided service and that, in any case, notice of the claim had not been brought home to him. In my opinion, substituted service may or may not be 'due' service according to the circumstances of the case. It is open to the defendant to establish that he never avoided service and that, in any case, notice of the claim had not been brought home to him. In the present case, as the learned District Munsiff seems to have proceeded upon the footing that merely because it was substituted service, it could not have been due service, the matter should, in my opinion, go back to him for fresh disposal after ascertaining the facts in the light of the observations made above. I would direct that the costs of the case should abide and follow the result." 26. In Ram August Tewari and others v. Bindeshwari Tewari and others, AIR 1972 Patna 142(V 59 C 35), the Division Bench has held that recourse to substituted service under Order 5, Rule 20 is to be taken only when the materials are placed before the Court to show "that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service." The Division Bench has held as under: "11. I would, next take up the question as to what is the effect of the substituted service under Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Recourse to substituted service under the said rule is to be taken only when the materials are placed before the Court to show "that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service." In this case, obviously, there was no such material before the Court. Rather the materials placed before the Court were that service had been effected on the defendants, both through the Court peon regularly and also through registered post. In the circumstances, steps for substituted service under the said rule ought not have been taken. Further, when substituted service is effected under the said rule and the summonses are published either in the gazette or in some news-paper ordinarily summonses are also affixed in some conspicuous place of the court house and some conspicuous part of the house, if any, in which the defendant is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. There is no evidence on the record that summonses were served in the suit by affixing copies thereof in some conspicuous place in the court house or upon some conspicuous part of the house, if any, in which the appellants were found to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain." 27. In Teharoonchand v. Messrs Surajmull Nagarmull, AIR 1984 Calcutta 82, the Division Bench has held that satisfaction of the Court from materials on record that defendant is keeping out of way for the purpose of avoiding service is necessary condition. The Division Bench has held as under: "9. As regards service through registered post, the registered cover shows that the addressee was not met on different occasions. There was thus no tender of the registered cover to the addressee. It is true that under the law service of summons under Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code shall be as effectual as if it had been made on the defendant personally. Before issuing summons under Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code, the Court is to be satisfied that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reason summons cannot be served in the ordinary way. Before such satisfaction, the Court has to consider the case carefully having regard to the nature of the earlier attempts made for the service of summons. Mere assertion of the plaintiff in this respect to attract the provisions of Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code will not be enough. Only when the Court is satisfied from the materials on record that there is reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reasons summons cannot be served in the ordinary way, the Court will be entitled to order service of summons under Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code. In the instant case, all these questions did not appear to have been properly considered before issue of the summons under Order 5, Rule 20 of the Code. The learned trial Court has failed to exercise jurisdiction properly. In this matter, the learned appellate court has not come to any finding regarding the service of summons." 28. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 29. The learned trial Court has failed to exercise jurisdiction properly. In this matter, the learned appellate court has not come to any finding regarding the service of summons." 28. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 29. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made herein above, there is no merit in this Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. No costs.