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2013 DIGILAW 1872 (RAJ)

Jaipur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Mathura Prasad

2013-10-25

ALOK SHARMA

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - The second appeal under Section 100 CPC has been filed by the appellant-defendant Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam Limited (hereinafter the defendant Nigam) aggrieved of the judgment and decree dated 7.2.1995 in Civil Regular Appeal No. 3/1994 (6/1994) passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division) Sawai Madhopur, reversing the judgment and decree dated 24.1.1994 in Civil Suit No. 140/1991, of the suit's dismissal by the Munsif Magistrate, Sawai Mahopur. Consequently the first appellate court decreed the suit for permanent injunction filed by the respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter the plaintiff) against the defendant Nigam. The Nigam was directed to treat the plaintiff's date of birth as 7.5.1939 in place of 1.7.1933 and to release the consequential benefits. 2. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit for permanent injunction against the defendant Nigam, praying that the defendant Nigam be restrained by way of a permanent injunction from retiring the plaintiff on 30.6.1991 treating his date of birth as 1.7.1933. It was stated that the plaintiff was initially appointed on Muster-roll as helper on 2.12.1962 in the office of Assistant Engineer (O&M) Rajasthan State Electricity Board (RSEB) Sawai Madhopur. It was stated that at the commencement of employment with the erstwhile RSEB his date of birth was recorded as 7.5.1939. It was further averred that the plaintiff's service book was prepared only on 11.5.1978 with several columns left empty therein but the thumb impression of the plaintiff was got appended thereon with the assurance that the blank columns in the service book particularly with regard to date of birth would be filled up with reference to the check form. The date of birth was then wrongly recorded as 1.7.1933, in the service book for reasons unknown to the plaintiff. A representation/objection was filed before erstwhile RSEB on 10.12.1987 for correction of the date of birth, on the plaintiff coming to first know of the change therein from the seniority list dated 12.11.1987, wherein he was placed at Serial No. 154 and his date of birth shown as 1.7.1933. But to no avail. Then on 20.3.1991 the plaintiff was informed by the Nigam that on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years he would be retired from service on 30.6.1991. This triggered the crisis of the plaintiff's very existence in service and resulted in the suit for permanent injunction filed about a week before the date of retirement. But to no avail. Then on 20.3.1991 the plaintiff was informed by the Nigam that on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years he would be retired from service on 30.6.1991. This triggered the crisis of the plaintiff's very existence in service and resulted in the suit for permanent injunction filed about a week before the date of retirement. The prayer in the suit was that the defendant Nigam be restrained from retiring the plaintiff on 30.6.1991 and that he be retired only on 31.5.1997 with his superannuation age reckoned with reference to 7.5.1939 as his date of birth. 3. On notice, the defendant Nigam filed a written statement denying the case of the plaintiff, it was stated that as per the plaintiffs service book his recorded date of birth was 1.7.1933. It was stated that all the columns of service book were filled in and were accepted by the plaintiff with his thumbs. impression appended thereto. It was further stated that although the plaintiff submitted a school certificate with his abjection in the name of Mathura Lal Sharma s/o Shri Nand Ram, it was belated and of little avail as in the service book the name of plaintiff had been entered as Mathura Prasad Sharma s/o Shri Nand Lal. In fact he was so described in all the records of the defendant Nigam. No primary evidence of the date of birth was submitted. Hence change sought was not accepted. It was further stated that according to Chapter-II of the RSEB Employees Service Regulations (Amended upto 1985), 1964 as adopted by the Nigam no application for change of date of birth in the service record of an employee could be entertained after expiry of 3 years of entrance in service. It was stated that if there was any objection as to his recorded date of birth with the defendant Nigam, the plaintiff ought to have submitted an objection with regard thereto in any event within three years of preparation of the service book. It was further stated that the provisional seniority list of Technical employees with the extant RSEB, the predecessor in interest of the defendant Nigam was published on 20.10.1973, wherein the plaintiffs date of birth was shown as 1.7.1933 and his date of joining as 2.12.1962. Objections were sought within 30 days. It was further stated that the provisional seniority list of Technical employees with the extant RSEB, the predecessor in interest of the defendant Nigam was published on 20.10.1973, wherein the plaintiffs date of birth was shown as 1.7.1933 and his date of joining as 2.12.1962. Objections were sought within 30 days. The plaintiff did not raise objection to the said seniority list dated 20.10.1973, with regard to his date of birth while he did with regard to the date of joining stating it to be 2.7.1962 and not 2.7.1963. The representation filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. It was further stated that the plaintiff was thus aware of his date of birth recorded as 1.7.1933 at least as early as 20.10.1973 or soon thereafter but had filed the suit belatedly in 1991 only five days prior to his superannuation. The suit was thus deserving of dismissal. 4. On the basis of pleadings of parties the trial court framed five issues thus. 1. Whether the correct date of birth of the plaintiff was 7.5.1939? 2. Whether the plaintiff was estopped by his conduct from seeking a change in his date of birth? 3. Whether the suit was hit by limitation? 4. Whether the civil court had a jurisdiction to hear the suit? 5. Relief? 5. The plaintiff examined five witness in support of his case and exhibited 8 documents. The defendant Nigam examined DW.1 Ramakant Sharma and exhibited five documents. 6. After hearing arguments of both the parties the trial court decided issues Nos. 1, 2 & 3 in favour of the defendant Nigam and consequently vide judgment and decree dated 24.1.1994 dismissed the suit. On appeal the first appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 7.2.1995 decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Hence this second appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant defendant Nigam has submitted that the first appellate court has wrongly interfered with the judgment of the trial court without just cause. The detailed reasons of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs suit were not addressed and no reason for disagreement there with or error therein pointed out. Important evidence noted by the trial court overlooked. It was submitted that according to Chapter-II of the RSEB Employees Service Regulations (Amended upto 1985). The detailed reasons of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs suit were not addressed and no reason for disagreement there with or error therein pointed out. Important evidence noted by the trial court overlooked. It was submitted that according to Chapter-II of the RSEB Employees Service Regulations (Amended upto 1985). 1964 which applied to the case, no application for change of date of birth in the service record of the plaintiff maintained by the Nigam could be entertained beyond 3 years of entrance as an employee in the service. The plaintiff entered service on 2.12.1962. The impugned date of birth was entered in his service book on 11.5.1978. The plaintiff also did not even file any objection regarding his date of birth as notified in the provisional seniority list dated 20.10.1973, where from he was once again informed of his recorded date of birth with the erstwhile RSEB in its record. Only an objection to date of joining not being 2.7.1963 but 2.7.1962 was filed. No objection regarding date of birth was filed. The right to challenge the recorded date of birth in the recorded of the extant RSEB was thus thereafter waived. It was submitted that a change of birth sought through a suit for injunction filed in June, 1991, a mere five days before the plaintiffs superannuation was contrary to Regulations 5 of the 1964 Regulations and was also not sustainable in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P & Ors. v. Prem Lal Shrivas, (2011) 9 SCC 664 . 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff had before the trial court exhibited Ex.6, certificate of the Government Secondary School Kundera wherein his date of birth was shown as 7.5.1939. He submitted that the service book was only prepared on 11.5.1978 and date of birth as 1.7.1933 was mentioned therein without any information or communication in regard thereto to the plaintiff. The entry was contrary the date in the check-form submitted at the time of joining service wherein his age was recorded as 22 years. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Mohd. The entry was contrary the date in the check-form submitted at the time of joining service wherein his age was recorded as 22 years. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus Khan v. U.R Power Corporation Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 80 to submit that a certificate of the school was relevant for ascertaining the date of birth of an employee and objection can only be filed on knowledge of error. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court has been supported. It was submitted that the seniority list of the year of 1973 was not indeed challenged but immediately after the seniority list of 1987 the plaintiff submitted a representation which arbitrarily did not draw a favourable response. The suit then filed was thus on a valid cause of action but wrongly dismissed by the trial court. The appellate court rightly decreed it. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and decree dated 24.1.1994 passed by the trial court as well as the judgment and decree dated 7.2.1995 passed by the first appellate court. 10. In my considered view the first appellate court has wrongly interfered without any just and legal ground with the well considered and detailed judgment of the trial court Chapter-II of the RSEB Employees Service Regulations (Amended upto 1985), 1964 clearly provided that no application for change of date of birth in the service record could be entertained after is expiry of 3 years of entrance of an employee in service. The plaintiff having entered in service on 2.12.1962 and his service book having been prepared under his own thumb impression on 11.5.1978 recording recording his date of birth as 1.7.1933, his claim for change of date of birth in 1991 was barred by Regulation 5 of Chapter-II of the RSEB Regulations, 1964 and hit by limitations. Further, the plaintiff did not even file any objection against the provisional seniority list dated 20.10.1973, indicating his date of birth as 1.7.1933 and merely confined his claim to the date of joining as Beldar on Muster Roll with RSEB on 2.7.1962 and not 2.7.1963 as shown by RSEB. this indicated an acceptance without demur of the date of birth in the RSEB's record as published on 20.10.1973 with the seniority list. this indicated an acceptance without demur of the date of birth in the RSEB's record as published on 20.10.1973 with the seniority list. To my mind, the findings recorded by the trial court on the very meticulous consideration of evidence on record were wholly legal and valid with no perversity or error. Similarly no inconsistencies or contradiction in the grounds of dismissal of the plaintiffs suit for permanent injunction even remotely be found. The first appellate court committed a gross illegality in interfering with the correct, valid and well considered detailed findings of the trial court without just reason and failed to consider the effect of regulation of the RSEB Regulations of 1964, providing that no change of date of birth was permissible 3 years after entering service by an employee in a catena of judgments the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that belated claims for change of date of birth at a time close to the superannuation of an employee should not be ordinarily considered except on very exceptionally grounds based on clinching evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that in any event, no application for change of birth date of the employee should be entertained and allowed by the courts and tribunals where claims are filed beyond the limitation provided therefore in the governing regulations and statutes relevant to an employee. See State of M.R & Ors. v. Prem Lal Shrivas (supra) and State of Haryana v. Satish Kumar Mittal, (2010) 9 SCC 337 para 13 ; Punjab and Haryana High Court v. Megh Raj Garg, (2010) 6 45 SCC 482 , para 17]. The case of Mohd. Yunus Khan v. U.R Power Corporation Ltd. & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 80 relied upon by the plaintiff turned on its fact and further the learned trial court has set out detailed reasons why the plaintiffs evidences were not adequate to allow a change in his date of birth in a suit filed in 1991 when the plaintiff raised no objection thereto even so at the time of admitted communication thereof in the seniority list of 20.10.1973. 11. So far the question of working of the plaintiff after the retirement 30.6.1991 under an interim order of the trial court is concerned, amount already paid cannot be refunded to the appellant Nigam on equity as it constituted wages for work done. 12. 11. So far the question of working of the plaintiff after the retirement 30.6.1991 under an interim order of the trial court is concerned, amount already paid cannot be refunded to the appellant Nigam on equity as it constituted wages for work done. 12. However, for reasons set out hereinabove, the judgment and decree dated 7.2.1995 passed by the first appellate court is liable to be quashed and set aside. The judgment and decree dated 24.1.1994 passed by the trial court is liable to be restored. The suit filed by the plaintiff stands dismissed. 13. The second appeal is allowed accordingly.Second Appeal Allowed. *******