Judgment : Kemal Pasha, J. 1. Often one can see common crows, fruit bats and such unfortunate birds hanging electrocuted and lying unattended, on power lines. Should that be the fate of human beings, visited with the misfortune of being electrocuted on coming into contact with electrical energy either, through the lines, the posts or towers supplying the lines carrying electrical energy under the control of the licensee? Can the licensee in control of supply management of an extra-hazardous business of supplying electricity, through uninsulated power lines, be permitted, to wriggle out of its strict liability to compensate the kith and kin of the electrocuted? These are the questions that crop up for consideration in this appeal. 2. Appellants are the parents of Sani Varghese (for short, "deceased") who died on 1.8.1990 at the age of 18, as a result of electrocution. According to them, on 25.7.1990, deceased sustained fatal burns when he came into contact with the tower of the 66 KV electric line near the ridge of a paddy field, while he was rushing to his house, when rain started unexpectedly. The boy, initially, admitted in the Medical College Hospital, Thrissur, was subsequently shifted to Little Flower Hospital, Angamaly, where he succumbed to the burns on 1.8.1990, while undergoing treatment. The appellants approached the court below claiming compensation of `Rs.1,65,000/- with interest. 3. The respondent, Kerala State Electricity Board, contended that the suit is barred by limitation and that the deceased sustained burns when he climbed on the tower, to release his kite that was entangled in the electric line, and therefore, negligence could not be attributed to it. 4. The court below held that the victim as well as the respondent were negligent and, accordingly, fixed the liability of the respondent at Rs. 21,500/-. After deducting 15,000/-paid by the respondent to the appellants as ex gratia, the court below decreed the suit for Rs. 6,500/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit. Dissatisfied with the meager amount decreed, the plaintiffs have come up in appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that there was gross negligence on the part of the respondent, leading to the flow of electricity through the tower, due to want of proper earthing, and therefore, there was no contributory negligence attributable to the deceased. Dissatisfied with the meager amount decreed, the plaintiffs have come up in appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that there was gross negligence on the part of the respondent, leading to the flow of electricity through the tower, due to want of proper earthing, and therefore, there was no contributory negligence attributable to the deceased. It was also argued that the doctrine of strict liability applies and the appellants cannot be called upon to prove any negligence on the part of the respondent in this case, beyond what they have done, to fasten the liability to compensate the appellants. Lastly, it was argued that the court below has miserably failed in correctly calculating the amount due as compensation, in accordance with accepted principles and that it has erred in arriving at the meager amount awarded by it as compensation. 6. There is no appeal by the respondent. Yet, we note that it is the admitted case that the deceased died on 1.8.1990, as is evident from Ext.A2 death certificate. The suit was filed on 1-8-1992, and therefore, the suit is well within the period of limitation as per Article 82 r/w S.12 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 7. The copy of the First Information Report and the First Information Statement allegedly furnished by PW1, who is none other than the father of the deceased were marked as Ext.X1. PW1 was not an eye witness. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the last portion of the First Information Statement was clearly manipulated, and the same could not have been the version furnished by PW1. It contains a version that, while the deceased along with his friends were flying kite, the kite got entangled with the electric line, and the incident occurred when the deceased attempted to get the kite released from the electric line. It seems that Ext.X1 was not properly proved. The said versions contained in Ext.X1 were not put to PW1 in cross-examination. When PW1 has got a case that he came to know that the incident had occurred when the body of the deceased came into contact with the electric tower, the respondent ought to have confronted PW1 with the said versions in Ext.X1. Ext.X1 was marked before the court below through DW2, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, Mala. When PW1 has got a case that he came to know that the incident had occurred when the body of the deceased came into contact with the electric tower, the respondent ought to have confronted PW1 with the said versions in Ext.X1. Ext.X1 was marked before the court below through DW2, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, Mala. He clearly admitted that the said statement was not recorded by him, and that he was not present at that police station during the period in which Ext.X1 was allegedly recorded. Admittedly, PW1 was not an eye witness to the incident. Matters being so, Ext.X1 has no evidentiary value at all as far as the incident is concerned. 8. The contention of the defendant before the court below was that, the deceased got electric shock from the electric line passing through the top of the tower, when the deceased climbed on the tower and attempted to take away his kite which got entangled with the electric line. The question is whether there is any evidence in this case to prove even the possibility of such a contention? PW1 had only hearsay information regarding the incident. PW2 was an eye witness to the incident. His version is that, while he was coming back to his house after his works at about 4 p.m. on 25.7.1990, he saw the deceased coming along with another boy through the ridge near the electric tower. There was drizzling, and suddenly he saw the deceased falling down to the paddy field and further he saw some thing like a fireball and thereby he could understand that the deceased got electric shock. PW3 also saw the incident while he was engaged in spraying pesticide in the nearby paddy field. According to him also, there was drizzling and he saw the deceased along with another boy, running through the ridge. The deceased who was running in front got his hand or body in contact with the electric tower and thereby he fell into the eastern paddy field. According to PW5, he was present along with the deceased during the incident. His version is that while they were walking through the ridge, unexpectedly rain came, and they ran through the ridge. The deceased who was running in front got his hand or body in contact with the electric tower and thereby he fell into the eastern paddy field. According to PW5, he was present along with the deceased during the incident. His version is that while they were walking through the ridge, unexpectedly rain came, and they ran through the ridge. The deceased was running in front, and when the deceased reached near the electric tower his hand and leg touched the electric tower, which resulted in a huge sound and fire, and the deceased was thrown to the nearby paddy field. Immediately, PW2 who was coming through that way, and PW3 who was engaged in spraying pesticide in the paddy filed, rushed to the spot. 9. According to PW5, DW3 was not present anywhere near the scene of occurrence at the time of incident. It is an admitted case that DW1, Assistant Engineer, Kerala State Electricity Board, was not present at the time of occurrence. He reached the scene of occurrence only on the next day, on getting information regarding the incident from the Electrical Substation on the next morning. According to DW1, DW3 was present along with the deceased at the time of the incident, and DW3 had furnished Ext.B1 statement in writing regarding the incident. DW3 has deposed that Ext.B1 statement was obtained from him by an officer from the Kerala State Electricity Board. According to him, when he refused to give such a statement, he was intimidated by stating that he would be made accused in the case, and it was on such a threat, he furnished the said statement. Whatever it be, apart from the contents of Ext.B1, there is no other evidence to show that DW3 was present anywhere near the scene of occurrence at the time of incident. According to DW3, he was not present anywhere near the scene of occurrence at the time of incident. From the available evidence on record, it has clearly come out that there is absolutely no evidence in this case to substantiate the contention resorted to by the defendant. 10. DW1, Assistant Engineer, K.S.E.B. has clearly admitted in cross-examination that, there would be electricity on the tower, in cases where there is no proper earthing. His evidence clearly reveals that any defect in earthing, can result in the passage of electricity through the tower. 10. DW1, Assistant Engineer, K.S.E.B. has clearly admitted in cross-examination that, there would be electricity on the tower, in cases where there is no proper earthing. His evidence clearly reveals that any defect in earthing, can result in the passage of electricity through the tower. Apart from the versions of DW1, there is nothing to show that there was fencing around the tower. PW2 has clearly deposed that there was no such fencing around the tower. The defendant has not produced the scene mahazar or any other mahazar to show the existence of any such fencing or precautions for preventing human beings or animals from touching the tower. Even the contention of the defendant that the deceased climbed on the tower, cuts the root of their contention that such safeguards were there. 11. As per Rule 44(a) of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956, if any accident occurs in connection with the generation, transmission, supply or use of electricity, and the accident results or is likely to have resulted in loss of human life or injury, the authorized person of the State Electricity Board shall send a telegraphic report of occurrence to the electrical inspector within 24 hours of the knowledge of the occurrence, and a written report in the form stated in Annexure XII within 48 hours of the knowledge of the occurrence. S.36 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 deals with the appointment of electrical inspectors. The defendant has not proved that any such reports were prepared or sent to the electrical inspector. The evidence of DW1 gives a clear picture as to how recklessly such matters were being dealt with by the defendant. There is absolutely nothing to show that the officers of the defendant had made any proper inspection to rule out the possibility of passage of electricity through the tower in question. Matters being so, the case of the appellants that there was gross negligence on the part of the defendant, which has resulted in the incident, is only to be believed. By weighing the preponderance of probabilities based on the evidence available on record, we are satisfied that there is sufficient proof of negligence in this case, on the part of the defendant, in order to rope them with the liability to pay damages. 12. By weighing the preponderance of probabilities based on the evidence available on record, we are satisfied that there is sufficient proof of negligence in this case, on the part of the defendant, in order to rope them with the liability to pay damages. 12. We have looked into the matter through another angle also, for considering whether the defendant is liable for damages, even where there is lack of evidence to prove any negligence on the part of the defendant. Despite the continuing dominance of fault liability, our law of torts does contain limited principles of strict liability with regard to personal injuries. Some of these are of common law origin and the rest like damages in cases of personal injuries on account of electricity supply, nuclear installations, environmental pollutions, fire, gas, explosions, oil, noxious fumes, vibrations etc., have been the creation of modern statutes. 13. The usual question that arises in cases of common risks, which are left to the law of negligence that, "whose fault was it that this accident occurred?", should be substituted with the question "whose risk was it that this accident might occur?" in cases of strict liability for extra ordinary or unusual risks. 14. The principle of strict liability was laid down in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R.3H.L.330 that, "if a person brings or accumulates on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbours, he does so at his peril. If it does escape and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent damage". Rylands v. Fletcher certainly involves a liability without proof of fault (subject to certain exceptions, most of which, are not recognized or accepted by our jurisprudence through precedents) for personal injuries or loss of life on account of the hazardous business of the defendant. 15. Rylands v. Fletcher certainly involves a liability without proof of fault (subject to certain exceptions, most of which, are not recognized or accepted by our jurisprudence through precedents) for personal injuries or loss of life on account of the hazardous business of the defendant. 15. Blackburn J, delivering the judgment in Rylands v. Fletcher held; "We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." It was further held; "But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches." 16. According to Winfield, the case should not be regarded as merely an application of the law of nuisance but as laying down a new principle governing a rather ill-defined category of "exceptional" and "unusual" risks. 17. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, has resulted in the creation of a category of liability, for damage caused by ultra- hazardous business or activities, which is justified on the basis that the persons carrying them on should bear all the risks associated with them, and not merely those arising from their negligence. In Shiffman v. Order of St. John [(1936) 1 All.E.R. 557], where the plaintiff became injured in Hyde park by a falling flagpole belonging to the defendants, it was held that the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover damages on the basis of Rylands v. Fletcher even though he neither owned nor occupied the land on which the injury occurred. 18. The rule of strict liability born in Rylands v. Fletcher has been applied in our country by almost all the Civil Courts, High Courts and the Apex Court. 18. The rule of strict liability born in Rylands v. Fletcher has been applied in our country by almost all the Civil Courts, High Courts and the Apex Court. In M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari [ 2002 (1) KLT 480 (SC)] it was held; "It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it, the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension, the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy." It was further held; "Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way ie., the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm, he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions." 19. The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was followed with approval by the Apex court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India ( 1990(1) SCC 613 ), Gujarath State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai ( 1987 (3) SCC 234 ), Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 2001 (2) SCC 9 and M.C.Mehta v. Union of India ( 1987 (1) SCC 395 ). 20. Ltd. 2001 (2) SCC 9 and M.C.Mehta v. Union of India ( 1987 (1) SCC 395 ). 20. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, the apex court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that; "Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on any one on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher." 21. In Kunjan Raghavan v. Kerala State Electricity Board ( 2010 (4) KLT 914 ), a Division Bench of this court in which one of us was a member, while speaking for the Bench held; "The question is whether the electric line was maintained with statutory clearance as required in terms of the relevant laws. The Board is the authority to have the best evidence. There is no evidence in this regard by the Board. This is a case of no evidence in defence. Not only that, the Board is a licensee dealing with electrical energy, which is hazardous. Board is the sole licensee having monopoly operation with the support of statutory provisions. Statutory rights are coupled with statutory duties. The duties and responsibilities of licensees stand to charge the Board and its officers of such liabilities as would fall within the principle of strict liability as laid down by the Apex Court in H.S.E.B. v. Ram Nath ( 2004 (5) SCC 793 ) and M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar [ (2002) 2 SCC 162 ]" 22. Even when no negligence is attributed to the defendant in this case, the defendant is liable for damages, based on the principles of strict liability. 23. Now regarding the quantum of damages, we are thoroughly dissatisfied with the way in which the court below has handled the matter. It is in evidence that the deceased boy was only 18 at the time of his death, and he was nearing his 19th year of age. It has come out in evidence that the deceased boy was working as a newspaper boy and was distributing Deepika Daily and Malayala Manorama Daily. It is in evidence that the deceased boy was only 18 at the time of his death, and he was nearing his 19th year of age. It has come out in evidence that the deceased boy was working as a newspaper boy and was distributing Deepika Daily and Malayala Manorama Daily. PW4, who was an agent of Deepika daily has given evidence that he used to pay him Rs.300 per month and that the agent of Malayala Manoram daily also used to pay him Rs.300 per month. After newspaper distribution, the boy used to attend Krishna Bakery at Ashtamichira and used to work there. 24. As per the table appended with the Motor Vehicles Act, even a person who has no job or income, is conferred with an yearly income of `15,000/-by way of notional income. It has come out in evidence that, the deceased, after meeting his personal expenses, used to give an amount of `600/-per month to his parents. The said amount can be taken as his monthly income after deducting 1/3rd of the expenses of the victim. 25. Considering the dependency of the parents, the age of the victim, and other relevant factors, the multiplier can be fixed at 18. Therefore, the calculation should be by multiplying the yearly income of `7,200/-with 18. The resultant amount of `1,29,600 could be treated as reasonable compensation towards loss of earnings. The deceased who sustained fatal burns on 25.7.1990 died only on 1.8.1990 while undergoing treatment. `15,000/- claimed by PW1 towards pain and sufferings is quite reasonable. The amount of `5,000/- claimed towards funeral expenses, and the amount of `15,000/-claimed towards compensation for loss of love and affection are also reasonable. It has come out in evidence that the boy has succumbed to the injuries while undergoing treatment at the Little Flower Hospital, Angamaly. Even though an amount of `15,000/-has been claimed as medical expenses, an amount of `5,000/-can be considered as actual medical expenses including the expenses for bystander. Therefore, the total amount would come to `1,69,600/-. 26. The plaint claim is an amount of `1,65,000/-. We accordingly confine the damages payable by the defendant, to`1,65,000/-. At the same time, in paragraph 5 of the plaint it has been averred that the plaintiff has calculated the compensation at `1,65,000/-of which `15,000/- was given by the defendant. Therefore, the total amount would come to `1,69,600/-. 26. The plaint claim is an amount of `1,65,000/-. We accordingly confine the damages payable by the defendant, to`1,65,000/-. At the same time, in paragraph 5 of the plaint it has been averred that the plaintiff has calculated the compensation at `1,65,000/-of which `15,000/- was given by the defendant. It is an admitted case that an ex gratia payment of `15,000/- was made by the defendant. PW1 in cross-examination has agreed that the said ex gratia payment of `15,000/-, he had received, could be deducted from the total amount claimed in the plaint. The balance amount payable is an amount of `1,50,000/- with eligible interest and costs. In the result, this appeal is allowed as follows: (i) The impugned decree and judgment are vacated. (ii) The appellants-plaintiffs are granted a decree for recovery of `1,50,000/- with interest at 6% per annum from 1.8.1990, the date of death of the deceased, till payment/recovery, with costs of this appeal and of the suit, charged on, and recoverable from, the assets of the respondent-defendant. It is further decreed that if the liability in terms of the aforesaid is not satisfied by depositing the entire amounts within a period of two months from now, the rate of interest awarded by this decree will stand modified at 12% per annum from 1.8.1990 till date of payment/recovery. (iii) In exercise of the power under Order 33 Rule 10 r/w O.44 R. 1, it is ordered that the court fee payable by the plaintiffs in this appeal, and in the suit from which this appeal arises, shall be recoverable from the respondent/defendant.