Hon'ble TRIVEDI, J.—The present appeal filed under Section 82 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”), is directed against the order dated 31.07.2000 passed by the Presiding Officer, Employees State Insurance Court, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as “the Insurance Court”) in Case No.ESI-3/94, whereby the Insurance Court has held the establishment of the appellant as covered under the provisions of the said Act and liable for the insurance contribution. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the appellant is a commercial establishment duly registered under the Rajasthan Shops & Establishment Act, 1958 and is a partnership firm engaged in the Hotel business. On 29.07.1992, the Insurance Inspector of the Office of the respondents had carried out an inspection at the establishment of the appellant and submitted the report recommending the coverage of the appellant's establishment under the provisions of the said Act. On the basis of the said recommendation made by the Insurance Inspector, the ESI Corporation had forwarded a letter dated 18.09.1992 to the appellant intimating interalia that the establishment of the appellant being a factory within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the said Act was covered under the provisions of the said Act w.e.f. 20.10.1989, and therefore, it was liable to comply with the provisions of the Act at the Code No.15/H-871/111. The respondent No.2, thereafter appears to have issued notice dated 03.05.1994 calling upon the appellant to show cause as to why the amount mentioned in the said notice should not be assessed as the ESI contribution for the period from October 1989 to June 1992. The appellant, thereafter, challenged the said letter dated 18.09.1992 and the notice dated 03.05.1994 before the Insurance Court under Section 75 of the said Act, contending interalia that the number of workmen employed in the hotel were not more than 11 to 12 and that no manufacturing process was being carried out in the hotel with the aid of power for the activities connected with the hotel business, and therefore, the provisions of the said Act were not applicable to the appellant establishment. The Insurance Court, however vide the impugned order dated 31.07.2000 held interalia that the appellant's establishment was covered under the Act, and therefore, was liable for the insurance contribution, and that since no determination under Section 45-A of the Act was made, the matter was required to be remitted to the respondent-corporation. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal has been filed. 3. It has been sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Ms. Chandrakala Sahv appearing on behalf of learned counsel Mr. Rinesh Gupta, for the appellant that the findings arrived at by the Insurance Court were perverse and liable to be set-aside, inasmuch as the appellant was neither a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the said Act, nor was carrying on any “manufacturing process” as contemplated under Section 2(14AA) of the said Act. She further submitted that merely because one fridge and the water cooler or the motor for pumping water were found at the premises when the Insurance Inspector carried out the inspection, it did not mean that the appellant was carrying on “manufacturing process”. Placing heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Hotel New Nalanda vs. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation (2009) 14 Supreme Court Cases 558, she submitted that the use of power in the manufacturing process should be direct and proximate and mere presence of refrigerator or other appliances would not necessarily lead to the inference that their establishment was a “factory” as defined under Section 2(12) of the said Act. 4. However, the learned counsel Mr. Ankur Saxena appearing on behalf of the learned counsel Mr. A.S. Khangarot, for the respondents submitted that the appellant had employed more than 10 persons and was carrying on “manufacturing process” as contemplated in Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, which is the meaning assigned to the definition of “manufacturing process” as contemplated in Section 2(14AA) of the said Act, and hence the Insurance Court has rightly held that the establishment of the appellant was covered under the said Act, and liable to pay the contribution. He also submitted that the appellant is not only paying the insurance contribution since the impugned order, but its employees are also availing the benefit of medical facilities under the said Act. 5. He also submitted that the appellant is not only paying the insurance contribution since the impugned order, but its employees are also availing the benefit of medical facilities under the said Act. 5. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the learned counsels for the parties, it would be beneficial to reproduce the definition of “factory” and of “manufacturing process” as contained in Sections 2(12) and 2(14AA) respectively of the said Act. Section 2(12) of The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 reads as under:- “2(12) " factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952) or a railway running shed;)” Section 2(14AA) of the said Act reads as under:- “manufacturing process” shall have the meaning assigned to it in the the Factories Act, 1948.” Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 defines the manufacturing process as under:- “(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or) (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or (iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding;) (or) (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; (or) (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage;)” 6. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, if the facts of the case are appreciated, it appears that admittedly the appellant was the partnership firm engaged in the business of Hotel and had employed more than 10 persons in the hotel at the relevant time when the inspection was carried out by the Insurance Inspector of the corporation on 29.07.1992. The moot question that arises for determination is as to whether the appellant was carrying on “manufacturing process” as contemplated in Section 2(14AA) so as to cover it within the definition of “factory” contained in Section 2(12) of the said Act. The moot question that arises for determination is as to whether the appellant was carrying on “manufacturing process” as contemplated in Section 2(14AA) so as to cover it within the definition of “factory” contained in Section 2(12) of the said Act. At this juncture, it is very pertinent to note that as per Section 2(14AA) of the said Act, the meaning of “manufacturing process” only has to be imported from the Factories Act, and not the meaning of “factory”. As such, there is a difference between the meaning of “factory” as contemplated in Section 2(12) of the said Act and of “factory” as contemplated in Section 2(m) of the Factories Act. For the purpose of the said Act, if in any premises ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily being carried on, except a mine or a railway running shed, it would be covered within the definition of “factory” under Section 2(12) of the said Act. Such manufacturing process for the purposes of the said Act need not be carried on with the aid of power as contemplated in the definition of “factory” under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act. 7. So far as the facts and evidence of the case in hand are concerned, the Insurance Court in the impugned order has discussed in detail the report of the Insurance Inspector and the evidence adduced by the appellant as well as by the respondents, in the light of the provisions contained in the said Act as well as in the Factories Act. It appears that the PW-1 Shri Ram Babu Gupta, partner of the appellant firm had admitted in his cross-examination that there was a restaurant in the Hotel of the appellant, which was providing food to the customers, who stayed in the hotel and that the hotel had rooms in all the three storeys for the stay of customers. It was also not denied by the appellant that there was an electric motor in the hotel which was being used to pump out the water to fill in the tank of the hotel. Of course, he had also stated that he and other partners were also staying in the said hotel. It was also not denied by the appellant that there was an electric motor in the hotel which was being used to pump out the water to fill in the tank of the hotel. Of course, he had also stated that he and other partners were also staying in the said hotel. As against that, the Insurance Inspector who had submitted the report was examined on behalf of the respondents, and he had stated interalia that the hotel of the appellant was used for the lodging and boarding purposes, and there was a fridge, LPG Gas which were lying and used in the kitchen of the hotel and that none of the partners were residing in the hotel. Thus, the Insurance Court considering the evidence on record meticulously and considering the benevolent object of the said Act held that the appellant was carrying on manufacturing process of making and preparing food for the customers in the hotel, which had more than 10 employees at the relevant time. It is settled legal position that the said Act is a social beneficial piece of legislation, to provide benefits to employees and its provisions should be interpreted in its correct perspective so as to fructify the legislative intention. In case of Transport Corporation of India vs. Employees' State Insurance Corpn. & Anr. (2000) (1) Supreme Court Cases 332, the Apex Court has held as under:- “27. Before parting with the discussion on this point, it is necessary to keep in view the salient fact that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to provide benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity, employment injury and for certain other matters in relation thereto. It is enacted with a view to ensuring social welfare and for providing safe insurance cover to employees who were likely to suffer from various physical illnesses during the course of their employment. Such a beneficial piece of legislation has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to fructify the legislative intention underlying its enactment. When two views are possible on its applicability to a given set of employees, that view which furthers the legislative intention should be preferred to the one which would frustrate it.....” 8. In view of the above, the Court does not find any illegality or infirmity muchless perversity in the impugned order passed by the Insurance Court. 9. When two views are possible on its applicability to a given set of employees, that view which furthers the legislative intention should be preferred to the one which would frustrate it.....” 8. In view of the above, the Court does not find any illegality or infirmity muchless perversity in the impugned order passed by the Insurance Court. 9. The decision of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant would not be applicable to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the establishment in question, in the said case was a tourist home, which was being let out to people on monthly or daily rent basis and that there was no evidence to show that there was any kitchen where the food was cooked using the appliances like grinder and fridge found at the said premises. However, in the instant case, the partner of the appellant firm had admitted in his evidence that the hotel was being used for lodging and boarding purposes and that there was a restaurant in the hotel in which food was being provided to the customers, who stayed in the hotel. The Insurance Court, therefore, has rightly observed that the fridge and the water cooler and the motor for pumping out the water in the overhead tank, found in the kitchen of the hotel were being used for the preparation of the food for being served to the customers, and therefore, it was held that the establishment of the appellant was the “factory” where more than 10 persons were employed and in which manufacturing process was being carried on as contemplated under Section 2(14AA) of the said Act. 10. Even otherwise, it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is paying the insurance contribution and is availing of the medical facilities under the said Act since the impugned order passed by the Insurance Court. Under the circumstances, the Court does not find any substance in the present appeal. The appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.