JUDGMENT : Dev Darshan Sud, J. These two appeals arise out of the same accident which was subject-matter of M.A.C. Petition No. 10-S/2 of 2010 decided by the learned Tribunal on 28.9.2011 awarding a sum of Rs. 15,42,000 and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum if amount is not paid within 45 days of the award, from the date of award till its payment. The case pleaded by claimant Sangeeta, who suffered injuries in the accident on 16.11.2009 and has been totally crippled for the rest of her life in an accident involving bus No. HP 07-0747 of Himachal Road Transport Corporation ('H.R.T.C.' hereinafter), is that on 16.11.2009, the claimant was travelling from Shimla to her home. She boarded H.R.T.C. bus No. HP 07-0747 and there were 25/26 passengers travelling in the bus. It was pleaded that the bus was being driven in a rash and negligent manner as a result it went off the road causing serious injuries to the claimant. Her backbone was fractured. She was rushed to Indira Gandhi Medical College & Hospital, Shimla ('I.G.M.C.' for short), immediately where she remained admitted and was discharged on 18.12.2009. The lower portion of her body had developed paraplegia. Exh. PW 4/A was the disability certificate issued by the Board constituted by I.G.M.C. consisting of three doctors which included the Professor, Head of the Department of Orthopaedics, Consultant and Registrar. They certified that she was suffering from 100 per cent disability in relation to both lower limbs and spine. The learned Tribunal on the evidence granted her compensation as noticed supra. The claimant challenges the adequacy of compensation in F.A.O. No. 461 of 2011 and H.R.T.C. challenges its liability to pay the compensation in F.A.O. No. 418 of 2011. 2. Adverting to the appeal preferred by H.R.T.C., I notice that they challenge the amount awarded on the ground that the learned Tribunal has acted with conjecture without appreciating the evidence. The datum figure for income at Rs. 3,000 has also been challenged. It was urged that she was 37 years of age and a multiplier of 15 should and ought to have been adopted. Learned Tribunal was in error in awarding Rs. 1,00,000 towards medical expenses and Rs. 6,48,000 on account of attendant charges. 3. The datum figure for income at Rs. 3,000 has also been challenged. It was urged that she was 37 years of age and a multiplier of 15 should and ought to have been adopted. Learned Tribunal was in error in awarding Rs. 1,00,000 towards medical expenses and Rs. 6,48,000 on account of attendant charges. 3. The appellant challenges the award as inadequate, non-award of interest which according to the appellant should and ought to have been granted from the date of institution of the claim petition, paltry charges for attendant which she would require for the rest of her life, pain and suffering and loss of normal amenities in life. Parties have placed reliance on the evidence as also on the law. I first advert to the law. In Smt. Neelam Anand Vs. Sardar Manmohan Singh and Others, (2007) ACJ 1386, this court awarded a sum of Rs. 18,85,000 to the claimant, who had suffered injuries on the spine as a result of which the whole body became paralysed. The facts noticed by this court were; (2) The appellant suffered injury in the spine as a result of which her whole body below neck became totally paralysed. She is confined to a wheelchair. She has no sensation in the lower part of the body. She needs assistance and constant attendance. She cannot perform her daily ablutions without the assistance of other person. She cannot stand. She cannot move. She cannot write. She can only thumb mark documents, that too with the help of somebody who lifts her hand to put/move her thumb. She is, however, mentally totally alert. She understands everything. Above neck, she is all there. Her fate is worse than that of the dead. 4. Adverting to the principle applicable for assessment of damages and the evidence on record, this court awarded a sum of Rs. 18,85,000 holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the nature of disability suffered by the claimant was fatal. 5. In NIC Vs. Hamnawaz and Others, (2011) ACJ 456, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir awarded a sum of Rs. 18,01,484 to the claimant, who had suffered from paraplegia due to which both his lower limbs and sphincter muscles became non-functional. The court holds: (9) On account of paraplegia, claimant is unable to move like a normal man and is also not capable to earn anything in future also. 18,01,484 to the claimant, who had suffered from paraplegia due to which both his lower limbs and sphincter muscles became non-functional. The court holds: (9) On account of paraplegia, claimant is unable to move like a normal man and is also not capable to earn anything in future also. The future loss of income assessed by the Tribunal at the rate of Rs. 4,000 and applied the multiplier of 18 has also been rightly done. (10) The petitioner being of 28-29 years at the time when the award was passed, the multiplier of 18 has rightly been applied in this case. In respect of medical expenses incurred, the actual bills produced and proved by claimant/petitioner has been worked out to be Rs. 3,55,484 for which there is no dispute and the compensation has been rightly assessed. 6. On the evidence produced on record which included medical expenses, loss of income during the trial as also future income, pain and suffering, loss of amenity of her life and future income, a sum of Rs. 15,42,000 was awarded. 7. In The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shweta Dilip Mehta and Others, (2011) ACJ 489, a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay had awarded a sum of Rs. 49,48,848 to the claimant who was aged about 11 years. The facts noticed by this court were (pp. 490-491): ...Facts in brief are that one Dilip Shah was proceeding to Kolhapur along with his family and the family of his close friend, Dilip Mehta, in a Maruti 800 car bearing registration No. MH 01-A 122. In all, 6 persons were travelling in the car. On 2.5.1993, at about 6.30 a.m., the car met with accident near Itkari Phata when a truck, bearing registration No. MHF 6469, which was travelling in the opposite direction, collided with it. As a result, the driver, Dilip Shah, died instantaneously, while the other passengers were severely injured. Shweta Dilip Mehta (hereinafter referred to as 'the appellant'), aged 11 years at the time, was rendered paraplegic, i.e., her entire body from waist-down is paralysed since the day of the accident and doctors assess her permanent disablement to an extent of 80-90 per cent. 8. The court holds: (23) In the present case, the appellant was only 11 years of age at the time of the accident. 8. The court holds: (23) In the present case, the appellant was only 11 years of age at the time of the accident. However, the aforementioned Table, laid down in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , does not specify the multiplier to be applied in such a case, i.e., where the victim is below 15 years of age. We feel that this is an inadvertence rather than an intended exclusion. The Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act itself specifies a multiplier of 15' to be applied for victims who are under 15 years of age. It cannot be said that victims below the age of 15 years are to be excluded from receiving compensation under the head of 'loss of future income' merely because a multiplier has not been specified for such age group. It is obvious that 'loss of future income' as a head of compensation applies to all persons, whether earning or not at the time. A child who is rendered permanently disabled due to an accident loses the capacity to earn for himself and his family, in the same manner as a working adult, and in fact, often loses such capacity for a longer period than such adult. Courts have merely sought to interpret and clarify the Second Schedule, on account of the several errors in it, and in the interests of justice. However, no judgment of the Apex Court explicitly suggests excluding a category or age group from receiving compensation under this head. We hence find no reason to exclude calculating compensation under this head for the victim in the present matter. (24) We note the mathematical progression of the multiplier values, in the aforementioned schedule, as explained in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 . We hence find no reason to exclude calculating compensation under this head for the victim in the present matter. (24) We note the mathematical progression of the multiplier values, in the aforementioned schedule, as explained in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 . We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15-20 and 20-25 years), reduced by one unit every five years, that is, M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years. As per this progression, the multiplier in the present case, for a victim below 15 years of age ought to have been 19. However, we are also bound by the judgment in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others Vs. Trilok Chandra and Others, (1996) 4 SCC 362 , where the Hon'ble Apex Court held that even in cases u/s 166 of the Act, the maximum multiplier to be applied is 18, which was an increase from the existing maximum value of 16 that was laid down earlier in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum Vs. Mrs. Susamma Thomas and others, (1994) 2 SCC 176 . The cap of 18' as the maximum multiplier that may be applied in any case has been reiterated in Sarla Verma's case, as well. Hence we conclude that irrespective of the mathematical progression in the schedule, the maximum multiplier that may be applied is 18, even if the victim is below 15 years. Thus, in the present case, the multiplier to be applied for computing 'loss of future income' for the victim is 18. (25) To compute the compensation, we will have to assume an annual income in this case, as the appellant did not work at the time of the accident, being only 11 years old. The Second Schedule specifies Rs. Thus, in the present case, the multiplier to be applied for computing 'loss of future income' for the victim is 18. (25) To compute the compensation, we will have to assume an annual income in this case, as the appellant did not work at the time of the accident, being only 11 years old. The Second Schedule specifies Rs. 15,000 per annum to be assumed as income in case of non-earning victims. However, we find this sum wholly inadequate in the present time. Moreover, the appellant was a bright student who seemed to be set for a successful future, prior to the accident. In fact, in spite of the accident, the appellant has managed to complete her M. Com. which itself is testimony to her potential. We feel that taking all contingencies, calamities and disadvantages that may have occurred in the appellant's normal future into account, to consider an annual income of Rs. 1,00,000 is reasonable. Applying the multiplier of 18 to this amount, the appellant is entitled to Rs. 18,00,000 as compensation towards loss of future income, which, if deposited at standard interest rates, would accrue an interest approximately equal to the assumed annual income. (Emphasis supplied) 9. In National Insurance Company and Others Vs. Gita Nagpal and Others the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir awarded a sum of Rs. 88,66,000 to the claimant. The court noticed the facts: (45) The claimant Kewal Nagpal has been disabled 100 per cent because of the spinal cord injuries of D-2 level. He is, therefore, dependent for his daily chores on others. He has, therefore, lost his earning capacity. (46) To determine compensation for loss of his earning capacity, the Tribunal has taken into consideration the annual loss of Rs. 11,96,540 to his profits, which he would otherwise, on an average, earn from his business in partnership with others in Kashmir Walnut Trading Company and Rajan Trading Co. before the accident. Deducting 1/3rd therefrom as his personal expenses, Rs. 7,97,694 has been taken as annual loss of income to the claimant. 11,96,540 to his profits, which he would otherwise, on an average, earn from his business in partnership with others in Kashmir Walnut Trading Company and Rajan Trading Co. before the accident. Deducting 1/3rd therefrom as his personal expenses, Rs. 7,97,694 has been taken as annual loss of income to the claimant. (47) There does not appear any justification in treating the claimant's disability, though 100 per cent as total loss to his income from the two firms, in that, even if the claimant was 100 per cent disabled to personally participate in the business of the two firms, yet the profit, which he would otherwise earn from his capital investments in the two firms, even as a sleeping partner, cannot be lost sight of while determining loss of income. 10. The assessment of damages is no longer res integra. In Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 343 , the Supreme Court, while considering this aspect in detail, holds: (7) The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45 per cent of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45 per cent permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60 per cent permanent disability of the right hand and 80 per cent permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140 per cent (that is, 80 per cent plus 60 per cent). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentage of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body cannot obviously exceed 100 per cent. (8) Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. (8) Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45 per cent as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45 per cent loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. What is required to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may, however, note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. [See, for example, the decisions of this court in Arvind Kumar Mishra Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 254 , and Yadava Kumar Vs. The Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 341 . (9) Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so, the extent of such permanent disability. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 254 , and Yadava Kumar Vs. The Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 341 . (9) Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so, the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the Tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement; (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is, the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. (13) We may now summarise the principles discussed above: (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries) do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases where the Tribunal, on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors. 11. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors. 11. This principle was later on reiterated in Govind Yadav Vs. The New India Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 10 SCC 683 holding: (10) The personal sufferings of the survivors and disabled persons are manifold. Some time they can be measured in terms of money but most of the times it is not possible to do so. If an individual is permanently disabled in an accident, the cost of his medical treatment and care is likely to be very high. In cases involving total or partial disablement, the term 'compensation' used in section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') would include not only the expenses incurred for immediate treatment, but also the amount likely to be incurred for future medical treatment/care necessary for a particular injury or disability caused by an accident. A very large number of people involved in motor accidents are pedestrians, children, women and illiterate persons. Majority of them cannot, due to sheer ignorance, poverty and other disabilities, engage competent lawyers for proving negligence of the wrongdoer in adequate measure. The insurance companies with whom the vehicles involved in the accident are insured usually have battery of lawyers on their panel. They contest the claim petitions by raising all possible technical objections for ensuring that their clients are either completely absolved or their liabilities minimized. This results in prolonging the proceedings before the Tribunal. Sometimes the delay and litigation expenses make the award passed by the Tribunal and even by the High Court (in appeal) meaningless. It is, therefore, imperative that the officers, who preside over the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, adopt a proactive approach and ensure that the claims filed u/s 166 of the Act are disposed of with required urgency and compensation is awarded to the victims of the accident and/or their legal representatives in adequate measure. The amount of compensation in such cases should invariably include pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In R.D. Hattangadi Vs. The amount of compensation in such cases should invariably include pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In R.D. Hattangadi Vs. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 551 , this court while dealing with a case involving claim of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ward v. James, (1965) 1 All ER 563, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 12 (page 446) and observed: (9) Broadly speaking, while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life. In the same case, the court further observed: (12) In its very nature whenever a Tribunal or a court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards. 12. The principles which stand settled are that the injured has to be compensated for not only the pain and suffering but also for reasonable requirement of an attendant, physiotherapy, medication for life. But what must not be lost sight of is the fact that a young lady of 37 years has been totally crippled for the rest of her life. The principles which stand settled are that the injured has to be compensated for not only the pain and suffering but also for reasonable requirement of an attendant, physiotherapy, medication for life. But what must not be lost sight of is the fact that a young lady of 37 years has been totally crippled for the rest of her life. The injuries as described in Exh. PW 4/A are telling. When coupled with the evidence of PW 4, Dr. Manoj Thakur, there is no doubt in my mind that the injured would require assistance throughout her life, i.e., an attendant to look after, wheelchair and specialised bed. 13. It is in the light of the principles considered above that the case of claimant has to be decided. PW 1 Sangeeta, the claimant, stated that on the date of the accident, i.e., 16.11.2009, she was aged about 37 years. She proved on record, Exh. PW 1/A which is a copy of the matriculation certificate. She is looking after her family and managing the house. She had also been doing tailoring and stitching work to supplement the family income. On the fateful day, she boarded the bus at Shimla to travel to her house. There were about 25/26 passengers in the bus. The bus was being driven in a rash and negligent manner with the result that the bus went off the highway and she suffered serious injuries. Her backbone was fractured. She was taken to I.G.M.C. and admitted on 16.11.2009 and discharged on 18.12.2009 with the direction that she should have a regular medical check-up. She has become absolutely helpless and dependent upon others. The lower portion of her body had developed paraplegia and she cannot attend to the call of nature. She is bedridden and requires a wheelchair throughout her life. Her disability certificate, Exh. PW 4/A, testifies this fact. 14. PW 2, Anu, stated that she had been attending to claimant in I.G.M.C., Shimla and, in addition, looking after the children of the injured. She was being paid a sum of Rs. 5,000 per month for these duties. PW 3, Madan Singh, proved the medical records of injured Sangeeta. It is the testimony of PW 4, Dr. Manoj Thakur, which assumes primary importance. PW 4, Dr. Manoj Thakur, Associate Professor of Orthopaedics Surgery, I.G.M.C., Shimla says that Sangeeta was brought to the casualty department for treatment on 16.11.2009. 5,000 per month for these duties. PW 3, Madan Singh, proved the medical records of injured Sangeeta. It is the testimony of PW 4, Dr. Manoj Thakur, which assumes primary importance. PW 4, Dr. Manoj Thakur, Associate Professor of Orthopaedics Surgery, I.G.M.C., Shimla says that Sangeeta was brought to the casualty department for treatment on 16.11.2009. She was suffering from unstable fracture dorsal spine with paraplegia. She was operated on 26.11.2009 and was discharged on 18.12.2009. He then states: Surgery performed as open reduction with internal fixation with posterior stabilization with MOSS Miami with Decompression with bone grafting on 26.11.2009. The petitioner must have spent about Rs. 75,000 for her treatment. She remained admitted in the hospital for about one month. During the course of her admission, the petitioner was in dire necessity of attendance and the attendance is required throughout her life. For assessing the disability, a Medical Board was constituted consisting of Dr. Mukand and Dr. Vivek Banyal and myself. The Medical Board had assessed permanent disability to the extent of 100 per cent. The disability certificate is Exh. PW 4/A which bears my signature in circle A. The petitioner will require continuous physiotherapy and one attendant is also required throughout her life. She was suffering urination problem. Discharge certificate is Exh. PW 1/B. 15. He has denied the suggestion that the injuries are capable of being cured. The medical bills, etc. have been proved by the other witnesses. It is in the totality of this evidence that the assessment has to be made with respect to the damages to be awarded. Exh. PW 4/A certifies the injuries as "unstable fracture dorsal spine with paraplegia". 16. The submission made on behalf of H.R.T.C. that the claim is excessive as the quantum has not been established on the record, cannot be accepted. The award has been challenged on a number of grounds by H.R.T.C. primarily that it is based on surmises and conjectures, the income of Rs. 3,000 per month has been taken on the higher side, multiplier of 18 has been applied though it should and ought to have been 15 and the award of attendant charges is excessive. In nutshell, the case made out is that the award cannot be allowed to be a windfall but only a reasonable compensation can be paid. I cannot accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, H.R.T.C. 17. In nutshell, the case made out is that the award cannot be allowed to be a windfall but only a reasonable compensation can be paid. I cannot accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, H.R.T.C. 17. On the aspect of income all that I need say is that this aspect now stands concluded by the judgment in Arun Kumar Agrawal and Another Vs. National Insurance Company and Others, (2010) 9 SCC 218 , A.K. Ganguly, J. holds that the dependency is now to be calculated as Rs. 5,000 per month. 18. On the other aspect of the injured requiring an attendant, etc., there is no doubt in my mind that the evidence on the record, more especially that of PW 4, Dr. Manoj Thakur, as also the injured PW 1 Sangeeta, is absolutely clear that she would require an attendant throughout her life. An amount of Rs. 36,000 x 18 = Rs. 6,48,000 has been awarded by the learned Tribunal. I may add that this sum will not prove to be adequate as it will not be possible to engage an attendant at this fixed rate for the future of 18 years considering the rate of inflation. On the question of multiplier, I do not intend to interfere since I find that the amount which has been awarded is frugal. As considered supra, there is no means of calculating the monetary sum for the permanent disablement which has been inflicted on the injured and with which she has to live throughout her life having lost control over her urine and bladder. Her capacity to enjoy life and live normally has been totally ruined. Her fate can be summed up as worse than death. In the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the nature of the disability suffered by the appellant, it would be appropriate in case the injured is awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs. 20,00,000 which would be required to take care of the inflation and special requirements of the injured. I also find that the learned Tribunal has been remiss in denying interest to the claimant. I direct that the award shall carry interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from the date of institution of the petition till the payment of the award. I also find that the learned Tribunal has been remiss in denying interest to the claimant. I direct that the award shall carry interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from the date of institution of the petition till the payment of the award. F.A.O. No. 418 of 2011 is dismissed and F.A.O. No. 461 of 2011 is allowed. The appellant Sangeeta in this appeal will be entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 20,00,000 plus interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its payment.