JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J. 1. By filing this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioner, inter alia, sought for the following relief(s): (i) Issue Notice, calling upon the respondents and each one of them to show cause as to why an Order/Direction, shall not be issued, quashing/setting aside the impugned complaint dated 09 December 2009 filed by the respondent No. 2, which has resulted in registration of West Agartala P.S. Case No. 27/2010 registered under Sections 379/406/408/420 of the IPC (Annexure-9 supra); (ii) Issue Notice, calling upon the respondents and each one of them to show cause as to why an Older/Direction, shall not be issued, quashing/setting aside the impugned Charge Sheet No. C/S No. 153/10 under Section 380/406/420 of IPC dated 29th April 2010 against the petitioner (Annexure-10 Colly supra); (iii) Issue Notice, calling upon the respondents and each one of them to show cause as to why and Order/Direction, shall not be issued, quashing/setting aside the Criminal proceeding, PRC 59 of 2010, pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Class, Court No. 3, Agartala, West Tripura; (iv) Issue Notice, calling upon the respondents and each one of them to show cause as to why an Order/Direction, shall not be issued, for staying the further proceeding of PRC 59 of 2010, pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Class, Court No. 3, Agartala, West Tripura; Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. V. Giri, assisted by learned counsel, Mr. Somik Deb as well as learned counsel, Mr. D.C. Kabir for the petitioner and learned Addl. P.P., Mr. A. Ghosh for respondent No. 1, the State of Tripura, and learned counsel, Mr. D. Dhingra along with learned counsel, Mr. A. Bhowmik for respondent No. 2. 2. Relevant facts for the purpose of disposal of the case may be summarized thus: 2.1. By a letter of appointment dated 03.01.2001, issued by respondent No. 2, Vivek Kumar, the petitioner herein, was appointed as a Sr. Manager of the respondent No. 2, Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. (for short, D.S. Ltd.) and was posted in a factory of respondent No. 2 at Agartala, Tripura under certain specific terms and conditions and the petitioner was performing his duties pursuant to such appointment. The petitioner was a confirmed employee of the respondent No. 2. 2.2. Manager of the respondent No. 2, Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. (for short, D.S. Ltd.) and was posted in a factory of respondent No. 2 at Agartala, Tripura under certain specific terms and conditions and the petitioner was performing his duties pursuant to such appointment. The petitioner was a confirmed employee of the respondent No. 2. 2.2. On 08.06.2006, by writing a letter to the Directors of respondent No. 2 the petitioner tendered his resignation from the service of the company for personal reason with immediate effect. On 15.06.2006, the petitioner wrote another letter to the Directors of the respondent-company informing that even after the persuasion of Mr. B.S. Negi on 12.06.2006 he was firm on his decision regarding his resignation and that he will not attend the office with effect from 16.06.2006. 2.3. On 15.06.2006, the petitioner left Agartala with his family in the afternoon by a Jet Airways Flight and availed a connecting flight of Jet Airways at Kolkata and reached Delhi at about 11.55 p.m. 2.4. One Arun Kumar Nigam, working as Security In-charge of D.S. Ltd. filed a written complaint to the Station House Officer (S.H.O.) of Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport PS alleging that the petitioner left clandestinely in violation of service conditions illegally without handing over of charges and had taken away Rs. 5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs) in cash as well as CDs of all data and other information and arrived Delhi by Flight No. 9W 912 of Jet Airways and on that information the petitioner was intercepted in the airport by one SI Sube Singh with police staff of Palam PS and he was thoroughly searched at the PS but nothing incriminating as alleged was found and thereafter he was let off. 2.5. On 13.07.2006, the petitioner filed a complaint before Palam PS alleging that a false information was given by the officials of respondent No. 2 and thereby an offence under Section 182 of IPC was committed by the Directors and other officials of respondent No. 2 and prayed for taking appropriate action. Thereafter, SI Sube Singh of Palam PS on 23.06.2006 submitted a report (Kalandra) before Addl. Thereafter, SI Sube Singh of Palam PS on 23.06.2006 submitted a report (Kalandra) before Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi against--(i) Rajiv Kumar, Managing Director, (ii) Arun Kumar Nigam, Security In-charge, (iii) Puesh Kumar, Director, (iv) B.S. Negi, Product Head, (v) R.K. Chaudhary, Legal Advisor & I.R. and (vi) M.C. Goyel, an officer of the company, alleging that Arun Kumar Nigam in conspiracy with other accused persons filed a false complaint against the petitioner, Vivek Kumar. Having taken an order from the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi on 24.08.2006, FIR No. 99/06 under Section182 of IPC at Palam Airport was registered and an investigation was taken up and after investigation SI Sube Singh of Palam PS submitted charge sheet on 25.08.2007 against accused Arun Kumar Nigam, Security In-charge, Umesh Chand Srivastava, HR Head of D.S. Ltd. and Puesh Kumar, Director of D.S. Ltd. alleging commission of offence punishable under Sections 182 and 120B of IPC. Cognizance has been taken on the basis of the police report and the criminal proceeding is pending before the Court of Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. 2.6. An application was filed by accused, Puesh Kumar before the High Court of Delhi challenging the FIR and the charge sheet. That petition was disposed of on 05.08.2011 with the following order passed by a learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court, which reads thus: 05.08.2011 Present: Mr. Deepak Dhingra, Advocate for the petitioner. Ms. Fizani Husain, APP for the respondent No. 1/State. Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, Advocate for the respondent No. 2. Crl. M.C. 382/2009 & Crl. M.A. 1423/2009(stay) Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to withdraw this petition and reserves his right to make submission on the point of charge before the concerned court. Petition is therefore dismissed as withdrawn. I am sure that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall hear the petitioner and consider his submission on merits before framing of charge. (AJIT BHARIHOKE) JUDGE AUGUST 05, 2011 2.7. Respondent No. 2 also filed a complaint before the Addl. Petition is therefore dismissed as withdrawn. I am sure that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall hear the petitioner and consider his submission on merits before framing of charge. (AJIT BHARIHOKE) JUDGE AUGUST 05, 2011 2.7. Respondent No. 2 also filed a complaint before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi in the year 2009 against the present petitioner, Vivek Kumar (copy placed as Annexure-5 to the counter affidavit) alleging commission of offence punishable under Sections379, 406, 408 and 420 of IPC but the complaint was withdrawn with a permission to submit it before the appropriate Court and thereafter on 09.12.2009 the present complaint was filed before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the Officer In-charge of West Agartala PS to register it as FIR and to investigate over the complaint and to submit report after investigation and, accordingly West Agartala PS Case No. 27 of 2010 under Sections 379, 406, 408 and 420 of IPC was registered and after investigation police submitted charge sheet No. 153 of 2010 under Sections 380, 406 and 420 of IPC on 29.04.2010 against accused Vivek Kumar, the petitioner herein. 2.8. By filing the present petition the petitioner challenged the FIR and the charge sheet filed against him. 3. It is contended by learned counsel of the petitioner that a complaint was lodged on 15.06.2006 by Arun Kumar Nigam on behalf of D.S. Ltd. before Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport PS (Palam PS) alleging that the petitioner clandestinely left his place of posting without handing over of charges violating service conditions, taken away Rs. 5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs) in cash and other CDs, etc. 5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs) in cash and other CDs, etc. containing data and that complaint is the first complaint in respect of the allegations made against the petitioner which was found to be false since on search of the petitioner nothing incriminating was found at the Airport itself and thereafter police suo motu filed an FIR against the officials of respondent No. 2-company alleging that a false complaint was made against the petitioner Vivek Kumar which was registered as FIR No. 99/06 at Palam PS and a thorough investigation was taken up by Palam PS in respect of the allegations made on behalf of the company and the complaint dated 15.06.2006 was found to be false and, therefore charge sheet was filed against the officials of the company under Sections 182 and 120B of IPC. Since the subject matter was already investigated upon by the police of the Palam PS, a subsequent FIR and/or a complaint filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Agartala cannot sustain and is liable to be quashed. 3.1. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the complaint before the Magisterial Court at Agartala was filed after three and half years of the alleged date of occurrence and from the facts and circumstances it is amply clear that the complaint has been filed only with the sole object of harassment and for victimizing and threatening the petitioner so that the petitioner does not proceed further with the case instituted by the police of Palam PS. The allegations made in the complaint dated 09.12.2009 at Agartala are all false, frivolous and the complaint has been filed with the sole object of causing irreparable loss and injury to the petitioner. According to learned counsel, the subject matter of allegations made in the complaint dated 15.06.2006 filed by Arun Kumar Nigam on behalf of the respondent-company and the subject matter of the complaint filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 09.12.2009 which has been registered as FIR No. 27 of 2010 are same and identical and the police at Agartala without collecting material evidence, simply recording the statement of some subordinate staff of the company, submitted charge sheet which does not make out any offence and further proceeding of the case before the Magistrate will simply amount to 'abuse of the process of the court'. 3.2. 3.2. It is strenuously contended by the learned counsel of the petitioner that the present criminal proceeding is nothing but a malicious prosecution and the petitioner has been made a subject of corporate rivalry of two companies and thereby he has been victimized and his position has been tarnished by the action taken by the respondent, D.S. Ltd. 3.3. It is also contended that the petitioner left the job after submitting his letter of resignation in due process after handing over all his charges to the authorized person and he carried nothing incriminating with him while he left the job and arrived at Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport, Delhi, which is evident from the police report of Palam PS. Since respondent No. 2 failed to retain the petitioner in the job, out of vengeance the respondent-company filed the present criminal case only with a view to get rid of the charges of the criminal prosecution started against the officials of respondent-company in Delhi. The allegation made in the present complaint does not constitute any offence and the allegations are absurd, inherently improbable, vague, unsubstantiated and imaginary and a purely mala fide attempt for wreaking vengeance on the petitioner. Only some oral statements of some of the witnesses recorded, which reflect that the petitioner did not hand over the charge and left the office clandestinely but no document seized to prove the allegations whereas the petitioner has got the documents that he has handed over the charge to the authorized officer and took nothing with him. 3.4. It is contended that learned Magistrate failed to appreciate the principle of 'piercing of corporate veil alien to IPC' and mechanically has taken cognizance on the charge sheet filed by the police against the petitioner. The criminal proceeding is a sheer abuse of the process of the Court and, hence is liable to be quashed. In support of his contention learned counsel of the petitioner referred the following case laws: (i) T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 . (ii) Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254 . (iii) 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335 State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal. (iv) Pepsi Foods Ltd. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749 . 4. Per contra, learned Addl. P.P., Mr. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 . (ii) Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254 . (iii) 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335 State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal. (iv) Pepsi Foods Ltd. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749 . 4. Per contra, learned Addl. P.P., Mr. Ghosh appearing on behalf of the State respondent has submitted that the complaint filed by the respondent No. 2, D.S. Ltd. is in details which discloses a cognizable offence and therefore the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala forwarded the complaint to the Officer In-charge of West Agartala PS for registering it as FIR and to investigate the case. Accordingly, police investigated the case and submitted charge sheet against the accused petitioner for commission of offence punishable under Sections 380, 406 and 420 of IPC. The allegations made in the charge sheet clearly made out a case that the accused-petitioner after submitting a letter of resignation clandestinely left the job and alleged to have been taken away with him the trade secrets of the company and other materials. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has applied his mind and taken cognizance on the basis of the police report and the accused-petitioner has also appeared and taken bail from the Court. Since charge sheet has already been filed after investigation alleging commission of certain offence by the accused petitioner and since there is prima facie material against the accused, this Court need not interfere in the matter under Section 482 of CrPC. The grounds taken in the petition may be well taken before the Magistrate at the time of framing of charge. Delay in filing the complaint is of no consequence since there is no legal impediment in filing such a complaint. The delay has to be explained by the prosecution at the time of trial. Therefore, the present petition should be dismissed since there is nothing to arrive at a conclusion that the trial on the basis of the charge sheet filed by the police will be a sheer abuse of the process of the Court. If after ultimate trial it is found that a false complaint was initiated against the petitioner, remedy is available as per law, which the petitioner may take in future. If after ultimate trial it is found that a false complaint was initiated against the petitioner, remedy is available as per law, which the petitioner may take in future. While a criminal complaint was filed which disclosed a cognizable offence and police investigated upon the complaint and submitted charge sheet alleging commission of certain offence, it should be tried and disposed of according to law. Learned Addl. P.P., therefore prayed for dismissing the present petition filed under Section 482 of CrPC. 5. Countering the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner learned counsel of respondent No. 2 made a lengthy submission, inter alia, stating that the petitioner was appointed as a Sr. Manager of the respondent-company in a factory at Agartala. The respondent-company, D.S. Ltd. deals in various products such as pan-masala, tobacco products and other food items for human consumption. For production of such items there are certain formulas to blend and to make the products. The petitioner, being the Sr. Manager of the company was In-charge of the factory and had under his control cash, various registers, documents, CDs and marry other articles of immense confidence and secrecy. The petitioner being the Sr. Manager was supposed to know and was in his custody of all secrets in respect of blending and ingredients of the products which generate fragrances and tastes. The petitioner was appointed as a permanent employee and, there was condition prohibiting an employee to take an engagement directly or indirectly in a similar business/similar product for a period of five years after leaving the job of the company. The petitioner violated his service condition and before acceptance of his resignation letter, he clandestinely left the job and joined a rival company of similar product to that of the respondent-company, just on the following day of his leaving the job and the appointment letter of the petitioner in that rival company makes it abundantly clear that the petitioner had negotiated with that rival company while he was in service condition of the respondent No. 2-company and thereby the petitioner was guilty of committing breach of trust. 5.1. 5.1. It is also contended that the petitioner was attracted by the rival company only with a view to know the trade secrets of the products of the respondent No. 2-company and the petitioner, having joined the rival company immediately after his resignation, has virtually sold out the trade secrets of the respondent No. 2-company and committed a serious breach of trust as well as cheating and, hence the criminal trial against the petitioner is inevitable and there is no escape of the petitioner except that of a punishment for such criminal breach of trust and cheating. There is also evidence on record, submitted learned counsel, that the petitioner did not hand over the charges while leaving the job of the respondent No. 2-company and also committed theft of CDs and other articles which the petitioner might have taken otherwise than at the time of leaving Agartala. 5.2. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel of respondent No. 2 that the complaint dated 15.06.2006 was just an information given to the Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport PS (Palam PS) since the petitioner clandestinely left the job and also left for Delhi and that information was never registered as a police case and also never investigated upon either by the Palam PS or otherwise. Based on that information dated 15.06.2006 lodged by Arun Kumar Nigam, Security In-charge of the respondent No. 2-company, SI Sube Singh of Palam PS intercepted the petitioner and searched his luggage but no incriminating material was recovered and, thereafter no action was taken on that complaint, rather on the basis of a complaint filed by the petitioner on 13.07.2006 the police of Palam PS registered FIR No. 99/06 and ultimately submitted charge sheet against three officers of respondent No. 2 company under Sections 182 and 120B of IPC. The allegation made by respondent No. 2-company was never enquired into and that was never registered as an FIR. So the allegation of the petitioner that the present complaint dated 09.12.2010 which has been registered as West Agartala PS Case No. 27 of 2010 is a second FIR of the case is an unworthy argument and has no basis at all. The respondent No. 2-company filed a similar complaint before the Addl. So the allegation of the petitioner that the present complaint dated 09.12.2010 which has been registered as West Agartala PS Case No. 27 of 2010 is a second FIR of the case is an unworthy argument and has no basis at all. The respondent No. 2-company filed a similar complaint before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Delhi but that was withdrawn with a liberty to file a fresh complaint before the appropriate court having jurisdiction and thereafter the present complaint was filed which has been entertained and investigated upon by police. So the delay in filing the complaint is of no consequence and, therefore no presumption can be drawn at this stage that the allegation made in the complaint is vague and baseless. There is no time limit for filing a complaint and since there is no legal bar the complaint filed by the petitioner has been rightly entertained by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Agartala and since the charge sheet has already been filed there is no question of quashing the charge sheet at this stage and the petitioner has to face the trial and that the allegations made in the present petition under Section 482 of CrPC may well be raised before the Magisterial Court at Agartala and while such scope is available to the petitioner he cannot take advantage of Section 482 of CrPC. Citing various decisions of the Apex Court, learned counsel of the respondent No. 2-company has contended that Section 482 of CrPC has vested a special power on the High Courts, which should be exercised sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases. According to learned counsel, since an investigation has been made and charge sheet has already been filed and cognizance also has been taken by the Magistrate this Court is not required to entertain a petition under Section 482 of CrPC since there is nothing to show that there is abuse of the process of the court or that the allegation is unfounded and no case is made out. In support of his contention learned counsel has referred the following case laws: (i) Manharan Lal Tiwari Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. 2012 Cri. LJ 1670. (ii) Iridium India Telecom Limited Vs. Motorola Incorporated & Ors. (2011) 1 SCC 74 . (iii) Jeffrey J. Diermeier & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. (2010) 6 SCC 243 . In support of his contention learned counsel has referred the following case laws: (i) Manharan Lal Tiwari Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. 2012 Cri. LJ 1670. (ii) Iridium India Telecom Limited Vs. Motorola Incorporated & Ors. (2011) 1 SCC 74 . (iii) Jeffrey J. Diermeier & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. (2010) 6 SCC 243 . (iv) K. Neelaveni Vs. State (2010) 11 SCC 607 . (v) State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Gourishetty Mahesh & Ors. (2010) 11 SCC 226 . (vi) Mahesh Chaudhuary Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2009) 4 SCC 439 . (vii) State of Maharashtra Vs. Sayed Mohammed Masood & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 787 . (viii) Som Mittal Vs. Government of Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC 574 . (ix) Alpana Das Vs. CBI (2006) DLT 85. (x) M. Krishnan Vs. Vijay Singh & Anr. 2002 SCC (Cri.) 19. (xi) Dinesh Dutt Joshi Vs. State of Rajasthan 2002 SCC (Cri.) 24. (xii) M.N. Damini Vs. S.K. Sinha & Ors. (2001) 5 SCC 156 . (xiii) State of Bihar Vs. Md. Khalique & Anr. (2002) 1 SCC 652 . (xiv) Om Wati (Smt.) & Anr. Vs. State (2001) 4 SCC 333 . (xv) Kamladevi Agarwal Vs. State of W.B. & Ors. (2002) 1 SCC 555 . (xvi) Mahabir Prashad Gupta & Ann Vs. State of National Capital Territory of Delhi & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 115 . (xvii) Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd Vs. Biological E. Ltd. & Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 269 . (xviii) Maratt Rubber Ltd. Vs. J.K. Marattukalam (2000) 9 SCC 547 . (xix) Rajesh Bajaj Vs. State NCT of Delhi & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 259 . (xx) Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors. (1999) 8 SCC 686 . (xxi) Mushtaq Ahmad Vs. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi & Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 440 . (xxii) Shatrughna Prasad Sinha Vs. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 263 . (xxiii) State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. (xxiv) State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan & Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 655. (xxv) Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi & Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1947 . (xxvi) R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 . (xxvii) Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 . 6. Section 482 of CrPC prescribes thus-- 482. (xxiv) State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan & Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 655. (xxv) Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi & Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1947 . (xxvi) R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 . (xxvii) Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 . 6. Section 482 of CrPC prescribes thus-- 482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.--Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A bare reading of the above provision makes it clear that the exercise of power under Section 482 of CrPC is an exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only serves the inherent power which the court possessed from before the enactment of the Code. Power should be exercised ex debito justitae (in accordance with the requirement of justice) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court but not to stifle legitimate prosecution. 7. The Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Naziar Ahmad (supra) has observed thus: In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Criminal P.C., to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code, and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act 8. The inherent power of the High Court is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice. Such powers are as much controlled by principle or and precedent as are its express powers by statute. It cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the grab of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicuiconcedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). 9. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) has prescribed certain guidelines in respect of exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power under Section 482 of CrPC by the High Court, in paragraphs 102 and 103 of the judgment, Court has observed thus-- 102. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) has prescribed certain guidelines in respect of exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power under Section 482 of CrPC by the High Court, in paragraphs 102 and 103 of the judgment, Court has observed thus-- 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where mere is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. 10. In the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (supra) the Supreme Court dealt with the matter in respect of exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution as well as under Section 482 of CrPC. It was a complaint case which was dealt with in the reported judgment. The observation has got relevance for deciding the present case. The Court has observed thus-- It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. Under Article 227the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. Under Article 227the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case like the present one the court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226, the court can certainly treat the petition one under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code. It may not however, be lost sight of that provisions exist in the code of revision and appeal but some time for immediate relief Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 may have to be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by the subordinate courts. The present petition though filed in the High Court as one under Articles 226 and 227 could well be treated under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. Let us now consider whether complaint dated 09.12.2009 filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Agartala is a second complaint or a subsequent FIR in respect of same allegation. 11.1. The present petition though filed in the High Court as one under Articles 226 and 227 could well be treated under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. Let us now consider whether complaint dated 09.12.2009 filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Agartala is a second complaint or a subsequent FIR in respect of same allegation. 11.1. Admittedly, Vivek Kumar left Agartala on 15.06.2006 and it is also an undisputed fact that on 15.06.2006 Arun Kumar Nigam, Security In-charge of respondent No. 2 at Delhi filed a complaint before the S.H.O. of Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport, New Delhi(Annexure-1 to the writ petition) wherein it has been alleged that the petitioner Vivek Kumar left the job of the company at Agartala without handing over charges, violating service conditions and illegally ran away with around ` 5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs) in cash and with all CDs of all data of the information. That complaint was entered vide D.D. No. 27 dated 15.06.2006 and SI Sube Singh was entrusted to enquire into the complaint. It is also an undisputed fact that SI Sube Singh pursuant to that complaint intercepted the petitioner at Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport, Palam and made a search of the petitioner but found nothing incriminating. That information and/or complaint lodged by the Security In-charge of respondent No. 2 was never registered as FIR at Palam PS and no investigation was taken up by the police pursuant to that information. It was stated in that letter of Arun Kumar Nigam that they will be lodging an FIR at Darya Ganj PS but there is nothing before this Court that any such FIR was lodged. A search of the petitioner at Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport was made pursuant to that information but there is nothing on record that any other action was taken by the police pursuant to that complaint. The contention of the petitioner is that he has been unnecessarily harassed, hackled and derogated in the airport and, therefore he lodged a complaint on 13.07.2006 at Palam PS alleging that a false information was lodged by Arun Kumar Nigam, Security In-charge of respondent No. 2, company and sought for action as per Section 182 of IPC and pursuant to the complaint of the petitioner, SI Sube Singh of Palam PS submitted a report (Kalandra) before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi and considering that report the learned Magistrate directed an investigation and, accordingly FIR No. 99/06 was registered on 28.08.2006 under Section 182 of IPC, which ended in charge sheet on 25.08.2007 as against three officials of the respondent No. 2-company, including Arun Kumar Nigam. Police of Palam PS investigated that complaint lodged by the petitioner and that investigation can in no way be termed as an investigation in respect of the allegation made by Arun Kumar Nigam at Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport PS. The said investigation concentrated only in respect of the complaint made by the petitioner that a false information was made against him and he was subjected to harassment at airport. 11.2. Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint in the year 2009 before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi against the petitioner alleging offence punishable under Sections 379, 406, 408 and 420 of IPC but that was later on withdrawn and subsequently the present complaint was filed on 09.12.2009 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Agartala. The complaint filed by respondent No. 2-company, which is annexed as Annexure-9 to the writ petition as well as Annex-ure-5 of the counter filed by respondent No. 2, inter alia, contains allegation that the accused petitioner being a Sr. Manager of the company used to deal with all trade secrets of the respondent No. 2-company in respect of its products and as per service conditions he was not supposed to leave the job so clandestinely as he did and that all confidential documents, CDs, accounts, finance, etc. were with him and that he left the job without handing over of the charges and that he had violated the contractual obligation and responsibility as per the terms and conditions of appointment. He kept in his possession all confidential documents and without handing over of the same left the job unfairly with a view to obtain unjust advantage and to cause wrongful loss to the respondent-company. He was requested by the respondent-company not to leave the job till the respondent company got a suitable replacement but violating the terms and conditions of employment use petitioner left the job before acceptance of his resignation. The important documents and records of respondent-company were not available after he left and that has reflected the mala fide intention of the petitioner that he removed those records. The important documents and records of respondent-company were not available after he left and that has reflected the mala fide intention of the petitioner that he removed those records. As per service conditions, the petitioner was supposed to give a three month notice and was supposed to hand over all the documents, CDs and trade secrets but he did not do so and dishonestly and fraudulently left the job clandestinely and joined a rival company and thereby cheated the respondent company and also committed criminal breach of trust. Police of West Agartala PS investigated upon the complaint and submitted charge sheet No. 153 of 2010 on 29.04.2010 against the petitioner for commission of of-fence punishable under Sections 380, 406 and 420 of IPC. In the charge sheet the investigating officer stated-- Sir, With due respect I beg to report you that during investigation of the case, visited the P/O prepared hand sketch map with separate index, examine available witnesses and recorded their statement under Section161 CrPC, seized the appointment letter, confirmation letter, attendance register of the accused persons from Dharmpal Satyapal Ltd., Unit No. 1, Shed No-14, A.D. Nagar, Agt, West Tripura. During investigation of the case, from the statement of complete, witnesses and other circumstantial evidences so far collected it is revealed that the AP Vivek Kumar S/o Sri Dhirendra Shastri of 222 Cooperative Colony, B.S. City, Jharkhand State, was appointed as Senior manager at Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., Unit No. 1, Shed No-14, AD Nagar, Agt West Tripura. On 15.1.2001, and within a one year he deputed as Unit Head of said company on 18.8.2002. The function of the company is production of Zarda, brand name "BABA ZARDA". By virtue of post as unit head, all the confidential documents and files like, formula of zarda, Banking, Finance, H/R, account of company was lying with Vivek Kumar(AP). On 15.6.2006 the unit head Vivek Kumar(AP) leave the job as well as Tripura for join at other company without handed over the charge of his post/office. He also stolen away the confidential Files of this company relating to the compound/Formula of Zarda mixing with a intention to sold the formula to other competitor Zarda Company for his financial gain, which will be suffer by the Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. company. Said Vivek Kumar also did not inform to company or other official staff regarding leaving of job. He also stolen away the confidential Files of this company relating to the compound/Formula of Zarda mixing with a intention to sold the formula to other competitor Zarda Company for his financial gain, which will be suffer by the Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. company. Said Vivek Kumar also did not inform to company or other official staff regarding leaving of job. Under the above fact, and circumstances, a prima facie charge has well been established against FIR named AP Vivek Kumar U/S 380/408/420 IPC in this case. Hence I do hereby submit C/S vide West Agartala P/S C/S No. 153/10 of 29.4.10 U/S 380/408/420 IPC against the FIR named Vivek Kumar showing absconder to face trial in the open court at and thus oblige. 11.3. Cognizance was taken on the basis of the police report (charge sheet) and process was issued against the petitioner. Lower Court's record shows that the petitioner appeared before the Court and obtained bail. The information lodged by Arun Kumar Nigam 15.06.2006 contains allegation that the petitioner did not hand over the charges and committed theft of cash and other CDs. That complaint, except a search of the petitioner in the airport, was never registered as an FIR nor any further action was taken on that complaint, rather a police case was registered on the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner that the information lodged by Arun Kumar Nigam on 15.06.2006 was a false information given to the police and, thereby an offence was committed under Section 182 of IPC. Since the information given by Arun Kumar Nigam has not been registered as an FIR and no investigation was taken on that complaint, the complaint lodged on 09.12.2009 cannot be termed as a second complaint or second FIR for the same allegation. 11.4. The principle laid down in T.T. Antony (supra) as referred by learned counsel of the petitioner cannot be applied in the present case since the fact of that case is clearly distinguishable to that of the fact of the present case. In that reported case immediately after the occurrence, two FIRs were lodged and investigation was taken up. Subsequently, on public demand a Commission of Inquiry was set up appointing a District & Sessions Judge and after the report was submitted by the commission another FIR was lodged for the same offence and action was taken based on that FIR. In that reported case immediately after the occurrence, two FIRs were lodged and investigation was taken up. Subsequently, on public demand a Commission of Inquiry was set up appointing a District & Sessions Judge and after the report was submitted by the commission another FIR was lodged for the same offence and action was taken based on that FIR. The Supreme Court discouraged the action taken based on the subsequent FIR. In paragraph 18 of the judgment the Court observed thus-- 18. An information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 of CrPC is commonly known as first information report (FIR) though this term is not used in the Code. It is a very important document. And as its nick name suggests it is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station. It sets the criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion under Section 169 or 170 of CrPC, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 of CrPC. It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more informations than one are given to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more man one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in Section 154 of CrPC. Apart from a vague information by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the station house diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a police station is the first information report--FIR postulated by Section 154 of CrPC. All other informations made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offenses as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 of CrPC. No such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of the CrPC. Take a care where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under Section 307 or 320 IPC and the investigating agency learns during the investigation or receives a fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under Section302 IPC need be registered which will be irregular, in such a case alternation of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt. Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his wife, informs the police that she is killed by an unknown persons or knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and during investigation the truth is detected; it does not require filing of fresh FIR against H--the read offender--who can be arraigned in the report under Section 173(2) or 173(8)of CPC, as the case may be. It is of course permissible for the investigating officer to send up a report to the concerned Magistrate even earlier that investigation is being directed against the person suspected to be the accused. 11.5. In the case at hand, the information given by Arun Kumar Nigam on 15.06.2006 since was not registered as an FIR and since no investigation was taken up pursuant to that information, the subsequent complaint dated 09.12.2009 which was registered as FIR at West Agartala PS cannot be treated as a second FIR and the principle laid down by the apex Court in T.T. Antony (supra) cannot be applied in this case. 11.6. In the case of Babubhai (supra) also, the factual matrix is completely different to that of the present case. In that case two FIRs were registered and the Supreme Court held that in case of subsequent FIR, the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. If the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. 11.7. In the case at hand, as already stated above, the information given on 15.06.2006 at Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport (Palam PS) was never registered as an FIR and not investigated upon. So a subsequent complaint cannot be treated as a second complaint on the same allegation. Further it is abundantly clear that the information given on 15.06.2006 was simply regarded and/or construed as an information for a search of the petitioner and the search was made and thereafter no further action was taken on that information, rather on a subsequent complaint filed by the petitioner a case was registered that the information given by Arun Kumar Nigam on 15.06.2006 was a false information and, therefore, ultimately a charge sheet was filed in that matter which is independent of the present complaint or the allegation made against the petitioner. While investigating upon an allegation of a false complaint, it cannot be assumed that the allegation of the respondent-company was also investigated. So far the complaint dated 09.12.2009 is concerned, the police report has already been reproduced above which makes out the allegation that the petitioner cheated the respondent-company and committed criminal breach of trust The decision of Babubhai (supra) therefore also can in no way be accepted in the aid of the petitioner. 12. Let us have a glimpse to the materials placed on record. 12.1. Admittedly, the petitioner joined the respondent No. 2-company on 03.01.2001. The appointment letter reads as follows-- 03.01.2001 Mr. Vivek Kumar 222, Co-Operative Colony BS City Jharkhand State. APPOINTMENT LETTER Dear Kumar We take pleasure in offering you an appointment with the Company on the following terms and conditions:- 1. OUR VALUE SYSTEM & CULTURE As was communicated to you during our discussions, we value COMPETENCE, PERFORMANCE, DISCIPLINE AND INTEGRITY before everything else and that constitutes the foundation of this contract. We believe strongly in delivering highest quality to our customers and dealing fairly with mutual respect and on strict merit with our employees. We work in an atmosphere of trust and understanding and go beyond our area of responsibility. You are accountable first to yourself and then to your superiors. YOU GROW OUR BUSINESS, OUR BUSINESS SPURS YOUR GROWTH, WE GROW TOGETHER. 2. POSITION/DESIGNATION At present you are being appointed as Sr. Manager. We work in an atmosphere of trust and understanding and go beyond our area of responsibility. You are accountable first to yourself and then to your superiors. YOU GROW OUR BUSINESS, OUR BUSINESS SPURS YOUR GROWTH, WE GROW TOGETHER. 2. POSITION/DESIGNATION At present you are being appointed as Sr. Manager. However, we may utilize your ability in any field/function in the best interests of the Group or any of its constituent Companies. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF JOINING Your appointment shall be effective from the date of your joining the Company. You may, however, report to us on 04.01.01. 4. REMUNERATION, BENEFITS AND PERKS Your monthly pay and allowances will be as under:- 5. IMMEDIATE POSTING AND FUTURE TRANSFERS At present we are posting you at our Company DSL Agartala. It is understood and agreed upon that your services, based on job/business requirements, are liable to be transferred to any of our other Officers/Units/Companies/Associate Companies, whether in existence or planned in future, in India or abroad at our sole discretion. 6. PROBATION You will be on probation, initially for a period of six months from the date of joining, which may be extended upto another period of six months at the sole discretion of the Company. Your case may be considered for confirmation as a regular employee after satisfactory completion of your probationary period. You would be deemed to be on probation till such time you are intimated in writing about your confirmation in the services. 7. GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS You will be governed by various rules and regulations/services conditions framed by the company from time to time. Existing General Rules & Regulations forming integral part of this offer of Appointment is enclosed as Annexure-1. 8. DOCUMENTS ON JOINING You will have to submit the attested copies of certificates showing your age/date of birth, academic and professional qualifications & 3 recent passport size photographs, if not submitted at the time of selection. 9. AGE OF RETIREMENT The age of superannuation will be 58(Fifty Eight) years and the actual date of retirement shall be the last working day of the calendar in which your 58th birthday falls. 10. 9. AGE OF RETIREMENT The age of superannuation will be 58(Fifty Eight) years and the actual date of retirement shall be the last working day of the calendar in which your 58th birthday falls. 10. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT/SERVICE During the initial or extended period of probation, your services may be terminated without assigning any reason whatsoever, by either side giving to the other one month notice in writing or salary in lieu thereof Upon confirmation, your contract of employment may be terminated at any time without assigning any reason, on either side, by giving to the other, three month's notice in writing or salary in lieu thereof. Such notice salary where due, may be deducted from the dues to which the employees would be eligible on such termination. We welcome you to our Group and look forward to your enriching our Human Resources and through your performance, making the Company/Group even stronger and more competitive. In reciprocation, we assure you of a long, challenging, happy an growing career. Please sign and return the duplicate copy of this letter/and its Annexures as a token of your acceptance of this offer. 12.2 A reading of the above appointment letter makes it clear that the petitioner was a permanent employee and was supposed to retire on his attaining the age of fifty eight years and he was on probation for a period of six months and his service was confirmed as submitted by the learned counsel of the respondent. 12.3. Annexure-1 to the letter of appointment as produced by the respondent No. 2 with their counter affidavit contains general rules and regulations of the company of which, paragraph 3 reads thus-- 3. You shall neither take EMPLOYMENT nor engage directly/indirectly with any individual, group or company nor shall engage yourself into any business/trade of your own in any form having business interests in the same &/or similar products, areas and activities for a period of 5 years from the date of leaving our Company. 12.4. Admittedly, the petitioner submitted his letter of resignation on 08.06.2006 and he left the job on 15.06.2006 writing another letter to the Directors of the respondent-company. The contents of letter dated 15.06.2006 written by the petitioner reads thus-- Dated: 15.6.2006 To, The Director, Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., 1711, S.P. Mukerjee Marg Delhi 10006. The Director, Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., A85-86, Sector 2 Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar, UP-201301. The contents of letter dated 15.06.2006 written by the petitioner reads thus-- Dated: 15.6.2006 To, The Director, Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., 1711, S.P. Mukerjee Marg Delhi 10006. The Director, Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., A85-86, Sector 2 Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar, UP-201301. Respected Sir, Further to my resignation and subsequent persuasion by Mr. B.S. Negi who arrived here at Agartala on 12.06.2006 for considering the decision this is to confirm you that I am firm on my decision of resignation and not interested to continue my services with the company any more. I shall not be able to attend duties w.e.f. 16.06.2006. This is for your information and necessary action. Thanks & Regards Yours Faithfully Vivek Kumar C.C. Mr. B.S. Negi, Product Head. 12.5. The letters of resignation dated 08.06.2006 and 15.06.2006 show that the petitioner did not give any notice to the respondent-company and that he assigned his personal reason for not continuing in the job and he was requested by Mr. B.S. Negi on behalf of the company to reconsider his resignation but writing a letter dated 15.06.2006 he confirmed that he was not interested to continue in the service and, therefore he left the job of the company by writing the letter dated 15.06.2006 itself. 12.6. Annexure-3 to the counter affidavit of the respondent No. 2 shows that on 16.06.2006 itself the petitioner joined a company of business rival to respondent No. 2, which also used to manufacture same articles as that of respondent No. 2-company, Annexure-3, letter dated 16.06.2006, is the appointment letter in the name of the petitioner issued by a company, namely 'Gopal Magic Moments' and the very first paragraph of the letter read thus-- Based on our discussions and on the basis of representations made by you in your application/curriculum vitae, we are pleased to offer you an appointment with the company on the following terms and conditions: 12.7. It is abundantly clear that the petitioner while was in service of the respondent No. 2-company, made correspondence and negotiation with 'Gopal Magic Moments' company for his job and, therefore he clandestinely left the job of respondent No. 2-company assigning his personal reason but on the following day itself he joined another competitor company of respondent No. 2 company, which also used to produce similar products. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no case made out against the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no case made out against the petitioner. There is prima facie allegation of breach of trust and cheating which only can be determined after adjudication of the case through a process of trial. It will not be proper to say at this stage that the petitioner has been unnecessarily harassed in a criminal proceeding having no material or ground at all. Therefore, the argument advanced that the present FIR is the second or the subsequent FIR cannot be entertained and this argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner has no merit at all. 13. The next point to be determined as to whether it will be an 'abuse of the process of court' in proceeding with the trial of the present criminal case. The expression, "abusing the process of court" is generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fides and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. No hard and fast rule can be formulated to specify what actually constitutes 'abuse of the process of the court'. Where a dispute raised is purely of civil nature, initiation of a criminal proceeding must be deemed to be an abuse of the process of the court and deserves to be quashed. Where a complaint and/or a charge sheet filed is found to be so absurd or inherently improbable or that such complaint or charge sheet makes out no case at all that no prudent man can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, the FIR and/or the charge sheet may be quashed. But where in a case there is some material at least to show that a trial should commence there is no scope at all to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. What the Supreme Court has observed in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) in paragraph 103 has already been quoted hereinbefore. 13.1. Learned counsel of the respondent No. 2 has referred a plethora of case laws as already noted hereinbefore and almost all those case laws refer to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC by a High Court. The case of Manharan Lal Tiwari (supra) relates to a different fact. However, paragraph 9 of the judgment may be quoted which reads thus-- 9. The case of Manharan Lal Tiwari (supra) relates to a different fact. However, paragraph 9 of the judgment may be quoted which reads thus-- 9. The case of the petitioner cannot be examined at this stage, even if, the same leads to acquittal subsequently after investigation or trial, as the case may be. The Court should exercise its power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution in quashing FIR, complaint or charge-sheet or sanction in the rarest of rare cases. However, the Court would also not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. It is the case where allegedly the petitioner was caught red handed while accepting the money, whether it was a case of bribe or refund of loan amount, is the subject-matter of investigation. The principle enunciated in that reported judgment is that a trial should proceed even if the same leads to acquittal subsequently when there is a prima facie case or there are some allegations at least on record. 13.2. In the case of Iridium India Telecom Limited (supra) the Court has observed thus-- The contours within which the High Court would exercise its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding has been dilated upon, and well defined by this Court in a catena of judgments. We may make a reference here only to a few representative cases. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 considering the limits within which the Magistrate is required to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC, this Court observed that the scope of such inquiry is (SCC pp. 740-41, para 4) extremely limited--limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint--(i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the court; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the case may have. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under Section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not. It has been further held as follows: (Nagawwa case (supra), SCC p. 741) 5.....Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code. Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The aforesaid examples are of course purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate the contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings. 13.3. In the case of Jeffrey J. Diermmeier (supra) the Apex court in paragraphs 20 and 23 of the judgment observed thus-- 20. Before addressing the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it will be useful to notice the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. 13.3. In the case of Jeffrey J. Diermmeier (supra) the Apex court in paragraphs 20 and 23 of the judgment observed thus-- 20. Before addressing the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it will be useful to notice the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The Section itself envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Nevertheless, it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Undoubtedly, the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but is not unlimited. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone the court exists. It needs little emphasis that the inherent jurisdiction does not conferan arbitrary power on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The power exists to prevent abuse of authority and not to produce injustice. 23. The purport of the expression "rarest of rare cases", to which reference was made by Shri Venugopal, has been explained recently in Som Mittal (2) v. Government of Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC 574 . Speaking for a bench of three Judges, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice said SCC pp. 580-81, para 9) 9. When the words 'rarest of rare cases' are used after the words 'sparingly and with circumspection' while describing the scope of Section 482, those words merely emphasize and reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words 'sparingly and with circumspection'. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression "rarest of rare cases" is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasize that the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection. 13.4. The expression "rarest of rare cases" is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasize that the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection. 13.4. In the case of Gourishetty Mahesh (supra) the Apex court has observed-- While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court. It is true that the Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, otherwise, it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, Section 482 is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short circuit a prosecution and brings about its closure without full-fledged enquiry. 13.5. In the case of Mahesh Chaudhuary (supra) the Supreme court has observed-- The principle providing for exercise of the power by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash a criminal proceeding is well known. The Court shall ordinarily exercise the said jurisdiction, inter alia, in the event the allegations contained in the FIR or the complaint petition even if on face value are taken to be correct in their entirety, does not disclose commission of an offence. It is also well settled that save and except in very exceptional circumstances, the Court would not look to any document relied upon by the accused in support of his defence. Although allegations contained in the complaint petition may disclose a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. For the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction, the superior courts are also required to consider as to whether the allegation made in the FIR or the complaint petition fulfill the ingredients of the offences alleged against the accused. 13.6. In the case of Som Mittal (supra) the Supreme Court has observed-- 2. For the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction, the superior courts are also required to consider as to whether the allegation made in the FIR or the complaint petition fulfill the ingredients of the offences alleged against the accused. 13.6. In the case of Som Mittal (supra) the Supreme Court has observed-- 2. The appeal was heard by a Bench consisting of H.K. Sema and Markandey Katju, JJ. By the main judgment dated 29-1-2008 (Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC 753 ) Sema, J. dismissed the appeal, making it clear that the Court was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and the learned Magistrate shall decide the maintainability of the complaint at the time of framing of the charge uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court or the High Court. In the course of his judgment, Sema, J. observed: In a catena of decisions this Court has deprecated the interference by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code in a routine manner. It has been consistently held that the power under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases. Exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not the rule but it is an exception. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the Court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed where the accused would be harassed unnecessary if the trial is allowed to linger.... 3. In his concurring judgment, Katju, J. agreed that the appeal should be dismissed without expressing any opinion on merits. He stated that he was rendering a separate opinion as he was not in agreement with the view expressed by Sema, J. that the power under Section 482 CrPC should be used only in the "rarest of rare cases", though he agreed with the observation that the said power should be used sparingly. He stated that he was rendering a separate opinion as he was not in agreement with the view expressed by Sema, J. that the power under Section 482 CrPC should be used only in the "rarest of rare cases", though he agreed with the observation that the said power should be used sparingly. He was of the view that the words "rarest of rare cases" are used only with reference to the death penalty for an offence under Section 302 IPC (see Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580 : AIR 1980 SC 898 ) and the use of the said words was inappropriate while referring to the scope of exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC. Paras 1 to 16 of his judgment related to the criminal appeal However in Paras 17 to 39 of his judgment, the learned Judge expressed concern over the situation prevailing in Uttar Pradesh on account of omission of Section 438 CrPC relating to anticipatory bail by an amendment to the Code by Section 9 of the U.P. Act 16 of 1976 and the consequential hardship created for the public and difficulties caused to the Allahabad High Court. He made, a recommendation to the U.P. Government to immediately issue an ordinance repealing Section 9 of the U.P. Act 16 of 1976 so as to restore Section 438 CrPC in Uttar Pradesh empowering the High Court and the Sessions Courts to grant anticipatory bail. He directed the Registry of this Court to send a copy of his judgment to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Law Secretary of the State of U.P. and also to the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court and the President/Secretary of the Allahabad Bar Association, the Allahabad High Court Advocates' Association and the Oudh Bar Association forthwith. He also referred to the prevailing practice of the police arresting those suspected of involvement in a crime and the directions issued by this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172 in regard to the procedure to be followed when arresting a person, and directed that copies of his judgment be sent to the Chief Secretaries, Home Secretaries and Law Secretaries of all state Governments and Union Territories with a direction to ensure strict compliance with the said decision. 13.7. 13.7. In the case of M. Krishnan (supra) the Supreme Court has observed-- Right from the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , the Supreme Court has held that revisional or inherent powers for quashing the proceedings at the initial stage can be exercised only where the allegations made in the complaint or the first information report, even if taken at their race value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence or where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence relied in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence against the accused, or the allegations are so absurd and inherently improper that on the basis of which no prudent person could have reached a just conclusion that there were sufficient grounds in proceeding against the accused or where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any provisions of the Code or any other statute to the institution and continuance of the criminal proceedings or where a criminal proceeding is manifestly actuated with mala fide and has been initiated maliciously with the ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 13.8. In the case of Dinesh Dutt Joshi (supra) the Supreme Court has observed-- Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers upon The High Court inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well-established principle of law that every court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae--to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. The principle embodied in the section is based upon the maxim: quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur it id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest i.e. when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable. The section does not confer any new power, but only declares that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the section. The section does not confer any new power, but only declares that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the section. As lacunae are sometimes found in procedural law, the section has been embodied to cover such lacunae wherever they are discovered. The use of extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court under this section are however required to be reserved, as far as possible, for extraordinary cases. 13.9. In the case of M.N. Damini (supra) the Supreme Court relied on paragraph 6 of the judgment in Sewakram Sobhani Vs. R.K. Karanjia, Chief Editor, Weekly Blitz reported in (1981) 3 SCC 208 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 698 has observed-- 6. The order recorded by the High Court quashing the prosecution under Section 482 of the Code is wholly perverse and has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice. The High Court has prejudged the whole issue without a trial of the accused persons. The matter was at the stage of recording the plea of he accused persons under Section 251 of the Code. The requirements of Section 251 are still to be complied with. The learned Magistrate had to ascertain whether the respondent pleads guilty to the charge or demands to be tried. The circumstances brought out clearly show that the respondent was prima facie guilty of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Code unless he pleads one of the exceptions to Section 499 of the Code. xxxxxxxxxxxx It is for the respondent to plead that he was protected under Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the Penal Code. The burden, such as it is, to prove that this case would come within that exception is on him. The ingredients of the Ninth Exception are that (1) the imputation must be made in good faith, and (2) the imputation must be for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or fix the public good. 13.10. In the case of Mahabir Prashad Gupta (supra) the Supreme Court has observed-- Undoubtedly there could be interference in rarest of rare cases. However, one such case would be when the complaint itself does not disclose any offence. 13.10. In the case of Mahabir Prashad Gupta (supra) the Supreme Court has observed-- Undoubtedly there could be interference in rarest of rare cases. However, one such case would be when the complaint itself does not disclose any offence. In this case, as set out hereinabove, the complaint merely pointed out that the goods had been entrusted to the petitioners and that the same, even though accepted and even though lorry receipt had been issued, were not delivered and were withheld. On those facts the police had to inquire whether there was any criminal breach of trust and forgery as claimed. On these facts it could not be said that the police should not have registered an FIR and/or to make an inquiry. 11. In our view, the High Court was right in dismissing the petition. No case has been made out for interference at all. As the petitioners have stalled inquiries for the last over 21/2 years, we direct that the police should now complete the investigation as expeditiously as possible and submit the final report in accordance with law. It is clarified that the police are at liberty to seize and/or attach the goods and remove the same from the godown of the petitioners to some other place, if they so choose. 13.11. As already stated earlier, the other cases referred on behalf of respondent No. 2-company also are on the same point that this Court is not required to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC unless it is clearly brought out that there is no case made out at all in the complaint or that the investigation is totally perverse and the report furnished after investigation makes out no case against the petitioner. 13.12. Since the criminal law has already been set in motion and cognizance has already been taken by the Magisterial Court on the basis of the police report and since the accused has also recorded his appearance and taken bail and since I find that the complaint discloses certain allegation against the petitioner which has been investigated upon and charge sheet has already been filed for trial against the accused petitioner, I find no justification at all to interfere in the criminal trial on the ground as contemplated on behalf of the petitioner. The facts and circumstances of this case justify a trial against the accused for the offence alleged. The facts and circumstances of this case justify a trial against the accused for the offence alleged. The points as raised before this Court may, however, be raised on behalf of the accused petitioner in the course of trial of the criminal case at the stage of flaming of charges. Further, if after trial, the accused is found to be innocent and not committed any offence or that no case is made out, the accused petitioner can take recourse of law for action against the complainant. 14. It has been argued that the present complaint was filed after more than three and half years, which is a fact. As it appears, the respondent No. 2-company filed the complaint before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Delhi before filing of this complaint but that was withdrawn with a liberty to file a fresh complaint. No doubt, before 2009 there was no attempt by the respondent No. 2-company to file a complaint for the alleged offence by the petitioner, that itself cannot be a ground to quash the criminal proceeding brought on record against the petitioner. Delay in filing the complaint and/or FIR may be a ground for consideration at the stage of trial taking into account other relevant facts and circumstances of the case. Since there is no legal bar on that point, this Court is not required to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. 15. The case of the petitioner, in my considered opinion, in view of the discussions made above, in the facts and circumstances, does not call upon the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction on any of the grounds considered by the Apex Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 16. Accordingly, the criminal petition stands dismissed. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.