JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, M/s. Saini Timber Merchant, has filed the contempt petition on the ground that the judgment dated 18.3.2011, passed by the learned Single Judge of this court, has not been implemented by the respondents-contemners.The judgment dated 18.3.2011 is as under:- "Learned counsel for the parties submit that matter is covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Civil) No.13 of 1996, M/s. Subhash Chand Suresh Kumar v. The State of Rajasthan and others, decided on 18.1.2011. The present matter may accordingly be covered by the aforesaid. Joint prayer is allowed. The writ petition is disposed of with the direction to cover the present matter by the judgment referred to above." 2. Thus, the said judgment was passed entirely on the basis of the decision pronounced by a learned Division Bench of this court in the case of M/s. Subhash Chand Suresh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. In the case of M/s. Subhash Chand Suresh Kumar (supra), the learned Division Bench of this court had passed the following order:- "We would accordingly, direct that the cases of the appellant and similar situated persons, who applied along with the appellant should be considered for allotment in accordance with the Policy of 2005." 3. Therefore, the learned Division Bench merely directed the respondents, in the said case, to consider the case of the appellant alongwith similarly situated persons for allotment of shop in the Agriculture Market Yards under the Policy of 2005. Hence, the said direction would have to be interposed in the order dated 18.3.2011 passed by this court. Hence, the direction of the learned Single Judge, then was to the respondents-contemners "to consider the petitioner's case for allotment of a shop in accordance with the Policy of 2005".The brief facts of the case are that after the passing of the judgment dated 18.3.2011, by notice dated 16.3.2011, the respondents-contemners asked the petitioner to submit an application so that the direction contained in the order dated 18.1.2011/18.3.2011 could be complied with. Consequently, on 21.3.2011, the petitioner filed an application. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the said application, he had clearly indicated that he was carrying on a trade in timber. 4. Consequently, on 21.3.2011, the petitioner filed an application. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the said application, he had clearly indicated that he was carrying on a trade in timber. 4. In a meeting held on 31.3.2011, the Agriculture Produce Market Samiti not only considered the petitioner's case, but also considered the cases of other similarly situated persons. According to the minutes of the meeting (Anx.C/5), there were cases of nineteen persons from the list of 1988 which needed to be considered by the Samiti. 5. As far as the present petitioner was concerned, the Samiti took a decision that since it may be incongruous to permit a timber merchant to carry on the trade of timber in an agriculture Mandi, direction from the Director should be sought. Therefore, the Samiti referred the petitioner's case to the Director for his directions. 6. Despite the decision of the Samiti, it seems, that the Director, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, silently sat over the entire issue. Therefore, the petitioner was constrained to file a second civil writ petition before this court, namely S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5499/11. By order dated 23.4.2011, this court directed the Director to decide the petitioner's case with regard to allotment of shop within a period of one month from the date of the order. 7. Thereafter by order dated 5.8.2011 (Anx.C/8), the Director decided the petitioner's case. In the said order the Director gave three reasons for rejecting the petitioner's case: firstly, according to the Samiti, it would be incongruous to permit a timber merchant to carry on his trade in timber in an agricultural Mandi which is overwhelmingly constituted for selling of agricultural product. Secondly, although the petitioner had submitted an affidavit that it would carry on the business of selling food items, it had not produced any valid license for the same. Thirdly, according to the Director, he had heard both the Secretary of the Samiti, and the Director of the Agriculture Marketing Board. After having heard them, he decided that the petitioner's case should be rejected. 8. Aggrieved by the order dated 5.8.2011, the petitioner filed a third writ petition before this court, namely S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.13208/11. The said writ petition was decided by judgment dated 22.9.2011. After having heard them, he decided that the petitioner's case should be rejected. 8. Aggrieved by the order dated 5.8.2011, the petitioner filed a third writ petition before this court, namely S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.13208/11. The said writ petition was decided by judgment dated 22.9.2011. The judgment dated 22.9.2011 is as under:- "The challenge in the writ petition is to the order dated 5.8.2011, passed by Director, Agriculture Marketing Board. The case of the petitioner is that the said order has been passed contrary to direction of this court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10721/2008 decided on 18.3.2011. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, and perusing the material available on record, I find that the foundation of writ petition appears to be a right conferred on petitioner in terms of order dated 18.3.2011. In this view of the matter, learned counsel submits that the order dated 5.8.2011, passed by the Director, Agriculture Marketing Board, is contempt of the order of this court. In view of above, learned counsel for the petitioner is allowed to withdraw the writ petition, to take proceedings of contempt of order dated 18.3.2011 passed by this court. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as having been withdrawn. Stay application also stands dismissed." 9. Consequently, the present contempt petition has been filed by the petitioner before this court. 10. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, the learned Single Judge in the third writ petition had clearly given a finding that foundation of the writ petition appears to be a right conferred on the petitioner in terms of the order dated 18.3.2011. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that a contempt petition should have been filed, rather than a writ petition challenging the order dated 5.8.2011. 11. Secondly, the right conferred on the petitioner is not only "the right of consideration", but most importantly, "to decide his representation in accordance with law". 12. Thirdly, although the Samiti in its meeting dated 31.3.2011 was of the opinion that the petitioner was certainly eligible for allotment of a shop, but it declined to grant him the shop. Moreover, while the case of the petitioner was similar to the case of other twelve applicants, while the other twelve applicants have been allotted shops, the petitioner has been discriminated in a hostile manner. 13. Moreover, while the case of the petitioner was similar to the case of other twelve applicants, while the other twelve applicants have been allotted shops, the petitioner has been discriminated in a hostile manner. 13. Fourthly, the Director in the order dated 5.8.2011 has ignored the fact that "timber" is included in the definition of "agricultural produce" given in the Rajasthan Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Rules, 1961. Therefore, the Director was not justified in concluding that an incongruous situation would arise if a timber merchant is permitted to carryout his trade in a predominantly agriculture Mandi. Therefore, the Director has ignored the vary provisions under which he was supposed to exercise his power. Hence, the order dated 5.8.2011 is patently erroneous. 14. Lastly, relying on the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. & Anr. [ (1996) 4 SCC 622 ] , the learned counsel has pleaded that the jurisdiction of the contempt court is not limited only to punish a contemner, but even extends to giving directions to the contemner so as to do complete justice between the parties. Hence, according to the learned counsel, this court is competent to not only give directions, but even to quash the order dated 5.8.2011. For, the order dated 5.8.2011 is not in conformity either with the decision of the learned Division Bench dated 18.1.2011, or with the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 18.3.2011. 15. On the other hand, Mr. S.N. Kumawat, the learned AAG, has raised the following pleas: firstly, by order dated 18.1.2011, the learned Division Bench had merely directed the respondents to consider the cases of the petitioner and "similarly situated persons". 16. Secondly, the order dated 18.3.2011 was entirely based on the order dated 18.1.2011. Hence, the only direction given to the contemners-respondents was "to consider the petitioner's case". 17. Thirdly, once the application was received by the respondents, the said application was "considered" in the meeting on 31.3.2011. But the Samiti was of the opinion that direction needs to be taken from the Director with regard to allotting a shop to the petitioner. Therefore, the decision of the Samiti was not a final one. The petitioner's case was referred to the Director for his final opinion. According to the learned counsel, the Director has given cogent reasons for rejecting the petitioner's application. Therefore, the decision of the Samiti was not a final one. The petitioner's case was referred to the Director for his final opinion. According to the learned counsel, the Director has given cogent reasons for rejecting the petitioner's application. Therefore, it cannot be claimed, according to the learned counsel, that the petitioner's case was not "considered" by the respondents-contemners. 18. Fourthly, the power to decide includes the power to decide incorrectly. Hence, if the petitioner were aggrieved by the order dated 5.8.2011, he was free to challenge the same. 19. Fifthly, in fact, he had challenged the order by filing a third writ petition before this court. However, for reasons best known to the petitioner, the said writ petition was withdrawn and the contempt petition was filed before this court. 20. Sixthly, in the order dated 22.9.2011, no finding has been given by the learned Single Judge that a contempt has been committed by order dated 5.8.2011. According to the learned counsel, it was merely a submission made before the court. 21. Lastly, since the order dated 18.3.2011 and the order dated 18.1.2011 have been complied with, both in letter and spirit, according to the learned counsel, no contempt is made out. 22. In rejoinder, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that if the interpretation being canvassed by the learned AAG were to be accepted, it would, in fact, leave the petitioner without any remedy, although a wrong has been committed against him. For, on the one hand he had filed a writ petition challenging the order dated 5.8.2011, and the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that a contempt petition would be the better remedy, yet if this court were to find that no contempt is made out, the petitioner would be left remediless. 23. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 24. Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act defines the terms "contempt of court" as meaning a civil contempt or a criminal contempt. While Section 2(b) defines the term "civil contempt", Section 2(c) defines the terms "criminal contempt". For our purpose, the definition of "civil contempt" is important. Section 2(b) is as under:- "2(b) civil contempt means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court." 25. While Section 2(b) defines the term "civil contempt", Section 2(c) defines the terms "criminal contempt". For our purpose, the definition of "civil contempt" is important. Section 2(b) is as under:- "2(b) civil contempt means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court." 25. Thus, "civil contempt" is confined to the limited extent of "a willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order or willful breach of any undertaking given to a court". 26. In the case of Anil Kumar Shahi (2) & Ors. v. Prof. Ram Sevak Yadav & Ors. [ (2008) 14 SCC 115 ] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court defined the scope of civil contempt as under:- "50. It is by now well settled under the Act and under Article 129 of the Constitution of India that if it is alleged before this Court that a person has willfully violated its order it can invoke its jurisdiction under the Act to enquire whether the allegation is true or not and if found to be true it can punish the offenders for having committed "civil contempt" and if need be, can pass consequential orders for enforcement of execution of the order, as the case may be, for violation of which, the proceeding for contempt was initiated. In other words, while exercising its power under the Act, it is not open to the Court to pass an order, which will materially add to or alter the order for alleged disobedience of which contempt jurisdiction was invoked. When the Court directs the authority to consider a matter in accordance with law, it means that the matter should be considered to the best of understanding by the authority and, therefore, a mere error of judgment with regard to the legal position cannot constitute contempt of Court. There is no willful disobedience if best efforts are made to comply with the order." (Emphasis added). 27. Thus when the court directs the authority to consider the matter in accordance with law, it merely means to consider to the best of the understanding by the authority. Therefore, a mere error of judgment with regard to legal position cannot constitute a contempt of court. 28. In the present case, the judgment dated 18.3.2011 was pronounced keeping in mind the judgment dated 18.1.2011. Therefore, a mere error of judgment with regard to legal position cannot constitute a contempt of court. 28. In the present case, the judgment dated 18.3.2011 was pronounced keeping in mind the judgment dated 18.1.2011. According to the judgment dated 18.1.2011, the learned Division Bench had directed the respondents in that case to consider the case of the petitioner and "of similarly situated persons for allotment of shop in Krishi Upaj Mandi in accordance with the police of 2005". Thus, obviously, the direction in the judgment dated 18.1.2011 would have to be read into the judgment dated 18.3.2011. Hence, the judgment dated 18.3.2011 is merely confined to certain directions given by this court. 29. Thus, the issue before this court is whether the application filed by the petitioner was "considered" or not. The issue before this court is not with regard to legality or illegality of the decision passed by the Director. For, the right which was conferred by judgment dated 18.3.2011, in the light of the judgment dated 18.1.2011, was merely a right of consideration. Hence, the short point before this court is whether the application was considered or not. 30. As narrated above, the petitioner's application was initially placed before the Samiti in its meeting on 31.3.2011. According to the Samiti, the petitioner's case was one of the nineteen cases left over from the list of 1988. Therefore, the Samiti was of the opinion that his case should be considered alongwith the cases of others. However, when the Samiti individually considered the petitioner's case, it was of the opinion that it would be rather strange to permit a "timber trader" to carry on his trade in a Mandi which is overwhelmingly devoted to selling of agricultural products. Thus, before taking its final decision, it decided to seek direction from the Director. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner's case was referred to the Director to be considered by him. 31. A bare perusal of the order dated 5.8.2011 clearly reveals that the Director has given three reasons, mentioned above, for rejecting the petitioner's case. Hence, the Director had duly "considered" the petitioner's case. 32. Whether these reasons are legally valid or invalid is not the concern of this court in a contempt jurisdiction. 31. A bare perusal of the order dated 5.8.2011 clearly reveals that the Director has given three reasons, mentioned above, for rejecting the petitioner's case. Hence, the Director had duly "considered" the petitioner's case. 32. Whether these reasons are legally valid or invalid is not the concern of this court in a contempt jurisdiction. For within the contempt jurisdiction, this court cannot look into legality or illegality of an order passed by an authority in exercise of discretion vested in it. The said jurisdiction is a limited one, where the short point is whether the judgment has been implemented or not. The contempt jurisdiction cannot be extended to bestow upon this court the power to enter into the legality or illegality of an order passed by a authority using its discretion. 33. Of course the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Director has ignored the definition of the word "agricultural produce" as given in the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961. Therefore, he has committed an illegality. But, as mentioned above, this court is not competent to enter into the issue with regard to legality or illegality of the reasons given by the Director. 34. The learned counsel has also relied upon the case of Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (supra). However, the said case does not rush to the petitioner's rescue. In the said case, the respondent (Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd.) purchased a plot in auction held by the appellant, the Delhi Development Authority. The respondent did not pay the bid amount as per the stipulated terms. Instead, it obtained property from the DDA, but singularly failed to deposit the required amount. Therefore, the DDA proposed to cancel the allotment. Faced with such a threat, the respondent-Company rushed to the Delhi High Court. The Hon'ble High Court stayed the cancellation. During operation of the stay order granted by the Hon'ble High Court, the Company continued to sell spaces in the proposed buildings to various persons and received their monies. Ultimately in 1990, the Hon'ble High Court directed the company to pay a specified sum (more than Rs. 8 Crore) within thirty days and to stop the construction on the plot till payment is made. It also provided that in default of such payment, the license, i.e. the revised agreement would stand determine, and the DDA would be entitled to re-enter the plot. 8 Crore) within thirty days and to stop the construction on the plot till payment is made. It also provided that in default of such payment, the license, i.e. the revised agreement would stand determine, and the DDA would be entitled to re-enter the plot. But the Company still did not deposit the amount as directed by the High Court. Instead, it rushed to the Apex Court. On 29.1.1991, while granting an interim order in favour of the company, the Apex Court directed the company to deposit Rs. 2.5 Crore within one month and another sum of Rs. 2.5 Crore before 8.4.1991. The Apex Court categorically prohibited the company from inducting any person in the building and from creating any right in favour of a third party. However, notwithstanding the absolute prohibition placed by the Apex Court, clandestinely the Company kept on selling the spaces of the building to innocent buyers. Ultimately the SLP filed by the Company was dismissed on 25.1.1993. Therefore, the DDA re-entered into the building and took possession of the property. Noticing the conduct of the Company, the Hon'ble Supreme Court initiated suo moto contempt proceedings against 'T' and his wife 'S', the Directors of the respondent-company by invoking power under Article 139 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India for imposing sentence of imprisonment and a fine on them. It is in this background that the issue arose whether while exercising the contempt jurisdiction, a court would have power to issue certain directions in order to do complete justice between the parties or not? Or whether the contempt jurisdiction is merely limited to imposing of a punishment by the court for willful disobedience of the judgment, decree, direction, order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court answered this issue as under:- "17. The principle that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well-settled. In Mohd. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the Court is not entitle to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its Orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was rejected holding that "the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach (of undertaking)". 19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Limited v. S. Suppiah and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun . In Century Flour Mills Limited, it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the Court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong-doing. The inherent power of the Court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order. 20. In Sujit Pal, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and took possession of the property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2A Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law. 21. It held that the object of Rule 2A Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law. 21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by over-ruling any procedural or other technical objections. Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised in tandem with Article 142, all such objection should give way. The Court must ensure full justice between the parties before it." 35. Thus, obviously, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expanded the power of contempt to the extent of giving direction to the parties only in those cases where an act is done in violation of the order of stay or injunction, or contrary to an undertaking given before the court. Moreover, in the case of Skipper (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had invoked its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 36. However, the present case is not a case where an act has been done in violation of an order of stay, or injunction, or an undertaking given before this court. For, apparently there is no stay or injunction granted by the order dated 18.3.2011, or even by the order dated 18.1.2011. In this scenario, this court cannot suo moto expand its contempt jurisdiction and clothe itself to give directions to the respondents-contemners. In case this court were to do so, naturally it would be overstepping its jurisdiction which stands well defined under the Act of 1971. 37. Whether the petitioner stands denuded of any legal remedy or not, is an issue on which this court cannot and should not express any opinion. For, it is for the petitioner to explore the legal remedies which may still be available to him. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that in case this petition were not allowed by this court, it would deprive him of a legal remedy is unacceptable. Much as a court may have sympathy for the plight of a litigant, but the court cannot overstep its jurisdiction defined by law. 38. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that in case this petition were not allowed by this court, it would deprive him of a legal remedy is unacceptable. Much as a court may have sympathy for the plight of a litigant, but the court cannot overstep its jurisdiction defined by law. 38. Thus, considering the fact that the application submitted by the petitioner was duly "considered" by the Samiti in its meeting, as reflected in the minutes of the meeting and by the Director, as revealed by the order dated 5.8.2011, this court is of the opinion that no contempt has been committed by the respondents-contemners. 39. This contempt petition being devoid of any merit is hereby, dismissed. The notices stand discharged. 40. However, the petitioner is free to take recourse to the legal remedies which may still be available to him.Petition Dismissed with Liberty to Seek Other Legal Remedy. *******