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2013 DIGILAW 19 (MEG)

Angela Rangad v. State of Meghalaya

2013-05-27

T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2013
Judgment T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner is assailing the order dated 28.08.2012 for appointing the respondent No. 8 Smti. Loma Nora Jyrwa as Mission Director under the State Resource Centre for Women on contract basis for initially a period of one year w.e.f. from the date of her joining, for that, one of the Members of the Departmental Selection Committee, on the recommendation of it, the respondent No. 8 had been appointed as Mission Director, more particularly, the Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya is mala fide and biased. Heard Mr. HS Thangkhiew, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. N. Mozika, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.P. Mahanta, learned Addl. Advocate General, Meghalaya assisted by Mr. S. Sen Gupta, learned counsel for the State respondents. Also heard Mr. R. Gurung, learned counsel for the respondent No. 8. 2. Factual backgrounds:-On 08.03.2010, the Govt. of India launched the National Mission for Empowerment of Women for the purpose of empowerment of women socially and educationally. At the National level, the Mission has a National Mission Authority under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister and is assisted by the Mission Directorate and the National Resource Centre for Women. At the State level, the Mission envisages setting up of State Mission Authority under the Chairmanship of the Chief Minister who will be provided the requisite support by the State Resource Centre for Women. The Govt. of India under the letter of the Secretary, Ministry of Women and Child Development Department, Govt. of India being letter No. D.O. No. 4-2/2010-WW dated 05.04.2010 informed the State Govt. about the Mission and also requested for initiation of the process for notifying the State Mission Authority at the earliest. The Ministry of Women & Child Development Department, Govt. of India, vide D.O. letter dated 22.04.2010 and the D.O. letter dated 25.05.2010, requested the State Govt. to constitute a State Resource Centre for Women (for short "SRCW") for operationalising the National Mission for Empowerment of Women. The Central Govt also prescribed the constitution of State Resource Centre for Women which is to comprise of a Project Advisor and a State Co-ordinator and other support staff. The Central Govt. laid down the qualifications, skills and experience etc. for selection of candidates for appointment to the said posts of Project Advisor and State Co-ordinator in the SRCW. The Central Govt also prescribed the constitution of State Resource Centre for Women which is to comprise of a Project Advisor and a State Co-ordinator and other support staff. The Central Govt. laid down the qualifications, skills and experience etc. for selection of candidates for appointment to the said posts of Project Advisor and State Co-ordinator in the SRCW. This case is concerned with the post of Project Advisor and the qualifications and experience etc. for selection of the candidate for appointment to the post of Project Advisor are:- 3. The maximum age limit for the candidates for the post of Project Advisor is 50 years and the qualifications are Master's Degree in Social Work/Economics/Women's Studies/Law/Governance/and any other related field. Ph.D. in relevant field is desirable. Pursuant to the said letters of the Govt. of India, the respondent No. 5, the Deputy Secretary, Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong, under his letter dated 09.12.2011, informed the respondent No. 2, the Union of India about the approval of the Govt. of Meghalaya for setting up of SRCW, but for the reasons best known to the respondents, the respondent No. 5 under the said letter dated 09.12.2011, had informed the Central Govt. that for the State Resource Centre for Women i.e. SCRW, it should have a Mission Director in place of the Project Advisor with the same consolidated fees of Rs. 50,000/- pm as applicable to the post of Project Advisor. 4. The Project Advisor is to head the SRCW under the State Centre Mission i.e. National Commission for Women Empowerment at the State level and as such, the Project Advisor is the most important and essential concomitant of the Mission at the State level. In response to the said letter of the respondent No. 5, the Executive Director, National Mission for Empowerment of Women and National Resource Centre for Women, Ministry of Women & Child Welfare, Govt. of India under his letter dated 16.12.2011, informed the State Govt. i.e. the respondent No. 5, that "they have no objection if the State desired to change the nomenclature of the Project Advisor to Mission Director as long as he/she performs the expected roles and responsibilities stated in the Guidelines. You are requested to adhere to the qualifications and experience prescribed in the guidelines appointing the State Mission Director." Under the qualifications and experience prescribed by the Central Govt. You are requested to adhere to the qualifications and experience prescribed in the guidelines appointing the State Mission Director." Under the qualifications and experience prescribed by the Central Govt. for the post of Project Advisor, the maximum age of the candidates for the post of Project Advisor should be 50 years. As prescribed in the guidelines (i.e. Central Govt. Guidelines), the appointments to the posts of Project Advisor (Mission Director) for the State of Meghalaya and the State Co-ordinator in the SRCW were to be made through a process of selection and all the eligible/qualified women were to be encouraged to apply for the said posts. But in clear infraction of the prescribed guidelines and also without following the constitutional scheme for appointment of the public posts, the respondent No. 6, the Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong without any advertisement for the said post, under his letter dated 17.02.2012 forwarded the curriculum vitae of only one person i.e. the person of his choice none other than the respondent No. 8, Smt. Loma Nora Jyrwa to the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Social Welfare Department for favour of necessary action and also recommended the case of the respondent No. 8 to the State Govt. 5. It is categorically pleaded in the writ petition that the motive of the respondents were to appoint the respondent No. 8 to exclusion of all other eligible candidates as Mission Director in the SRCW by relaxing the upper age limit for the candidates for the post of Mission Director. Such motive of the respondents for appointing the respondent No. 8 at the exclusion of other eligible candidates as Mission Director by relaxing the upper age limit were clearly reflected in the File, which reads as follows:- "NO. SW/ALT. 15/79 DT. 17.2.12 OF DSW, Meeh. Shg SI. 175-189 NO. SW/WW. 11/2012/5403, dt. 15.2.12 of DSW, Megh.Shg.SI. 190-196 U/Secy SI. 175-189 may pl. be seen. The Director of Social Welfare has seen the curriculum vitae of Smt. L.N. Jyrwa, Addl. DSW, preferably for engaging her as the Mission Director in the State Resource Centre for Women. Setting up of the State Mission Authority and State Mission Authority and State Resource Centre for women has received Cabinet approval on 24.08.2011, and the Department has been advised to examine the feasibility of having dedicated Mission Director for the purpose. DSW, preferably for engaging her as the Mission Director in the State Resource Centre for Women. Setting up of the State Mission Authority and State Mission Authority and State Resource Centre for women has received Cabinet approval on 24.08.2011, and the Department has been advised to examine the feasibility of having dedicated Mission Director for the purpose. We have also received the approval from the GOI to change the nomenclature of Project Adviser to Mission Director vide letter at 31.160, with the advice to adhere to the qualification and experience prescribed in the guidelines. As per the terms of reference at Sl. 186, the maximum age limit for appointment as Mission Director is 50 years. Smti. L.N. Jyrwa, Addl. DSW will be superannuating w.e.f. 30.04.2012 at the age of 58 years. On examination of her curriculum vitae, it appears that she possess all the suggest qualification, experience and skill, except the age bar. Relaxation of age bar may perhaps be taken up with the Govt. of India to enable other qualified women to apply. Further, Sl. 190-196 may also pl. be seen, regarding the letter received from the DSW, requesting the State Govt. to take up with the GOI for relaxation of norms for the post of State Co-ordinator, Research Officer and Assistant Coordinator. As per the term of reference giving by the GOI, these post(s) are to be filled up by candidates haying PHD/MPHC Degree in the relevant field with 5-7 years experience. We have been requested to take up the matter with the GOI to relax the norms for the post(s) to a Master's Degree in Social Work/Economic/Women's Studies/Law, with 4 years experience only. We may perhaps take up with the GOI, with prior appl. of Prn. Secy.(SW)." 6. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that relaxation of the upper age limit of the candidates for the post of Mission Director is only for accommodating the respondent No. 8, who had already attained more than 58 years of age. The respondent No. 6, the Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya again under his letter dated 07.03.2012 to the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Social Welfare Department, submitted a proposal for relaxation of the norms for post-wise under the State Resource Centre for Women. The respondent No. 6, the Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya again under his letter dated 07.03.2012 to the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Social Welfare Department, submitted a proposal for relaxation of the norms for post-wise under the State Resource Centre for Women. The relevant portion of the said letter of the respondent No. 6 reads as follows:- "GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA DIRECTORATE OF SOCIAL WELFARE SHILLONG No. SW/WW/1/2010/5937 Dated Shillong, the 7th March, 2012. From: Shri. H.M. Shangpliang, MCS, Director of Social Welfare, Meghalaya, Shillong. To: The Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Social Welfare Department. Ref: Term of Reference-Selection of Candidates for State Resource Centre for Women. Sir, In continuation to this office letter No. under reference and as per discussions at the Review meeting held with the Principal Secretary on 29th February, 2012, I have the honour to submit the proposal for relaxation of norms Post-wise under the State Resource Centre for Women. Government of India may kindly be requested to relax the norms for the post as stated above. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (Shri. H.M. Shangpliang) Director of Social Welfare Meghalaya, Shillong. TERM OF REFERENCE - for selection of Candidates for State Resource Centre for women 1. Name of Post: MISSION DIRECTOR/PROJECT ADVISER 2. No. of Post: 1 post 3. Age Limit: 35-50 years 4. Nature of appointment: Contract with fixed salary of Rs. 50,000/- pm 5. Qualification: Master Degree in Social/Work/Economics/Women's Studies/Law 6. Desirable: Ph.D. in relevant field 7. Experiences: 7-10 years working on women issues at State Level 8. Preferences: a) Previous publications, articles and papers on the area of expertise, with particular emphasis on women is desirable. b) Excellent understanding and knowledge of women's issues and policies and programmes of the Government, at the National and State Level. c) Knowledge of monitoring and evaluation techniques as well as conducting impact assessment studies. d) Should be prepared to travel extensively within the State for consultations with stakeholders, carrying out impact assessment and other studies. Proposed Relaxation: 1. Age Limit: 35 above and retired Govt. servant experienced in Social Work 2. Desirable: Ph.D. in relevant filed may not be made compulsory 3. Experiences: Preferably working on Gender issues with 5 years experience and familiar with gender budgeting." 7. Proposed Relaxation: 1. Age Limit: 35 above and retired Govt. servant experienced in Social Work 2. Desirable: Ph.D. in relevant filed may not be made compulsory 3. Experiences: Preferably working on Gender issues with 5 years experience and familiar with gender budgeting." 7. The respondent No. 6, the Director of Social Welfare Department under his said letter dated 07.03.2012, had made the proposal to the State Govt. for relaxation of the upper age limit of the candidates for the post of Mission Director for the purpose of accommodating the respondent No. 8, according to the pleadings of the writ petitioner in the writ petition, inasmuch as, the respondent No. 8 who was working as Additional Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya was about to retire from service at the time the said proposal was made. 8. The Central Govt. under the letter of the Executive Director, NRCWNM(sic)W (no date), alleged to have given the approval to go ahead recruiting officers for various posts based on the qualifications and experience prescribed in the guidelines. Relaxation of age norm for the Project Advisor/Mission Director, as proposed by the State Govt. had been approved. The qualified persons or a retired Government officials or non-officials could be considered for appointment to the post of Project Advisor initially for a year based on the performance report further extension could be considered. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that with a motive to appoint the respondent No. 8 with the assistance of the respondent No. 6 i.e. the Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong, issued an advertisement dated 18.05.2012 for the post of Mission Director by relaxing the upper age limit of the candidates for the post of Mission Director i.e. 50 years and also by mentioning the qualifications for the post of Mission Director not in conformity with the educational qualifications, experience and age prescribed by the Central Govt. under the said guidelines for the post of Project Advisor (Mission Director). The said advertisement was also issued by the respondent No. 6 i.e. the Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong. 9. In response to the said advertisement dated 18.05.2012, the petitioner and others including the respondent No. 8 had applied for the said post. under the said guidelines for the post of Project Advisor (Mission Director). The said advertisement was also issued by the respondent No. 6 i.e. the Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong. 9. In response to the said advertisement dated 18.05.2012, the petitioner and others including the respondent No. 8 had applied for the said post. The interview of the candidates was held on 30.07.2012 by the Selection Committee for selection and recommendation of candidate for the post of Mission Director. The Selection Committee recommended the respondent No. 8 i.e. Smti. Loma Nora Jyrwa for the post of Mission Director and the petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 2 in the Select List i.e. No. 1 was the respondent No. 8 and No. 2 is the petitioner herself. On the recommendation of the said Selection Committee, the respondent No. 8 was appointed as Mission Director for a period of one year initially w.e.f. the date of joining vide impugned order dated 28.08.2012. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner came to know the constitution of the Selection Committee which consists of the respondent No. 6 i.e. the Director of Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong, who had taken all the steps mentioned above for appointing the respondent No. 8 by giving undue favours to her to the post of Mission Director only after appearing for interview and it is also the case of the petitioner that the recommendation of the respondent No. 8 by the Selection Committee which consists of the respondent No. 6 is vitiated inasmuch as, the respondent No. 6 is biased and mala fide. 10. The State respondents filed their affidavit-in-opposition. In their affidavit-in-opposition, the respondents are not denying the said letters written by the respondent No. 6 for relaxing the upper age limit, the experience and qualifications prescribed by the Central Govt. for appointment of the candidate to the post of Project Advisor/Mission Director and also the State respondents are not denying that under the said letters of the respondent No. 6, the curriculum vitae of the respondent No. 8 had been forwarded to the Govt. and also made a proposal for appointment of the retired Govt. employees. It is a fact that the respondent No. 8 was at the fag end of her service at the time the proposal had been made for appointment of the retired Govt. and also made a proposal for appointment of the retired Govt. employees. It is a fact that the respondent No. 8 was at the fag end of her service at the time the proposal had been made for appointment of the retired Govt. servants/office/s to the post of Mission Director. But the only reply of the State respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition are that the curriculum vitae of the respondent No. 8 submitted by the respondent No. 6 under his letter dated 07.03.2012 was only to enable the concerned department to examine the possibility to utilize the skill and experience of the respondent No. 8 in any appropriate capacity and not for filling up the post of Mission Director in particulars. The Selection Committee recommended the name of the respondent No. 8 based on merit and performance at the interview. The Departmental Selection Committee consists of 4 members and the recommendation of the candidates was on the basis of the scoresheets of the panel members of the Selection Committee. 11. The Apex Court in a number of cases had ruled that it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the allegations of mala fide or bias or improper motive on the part of the person in authority. For this point, it would be suffice to refer to the decision of the Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in S.G. Jaisinghani vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1427 . 12. It is fairly well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases, the test is not whether in fact a bias had affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. (Ref:- Manak Lal, Advocate vs. Dr. Pren Chand Singhvi & Ors. AIR 1957 SC 425 ). 13. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. (Ref:- Manak Lal, Advocate vs. Dr. Pren Chand Singhvi & Ors. AIR 1957 SC 425 ). 13. In the case of allegations for bias and impartiality to a member of the Tribunal/Committee, the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal/Committee. 14. The allegations of mala fide are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party. In the absence of necessary particulars of the charge of bias and mala fide making out a prima facie case in the writ petition, the High Court is justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegations of mala fides. Therefore, in the case of the charge of bias and mala fide, there should be necessary particulars for making out a prima facie case in the writ petition. 15. In the instant case, the necessary particulars for charging bias and mala fide against the respondent No. 6, who took the active part in appointing the respondent No. 8 to the post of Mission Director to the extent indicated above had been mentioned in the pleadings of the writ petitioner in the writ petition. It appears that the petitioner makes out a prima facie case in the writ petition for justifying this Court to decide if, the respondent No. 6 is bias and mala fide. (Ref:-(1) E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (1974) 4 SCC 3 and (2) Smt. Swaran Lata vs. Union of India & Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 165 ). 16. There is no straitjacket formula in a case of personal bias, for deciding, if, there is personal bias or not. But acceptable tests are (i) the real likelihood of bias; (ii) whether a reasonable intelligent man, folly apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias and (iii) not to the extent that there should be clear evidence of bias/existence of bias. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. But acceptable tests are (i) the real likelihood of bias; (ii) whether a reasonable intelligent man, folly apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias and (iii) not to the extent that there should be clear evidence of bias/existence of bias. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 2, para 551, it has been indicated that the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias . This principle had been accepted by the Apex Court in Mahak Lal vs. Dr. Prem Chand AIR 1957 SC 425 . De Smith in his Judicial review of Administrative Action, (1980) P. 262 had considered what are "real likelihood of bias or reasonable suspicion of bias " and observed that: "Real Likelihood of Bias or Reasonable Suspicion of Bias A "real likelihood" of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias . The court, it has been said, will fudge of the matter "as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business". The test of real likelihood of bias , which has been applied in a number of leading cases in magisterial and liquor licensing, is based on the reasonable apprehensions of a reasonable man, fully apprised of the facts. It is no doubt desirable that all judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion; but it would be hopeless for the courts to insist that only "people who cannot be suspected of improper motives" were qualified at common law to discharge judicial functions, or to quash decisions on the strength of the suspicions of fools or other capricious and unreasonable people. What is the position if the court is satisfied, on the evidence before it, that there was no real likelihood of bias but is nevertheless of the opinion that a reasonable man, at the time when the decision under review was made, could well have suspected that the tribunal would be biased? Does the public interest nevertheless demand that the original decision be set aside? The cases do not speak with one voice on this matter. The courts have often quashed decisions strength of the reasonable suspicions of the party aggrieved, without having made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed. Does the public interest nevertheless demand that the original decision be set aside? The cases do not speak with one voice on this matter. The courts have often quashed decisions strength of the reasonable suspicions of the party aggrieved, without having made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed. In 1954 the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division, after having reviewed the authorities, held that "real likelihood" was the proper test, and that a real likelihood of bias had to be "made to appear not only from the materials in fact ascertained by the party complaining, but from such further facts as he might readily have ascertained and easily verified in the course of his inquiries." This might be regarded as but another formulation of the "reasonable suspicion" test, for it is the duty of a reasonable man to make reasonable inquiries; if, after having made his inquiries, he is still left with the impression that there was a real likelihood that the tribunal would be biased against him, it is the duty of the Court to quash the decision although, on the full information available to it, it is satisfied that his suspicions were unfounded? The answer given by Devlin L.J. in a subsequent case was in the negative. Whether a real likelihood of bias existed was to be determined on the probabilities to be interfered from the circumstances, not upon the basis of the impressions that might reasonably be left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the public at large. However, the pendulum has now swung towards a test of reasonable suspicion, founded on the apprehensions of a reasonable man who had taken reasonable steps to inform himself of the material facts. "Reasonable suspicion" tests look mainly to outward appearances, "real likelihood" tests focus on the court's own evaluation of the probabilities; but in practice the tests have much in common with one another, and in the vast majority of cases they will lead to the same result. For the courts to retain both tests as alternative methods of approach is unlikely to cause serious uncertainty, and there may be advantages in preserving a measure of flexibility. For the courts to retain both tests as alternative methods of approach is unlikely to cause serious uncertainty, and there may be advantages in preserving a measure of flexibility. It would be surprisingly, surely, if a court were to refuse to set aside a decision on the ground that a reasonable observer could not have discovered facts that subsequently came to light and which indicated to the court that there was a, real likelihood of bias in the adjudicator." 17. In the case of personal bias, two tests are there: (i) likelihood of bias and (ii) that there is reasonable case of bias. But nevertheless, the opinion of likelihood of bias is that of a reasonable man, at the time the decision under review was made, could well have suspected that the Tribunal would be bias? There is another formula "reasonable suspicion" tests for it is the duty of a reasonable man to make reasonable inquiries, if, after having made his inquiries, he is still left with the impression that there was a real likelihood that the tribunal would be biased against him, is it is the duty of the Court to quash the decision. De Smith observed that the apprehension of a reasonable man who had taken reasonable steps to inform himself of the material facts and "reasonable suspicion" tests look mainly to outward appearances. The inferences of mala fide can be drawn only on the basis of factual matrix and not merely on the basis of insinuations, conjectures and surmises. (Ref:- M. Sankarannarayan, IAS vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 54 ). 18. The Apex Court in (Constitution Bench) in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 1969 (2) SCC 262 , held that the real question is not whether he was biased, for it is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias and a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. In deciding the question of bias human probabilities and ordinary course of conduct must be taken into consideration. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias and a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. In deciding the question of bias human probabilities and ordinary course of conduct must be taken into consideration. In A.K. Kraipak's case (Supra) one of the members of the Selection Committee is said to have interest in preparation of the list of the selected candidates in order of preference and that member was not in the Selection Committee at the time of consideration of his case, even then the Apex Court held that preparation of the selected candidates in order of preference is vitiated as the said member (lone member) of the Selection Committee is biased. Paras 16, 21, 22, 23 & 24 of the SCC in A.K. Kraipak's case (Supra) held as follows:- "16. The members of the selection board other than Naqishbund, each one of them separately, have filed affidavits in this Court swearing that Naqishbund in no manner influenced their decision in making the selections. In a group deliberation each member of the group is bound to influence the others, more so, if the member concerned is a person with special knowledge. His bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner. It is no wonder that the other members of the selection board are unaware of the extent to which his opinion influenced their conclusions. We are unable to accept the contention that in adjudging the suitability of the candidates the members of the board did not have any mutual discussion. It is not as if the records spoke of themselves. We are unable to believe that the members of selection board functioned like computers. At this stage it may also be noted that at the time the selections were made, the members of the selection board other than Naqishbund were not likely to have known that Basu had appealed against his supersession and that his appeal was pending before the State Government. Therefore there was no occasion for them to distrust the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. Hence the board in making the selections must necessarily have given weight to the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. 21. It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that after all the selection board was only a recommendatory body. Therefore there was no occasion for them to distrust the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. Hence the board in making the selections must necessarily have given weight to the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. 21. It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that after all the selection board was only a recommendatory body. Its recommendations had first to be considered by the Home Ministry and thereafter by the U.P.S.C. The final recommendations were made by the U.P.S.C. Hence grievances of the petitioners have no real basis. According to him while considering the validity of administrative actions taken, all that we have to see is whether the ultimate decision is just or not. We are unable to agree with the learned Attorney-General that the recommendations made by the selection board were of little consequence. Looking at the composition of the board and the nature of the duties entrusted to it we have no doubt that its recommendations should have carried considerable weight with the U.P.S.C. If the decision of the selection board is held to have been vitiated, it is clear to our mind that the final recommendation made by the Commission must also be held to have been vitiated. The recommendations made by the Union Public Service Commission cannot be disassociated from the selections made by the selection board which is the foundation for the recommendations of the Union Public Service Commission. In this Connection reference may be usefully made to the decision in Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex. Parte Lain (Supra). 22. It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that the mere fact that one of the members of the Board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the entire proceedings. In this connection he invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Summer Chand Jain v. Union of India and Anr. Writ Petition No. 237/1966 decided on 4.5.1967. Therein the Court repelled the contention that the proceedings of a departmental promotion committee were vitiated as one of the members of that committee was favourably disposed towards one of the selected candidates. The question before the Court was whether the plea of mala fides was established. The Court came to the conclusion that on the material on record it was unable to uphold that plea. The question before the Court was whether the plea of mala fides was established. The Court came to the conclusion that on the material on record it was unable to uphold that plea. In that case there was no question of any conflict between duty and interest nor any members of the departmental promotion committee was a judge in his own case. The only thing complained of was that one of the members of the promotion committee was favourably disposed towards one of the competitors. As mentioned earlier in this case we are essentially concerned with the question whether the decision taken by the board can be considered as having been taken fairly and justly. 23. One more argument of the learned Attorney-General remains to be considered. He urged that even if we are to hold that Naqishbund should not have participated in the deliberations of the selection board while it considered the suitability of Basu, Baig and Kaul, there is no ground to set aside the selection of other officers. According to him it will be sufficient in the interest of justice if we direct that the cases of Basu, Baig and Kaul be reconsidered by a Board of which Naqishbund is not a member. Proceeding further he urged that under any circumstance no case is made out for disturbing the selection of the officers in the junior scale. We are unable to accept either of these contentions. As seen earlier Naqishbund was a party to the preparation of the select list in order of preference and that he is shown as No. 1 in the list. To that extent he was undoubtedly a judge in his own case, a circumstance which is abhorrent to our concept of justice. Now coming to the selection of the officers in the junior scale service, the selections to both senior scale service as well as junior scale service were made from the same pool. Every officer who had put in a service of 8 years or more, even if he was holding the post of an Assistant Conservator of Forests was eligible for being selected for the senior scale service. In fact some Assistant Conservators have been selected for the senior scale service. At the same time some of the officers who had put in more than eight years of service had been selected for the junior scale service. In fact some Assistant Conservators have been selected for the senior scale service. At the same time some of the officers who had put in more than eight years of service had been selected for the junior scale service. Hence it is not possible to separate the two sets of officers. 24. For the reasons mentioned above these petitions are allowed and the impugned selections set aside. The Union Government and the State Government shall pay the costs of the petitioners." 19. The Apex Court in Raton Lal Sharma vs. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School & Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 10 , held that the real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias . Answer to the question whether there was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. The test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. The relevant portion of paras 9, 10 & 11 of the SCC in Ratan Lal Sharma's case (Supra) held as follows:- 9. "...........................In State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei AIR 1967 SC 1269 : (1967) 2 LLJ 266 : (1967) 2 SCR 625 , this Court also accepted the application of the principle of natural justice in the order which is administrative in character. It was observed by Shah, J.: "It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences ... must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice." Similar view was also taken in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262 : (1970) 1 SCR 457 and the observation of Justice Hedge may be referred to: (SCC p. 272, para 20). "........Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. "........Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see why those rulers should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries." There are number of decisions where application of principle of natural justice in the decision making process of the administrative body having civil consequence has been upheld by this Court but it is not necessary to refer to all such 'decisions. Prof Wade in his Administrative Law, (1988) at page 503, has very aptly observed that the principles of natural justice are applicable to almost the whole range of administrative powers. 10. ......................It has been observed by this Court in Union of India v. P.K. Roy, AIR 1968 SC 850 : (1970) 1 LLJ 633 : (1968) 2 SCR 186 "The extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case." Similar view was also expressed in A.K. Kraidak's case (1969) 2 SCC 262 : (1970) 1 SCR 457 . This Court observed: (SCC pp. 272-73, para 20) "What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened, the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." Prof. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened, the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." Prof. Wade in his Administrative Law has succinctly summarised the principle of natural justice to the following effect: "It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: not as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject matter, the application for principles of natural justice, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject-matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice depend on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth. ......................" 11. .....................For appreciating a case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter the test is whether there was a real likelihood of a bias even though such bias has not in fact taken place. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (1980) at pace 262 has observed that real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. In R. v. Sunderland Justices (1901) 2 KB 357, 373 it has been held that the Court will have to judge the matter as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business. In R. versus Sussex Justices (1924) 1 KB 256, 259 : 1923 All ER Rep 233 it has been indicated that answer to the question whether there was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. In Halsbury Laws of England, (4th Edn.) Vol. 2, para 551, it has been indicated that the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. In Halsbury Laws of England, (4th Edn.) Vol. 2, para 551, it has been indicated that the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. The same principle has also been accepted by this Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand (1957) SCR 575 : AIR 1957 SC 425 . This Court has laid down that the test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done." 20. The Apex Court in Badrinath vs. Government of Tamil Nadu (2000) 8 SCC 395 , held that Wednesbury principles apply in the judicial review of the DPC's assessment and so also the principles of a reasonable likelihood of bias applies in that case because serious allegation of bias had been made out against one of the members of the Selection Committee for the fact that the member was defending a writ appeal in which appellant (candidate) contended that the State Government's denial to sanction prosecution of that member was not justified and for that, as the said member (one member) is biased, recommendation of the Selection Committee is not acceptable. The relevant decision of the Apex Court in Badrinath case (Supra) read as follows:- "Although no bias can be imputed from that fact alone in the present case, there are other important facts which clearly make out a case of real likelihood of bias on the part of V. The appellant had delivered a speech at a public function on 7.9.1973 criticising the "time capsule" buried in the precincts of Red Fort at Delhi. The Government of T.N. started a disciplinary inquiry but later dropped the same on 25.8.1977. However, on 24.8.1977, a news item appeared in The Indian Express stating that a government spokesman charged the appellant as trying to "sabotage the civil services from within". The Government of T.N. started a disciplinary inquiry but later dropped the same on 25.8.1977. However, on 24.8.1977, a news item appeared in The Indian Express stating that a government spokesman charged the appellant as trying to "sabotage the civil services from within". It was later found the said statement was made by V. The appellant unsuccessfully sought permission from the Government to prosecute V. His writ petition although was dismissed by a Single Judge but a Division Bench of the High Court held that the refusal to grant sanction was not justified and ought to have been given in public interest rind that judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court. It is in this background of the special facts that the question of likelihood of bias arises in the present case. On the date of the meeting of the Joint Screening Committee on 30.8.1979, V was defending the appellant's writ appeal before the Division Bench. The plea of bias, although not raised during the inquiry proceedings, it is raised in the High Court, it is sufficient as it goes to the root of the question and is based on "admitted and" uncontroverted facts" and does not require any further investigation of facts. Therefore, V should have "recused" himself from the Committee. As he did not do so and participated in the decision making process and disqualified the appellant, the entire recommendations dated 30.8.1979 of the Screening Committee must be treated as vitiated and invalid. This defect is also not cured because of the remedy of an appeal. The recommendation of the Committee dated 30.8.1979, the decision of the State Government dated 22.5.1980 accepting and sending the same to the Central Government, and the decision of the Central Government dated 7.8.1980 on appeal are all liable to be quashed in view of the legal position referred to above." 21. For the foregoing discussions, the respondent No. 6 had every likelihood of bias and therefore the recommendation of the Selection Committee in which the respondent No. 6 is one of the members recommending the respondent No. 8 for appointment to the post of Mission Director is invalid or illegal. 22. In the result, the impugned order dated 28.08.2012 is called for interference. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 28.08.2012 is hereby quashed. 23. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.