Judgment : K. Vinod Chandran, J. 1. The appellant is aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition and the subsequent review, by the learned Single Judge. Essentially the appellant, on the basis of a settlement deed executed by his father, sought to resile from the surrender of certain lands by the father for the development of a road; with an eye on the compensation that he would get if the local authority was forced into acquiring such land; which is apparently necessary and crucial for the development of the Thammanam - Pullepady road. 2. The appellant approached this Court without even the local authority in the party array by a writ petition; in which he sought for a mandamus commanding the 1st respondent, Village Officer, to effect mutation of the property covered as per Exhibit P2 document and for acceptance of land tax. The appellant claimed in the writ petition that 2.08 ares of land in survey No.478/1 of Elamkulam Village, in the exclusive ownership and enjoyment of his father and which was comprised in 2.28 ares surrendered by his father for the development of Thammanam - Pullepady road, was settled in his favour by virtue of Exhibit P2 deed, executed by his father. The appellant contended that the surrender being of the year 2002, is no more valid for reason of the Revenue Divisional officer having passed no order under Section 4 of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as "the Relinquishment Act". The surrendered lands, hence, does not vest in the Government and execution of the deed of 2011, Exhibit P2, is perfectly valid and mutation on that basis is to be effected, was the prayer. 3. The 2nd respondent, Revenue Divisional Officer, filed a counter affidavit dated 16.1.2012, contending that the land in question is ordered to be taken into possession as "free surrender" and handed over to the Council of the Cochin Corporation for development of Thamannam - Pullepady road. As directed by this Court, a meeting was convened by the 3rd respondent and a report of the District Collector dated 22.2.2012 was placed on record. The said report stated that the survey work for the development of Thammanam – Pullepady road had commenced and permission has been sought from the Land Revenue Commissioner for publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 4. The said report stated that the survey work for the development of Thammanam – Pullepady road had commenced and permission has been sought from the Land Revenue Commissioner for publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 4. Subsequently, the local authority, the Corporation of Cochin, was impleaded as per order dated 5.6.2012 and they filed a counter affidavit dated 14.6.2012 contending that the father of the appellant had agreed for surrender of 2.28 ares of land situated in Survey No.478/1 and on the strength of that, the Road Committee had approved the construction of a building having Ground + 5 Floors, which had Floor Area Ratio (for short "FAR"), more than that permissible under the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as "the Building Rules"). The proposal was approved and sanctioned, specifically by virtue only of the free surrender of land for the purpose of development of the road, on condition that no compound wall should be constructed on the eastern side of the property. The appellant's father thus having availed of the benefits under the Building Rules, more specifically Rules 79 to 84, is precluded from resiling from the agreed surrender. Since the appellant's claim is only on the alleged assignment of that land by his father; who had originally surrendered it, he too is bound to honour the surrender and the subsequent assignment cannot create any better right on the appellant. The building permit and the plan were also produced. 5. In the reply affidavit, the appellant contended that the building permit was issued in accordance with the Building Rules prevailing at that point of time and no exemption or concession was granted. The appellant contended that though his father had agreed for the surrender, the same had not come into effect, since the road was not formed immediately. The intention of the appellant is very clear from his statement in paragraph 6 of the reply affidavit dated 27.6.2012: "Even this petitioner has no objection in acquiring the land provided the compensation in accordance with law is paid". Evidently nothing could be done on the said property which abuts and is a part of the proposed Thammanam – Pullepady road and the assignment made by his father as also the claim petition was a veiled attempt to ensure payment of compensation. Evidently nothing could be done on the said property which abuts and is a part of the proposed Thammanam – Pullepady road and the assignment made by his father as also the claim petition was a veiled attempt to ensure payment of compensation. The land is situated behind the residential apartment building of the 6 storey building, built by the appellant's father, as is evident from the plans produced; to its south. 6. The learned Single Judge having discussed the contentions elaborately, found that the application for building permit was submitted immediately after the surrender was made. Though no order was passed under Section 4C of the Act, it was found that the files produced by the Cochin Corporation reveal that the appellant's father had applied for construction of an eight storeyed building and the said application was referred to the Road Committee for consideration under the Building Rules. It was found that even the revised building permit to construct a six storeyed building was issued to the appellant's father only on condition of unconditional surrender of 2.28 ares of land in Survey No.478/1. The learned Single Judge found that admittedly the appellant's father had surrendered a portion of the land on the eastern (mistakenly noted and corrected in review) portion of the building which abuts the proposed Thammanam - Pullepady road for the purpose of obtaining building permit and that it is a deemed dedication of the land for user as a public way. The dedication having been made, though it does not altogether deprive him of his right over the soil, the enjoyment of the land could not be inconsistent with the public right of passage over it. In such circumstance, it was held that a formal order accepting the unconditional surrender of land having not been passed by the R.D.O. does not efface the dedication of the land for user as a public way. 7. We have also looked at the Relinquishment Act, which was brought in, to provide for the relinquishment of land in favour of Government. "Relinquishment", inter alia, is defined under Section 2(b) as the unconditional surrender by the registered holder of all his rights over the land in case of possession by a registered holder. In the instant case, the appellant's father was a 'registered holder' and was the sole registered holder. "Relinquishment", inter alia, is defined under Section 2(b) as the unconditional surrender by the registered holder of all his rights over the land in case of possession by a registered holder. In the instant case, the appellant's father was a 'registered holder' and was the sole registered holder. Section 3, with respect to relinquishment of land, provides for relinquishment in favour of the Government by a registered holder the whole or any portion of any land entered in his name in the revenue records, provided that such land or portion is in his possession and free of encumbrances; by virtue of sub-section (1). Section 4 provides for the procedure to be followed when lands are relinquished. The application for relinquishment has to be submitted to the R.D.O. of a division, as per sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) provides that on receipt of the application, R.D.O., if satisfied that the registered owner is competent to relinquish by virtue of a valid title in the land, shall issue a notice in the prescribed form to all concerned, giving them an opportunity, before a date specified in the notice, to show cause why such relinquishment cannot be accepted. Sub-section (2), according to us, does not contemplate a notice against the registered holder. 8. On submission of an application, the registered holder expresses his intention to unconditionally surrender the land to the Government. What is contemplated in subsection (2) is the requirement of notice to any other person who is interested in the land, indicating a tenant or any person in possession of such land or disclosed from the revenue records to have a right over such land. Sub-section (3) again provides for the affixture of the notice in the notice board of the office of the R.D.O. and sub-section (4) permits any person interested in the land to file an objection before the R.D.O. Subsection (5) contemplates an order, either accepting or rejecting the relinquishment. Section 4C speaks of vesting of relinquished lands in Government on acceptance in consequence of an order by the R.D.O., or in appeal or revision. On a reading of the above Sections, we are of the view that the relinquishment by a registered holder as against him, operates unconditionally, on an application being made under the Act. Section 4C speaks of vesting of relinquished lands in Government on acceptance in consequence of an order by the R.D.O., or in appeal or revision. On a reading of the above Sections, we are of the view that the relinquishment by a registered holder as against him, operates unconditionally, on an application being made under the Act. The act of relinquishment is a voluntary act of the registered holder which is unilateral and takes effect from the date of the application. This is, for reason of the application being an expression of the intention to unconditionally surrender the possession and rights over the land to the Government. The procedure contemplated is to ensure that no further claims are raised on the land by a third party on one count or another. It cannot be gainsaid that if no order is passed, the land reverts back to the registered holder who had relinquished his rights. If no order is passed, definitely by the relinquishment there is no vesting and cannot be final as against any third-party claiming title, possession or any other right over such land. In the instant case, the appellant does not claim any such right over the land in addition to the right of his father. The appellant's claim is as an assignee of his father and what the father, the original registered holder, could not have claimed, definitely the assignee cannot claim. 9. Administrator, Municipal Committee Charkhi Dadri v. Ramji Lal Bagla, (1995) 5 SCC 272 , the question was whether after acquisition of land for implementation of a scheme; the scheme having not been executed and the State Government having not extended the period for such execution; whether land reverts back to the original owner. Section 44-A of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 provided that "any scheme in respect of which a notification has been published under Section 42 shall be executed by the trust within a period of five years from the date of such notification". The proviso empowered the extension of the period by the State Government, by order. Though an application was made, no orders were passed. Reversing the judgment of the High Court restoring the land to the owners; their Lordships held: "14. The proviso empowered the extension of the period by the State Government, by order. Though an application was made, no orders were passed. Reversing the judgment of the High Court restoring the land to the owners; their Lordships held: "14. In our considered opinion, Section 44-A cannot be held to be mandatory in the sense that non-compliance with it leads to of the acquisition which has already become final. Such non-compliance cannot also result in divesting of title of the trust nor is there any obligation to restore the unutilised portion(s) of land to its erstwhile owners/ persons interested. The reasons are the following: (a) The section while using the expression 'shall' does not provide the consequence of non-compliance with its requirement. One of the well-accepted tests for determining whether a provision is directory or mandatory is to see whether the enactment provides for the consequence flowing from non-compliance with the requirement prescribed (State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 ). The proviso to Section 44-A empowers the Government to extend the said period. The proviso does not prescribe the outer limit beyond which extension cannot be granted. Nor does it indicate in any manner that the said power can be exercised by the Government only once and no more". The provisions of the Relinquishment Act too does not provide for any consequence in the event of an order being not passed under Section 4; nor does it provide for an outer limit within which time an order of acceptance can be passed. We are, hence, fortified in our view that the absence of an order under Section 4 does not lead to restoration of the land to the registered holder who voluntarily relinquished it. In this case, it is also pertinent to note that the registered holder by virtue of such relinquishment enjoyed a benefit by way of exemption in the Building Rules, with respect to the balance properties; as we shall presently see. 10. The learned Single Judge having dismissed the writ petition, the appellant was again before the learned Single Judge with a review on the ground that the learned Single Judge misunderstood that it was the property lying to the east that was surrendered. The mistake with respect to the boundary was projected as an error apparent on the face of the record. The mistake with respect to the boundary was projected as an error apparent on the face of the record. However, the entire matter was reagitated, as is evident from the order in the review petition. The contention in review was three-fold. The primary argument was with respect to the subject land as also the Thammanam -Pullepady road lying to the south of the building constructed by the appellant's father; and not to the east as was noticed by the learned Single Judge. The next contention was that there was no surrender of land by the appellant's father, but only an offer which was never accepted by the State. The last contention was that there was no averment or evidence to prove that any exemption was granted in accordance with Chapter XI of the Building Rules. 11. The learned Single Judge once again perused the files and found that the files disclosed that the application dated 6.9.2002 by the appellant's father was to construct an apartment building, which was forwarded to the Road Committee, which met on 4.10.2002 and resolved to grant the permit. Such grant was found to be directly based on Exhibit P1 application for relinquishment. The revised plan submitted was also considered by the Road Committee that met on 31.10.2003 and resolved to approve the same. It was thereafter that Exhibit R4(a) permit was issued to construct a six storeyed building. One of the conditions imposed was that the eastern boundary shall be kept open without walling the same. The learned Single Judge having considered the issue, though noticed that mistakenly in the judgment, the property surrendered was indicated as being on the eastern boundary, that alone, according to us, does not in any manner upset the findings of the learned Single Judge. The boundary in which the land lies was not a question which came up for consideration in the writ petition. The land which was the subject matter of the writ petition was that surrendered for the development of Thammanam - Pullepady road and that the said Thammanam -Pullepady road was located on the southern side of the building constructed by the appellant's father are undisputed. 12. The Writ Appeal has been filed, as noticed earlier, mainly on three grounds. The land which was the subject matter of the writ petition was that surrendered for the development of Thammanam - Pullepady road and that the said Thammanam -Pullepady road was located on the southern side of the building constructed by the appellant's father are undisputed. 12. The Writ Appeal has been filed, as noticed earlier, mainly on three grounds. The first ground is that the finding that the property allegedly surrendered is on the eastern side is erroneous and, hence, the declaration of the learned Single Judge that there is dedication of property for public use; contrary to which the appellant or his father could not use the said property even in the absence of an order under the Relinquishment Act, is also erroneous. We have already expressed our opinion that the mistake in finding the surrendered land to be on the eastern boundary, has been corrected by the learned Single Judge himself in review and in any event, that is, of no consequence. Whether it be on the east or south, apparently there is a proposal for a public road and the surrender was for the purpose of the development of that road. 13. There is an attempt on the part of the appellant to say that the surrender was only on the expectation that there would be immediately laid, a road; having access to the balance properties remaining with the father. We notice that the said contention is destructive of the earlier contention. The appellant had always contended that the surrender had been made under the Relinquishment Act and has not been accepted by the authority and that the absence of an order passed under Section 4 would result in the property reverting back to the owner. We have noticed earlier that the relinquishment contemplated under the Act is unconditional and the appellant cannot now have a claim that the surrender was with a rider that the road would be laid immediately. We also notice that Exhibit P1 surrender made by the appellant's father was within the knowledge of the appellant also, since he was also one of the witnesses who signed the surrender. The appellant, being an assignee of the registered holder who had surrendered the property, cannot now turn around and claim that the condition of surrender was not satisfied. We also notice that Exhibit P1 surrender made by the appellant's father was within the knowledge of the appellant also, since he was also one of the witnesses who signed the surrender. The appellant, being an assignee of the registered holder who had surrendered the property, cannot now turn around and claim that the condition of surrender was not satisfied. This answers the contention raised by the appellant in the writ petition as well as the review that the relinquishment has not been accepted and there was no unconditional surrender of land. We uphold the findings of the learned Single Judge on both these aspects dealt with in the writ petition as also the review petition. 14. In review the scope of the litigation was considerably enlarged, because the contention with respect to the exemption in Building Rules, not being granted to the appellant's father was one urged only in the review. We have already held that the contention with reference to the procedure contemplated under the Relinquishment Act is not sustainable. The entire controversy now turns only on whether any exemption was granted on the basis of the surrender. We are of the opinion that any decision on that aspect is irrelevant in so far as we found the unconditional surrender made by the father of the appellant was not one from which his father or himself, as his assignee, could resile from. Arguments were addressed on that count and the learned Single Judge has dealt with the said issue and more than one affidavit were filed by the appellant and the local authority regarding this aspect. Hence, we think it appropriate that we consider the same lest the parties are placed in any confusion on that aspect. 15. Now we come to the contention that the sanction for construction of the building was without any exemption under Chapter XI of the Building Rules. We notice that, that was a contention that was urged only in the review. The learned Single Judge had perused the files produced by the Corporation, while the writ petition was being argued as also while, the review petition was argued. The learned Single Judge has, with specific reference to the dates, found that the application for building permit was filed immediately after the application for surrender was made before the appropriate authority. The learned Single Judge had perused the files produced by the Corporation, while the writ petition was being argued as also while, the review petition was argued. The learned Single Judge has, with specific reference to the dates, found that the application for building permit was filed immediately after the application for surrender was made before the appropriate authority. The consideration of the original plan submitted and the revised plan by the Road Committee also is very evident from the files. It was in this context that the learned Single Judge found that the appellant's father had availed of the exemption under Chapter XI of the Building Rules. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that coverage and FAR should be computed as per Table 2 under Rule 31 of the Building Rules. It is submitted that the same was substituted by S.R.O.No.170/2001 with effect from 22.2.2001. The building constructed by the father of the appellant comes under Group A1, "Residential". The maximum permissible FAR as per Table 2 without additional fee was 3.00 as per the said substitution. It is the contention of the learned counsel that the Corporation and the Government in the present litigation, had proceeded on the premise that it was 1.50 as specified before the substitution of 2001. Taking the FAR as 3.00, it is submitted that the building of the father of the appellant, as sought for by the revised plan for six floors, comes within the limit permissible as per the substitution of 2001. 17. From the counter affidavit dated 5.12.2012, of the Corporation, filed in the Writ Appeal, particularly paragraphs 4 to 7, it is seen that the appellant's father originally owned 766 square meters in Survey Nos.476/1 and 478/1, out of which he relinquished 228 square meters from Survey No.478/1, for the purpose of road development. Computing the FAR of the original land at 1.5 comes to 1149 square meters and if as contended by the appellant it is 3.00, the same comes to 2298. The original plan submitted by the father of the appellant, for construction of an 8 storeyed building, had a total plinth area of 2348.86 square meters. The revised plan, according to which the present building has been constructed, comes to 1778.56 square meters. The original plan submitted by the father of the appellant, for construction of an 8 storeyed building, had a total plinth area of 2348.86 square meters. The revised plan, according to which the present building has been constructed, comes to 1778.56 square meters. It is the specific contention of the appellant, that the appellant's father, due to financial constraints, had submitted the revised plan, which was within the limits permitted by the Building Rules and, hence, no exemption can be inferred on that count. We should immediately say that that contention is besides the point in dispute, since now, categorically, there is an admission that there was an exemption originally. If on financial constraints he submitted a revised plan, that does not in any manner take away or efface the relinquishment made or the exemption granted. 18. We would also examine as to whether there is any reasonableness in the contention that the revised plan was sanctioned within the permissible limits of the Building Rules. As we have already noticed, 776 square meters was the original area of the land and going by which the building now constructed having plinth area of 1178.56 square meters, is within the permissible limits as per Table 2, substituted in 2001. However, the additional counter affidavit dated 20.1.2013 filed by the respondent-Corporation refers to the Government Order, G.O.(Ms). No.103/91/LAD dated 20.03.1991, produced as Exhibit R4(e), issued by the Government in exercise of the statutory power conferred under Section 12(2) of the Town Planning Act 1108 and Section 14 of the Madras Town Planning Act, 1920 brought into force as a General Town Planning Scheme, known as "Detailed Town Planning Scheme" (D.T.P. Scheme) for the Cochin City area. The FAR allowed in the City Area for "residential" buildings has been specified as 1.50. The sanctioned plan of the building constructed by the father of the appellant has been produced as Exhibit R4(f) by the Corporation. The respondent-Corporation has shown the contours of the building as per the approved plan as also the permissible limits. In the counter affidavit it has also been specifically pleaded that while the Building Rules insist set back on all sides, there was an exemption for the building constructed by the appellant's father, which was considered and granted by the Road Committee. In the counter affidavit it has also been specifically pleaded that while the Building Rules insist set back on all sides, there was an exemption for the building constructed by the appellant's father, which was considered and granted by the Road Committee. We extract herein below para 10 of the counter affidavit dated 20.1.2013 filed by the Secretary of the Corporation of Cochin. "10. It is submitted that the Road Committee had granted FAR of 2.32 whereas he was eligible only for FAR 1.50 which is 54.70% increase from the maximum FAR of 1.50 as provided under the structure plan. (a) It may kindly be noted that as far as the open space of the building is concerned the father of the Appellant got the benefit of having 4 meters front yard open space whereas the Rule insists for 4.50 meters as per Rule 82(1) of KMBR 1999. (b) On the eastern side as far as the set back of the building is concerned the building comes under the category of high rise building as per the KMBR 1999 since the height of the building is 17.10 meters. Under Rule 117 of the KMBR every high rise building if it does not abut on two or more motorable roads, shall be provided with a minimum of meters wide open space on any one of its dies contiguous to the road abutting it to facilitate fire fighting. The Road Committee considered the case of the Appellant and has relaxed this open space with a set back of 1.28 M, 1.46 M and 3.15 M at three places on the eastern side with the condition that no compound wall shall be constructed on that side. But the Appellant had later violated the condition and has constructed a compound wall. (c) The father of the Petitioner also got the relaxation of the Rule with regard to the set back on the western side of the building. It is submitted that as per Rule 24(8) of the KMBR the high rise building of the Appellant should have on the western side an open space of 2.5 M whereas the Road Committee granted the Appellant the building permit with an open space of 1.36, 1.24, 1.48 and 4.30 M. at four places as per Rule 82(4) of KMBR 1999. It is submitted that on the southern side of the building (rear side) the Appellant should have provided an open space of 3.70 M. whereas he Road Committee relaxed the Rule and granted the permit with 1 M. open space as per Rule 82(3) of KMBR. ........". This clearly indicates that exemption was granted for the construction of the building. 19. We cannot, but notice that the contention of the appellant that there can be no exemption inferred under Table 2 under Rule 31 of the Building Rules does not hold water. Even if FAR is computed at 3.00 times, the same cannot be computed for the total 766 since, undisputedly there is a development plan in place and also a proposal for the road between Thammanam and Pullepady. The proposed road definitely takes in a portion of the appellant's father's property and the Corporation would not have sanctioned FAR on the total 766 square meters. Deducting the surrendered land, which on any count would have fallen under acquisition; the remaining property available for effecting construction would only be 538. FAR permissible as per Table 2 would be 1614 square meters (538 x 3). The building sanctioned and constructed has 1778.56 square meters, clearly above the permissible limit. In view of the reasoning above, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was perfectly right in dismissing the writ petition and the Writ Appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed, however, without costs.