Judgment :- This writ petition has been filed by six Members of the Legislative Assembly, who were elected to their respective constituencies from the DMDK Political party. The first petitioner is the whip of the DMDK Political party which is the Opposition Party in the Legislature. 2. The case of the writ petitioners as stated in the affidavit is as follows: There are 29 Members in the Legislature of the Assembly belonging to the DMDK Political Party. However, four of the Members without resigning from the party or the post of Legislature, remained as disaffected Members of the party and they started behaving independently with an intention to cause split in the DMDK Party. 3. On 08.03.2013 certain incident took place in the meeting of the Assembly. Though the alleged incident took place due to the provocation of not only the above said four Members, viz., Tamil Alagan, Michael Royappan, R.Sundar Rajan and Arun Pandiyan of the DMDK party (who are alleged to act with an intention to cause split), but, also from the AIADMK Members who forcibly participated in the above incident in support of the above said four Members. The Speaker of the Assembly considering the incident as an alleged breach of privilege, referred the matter under Rule 226 to the Privilege Committee to investigate and report not only the incident of the Members involving the writ petitioners, but also, against all such persons whoever behaved like that. However, the proceedings and recommendations of the Privilege Committee dated 21.03.2013 was deliberately restricted to the petitioners only without examining the video footage completely and without taking into consideration the statements of the other members of the Privilege Committee. According to the writ petitioners, the proceedings of the Privilege Committee dated 15.03.2013 and 21.03.2013 which culminated into the report of the Chairman, dated 21.03.2013 are one-sided, arbitrary and erroneous. 4. It is the case of the writ petitioners that none of them was issued with a notice of the alleged breach of the privilege by the Privilege Committee before making an enquiry, investigation and submission of report under Rule 229. When principles of natural justice are given a go-by, then, the judicial review of the Privilege proceedings are very much available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the writ petitioners, the case reported in 2012 (3) CTC 449 (Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, rep. When principles of natural justice are given a go-by, then, the judicial review of the Privilege proceedings are very much available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the writ petitioners, the case reported in 2012 (3) CTC 449 (Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, rep. by its Secretary, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009, 2.The Hon'ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009), which deals with a similar incident involving their Party Leader, Mr.Vijayakanth stands on a different footing, as in that case, a notice was given to appear before the Privileges Committee, whereas none of the petitioners herein was issued with a similar notice from the Privileges Committee, asking them to furnish their representation against the alleged breach of privilege. Therefore, according to the writ petitioners, the writ petition is to be allowed on the ground of violation of principles of Natural Justice alone. 5. It is the further contention of the writ petitioners that the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside in consonance with Article 194 read with Rules made under Article 208 of the Constitution of India, as they restrict the scope of the proceedings only to the four walls of the Legislature and not beyond the same. However, the impugned proceedings punishing the petitioners herein for the alleged breach of privilege inside the house for their other functioning outside the House like the statutory benefits available to them under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951 and the rules framed there under including the provision under the Representation of People's Act, 1951. 6. The petitioners contend that suspending them for a period of one year on 25.03.2013 which was subsequently modified as six months on 26.03.2013 is ultra-virus to Article 190 of the Constitution of India. According to them, Article 190 deals with disqualification of a Member and vacation of his/her seat. Article 190(3) states that either on disqualification or on resignation with the permission of the Chairman, the seat will become vacant. Article 190(4) states that if for a period of sixty days, a Member of a House of Legislature of the State is without permission of the House, absent from all meetings thereon, the House may declare the seat vacant. Article 190(3) states that either on disqualification or on resignation with the permission of the Chairman, the seat will become vacant. Article 190(4) states that if for a period of sixty days, a Member of a House of Legislature of the State is without permission of the House, absent from all meetings thereon, the House may declare the seat vacant. In the present case, the petitioners were originally suspended for a period of one year from 25.03.2013 and subsequently for a period of six months. Since Article 190 dis-qualifies a Member of the Assembly for more than sixty days, both under six months suspension as well as one year suspension, there is an inherent restriction on the power of suspending the Member beyond sixty days. 7. The petitioners relying on the decision of the Apex Court in P.V.Narasimha Rao's case and Amarinder Singh Vs. Punjab Vidhan Sabha ( 2010 (6) SCC 113 ) and Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker ( 2007 (3) SCC 184 ) contend that the punishment of taking away the salary and allowance is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. 8. Hence, they prayed for an issue of a Writ of Declaration to declare that the entire proceedings are illegal and unconstitutional. 9. Notice was ordered by this Court to both the respondents herein. Notice was served on the first respondent and the notice sent to the second respondent was returned as refused. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the first respondent and since the notice sent to the second respondent was returned as refused, this Court requested Mr. A.L.Somayaji, the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu to act as a Amicus Curiae in this matter. 10. A counter affidavit has been filed by the Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Secretariat, the first respondent herein. 11. In the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary, it is stated that the writ petition itself is not maintainable as what is sought for is the intervention in the internal affairs of the State Legislative Assembly, of which, the Privileges Committee is a part. Referring to Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India, it is stated that the Legislative Assembly has all the powers, privileges and immunities by the British House of Commons at the time of commencement of the Constitution. Referring to Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India, it is stated that the Legislative Assembly has all the powers, privileges and immunities by the British House of Commons at the time of commencement of the Constitution. Further, under Article 212 of the Constitution, the House has powers to regulate its own proceedings and it is the privilege of the House to conduct its internal proceedings within the four walls of the House free from interference including its right to impose disciplinary measures against its Members for assault and disorderly conduct, as they constitute breach of privilege and contempt of the House. The Assembly proceeded against its Members for interfering in the discharge of duties by a Fellow Member of their Party by intimidation and assault and for bringing the House into dis-respect. Hence, according to the first respondent, the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. It is stated by the first respondent that on 08.02.2013, during Question Hour, Thiru.K.Tamilalagan, M.L.A. of the DMDK Party representing the Thittakudi (SC) Constituency was permitted by the Hon'ble Speaker to ask a supplementary question. Thiru.K.Tamilalagan thanked for the welfare measures being implemented in his constituency following his meeting with the Hon'ble Chief Minister. Objecting to his statement, Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the Whip of the DMDK Party, the first writ petitioner herein and many other M.L.A.s' of the same party left their seats furiously and simultaneously rushed towards Thiru.K.Tamilalagan in a threatening mood shouting at him, using derogatory words so as to prevent him from proceeding further. Despite the repeated advice of the Hon'ble Speaker not to speak directly to the Member and return to their seats, many DMDK Members ignoring the warnings of the Hon'ble Speaker, left in Block VI of the Assembly and proceeded enmasse to Block V to attack Thiru.K.Tamilalagan with an intention to prevent him from continuing his speech. When Thiru.C.Michael Royappan, a DMDK Member who was seated in the first row in Block V, in which, Thiru.K.Tamilalagan has also been allotted a seat, intervened and tried to pacify them, the DMDK Members surrounded Thiru.C.Michael Royappan and assaulted him. When Thiru.C.Michael Royappan, a DMDK Member who was seated in the first row in Block V, in which, Thiru.K.Tamilalagan has also been allotted a seat, intervened and tried to pacify them, the DMDK Members surrounded Thiru.C.Michael Royappan and assaulted him. In order to restore order and to prevent further scuffle and pandemonium in the House and the continuous surcharged atmosphere in the House, the Hon'ble Speaker ordered eviction of the DMDK Members who were involved in the clash and accordingly, they were evicted by the Watch and Ward Staff. 13. According to the first respondent, the incident of assault happened during sitting of the House within the view and knowledge of the members, the Press, the Media covering the proceedings, the Officials and the persons in the Visitors Galleries. The Hon'ble Leader brought this incident to the notice of the House and stated that it was a shameful incident and requested the Hon'ble Speaker to subject Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner and all other Members, who involved in the disorderly and barbaric assault, to stringent punishment so as to prevent recurrence of such incidents in future. 14. It is further submitted that the DMDK Members are seated in Block V and Block VI i.e. the left side of the Speaker's Stage. From whatever he saw, the Hon'ble Speaker recalled the names of Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner, Thiru.V.Parthasarathy, the second writ petitioner, Thiru.L.Venkatesan, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan, Thiru.C.H.Sekar and Thiru.Muthukumar and stated that the action indulged in by these DMDK Members was against the decorum and decency of the House. He announced in the House itself that he was referring the issue to the Privileges Committee under Article 226 of the Assembly Rules in order to identify from the video recording of the scene, all those who were indulged in such action and for suitable action. 15. After the issue was referred to the Privileges Committee on 08.02.2013, later in the very same day, Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner and 21 other DMDK M.L.A.s submitted a written explanation to the Hon'ble Speaker regarding the incident. In their letter, they alleged that DMDK members Thiru.C.Michael Royappan, Thiru.R.Sundar Rajan and Thiru.R.Arun Pandiyan berated them and they were also abused by some Members from the ruling AIADMK party. They further stated that Thiru.C.Michael Royappan forcefully punched Thiru.D.Murugesan, the third writ petitioner on the chest and pulled his shirt and threatened him of murder. In their letter, they alleged that DMDK members Thiru.C.Michael Royappan, Thiru.R.Sundar Rajan and Thiru.R.Arun Pandiyan berated them and they were also abused by some Members from the ruling AIADMK party. They further stated that Thiru.C.Michael Royappan forcefully punched Thiru.D.Murugesan, the third writ petitioner on the chest and pulled his shirt and threatened him of murder. The 22 DMDK Members requested the Hon'ble Speaker to take action against the above said Members. 16. Thiru. C.Michael Royappan has also on the same day given an explanation to the Hon'ble Speaker narrating his version of the event. He alleged that when Thiru.K.Tamilalagan was asking a supplementary question, several colleagues of his party shouted at him and tried to engage him in a loud altercation. They also moved towards him and tried to attack him. As he was seated before Thiru.K.Tamilalagan, he tried to stop them and Thiru.D.Murugesan, the third writ petitioner advanced menacingly and tried to attack and push him down. Further, he alleged that Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner, S.Senthil Kumar, the 5th writ petitioner, Thiru.B.Parthasarathy, the second writ petitioner, Thiru.R.Arulselvan, the 6th writ petitioner, Thiru.V.Muthukumar, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan and Thiru.K.Nallathambi, the 4th writ petitioner surrounded, assaulted and pushed him down. They also abused him in indecent language and extended murderous threats. Thiru.C.Michael Royappan requested the Hon'ble Speaker to take action against those Members. 17. As the issue was already referred to the Privileges Committee of the House, the Hon'ble Speaker forwarded the written explanations to the Committee along with the video clipping of the scene of assault. As per Rule 227 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, the Privileges Committee was elected according to the Principle of proportional Representation by means of a single transferable vote. The Hon'ble Deputy Speaker of the State Assembly is Ex-officio, the Chairman of the Committee. The Committee consists of members belonging to the Ruling AIADMK Party and members of Opposition Parties like the DMDK, the DMK, the CPI(M), the CPI and the Indian National Congress. The leader of the Opposition belonging to the DMDK Party is also an ex-officio member of the Committee. Thiru.S.R.Parthiban of the DMDK, who is a signatory to the explanation submitted by the first writ petitioner, is incidentally a Member of the Privileges Committee. 18. The leader of the Opposition belonging to the DMDK Party is also an ex-officio member of the Committee. Thiru.S.R.Parthiban of the DMDK, who is a signatory to the explanation submitted by the first writ petitioner, is incidentally a Member of the Privileges Committee. 18. It is stated that the Privileges Committee had its first sitting on 15.03.2013 and all the members including Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan of the DMDK saw the video clipping of the assault and went through the explanations of Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar and Thiru.C.Michael Royappan forwarded by the Hon'ble Speaker. After detailed discussions, the Committee by majority decision concluded that six DMDK M.L.A.s, the writ petitioners herein, committed breach of privilege and contempt of the House by obstructing a member from discharging his duties as an M.L.A. inside the House and for attacking a fellow member who tried to pacify them. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the six M.L.A.s of the DMDK Party are to be suspended from the service of the Assembly for a period of one year and during that period, they are ineligible to receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or entitlements admissible to them as the Members of the Legislative Assembly. In the draft report containing the above recommendation, the same was considered by the Committee during its second sitting on 21.03.2013 and the report was adopted by the Committee on the same day. The Committee authorised the Chairman to sign and present the report to the House on its behalf. 19. It is stated by the first respondent that as per Rule 229(a) of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, the report was presented to the Assembly by the Chairman of the Committee on 25.03.2013. As per Rule 229(b), the Hon'ble Leader of the House moved a motion that the report be taken into consideration and the motion was put to vote of the House and was carried out. As per Rule 229(d), the Leader of the House moved a motion that the House agrees with the recommendations contained in the report of the Privileges Committee. The motion was put to vote of the House and the House resolved to accept the recommendations contained in the report. As per Rule 229(d), the Leader of the House moved a motion that the House agrees with the recommendations contained in the report of the Privileges Committee. The motion was put to vote of the House and the House resolved to accept the recommendations contained in the report. Consequently, the Hon'ble Speaker announced that as per the resolutions passed by the Assembly, the six writ petitioners herein, belonging to the DMDK Party, were being suspended from the service of the Assembly for a period of one year and during such period, they would be ineligible to receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or entitlements admissible to them as Members of Legislative Assembly. 20. It is further stated that on 26.03.2013, the leaders of the parties spoke in the Assembly, acknowledging the right of the Privileges Committee and requested for remission of the quantum of punishment. The Hon'ble Chief Minister intervened and recommended that keeping in view the request of the Opposition Party members, the period of punishment awarded to the DMDK Members may be reduced to six months. The Hon'ble Leader of the House moved a resolution that the six writ petitioners be suspended for a period of six months and that they may be made ineligible to receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or entitlements admissible to them as Members of Legislative Assembly during such period. This resolution was put to the vote of the House and carried. 21. The first respondent having narrated the factual aspects as above in the counter affidavit, further states that the incident of intimidation and attempt to physical attack on Thiru.A.Tamilalagan is a direct negation of the freedom of speech inside the House guaranteed by the Constitution under Article 194(1). This attempt and the subsequent assaults on Thiru.C.Michael Royappan created a ruckus inside the Assembly and disrupted the smooth practice of the Question Hour on 08.02.2013. As the assault happened in full view of the House, an incident is never in doubt, but, only the identity of each one of the perpetrators of the attack was in question. The House could have immediately proceeded against the Members who took part in the assault by passing a resolution extending such punishment. As the assault happened in full view of the House, an incident is never in doubt, but, only the identity of each one of the perpetrators of the attack was in question. The House could have immediately proceeded against the Members who took part in the assault by passing a resolution extending such punishment. However, as so many members simultaneously rushed towards Thiru.K.Tamilalagan and surrounded and attacked Thiru.C.Michael Royappan, the Hon'ble Speaker and others sitting on the Treasury Benches who were the eye-witnesses for the incident could not pin-point beyond reasonable doubt the identity of each one of the Members in such a melee. Though the Hon'ble Speaker initially named a few members, in the interest of natural justice and with good intention, the Hon'ble Speaker exercised his powers under Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules and referred the issue to the Privileges Committee for ascertaining from the video clipping of the scene, the identity of all those members who took part in the enraged action and for recommending disciplinary and penal action thereon. 22. On the very same day, after the session was over, the first writ petitioner, who is the Whip of the DMDK Legislative Party, gave a written explanation on the incident of assault to the Hon'ble Speaker in person which was counter signed by 21 other DMDK Members. Similarly, Thiru.C.Michael Royappan gave an explanation regarding the incident of assault to the Hon'ble Speaker on the same day. Both these two explanations were forwarded to the Privileges Committee. Therefore, according to the first respondent, the scope and ambit of the Privileges Committee's examination was not to trace the entire discussion in the Assembly that happened on 08.02.2013 or to investigate such incident happened or not or to find out the reason which made the DMDK Members to leave their seats to engage in a physical attack, but, it was limited only to ascertaining the identity of the members who actually took part in the unruly behaviour in the light of the videographed evidence of the footage and the contents of the two written explanations voluntarily submitted by the DMDK Members. Therefore, what has been done by the Hon'ble Speaker is as per Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules and therefore, the same cannot be questioned by the writ petitioners. 23. Therefore, what has been done by the Hon'ble Speaker is as per Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules and therefore, the same cannot be questioned by the writ petitioners. 23. In so far as the grounds raised by the writ petitioners like violation of principles of natural justice, violation of their right to receive salary, negation of fundamental rights, etc., are concerned the first respondent submits that these issues were already decided by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of judgments and therefore, those grounds do not support the case of the writ petitioners herein. 24. With regard to the non-issue of notice of the alleged breach of privilege by the Committee before enquiry investigation and submission of report, it is stated that the principles of natural justice are not immutable, but are flexible. They cannot be case in a rigid mould and put in a straight jacket and the compliance therewith has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. According to the first respondent, in the light of the above facts and circumstances, the need for sending Notice from the Committee did not arise at all. As written explanations were submitted by DMDK members voluntarily giving their version of the event, they have pre-empted the Privileges Committee from issuing notice to them. Further, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan who was one of the signatories to the written explanation submitted on 08.02.2013, was a Member in the Privileges Committee apart from the Leader of the Opposition belonging to DMDK party who is an ex-officio member. Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan participated in the meeting and saw the video footage and he was given full opportunity to give explanation and arguments. Further, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan identified his party members in the video footage and his views were recorded in the proceedings of the Committee. Therefore, it is submitted by the first respondent that it cannot be said that the basic principles of natural justice are violated in this case. 25. Further, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan identified his party members in the video footage and his views were recorded in the proceedings of the Committee. Therefore, it is submitted by the first respondent that it cannot be said that the basic principles of natural justice are violated in this case. 25. It is further stated that the Legislatures in India possess the powers and privileges of the British House of Commerce as available at the time of the commencement of the Constitution under Article 194 and therefore, they have the right to punish the members and others for breach of privilege and contempt and the result of such punishment may extend beyond the four walls of the Legislature and may not be limited to suspension, but, may even extend the commitment to prison. It is further stated that the benefits, privileges, salary and entitlement of the petitioners are admissible to them only on account of their membership in the Legislative Assembly and when such membership itself is suspended for a specific period by a resolution passed by the House, suspension of salaries and other entitlements follows as a consequence. 26. With regard to the disqualification of a Member, as contemplated under Article 190 (4) of the Constitution of India, it is stated in the counter that Article 190(4) speaks about the absence without the permission of the House, but, in this case, the House itself has suspended the members for a period of six months. 27. Hence, the first respondent prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. 28. I have heard Thiru.K.M.Vijayan, the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioners, Thiru.V.Jayaprakash Narayanan, the learned Special Government Pleader for the first respondent and Thiru.A.L.Somayaji, the learned Advocate General as Amicus Curiae. I have also gone through the entire documents available on record including the counter affidavit of the first respondent. 29. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners submits that the entire proceedings are to be set aside on the ground of denial of principles of natural justice. He submits that none of the petitioners was given notice of the alleged breach either at the time of investigation or at the time of enquiry or at the time of recommendations of the alleged breach by the Privileges Committee on 15.03.2013 and 21.03.2013. The above lapse is a clear case for interference by this Court. He submits that none of the petitioners was given notice of the alleged breach either at the time of investigation or at the time of enquiry or at the time of recommendations of the alleged breach by the Privileges Committee on 15.03.2013 and 21.03.2013. The above lapse is a clear case for interference by this Court. He relies on the judgment of this Court reported in: 1. 1994 (2) LW 424 (S.Balasubramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others) 2. 2012 (3) CTC 449 (Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, rep. by its Secretary, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009 and another) and 3. 2007 (3) SCC 184 (Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and others). 30. He further submits that there is no alleged breach of privilege without the same being codified as required under Article 194(3) or by Rules under Article 228 and recourse to British Parliamentary Practice is not permissible pursuant to Constitution's 44th Amendment which did not save the law as stood on 1950 when the Constitution was enacted as per Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. For the same reason, he contends that except as a temporary provision, the reliance on the power of breach of privilege available under British Parliament cannot be relied upon either on the ground that in Britain itself, the said power is diluted or on the ground that the Supreme Court took a view that recourse to British Practice of Parliament is not available in a decision reported in 2010 (6) SCC 133 (Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and others). It is his further contention that the scope of approval is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and cannot travel outside the assembly. He also submits that suspending a member of the Legislative Assembly for six months (for more than 60 days) is ultra-virus of Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India, according to which, if for a period of 60 days, a member of House of Legislature of a State is absent without permission from the House from all meetings, the House may declare his seat vacant. He further submits that denial of salary and the other benefits of a Member is ultra-virus to Article 195 read with the Provision of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951. He further submits that denial of salary and the other benefits of a Member is ultra-virus to Article 195 read with the Provision of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951. He also attacks the impugned order on the ground of violating Article 80(4) and 191 read with the provisions relating to Representation of People's Act, 1951. The learned Senior Counsel concludes his arguments by submitting that whenever a disqualification has to be treated on par with a privilege proceeding under Article 194, the same requires legislation or constitutional sanction. When such an enabling power is not there, no privilege proceeding can be taken against any member in violation of Article 190(4), 191, 195 and 80 respectively, even if such power is construed as an independent power. 31. The learned Special Government Pleader, for the first respondent, per contra, submits that Article 194 (3) of the Constitution of India enshrines that the Legislative Assembly has all powers, privileges and immunities and Article 212 of the Constitution states that the House has powers to regulate its own proceedings and it is the privilege of the house to conduct its internal proceedings within the walls of the house free from interference. He submits that the Assembly and the Privileges Committee acted in exercise of the powers lawfully vested with them and therefore, Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be invoked to quash the proceedings in the absence of any unconstitutionality or illegality. Referring the entire factual aspects which arose on 08.02.2013 and ended on 26.03.2013, he submits that there was no illegality in the proceedings and therefore, the same could not be challenged before this Court. 32. With regard to violation of principles of natural justice, he submits that there is no such violation and in fact opportunity was given to them by receiving their explanations and forwarding them to the Committee. They were also duly represented by their own Member (Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan) in the Privileges Committee. In fact, he also saw the video and identified all the petitioners. Hence according to him, there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice. 33. They were also duly represented by their own Member (Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan) in the Privileges Committee. In fact, he also saw the video and identified all the petitioners. Hence according to him, there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice. 33. Regarding the judgment reported in (2012) 3 CTC 449 (cited supra), he submits that, the benefits, privileges, salary and entitlements of the petitioners are admissible to them only on account of their Membership in the Legislative Assembly and when such membership itself is suspended for a specified period by a resolution passed by the House, the suspension of salary and the other entitlements follows as a sequence. Similarly, he submits that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu payment of Salaries Act and the Representation of People's Act could not be pressed into service to attack the proceedings, as such arguments were already overruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal case (cited supra). 34. With regard to the power of the Privileges Committee, under Article 194 of the Constitution of India, it is submitted that this issue was gone into in detail Raja Ram Pal's case and the Hon'ble Supreme Court repelled such contentions by holding that the Legislatures in India are definitely having the power to even expel a Member leave alone suspending a member. Relying on the very same Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment of Raja Ram Pal's case (cited supra), he submits that disqualification is different from expulsion or suspension and therefore, Article 190(4) could not be relied upon by the writ petitioners to contend that no person could be suspended beyond the period of sixty days. 35. The learned Special Government Pleader further submits that the writ petitioners could not rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2010 (6) SCC 113 (cited supra), as in that case, Thiru. Amarinder Singh was expelled from the Membership of the 13th Assembly of Punjab for alleged improper exemption of vacant plot of land from a developed scheme during his tenure as Chief Minister during the 12th Assembly period. The resolution for his expulsion was held invalid as alleged improper exemption was an administrative act and it would not cause obstruction of legislative proceedings. Therefore, he submits that the law laid down in that case is on different facts and circumstances and it will not support the case of the writ petitioners herein. The resolution for his expulsion was held invalid as alleged improper exemption was an administrative act and it would not cause obstruction of legislative proceedings. Therefore, he submits that the law laid down in that case is on different facts and circumstances and it will not support the case of the writ petitioners herein. 36. While winding up his arguments, he submits that Anandha Vikatan case ( 1994 (2) LW 424 ) (cited supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as in that case, action was taken against a non-member and that action was tested by this Court in the light of violating his fundamental rights. Therefore, he prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. 37. The learned Advocate General, as amicus curiae placed before me all the relevant articles of the Constitution of India and other provisions of the Acts like the Representation of People's Act and Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, etc. and quoted extensively from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2007 (3) SCC 184 and 2012 (3) CTC 449 (cited supra). 38. After placing the entire facts along with the relevant legal aspects, the learned Advocate General assisted the Court in the best possible manner and I place on record the appreciation of this Court of his able and valid assistance. 39. I have considered the rival submissions and the submissions of the amicus curiae carefully. 40. In the light of the above factual aspects and in the light of the arguments advanced, the following questions arise for consideration in this writ petition: a) Whether the entire proceedings are vitiated and are liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice? b) Whether the State Legislature has the power and privilege under Article 194 to suspend the writ petitioners? c) If the answer is affirmative for question number (b) then, whether the writ petitioners could be suspended for more than 60 days in the light of Article 190 (4) of the Constitution of India? d) Whether the privilege is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and Whether it can travel outside the Assembly? c) If the answer is affirmative for question number (b) then, whether the writ petitioners could be suspended for more than 60 days in the light of Article 190 (4) of the Constitution of India? d) Whether the privilege is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and Whether it can travel outside the Assembly? e) Whether the Legislative Assembly has the power to suspend the salary and other benefits of a Member including their right to vote in the Raja Sabha in the capacity of a Member of the Assembly? 41. Now, let me take up the above questions one by one which arose for consideration before this Court: (b) The learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that Article 194 deals with powers, privileges and immunities of State Legislature and their Members. Article 194 (3) states that powers, privileges and immunities of a House of a Legislature of a State and the Members and the Committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Legislature by law and until so defined, shall be those of that House and all its Members and committees immediately before coming into force of Section 26 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. He submits that in so far as Article 194(3) is concerned, even though the word breach of privilege is not coined there, it was originally traced to the power of British Parliament as a temporary provision until appropriate law is made by the Parliament or the State Legislature. The learned senior counsel submits that as on date there is no law codifying the power and breach of privilege under Article 194(3) and the transitory provision taking recourse to British Parliamentary Practice is not now available due to the fact that the Constitution was amended by 42nd Amendment in 1976 and further by 44th Amendment in 1978 substituting the original Article 194(3). The transitory provision of taking recourse to British Parliament Practice is not at all suffered by the 44th Constitutional Amendment as the law stands today, the learned Senior Counsel contends that is due to recourse to Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. The transitory provision of taking recourse to British Parliament Practice is not at all suffered by the 44th Constitutional Amendment as the law stands today, the learned Senior Counsel contends that is due to recourse to Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that there is no alleged breach of privilege without the same being codified as required under Article 194(3), a recourse to British Parliament Practice is not at all permissible pursuant to 44th Amendment to the Constitution which did not save the law as stood on 1950 when the Constitution was enacted as per Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. Further, he contends that the power of breach of privilege available under the British Parliament is no longer available as in Britain itself, the said power itself is very much diluted and therefore, the entire action initiated is illegal and unconstitutional warranting interference by this Court. To support his contention, he relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2010 (6) SCC 113 (Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee Punjab Vidhan Sabha and others). 42. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that Article 208 of the Constitution also does not specify about what conduct would amount to breach and the procedure to punish thereof. Therefore, according to him, until an appropriate law is made by the State Legislature, it is not open to the Assembly to expel or suspend a Member by way of punishment for alleged breach of privilege. 43. I am unable to accept the above submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, as a similar argument was made before the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case (cited supra) but, the majority judgment rejected such argument and held that the Assembly has got power under Article 194(3) to even expel a Member and therefore, the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel in this regard are to be rejected. 44. In this regard, it is appropriate and useful to refer to the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case, which are as follows: "125. We would like to dispose of here itself a small argument put across by learned counsel for the petitioners. 44. In this regard, it is appropriate and useful to refer to the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case, which are as follows: "125. We would like to dispose of here itself a small argument put across by learned counsel for the petitioners. The argument is that the fact that the provisions of Article 105 were amended by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, thereby deleting the reference to the House of Commons with effect from 20.06.1979, the subject of powers and privileges are to be construed and pegged to that date and further that since the House of Commons had not exercised the power of expulsion after 1947, such power, even if it existed in the House of Commons in 1947 has become obsolete and non-existing. While arguing that such power has not been inherited by the Indian Parliament, counsel would also refer to certain recent developments in United Kingdom, in particular Parliamentary Privilege-First Report, published on 30.03.1999, in the wake of which a recommendation has been made that "the Parliament's power to imprison a person whether Member or not, who are in contempt of Parliament should be abolished" and further that, "the power of the House of Lords to suspend its Members should be clarified and confirmed. 126. We are not impressed with any of these arguments. The amendment brought into force in 1979 does not turn the clock ahead. The powers and privileges of the House of Commons of Parliament of the United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India were the powers and privileges available to Parliament before the amendment and that is the package which continues to be available post-amendment. Use of a particular power in 1947 would rather make it closer in terms of time to the crucial date of commencement of the Indian Constitution. Its disuse in later period is of no consequence. In this view, we are also not concerned with subsequent developments." From the above, it is very clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision, clearly held that the power of expulsion is not negated by any of the constitutional or statutory provisions. Its disuse in later period is of no consequence. In this view, we are also not concerned with subsequent developments." From the above, it is very clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision, clearly held that the power of expulsion is not negated by any of the constitutional or statutory provisions. If that being so, when the Assembly has got power under Article 194(3) to even expel a Member, it cannot be said that it has no power at all to suspend a person which is a lesser punishment than the punishment of expulsion. 45. In 2010 (6) SCC 113 (cited supra), it is true that another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that British precedents are to be followed only to the extent compatible with our Constitutional Scheme, as Indian Legislatures are controlled by a written Constitution and therefore, they do not have absolute power of self-composition unlike British House of Commons which is controlled by an un-written Constitution. But, this judgment is not at all in conflict with the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case (cited supra). In fact, even in Raja Ram Pal's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to U.P. Assembly case ( AIR 1965 SC 745 ) which was delivered by a Seven Judges Bench wherein it was held that the findings in the U.P. Assembly case that there are some powers of the British House, which cannot be claimed by the Indian Legislatures, do not mean that the power of expulsion falls in that category. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case made it very clear that in U.P. Assembly case, the Supreme Court was mainly concerned with power claimed by the Legislature to issue a general warrant and claimed conclusive character thereof. There was no challenge in that case to the power to punish for contempt, much less the power to expel. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the ratio of U.P. Assembly case cannot be interpreted to have held that all the powers of the House of Commons enjoyed in its capacity as a Court of record are unavailable to the Indian Parliament, including the power to punish for contempt. The relevant findings in Raja Ram Pal's case could be usefully referred to as follows: "266. The relevant findings in Raja Ram Pal's case could be usefully referred to as follows: "266. Thus, in U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964) the Court was mainly concerned with the power claimed by legislature to issue general warrant and conclusive character thereof. There was no challenge in that case to the power to punish for contempt, much less the power to expel, these issues even otherwise being not inherent in the strict frame of reference made to the Court. 267. Indeed, the thrust of the decision was on the examination of the power to issue unspeaking warrants immune from the review of the courts, and not on the power to deal with contempt itself. A close reading of the case demonstrates that the Court treated the power to punish for contempt as a privilege of the House. Speaking of the legislatures in India, it was stated: (U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964). AIR p.786, para 125) "125. There is no doubt that the House has the power to punish for contempt committed outside its chamber, and from that point of view it may claim one of the rights possessed by a court of record." (emphasis supplied) 268. Speaking of the Judges' power to punish for contempt, the Court observed: (U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964), AIR p.791, para 142) "We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct. We venture to think that what is true of the judicature is equally true of the legislatures." (emphasis supplied) 269. It is evident, therefore, that in the opinion of the Court in U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964), legislatures in India do enjoy the power to punish for contempt. We venture to think that what is true of the judicature is equally true of the legislatures." (emphasis supplied) 269. It is evident, therefore, that in the opinion of the Court in U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964), legislatures in India do enjoy the power to punish for contempt. It is equally clear that while the fact that the House of Commons enjoyed the power to issue unspeaking warrants in its capacity of a court of record was one concern, what actually worried the Court was not the source of the power per se, but the "judicial" nature of power to issue unspeaking warrant insofar as it was directly in conflict with the scheme of the Constitution whereby citizens were guaranteed fundamental rights and the power to enforce the fundamental rights is vested in the courts. It was not the power to punish for contempt about which the Court had reservations. Rather, the abovequoted passage shows that such power had been accepted by the Court. The issue decided concerned the non-reviewability of the warrant issued by the legislature, in the light of various constitutional provisions. 270. Last, but not least, there are many differences between U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964) and the one at hand. The entire controversy in the former case revolved around the privileges of the House in relation to the fundamental rights of a citizen, an outsider to the House. The decision expressly states that the Court was not dealing with internal proceedings, nor laying down law in relation to Members of the House. In the words of the Court: (AIR pp.781 & 790, paras 108 & 141) "The obvious answer to this contention is that we are not dealing with any matter relating to the internal management of the House in the present proceedings. We are dealing with the power of the House to punish citizens for contempt alleged to have been committed by them outside the four walls of the House, and that essentially raises different considerations. We are dealing with the power of the House to punish citizens for contempt alleged to have been committed by them outside the four walls of the House, and that essentially raises different considerations. In conclusion, we ought to add that throughout our discussion we have consistently attempted to make it clear that the main point which we are discussing is the right of the House to claim that a general warrant issued by it in respect of its contempt alleged to have been committed by a citizen who is not a Member of the House outside the four walls of the House, is conclusive, for it is on that claim that the House has chosen to take the view that the Judges, the advocate, and the party have committed contempt by reference to the conduct in the habeas corpus petition pending before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court". (emphasis supplied) 271. In the light of the above, we are of the opinion that the ratio of U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964) which was decided under significantly different circumstances, cannot be interpreted to have held that all the powers of the House of Commons enjoyed in its capacity as a court of record are unavailable to the Indian Parliament, including the power to punish for contempt." 46. In the light of the above, I am of the considered view that the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amarinder Singh's case is not at all helpful to the case of the petitioners herein, because in Amarinder Singh's case, a resolution was passed directing expulsion of a former Chief Minister of Punjab for his alleged conduct of exempting improperly vacant plots of land licensed to a private party from a pool of 187 acres of land notified for acquisition by Amritsar Lands Improvement Trust for a development scheme. Only on the basis of the above facts and circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amarinder Singh's case held that Punjab Vidhan Sabha exceeded its powers by expelling the former Chief Minister on the ground of breach of privilege when there existed none. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that alleged improper exemption of lands was an executive act and that act did not distort, obstruct or threaten the integrity of legislature proceedings in any manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that alleged improper exemption of lands was an executive act and that act did not distort, obstruct or threaten the integrity of legislature proceedings in any manner. Hence, it was held that the action taken under Article 194(3) is not proper and the resolution directing expulsion is constitutionally invalid. Therefore, the law as decided in Amarinder Singh's case is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. 47. In the light of the above, Question No.(b) as referred to above, is answered in the affirmative that the State Legislature has the power and privilege under Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India to suspend the writ petitioners. 48. Question (c): The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that suspending a member of the Legislature Assembly for more than 60 days is ultra-virus of Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India. According to the learned Senior Counsel, disqualification of Members are dealt with under Articles 190 to 193. As per Article 190(4), if for a period of sixty days, a member of a House of the Legislature of a State is without permission of the House absent from all meetings thereof, the House may declare his seat vacant. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that if a member is suspended for more than sixty days, as happened in this case, the seat of the member would become vacant and therefore, any suspension beyond a period of sixty days is ultra-virus to Article 190(4). 49. I am unable to accept this submission also. I am again referring to Raja Ram Pal's case, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the term vacancy, disqualification and expulsion have different meanings and they do not overlap. Disqualification strikes at the very root of the candidate's qualification and renders a member unable to occupy a member seat. Expulsion on the other hand deals with a member who is otherwise qualified, but in the House of the Legislature is unworthy of membership. While disqualification operates to prevent a candidate from re-election, expulsion occurs after the election of the member and there is no power of re-election. As far as the term vacancy is concerned, it is a consequence of the fact that a member cannot continue to hold membership. While disqualification operates to prevent a candidate from re-election, expulsion occurs after the election of the member and there is no power of re-election. As far as the term vacancy is concerned, it is a consequence of the fact that a member cannot continue to hold membership. The reason may be any one of the several possible reasons which prevents the member from continuing membership, for example, disqualification, death or expulsion. 50. In view of the above, I am of the considered view that Article 190(4) has nothing to do with Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India, as under Article 190(4), if a Member is absent without the permission of the House for a period of 60 days from all the meetings thereof, then, the House may declare the seat vacant. Under Article 194(3), the House enjoys powers, privileges and immunities which include the power to punish a person for contempt and the power to expel or suspend a person. When a person is expelled or punished beyond a period of sixty days, it cannot be said that member is absent without the permission of the House for a period of sixty days. When a person is suspended for more than sixty days by the House, it is the House which makes him stay away from all the meetings and the member is not absent without the permission of the House for a period of sixty days as contemplated under Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the argument that suspending a Member for more than 60 days would be ultra-virus to Article 190(4) is far-fetched and misconceived. Therefore, it is to be held that the State Legislature has power and privilege to suspend a member for more than sixty days and it does not in any way offend Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India. 51. Questions (d) and (e): According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that denial of salary and other consequential benefits to the writ petitioners highlights Article 195 and Section 12 and Section 12A of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act. The learned Senior Counsel contends that by a proceeding under privilege of breach, there is no enabling power to deny salary and other benefits of a member. The learned Senior Counsel contends that by a proceeding under privilege of breach, there is no enabling power to deny salary and other benefits of a member. For making the above submission, the learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1980 SC 2147 (para 72(1) (Maru Ram and others Vs. Union of India and others). 52. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that the impugned proceedings are ultra-virus to Article 80(4) and 191 read with the provisions relating to the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners have a right to choose a member of Rajya Sabha in their capacity as member of Legislative Assembly. Rajya Sabha Elections are contemplated in July, 2013 and the petitioners have a right to elect a member of their choice in the elections. However, the impugned proceedings taken under the pretext of breach of privilege, impair the right to vote for the Rajya Sabha and therefore, on this ground, the impugned proceeds are liable to be set aside. 53. I am unable to accept this submission also. Provisions relating to salary, etc. of an expelled or a suspended member came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case. In that case also, it was contended that the provisions in the Constitution relating to salary and the term for which they serve in the House are the constitutional rights of the members and the power of expulsion by terminating their membership violates these constitutional rights. The relevant provisions are, Article 106 on the subjects of salary and Article 83(2) in relation to the duration of the House of Parliament. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the argument by holding that they are not constitutional rights and therefore, it cannot be contended that provisions relating to salaries and duration of the House would have supremacy over the power of expulsion of the House. The following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court could be usefully referred to in this regard. "154. Similar arguments were made in K.Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secy., Govt. of Madras. In that case, certain Members of Parliament were detained by the Government of Madras and one of the grounds on which they challenged their detention was the violation of their constitutional rights. "154. Similar arguments were made in K.Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secy., Govt. of Madras. In that case, certain Members of Parliament were detained by the Government of Madras and one of the grounds on which they challenged their detention was the violation of their constitutional rights. In support of this contention, the petitioners relied on various provisions relating to Members and proceedings of Parliament including Articles 79, 85, 86 and 100. They claimed that they continued to exercise all the "constitutional rights" that flow from membership unless the member is disqualified. The contention was that: (AIR p.662, para 11) "If a Member of Parliament incurs a disqualification, he may cease to be such Member, but if he continues to be qualified to be a Member, his constitutional rights cannot be taken away by any law or order". This Court rejected this argument holding that (AIR p.664, para 18) "...they are not constitutional rights in the strict sense, and quite clearly, they are not fundamental rights at all". (emphasis supplied) 155. Although this case involved detention and the arrest of the Members of Parliament, which are matters relating to a field distinct from that of the rights claimed in the cases at hand, we are of the view that the logic in the case applies equally to the present situation. In this case certain provisions regarding Members and their functioning within Parliament were held not to create independent rights which could be given supremacy over a legal detention. Similarly, in the present case, where there is a lawful expulsion, the Members cannot claim that the provisions relating to salaries and duration of the House create such rights for the Members that would have supremacy over the power of expulsion of the House. 156. With specific reference to the power of expulsion, a similar argument with respect to the duration of the Legislative Assembly of a State was rejected by the Madras High Court in K.Anbazhagan. The High Court rightly held that such a provision could not negate the power of expulsion. It stated: (AIR p.303, para 73) "Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because Article 172 provided for a period of five years to be the duration of the Legislative Assembly each member must necessarily continue to be a Member for five years irrespective of the other provisions of the Constitution". 157. It stated: (AIR p.303, para 73) "Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because Article 172 provided for a period of five years to be the duration of the Legislative Assembly each member must necessarily continue to be a Member for five years irrespective of the other provisions of the Constitution". 157. As far as the provision for the duration of the House is concerned, it simply states that the normal duration of a House is to be five years. It cannot be interpreted to mean that it guarantees to the Members a term of five years. The respondents have correctly pointed out that a Member does not enjoy the full five-year term under various circumstances; for example when he or she is elected mid-term, when the term of the House is cut short by dissolution, when the Member stands disqualified or the seat is rendered vacant. We find that a correct view in this regard has been taken in K.Anbazhagan in line with the view expressed by this Court in K.Anandan Nambiar. If the provisions mentioned by the petitioners were actually to create rights in respect of Members, then each of the above situations would be liable to be challenged for their violation. This quite obviously is not what is intended by the Constitution. Expulsion is only an additional cause for the shortening of a term of a Member. 158. Further, as far as the provision relating to the salary of the Member is concerned, it is quite absurd to claim that because the Constitution makes a provision for salaries, the power of the House to expel is negated since the result would be that the Member would no longer be paid. Salaries are obviously dependent upon membership, and the continuation of membership is an independent matter altogether. The termination of membership can occur for a variety of reasons and this is at no point controlled by the fact that salaries are required to be paid to a Member. 159. Thus, in our view, the above provisions do not negate the power of expulsion of the House, and there is no inconsistency between the House's power of expulsion and the said provisions. (iii) The right of the constituency to be represented and the right to vote." 54. 159. Thus, in our view, the above provisions do not negate the power of expulsion of the House, and there is no inconsistency between the House's power of expulsion and the said provisions. (iii) The right of the constituency to be represented and the right to vote." 54. In 2012 (3) CTC 449 (cited supra), identical question arose for consideration before this Court and this Court in the above judgment held that placing an elected member under suspension is the cause and all other things are its consequences. After referring to Raja Ram Pal's case, the learned Judge who decided Vijayakant's case held that an elected member who is de-barred by virtue of an order of suspension from discharging his duties and functions, may have to suffer all the consequences that go with the office. Therefore, the argument that the impugned proceedings violate Article 195 and Sections 12 and 12(A) of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act are untenable and unacceptable. 55. Similarly, the reliance placed on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1980 SC 2147 (Para-72) is also not applicable to the facts of the present case and therefore, the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-72 of the above judgment are not useful to the case of the writ petitioners herein. 56. Similarly, contending that the impugned proceedings are ultra-virus to Article 80(4) and 191 read with provisions relating to Representation of People's Act, 1951, is also not acceptable for the simple reason that placing a member under suspension is the cause and all other things are its consequences. Once it is held that the House has the power and privilege to expel or suspend a member for committing breach, then, it is for the house to decide what would be the punishment that should be given to the member. Once a punishment is given and a resolution is passed thereafter and there is no violation of any constitutional and fundamental rights affecting the person who is to be suspended, then he / she has to face the consequences including the denial of salary, attending the House, function as a member of the House, etc. Once a punishment is given and a resolution is passed thereafter and there is no violation of any constitutional and fundamental rights affecting the person who is to be suspended, then he / she has to face the consequences including the denial of salary, attending the House, function as a member of the House, etc. Once a Member is suspended for a period and during the period, if any intervening circumstances arise, then, as a suspended member, he is not entitled to participate in those events in his capacity as a member of the House. Denial of salary and the other privileges like voting in an election are not constitutional rights nor the fundamental rights and in such circumstances, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that as these rights are affected, the impugned proceedings are violated and are liable to be set aside. Therefore, the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners in this regard are rejected. Judgment :- This writ petition has been filed by six Members of the Legislative Assembly, who were elected to their respective constituencies from the DMDK Political party. The first petitioner is the whip of the DMDK Political party which is the Opposition Party in the Legislature. 2. The case of the writ petitioners as stated in the affidavit is as follows: There are 29 Members in the Legislature of the Assembly belonging to the DMDK Political Party. However, four of the Members without resigning from the party or the post of Legislature, remained as disaffected Members of the party and they started behaving independently with an intention to cause split in the DMDK Party. 3. On 08.03.2013 certain incident took place in the meeting of the Assembly. Though the alleged incident took place due to the provocation of not only the above said four Members, viz., Tamil Alagan, Michael Royappan, R.Sundar Rajan and Arun Pandiyan of the DMDK party (who are alleged to act with an intention to cause split), but, also from the AIADMK Members who forcibly participated in the above incident in support of the above said four Members. The Speaker of the Assembly considering the incident as an alleged breach of privilege, referred the matter under Rule 226 to the Privilege Committee to investigate and report not only the incident of the Members involving the writ petitioners, but also, against all such persons whoever behaved like that. The Speaker of the Assembly considering the incident as an alleged breach of privilege, referred the matter under Rule 226 to the Privilege Committee to investigate and report not only the incident of the Members involving the writ petitioners, but also, against all such persons whoever behaved like that. However, the proceedings and recommendations of the Privilege Committee dated 21.03.2013 was deliberately restricted to the petitioners only without examining the video footage completely and without taking into consideration the statements of the other members of the Privilege Committee. According to the writ petitioners, the proceedings of the Privilege Committee dated 15.03.2013 and 21.03.2013 which culminated into the report of the Chairman, dated 21.03.2013 are one-sided, arbitrary and erroneous. 4. It is the case of the writ petitioners that none of them was issued with a notice of the alleged breach of the privilege by the Privilege Committee before making an enquiry, investigation and submission of report under Rule 229. When principles of natural justice are given a go-by, then, the judicial review of the Privilege proceedings are very much available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the writ petitioners, the case reported in 2012 (3) CTC 449 (Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, rep. by its Secretary, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009, 2.The Hon'ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009), which deals with a similar incident involving their Party Leader, Mr.Vijayakanth stands on a different footing, as in that case, a notice was given to appear before the Privileges Committee, whereas none of the petitioners herein was issued with a similar notice from the Privileges Committee, asking them to furnish their representation against the alleged breach of privilege. Therefore, according to the writ petitioners, the writ petition is to be allowed on the ground of violation of principles of Natural Justice alone. 5. It is the further contention of the writ petitioners that the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside in consonance with Article 194 read with Rules made under Article 208 of the Constitution of India, as they restrict the scope of the proceedings only to the four walls of the Legislature and not beyond the same. 5. It is the further contention of the writ petitioners that the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside in consonance with Article 194 read with Rules made under Article 208 of the Constitution of India, as they restrict the scope of the proceedings only to the four walls of the Legislature and not beyond the same. However, the impugned proceedings punishing the petitioners herein for the alleged breach of privilege inside the house for their other functioning outside the House like the statutory benefits available to them under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951 and the rules framed there under including the provision under the Representation of People's Act, 1951. 6. The petitioners contend that suspending them for a period of one year on 25.03.2013 which was subsequently modified as six months on 26.03.2013 is ultra-virus to Article 190 of the Constitution of India. According to them, Article 190 deals with disqualification of a Member and vacation of his/her seat. Article 190(3) states that either on disqualification or on resignation with the permission of the Chairman, the seat will become vacant. Article 190(4) states that if for a period of sixty days, a Member of a House of Legislature of the State is without permission of the House, absent from all meetings thereon, the House may declare the seat vacant. In the present case, the petitioners were originally suspended for a period of one year from 25.03.2013 and subsequently for a period of six months. Since Article 190 dis-qualifies a Member of the Assembly for more than sixty days, both under six months suspension as well as one year suspension, there is an inherent restriction on the power of suspending the Member beyond sixty days. 7. The petitioners relying on the decision of the Apex Court in P.V.Narasimha Rao's case and Amarinder Singh Vs. Punjab Vidhan Sabha ( 2010 (6) SCC 113 ) and Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker ( 2007 (3) SCC 184 ) contend that the punishment of taking away the salary and allowance is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. 8. Hence, they prayed for an issue of a Writ of Declaration to declare that the entire proceedings are illegal and unconstitutional. 9. Notice was ordered by this Court to both the respondents herein. Hon'ble Speaker ( 2007 (3) SCC 184 ) contend that the punishment of taking away the salary and allowance is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. 8. Hence, they prayed for an issue of a Writ of Declaration to declare that the entire proceedings are illegal and unconstitutional. 9. Notice was ordered by this Court to both the respondents herein. Notice was served on the first respondent and the notice sent to the second respondent was returned as refused. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the first respondent and since the notice sent to the second respondent was returned as refused, this Court requested Mr. A.L.Somayaji, the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu to act as a Amicus Curiae in this matter. 10. A counter affidavit has been filed by the Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Secretariat, the first respondent herein. 11. In the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary, it is stated that the writ petition itself is not maintainable as what is sought for is the intervention in the internal affairs of the State Legislative Assembly, of which, the Privileges Committee is a part. Referring to Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India, it is stated that the Legislative Assembly has all the powers, privileges and immunities by the British House of Commons at the time of commencement of the Constitution. Further, under Article 212 of the Constitution, the House has powers to regulate its own proceedings and it is the privilege of the House to conduct its internal proceedings within the four walls of the House free from interference including its right to impose disciplinary measures against its Members for assault and disorderly conduct, as they constitute breach of privilege and contempt of the House. The Assembly proceeded against its Members for interfering in the discharge of duties by a Fellow Member of their Party by intimidation and assault and for bringing the House into dis-respect. Hence, according to the first respondent, the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. It is stated by the first respondent that on 08.02.2013, during Question Hour, Thiru.K.Tamilalagan, M.L.A. of the DMDK Party representing the Thittakudi (SC) Constituency was permitted by the Hon'ble Speaker to ask a supplementary question. Thiru.K.Tamilalagan thanked for the welfare measures being implemented in his constituency following his meeting with the Hon'ble Chief Minister. 12. It is stated by the first respondent that on 08.02.2013, during Question Hour, Thiru.K.Tamilalagan, M.L.A. of the DMDK Party representing the Thittakudi (SC) Constituency was permitted by the Hon'ble Speaker to ask a supplementary question. Thiru.K.Tamilalagan thanked for the welfare measures being implemented in his constituency following his meeting with the Hon'ble Chief Minister. Objecting to his statement, Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the Whip of the DMDK Party, the first writ petitioner herein and many other M.L.A.s' of the same party left their seats furiously and simultaneously rushed towards Thiru.K.Tamilalagan in a threatening mood shouting at him, using derogatory words so as to prevent him from proceeding further. Despite the repeated advice of the Hon'ble Speaker not to speak directly to the Member and return to their seats, many DMDK Members ignoring the warnings of the Hon'ble Speaker, left in Block VI of the Assembly and proceeded enmasse to Block V to attack Thiru.K.Tamilalagan with an intention to prevent him from continuing his speech. When Thiru.C.Michael Royappan, a DMDK Member who was seated in the first row in Block V, in which, Thiru.K.Tamilalagan has also been allotted a seat, intervened and tried to pacify them, the DMDK Members surrounded Thiru.C.Michael Royappan and assaulted him. In order to restore order and to prevent further scuffle and pandemonium in the House and the continuous surcharged atmosphere in the House, the Hon'ble Speaker ordered eviction of the DMDK Members who were involved in the clash and accordingly, they were evicted by the Watch and Ward Staff. 13. According to the first respondent, the incident of assault happened during sitting of the House within the view and knowledge of the members, the Press, the Media covering the proceedings, the Officials and the persons in the Visitors Galleries. The Hon'ble Leader brought this incident to the notice of the House and stated that it was a shameful incident and requested the Hon'ble Speaker to subject Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner and all other Members, who involved in the disorderly and barbaric assault, to stringent punishment so as to prevent recurrence of such incidents in future. 14. It is further submitted that the DMDK Members are seated in Block V and Block VI i.e. the left side of the Speaker's Stage. 14. It is further submitted that the DMDK Members are seated in Block V and Block VI i.e. the left side of the Speaker's Stage. From whatever he saw, the Hon'ble Speaker recalled the names of Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner, Thiru.V.Parthasarathy, the second writ petitioner, Thiru.L.Venkatesan, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan, Thiru.C.H.Sekar and Thiru.Muthukumar and stated that the action indulged in by these DMDK Members was against the decorum and decency of the House. He announced in the House itself that he was referring the issue to the Privileges Committee under Article 226 of the Assembly Rules in order to identify from the video recording of the scene, all those who were indulged in such action and for suitable action. 15. After the issue was referred to the Privileges Committee on 08.02.2013, later in the very same day, Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner and 21 other DMDK M.L.A.s submitted a written explanation to the Hon'ble Speaker regarding the incident. In their letter, they alleged that DMDK members Thiru.C.Michael Royappan, Thiru.R.Sundar Rajan and Thiru.R.Arun Pandiyan berated them and they were also abused by some Members from the ruling AIADMK party. They further stated that Thiru.C.Michael Royappan forcefully punched Thiru.D.Murugesan, the third writ petitioner on the chest and pulled his shirt and threatened him of murder. The 22 DMDK Members requested the Hon'ble Speaker to take action against the above said Members. 16. Thiru. C.Michael Royappan has also on the same day given an explanation to the Hon'ble Speaker narrating his version of the event. He alleged that when Thiru.K.Tamilalagan was asking a supplementary question, several colleagues of his party shouted at him and tried to engage him in a loud altercation. They also moved towards him and tried to attack him. As he was seated before Thiru.K.Tamilalagan, he tried to stop them and Thiru.D.Murugesan, the third writ petitioner advanced menacingly and tried to attack and push him down. Further, he alleged that Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner, S.Senthil Kumar, the 5th writ petitioner, Thiru.B.Parthasarathy, the second writ petitioner, Thiru.R.Arulselvan, the 6th writ petitioner, Thiru.V.Muthukumar, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan and Thiru.K.Nallathambi, the 4th writ petitioner surrounded, assaulted and pushed him down. They also abused him in indecent language and extended murderous threats. Thiru.C.Michael Royappan requested the Hon'ble Speaker to take action against those Members. 17. They also abused him in indecent language and extended murderous threats. Thiru.C.Michael Royappan requested the Hon'ble Speaker to take action against those Members. 17. As the issue was already referred to the Privileges Committee of the House, the Hon'ble Speaker forwarded the written explanations to the Committee along with the video clipping of the scene of assault. As per Rule 227 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, the Privileges Committee was elected according to the Principle of proportional Representation by means of a single transferable vote. The Hon'ble Deputy Speaker of the State Assembly is Ex-officio, the Chairman of the Committee. The Committee consists of members belonging to the Ruling AIADMK Party and members of Opposition Parties like the DMDK, the DMK, the CPI(M), the CPI and the Indian National Congress. The leader of the Opposition belonging to the DMDK Party is also an ex-officio member of the Committee. Thiru.S.R.Parthiban of the DMDK, who is a signatory to the explanation submitted by the first writ petitioner, is incidentally a Member of the Privileges Committee. 18. It is stated that the Privileges Committee had its first sitting on 15.03.2013 and all the members including Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan of the DMDK saw the video clipping of the assault and went through the explanations of Thiru.V.C.Chandhirakumar and Thiru.C.Michael Royappan forwarded by the Hon'ble Speaker. After detailed discussions, the Committee by majority decision concluded that six DMDK M.L.A.s, the writ petitioners herein, committed breach of privilege and contempt of the House by obstructing a member from discharging his duties as an M.L.A. inside the House and for attacking a fellow member who tried to pacify them. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the six M.L.A.s of the DMDK Party are to be suspended from the service of the Assembly for a period of one year and during that period, they are ineligible to receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or entitlements admissible to them as the Members of the Legislative Assembly. In the draft report containing the above recommendation, the same was considered by the Committee during its second sitting on 21.03.2013 and the report was adopted by the Committee on the same day. The Committee authorised the Chairman to sign and present the report to the House on its behalf. 19. In the draft report containing the above recommendation, the same was considered by the Committee during its second sitting on 21.03.2013 and the report was adopted by the Committee on the same day. The Committee authorised the Chairman to sign and present the report to the House on its behalf. 19. It is stated by the first respondent that as per Rule 229(a) of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, the report was presented to the Assembly by the Chairman of the Committee on 25.03.2013. As per Rule 229(b), the Hon'ble Leader of the House moved a motion that the report be taken into consideration and the motion was put to vote of the House and was carried out. As per Rule 229(d), the Leader of the House moved a motion that the House agrees with the recommendations contained in the report of the Privileges Committee. The motion was put to vote of the House and the House resolved to accept the recommendations contained in the report. Consequently, the Hon'ble Speaker announced that as per the resolutions passed by the Assembly, the six writ petitioners herein, belonging to the DMDK Party, were being suspended from the service of the Assembly for a period of one year and during such period, they would be ineligible to receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or entitlements admissible to them as Members of Legislative Assembly. 20. It is further stated that on 26.03.2013, the leaders of the parties spoke in the Assembly, acknowledging the right of the Privileges Committee and requested for remission of the quantum of punishment. The Hon'ble Chief Minister intervened and recommended that keeping in view the request of the Opposition Party members, the period of punishment awarded to the DMDK Members may be reduced to six months. The Hon'ble Leader of the House moved a resolution that the six writ petitioners be suspended for a period of six months and that they may be made ineligible to receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or entitlements admissible to them as Members of Legislative Assembly during such period. This resolution was put to the vote of the House and carried. 21. This resolution was put to the vote of the House and carried. 21. The first respondent having narrated the factual aspects as above in the counter affidavit, further states that the incident of intimidation and attempt to physical attack on Thiru.A.Tamilalagan is a direct negation of the freedom of speech inside the House guaranteed by the Constitution under Article 194(1). This attempt and the subsequent assaults on Thiru.C.Michael Royappan created a ruckus inside the Assembly and disrupted the smooth practice of the Question Hour on 08.02.2013. As the assault happened in full view of the House, an incident is never in doubt, but, only the identity of each one of the perpetrators of the attack was in question. The House could have immediately proceeded against the Members who took part in the assault by passing a resolution extending such punishment. However, as so many members simultaneously rushed towards Thiru.K.Tamilalagan and surrounded and attacked Thiru.C.Michael Royappan, the Hon'ble Speaker and others sitting on the Treasury Benches who were the eye-witnesses for the incident could not pin-point beyond reasonable doubt the identity of each one of the Members in such a melee. Though the Hon'ble Speaker initially named a few members, in the interest of natural justice and with good intention, the Hon'ble Speaker exercised his powers under Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules and referred the issue to the Privileges Committee for ascertaining from the video clipping of the scene, the identity of all those members who took part in the enraged action and for recommending disciplinary and penal action thereon. 22. On the very same day, after the session was over, the first writ petitioner, who is the Whip of the DMDK Legislative Party, gave a written explanation on the incident of assault to the Hon'ble Speaker in person which was counter signed by 21 other DMDK Members. Similarly, Thiru.C.Michael Royappan gave an explanation regarding the incident of assault to the Hon'ble Speaker on the same day. Both these two explanations were forwarded to the Privileges Committee. Similarly, Thiru.C.Michael Royappan gave an explanation regarding the incident of assault to the Hon'ble Speaker on the same day. Both these two explanations were forwarded to the Privileges Committee. Therefore, according to the first respondent, the scope and ambit of the Privileges Committee's examination was not to trace the entire discussion in the Assembly that happened on 08.02.2013 or to investigate such incident happened or not or to find out the reason which made the DMDK Members to leave their seats to engage in a physical attack, but, it was limited only to ascertaining the identity of the members who actually took part in the unruly behaviour in the light of the videographed evidence of the footage and the contents of the two written explanations voluntarily submitted by the DMDK Members. Therefore, what has been done by the Hon'ble Speaker is as per Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules and therefore, the same cannot be questioned by the writ petitioners. 23. In so far as the grounds raised by the writ petitioners like violation of principles of natural justice, violation of their right to receive salary, negation of fundamental rights, etc., are concerned the first respondent submits that these issues were already decided by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of judgments and therefore, those grounds do not support the case of the writ petitioners herein. 24. With regard to the non-issue of notice of the alleged breach of privilege by the Committee before enquiry investigation and submission of report, it is stated that the principles of natural justice are not immutable, but are flexible. They cannot be case in a rigid mould and put in a straight jacket and the compliance therewith has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. According to the first respondent, in the light of the above facts and circumstances, the need for sending Notice from the Committee did not arise at all. As written explanations were submitted by DMDK members voluntarily giving their version of the event, they have pre-empted the Privileges Committee from issuing notice to them. Further, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan who was one of the signatories to the written explanation submitted on 08.02.2013, was a Member in the Privileges Committee apart from the Leader of the Opposition belonging to DMDK party who is an ex-officio member. Further, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan who was one of the signatories to the written explanation submitted on 08.02.2013, was a Member in the Privileges Committee apart from the Leader of the Opposition belonging to DMDK party who is an ex-officio member. Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan participated in the meeting and saw the video footage and he was given full opportunity to give explanation and arguments. Further, Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan identified his party members in the video footage and his views were recorded in the proceedings of the Committee. Therefore, it is submitted by the first respondent that it cannot be said that the basic principles of natural justice are violated in this case. 25. It is further stated that the Legislatures in India possess the powers and privileges of the British House of Commerce as available at the time of the commencement of the Constitution under Article 194 and therefore, they have the right to punish the members and others for breach of privilege and contempt and the result of such punishment may extend beyond the four walls of the Legislature and may not be limited to suspension, but, may even extend the commitment to prison. It is further stated that the benefits, privileges, salary and entitlement of the petitioners are admissible to them only on account of their membership in the Legislative Assembly and when such membership itself is suspended for a specific period by a resolution passed by the House, suspension of salaries and other entitlements follows as a consequence. 26. With regard to the disqualification of a Member, as contemplated under Article 190 (4) of the Constitution of India, it is stated in the counter that Article 190(4) speaks about the absence without the permission of the House, but, in this case, the House itself has suspended the members for a period of six months. 27. Hence, the first respondent prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. 28. I have heard Thiru.K.M.Vijayan, the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioners, Thiru.V.Jayaprakash Narayanan, the learned Special Government Pleader for the first respondent and Thiru.A.L.Somayaji, the learned Advocate General as Amicus Curiae. I have also gone through the entire documents available on record including the counter affidavit of the first respondent. 29. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners submits that the entire proceedings are to be set aside on the ground of denial of principles of natural justice. I have also gone through the entire documents available on record including the counter affidavit of the first respondent. 29. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners submits that the entire proceedings are to be set aside on the ground of denial of principles of natural justice. He submits that none of the petitioners was given notice of the alleged breach either at the time of investigation or at the time of enquiry or at the time of recommendations of the alleged breach by the Privileges Committee on 15.03.2013 and 21.03.2013. The above lapse is a clear case for interference by this Court. He relies on the judgment of this Court reported in: 1. 1994 (2) LW 424 (S.Balasubramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others) 2. 2012 (3) CTC 449 (Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, rep. by its Secretary, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009 and another) and 3. 2007 (3) SCC 184 (Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and others). 30. He further submits that there is no alleged breach of privilege without the same being codified as required under Article 194(3) or by Rules under Article 228 and recourse to British Parliamentary Practice is not permissible pursuant to Constitution's 44th Amendment which did not save the law as stood on 1950 when the Constitution was enacted as per Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. For the same reason, he contends that except as a temporary provision, the reliance on the power of breach of privilege available under British Parliament cannot be relied upon either on the ground that in Britain itself, the said power is diluted or on the ground that the Supreme Court took a view that recourse to British Practice of Parliament is not available in a decision reported in 2010 (6) SCC 133 (Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and others). It is his further contention that the scope of approval is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and cannot travel outside the assembly. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and others). It is his further contention that the scope of approval is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and cannot travel outside the assembly. He also submits that suspending a member of the Legislative Assembly for six months (for more than 60 days) is ultra-virus of Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India, according to which, if for a period of 60 days, a member of House of Legislature of a State is absent without permission from the House from all meetings, the House may declare his seat vacant. He further submits that denial of salary and the other benefits of a Member is ultra-virus to Article 195 read with the Provision of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951. He also attacks the impugned order on the ground of violating Article 80(4) and 191 read with the provisions relating to Representation of People's Act, 1951. The learned Senior Counsel concludes his arguments by submitting that whenever a disqualification has to be treated on par with a privilege proceeding under Article 194, the same requires legislation or constitutional sanction. When such an enabling power is not there, no privilege proceeding can be taken against any member in violation of Article 190(4), 191, 195 and 80 respectively, even if such power is construed as an independent power. 31. The learned Special Government Pleader, for the first respondent, per contra, submits that Article 194 (3) of the Constitution of India enshrines that the Legislative Assembly has all powers, privileges and immunities and Article 212 of the Constitution states that the House has powers to regulate its own proceedings and it is the privilege of the house to conduct its internal proceedings within the walls of the house free from interference. He submits that the Assembly and the Privileges Committee acted in exercise of the powers lawfully vested with them and therefore, Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be invoked to quash the proceedings in the absence of any unconstitutionality or illegality. Referring the entire factual aspects which arose on 08.02.2013 and ended on 26.03.2013, he submits that there was no illegality in the proceedings and therefore, the same could not be challenged before this Court. 32. Referring the entire factual aspects which arose on 08.02.2013 and ended on 26.03.2013, he submits that there was no illegality in the proceedings and therefore, the same could not be challenged before this Court. 32. With regard to violation of principles of natural justice, he submits that there is no such violation and in fact opportunity was given to them by receiving their explanations and forwarding them to the Committee. They were also duly represented by their own Member (Thiru.S.R.Parthibhan) in the Privileges Committee. In fact, he also saw the video and identified all the petitioners. Hence according to him, there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice. 33. Regarding the judgment reported in (2012) 3 CTC 449 (cited supra), he submits that, the benefits, privileges, salary and entitlements of the petitioners are admissible to them only on account of their Membership in the Legislative Assembly and when such membership itself is suspended for a specified period by a resolution passed by the House, the suspension of salary and the other entitlements follows as a sequence. Similarly, he submits that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu payment of Salaries Act and the Representation of People's Act could not be pressed into service to attack the proceedings, as such arguments were already overruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal case (cited supra). 34. With regard to the power of the Privileges Committee, under Article 194 of the Constitution of India, it is submitted that this issue was gone into in detail Raja Ram Pal's case and the Hon'ble Supreme Court repelled such contentions by holding that the Legislatures in India are definitely having the power to even expel a Member leave alone suspending a member. Relying on the very same Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment of Raja Ram Pal's case (cited supra), he submits that disqualification is different from expulsion or suspension and therefore, Article 190(4) could not be relied upon by the writ petitioners to contend that no person could be suspended beyond the period of sixty days. 35. The learned Special Government Pleader further submits that the writ petitioners could not rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2010 (6) SCC 113 (cited supra), as in that case, Thiru. 35. The learned Special Government Pleader further submits that the writ petitioners could not rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2010 (6) SCC 113 (cited supra), as in that case, Thiru. Amarinder Singh was expelled from the Membership of the 13th Assembly of Punjab for alleged improper exemption of vacant plot of land from a developed scheme during his tenure as Chief Minister during the 12th Assembly period. The resolution for his expulsion was held invalid as alleged improper exemption was an administrative act and it would not cause obstruction of legislative proceedings. Therefore, he submits that the law laid down in that case is on different facts and circumstances and it will not support the case of the writ petitioners herein. 36. While winding up his arguments, he submits that Anandha Vikatan case ( 1994 (2) LW 424 ) (cited supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as in that case, action was taken against a non-member and that action was tested by this Court in the light of violating his fundamental rights. Therefore, he prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. 37. The learned Advocate General, as amicus curiae placed before me all the relevant articles of the Constitution of India and other provisions of the Acts like the Representation of People's Act and Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, etc. and quoted extensively from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2007 (3) SCC 184 and 2012 (3) CTC 449 (cited supra). 38. After placing the entire facts along with the relevant legal aspects, the learned Advocate General assisted the Court in the best possible manner and I place on record the appreciation of this Court of his able and valid assistance. 39. I have considered the rival submissions and the submissions of the amicus curiae carefully. 40. In the light of the above factual aspects and in the light of the arguments advanced, the following questions arise for consideration in this writ petition: a) Whether the entire proceedings are vitiated and are liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice? b) Whether the State Legislature has the power and privilege under Article 194 to suspend the writ petitioners? b) Whether the State Legislature has the power and privilege under Article 194 to suspend the writ petitioners? c) If the answer is affirmative for question number (b) then, whether the writ petitioners could be suspended for more than 60 days in the light of Article 190 (4) of the Constitution of India? d) Whether the privilege is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and Whether it can travel outside the Assembly? e) Whether the Legislative Assembly has the power to suspend the salary and other benefits of a Member including their right to vote in the Raja Sabha in the capacity of a Member of the Assembly? 41. Now, let me take up the above questions one by one which arose for consideration before this Court: (b) The learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that Article 194 deals with powers, privileges and immunities of State Legislature and their Members. Article 194 (3) states that powers, privileges and immunities of a House of a Legislature of a State and the Members and the Committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Legislature by law and until so defined, shall be those of that House and all its Members and committees immediately before coming into force of Section 26 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. He submits that in so far as Article 194(3) is concerned, even though the word breach of privilege is not coined there, it was originally traced to the power of British Parliament as a temporary provision until appropriate law is made by the Parliament or the State Legislature. The learned senior counsel submits that as on date there is no law codifying the power and breach of privilege under Article 194(3) and the transitory provision taking recourse to British Parliamentary Practice is not now available due to the fact that the Constitution was amended by 42nd Amendment in 1976 and further by 44th Amendment in 1978 substituting the original Article 194(3). The transitory provision of taking recourse to British Parliament Practice is not at all suffered by the 44th Constitutional Amendment as the law stands today, the learned Senior Counsel contends that is due to recourse to Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. The transitory provision of taking recourse to British Parliament Practice is not at all suffered by the 44th Constitutional Amendment as the law stands today, the learned Senior Counsel contends that is due to recourse to Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that there is no alleged breach of privilege without the same being codified as required under Article 194(3), a recourse to British Parliament Practice is not at all permissible pursuant to 44th Amendment to the Constitution which did not save the law as stood on 1950 when the Constitution was enacted as per Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. Further, he contends that the power of breach of privilege available under the British Parliament is no longer available as in Britain itself, the said power itself is very much diluted and therefore, the entire action initiated is illegal and unconstitutional warranting interference by this Court. To support his contention, he relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2010 (6) SCC 113 (Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee Punjab Vidhan Sabha and others). 42. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that Article 208 of the Constitution also does not specify about what conduct would amount to breach and the procedure to punish thereof. Therefore, according to him, until an appropriate law is made by the State Legislature, it is not open to the Assembly to expel or suspend a Member by way of punishment for alleged breach of privilege. 43. I am unable to accept the above submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, as a similar argument was made before the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case (cited supra) but, the majority judgment rejected such argument and held that the Assembly has got power under Article 194(3) to even expel a Member and therefore, the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel in this regard are to be rejected. 44. In this regard, it is appropriate and useful to refer to the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case, which are as follows: "125. We would like to dispose of here itself a small argument put across by learned counsel for the petitioners. 44. In this regard, it is appropriate and useful to refer to the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case, which are as follows: "125. We would like to dispose of here itself a small argument put across by learned counsel for the petitioners. The argument is that the fact that the provisions of Article 105 were amended by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, thereby deleting the reference to the House of Commons with effect from 20.06.1979, the subject of powers and privileges are to be construed and pegged to that date and further that since the House of Commons had not exercised the power of expulsion after 1947, such power, even if it existed in the House of Commons in 1947 has become obsolete and non-existing. While arguing that such power has not been inherited by the Indian Parliament, counsel would also refer to certain recent developments in United Kingdom, in particular Parliamentary Privilege-First Report, published on 30.03.1999, in the wake of which a recommendation has been made that "the Parliament's power to imprison a person whether Member or not, who are in contempt of Parliament should be abolished" and further that, "the power of the House of Lords to suspend its Members should be clarified and confirmed. 126. We are not impressed with any of these arguments. The amendment brought into force in 1979 does not turn the clock ahead. The powers and privileges of the House of Commons of Parliament of the United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India were the powers and privileges available to Parliament before the amendment and that is the package which continues to be available post-amendment. Use of a particular power in 1947 would rather make it closer in terms of time to the crucial date of commencement of the Indian Constitution. Its disuse in later period is of no consequence. In this view, we are also not concerned with subsequent developments." From the above, it is very clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision, clearly held that the power of expulsion is not negated by any of the constitutional or statutory provisions. Its disuse in later period is of no consequence. In this view, we are also not concerned with subsequent developments." From the above, it is very clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision, clearly held that the power of expulsion is not negated by any of the constitutional or statutory provisions. If that being so, when the Assembly has got power under Article 194(3) to even expel a Member, it cannot be said that it has no power at all to suspend a person which is a lesser punishment than the punishment of expulsion. 45. In 2010 (6) SCC 113 (cited supra), it is true that another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that British precedents are to be followed only to the extent compatible with our Constitutional Scheme, as Indian Legislatures are controlled by a written Constitution and therefore, they do not have absolute power of self-composition unlike British House of Commons which is controlled by an un-written Constitution. But, this judgment is not at all in conflict with the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case (cited supra). In fact, even in Raja Ram Pal's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to U.P. Assembly case ( AIR 1965 SC 745 ) which was delivered by a Seven Judges Bench wherein it was held that the findings in the U.P. Assembly case that there are some powers of the British House, which cannot be claimed by the Indian Legislatures, do not mean that the power of expulsion falls in that category. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case made it very clear that in U.P. Assembly case, the Supreme Court was mainly concerned with power claimed by the Legislature to issue a general warrant and claimed conclusive character thereof. There was no challenge in that case to the power to punish for contempt, much less the power to expel. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the ratio of U.P. Assembly case cannot be interpreted to have held that all the powers of the House of Commons enjoyed in its capacity as a Court of record are unavailable to the Indian Parliament, including the power to punish for contempt. The relevant findings in Raja Ram Pal's case could be usefully referred to as follows: "266. The relevant findings in Raja Ram Pal's case could be usefully referred to as follows: "266. Thus, in U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964) the Court was mainly concerned with the power claimed by legislature to issue general warrant and conclusive character thereof. There was no challenge in that case to the power to punish for contempt, much less the power to expel, these issues even otherwise being not inherent in the strict frame of reference made to the Court. 267. Indeed, the thrust of the decision was on the examination of the power to issue unspeaking warrants immune from the review of the courts, and not on the power to deal with contempt itself. A close reading of the case demonstrates that the Court treated the power to punish for contempt as a privilege of the House. Speaking of the legislatures in India, it was stated: (U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964). AIR p.786, para 125) "125. There is no doubt that the House has the power to punish for contempt committed outside its chamber, and from that point of view it may claim one of the rights possessed by a court of record." (emphasis supplied) 268. Speaking of the Judges' power to punish for contempt, the Court observed: (U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964), AIR p.791, para 142) "We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct. We venture to think that what is true of the judicature is equally true of the legislatures." (emphasis supplied) 269. It is evident, therefore, that in the opinion of the Court in U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964), legislatures in India do enjoy the power to punish for contempt. We venture to think that what is true of the judicature is equally true of the legislatures." (emphasis supplied) 269. It is evident, therefore, that in the opinion of the Court in U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964), legislatures in India do enjoy the power to punish for contempt. It is equally clear that while the fact that the House of Commons enjoyed the power to issue unspeaking warrants in its capacity of a court of record was one concern, what actually worried the Court was not the source of the power per se, but the "judicial" nature of power to issue unspeaking warrant insofar as it was directly in conflict with the scheme of the Constitution whereby citizens were guaranteed fundamental rights and the power to enforce the fundamental rights is vested in the courts. It was not the power to punish for contempt about which the Court had reservations. Rather, the abovequoted passage shows that such power had been accepted by the Court. The issue decided concerned the non-reviewability of the warrant issued by the legislature, in the light of various constitutional provisions. 270. Last, but not least, there are many differences between U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964) and the one at hand. The entire controversy in the former case revolved around the privileges of the House in relation to the fundamental rights of a citizen, an outsider to the House. The decision expressly states that the Court was not dealing with internal proceedings, nor laying down law in relation to Members of the House. In the words of the Court: (AIR pp.781 & 790, paras 108 & 141) "The obvious answer to this contention is that we are not dealing with any matter relating to the internal management of the House in the present proceedings. We are dealing with the power of the House to punish citizens for contempt alleged to have been committed by them outside the four walls of the House, and that essentially raises different considerations. We are dealing with the power of the House to punish citizens for contempt alleged to have been committed by them outside the four walls of the House, and that essentially raises different considerations. In conclusion, we ought to add that throughout our discussion we have consistently attempted to make it clear that the main point which we are discussing is the right of the House to claim that a general warrant issued by it in respect of its contempt alleged to have been committed by a citizen who is not a Member of the House outside the four walls of the House, is conclusive, for it is on that claim that the House has chosen to take the view that the Judges, the advocate, and the party have committed contempt by reference to the conduct in the habeas corpus petition pending before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court". (emphasis supplied) 271. In the light of the above, we are of the opinion that the ratio of U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964) which was decided under significantly different circumstances, cannot be interpreted to have held that all the powers of the House of Commons enjoyed in its capacity as a court of record are unavailable to the Indian Parliament, including the power to punish for contempt." 46. In the light of the above, I am of the considered view that the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amarinder Singh's case is not at all helpful to the case of the petitioners herein, because in Amarinder Singh's case, a resolution was passed directing expulsion of a former Chief Minister of Punjab for his alleged conduct of exempting improperly vacant plots of land licensed to a private party from a pool of 187 acres of land notified for acquisition by Amritsar Lands Improvement Trust for a development scheme. Only on the basis of the above facts and circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amarinder Singh's case held that Punjab Vidhan Sabha exceeded its powers by expelling the former Chief Minister on the ground of breach of privilege when there existed none. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that alleged improper exemption of lands was an executive act and that act did not distort, obstruct or threaten the integrity of legislature proceedings in any manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that alleged improper exemption of lands was an executive act and that act did not distort, obstruct or threaten the integrity of legislature proceedings in any manner. Hence, it was held that the action taken under Article 194(3) is not proper and the resolution directing expulsion is constitutionally invalid. Therefore, the law as decided in Amarinder Singh's case is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. 47. In the light of the above, Question No.(b) as referred to above, is answered in the affirmative that the State Legislature has the power and privilege under Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India to suspend the writ petitioners. 48. Question (c): The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that suspending a member of the Legislature Assembly for more than 60 days is ultra-virus of Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India. According to the learned Senior Counsel, disqualification of Members are dealt with under Articles 190 to 193. As per Article 190(4), if for a period of sixty days, a member of a House of the Legislature of a State is without permission of the House absent from all meetings thereof, the House may declare his seat vacant. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that if a member is suspended for more than sixty days, as happened in this case, the seat of the member would become vacant and therefore, any suspension beyond a period of sixty days is ultra-virus to Article 190(4). 49. I am unable to accept this submission also. I am again referring to Raja Ram Pal's case, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the term vacancy, disqualification and expulsion have different meanings and they do not overlap. Disqualification strikes at the very root of the candidate's qualification and renders a member unable to occupy a member seat. Expulsion on the other hand deals with a member who is otherwise qualified, but in the House of the Legislature is unworthy of membership. While disqualification operates to prevent a candidate from re-election, expulsion occurs after the election of the member and there is no power of re-election. As far as the term vacancy is concerned, it is a consequence of the fact that a member cannot continue to hold membership. While disqualification operates to prevent a candidate from re-election, expulsion occurs after the election of the member and there is no power of re-election. As far as the term vacancy is concerned, it is a consequence of the fact that a member cannot continue to hold membership. The reason may be any one of the several possible reasons which prevents the member from continuing membership, for example, disqualification, death or expulsion. 50. In view of the above, I am of the considered view that Article 190(4) has nothing to do with Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India, as under Article 190(4), if a Member is absent without the permission of the House for a period of 60 days from all the meetings thereof, then, the House may declare the seat vacant. Under Article 194(3), the House enjoys powers, privileges and immunities which include the power to punish a person for contempt and the power to expel or suspend a person. When a person is expelled or punished beyond a period of sixty days, it cannot be said that member is absent without the permission of the House for a period of sixty days. When a person is suspended for more than sixty days by the House, it is the House which makes him stay away from all the meetings and the member is not absent without the permission of the House for a period of sixty days as contemplated under Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the argument that suspending a Member for more than 60 days would be ultra-virus to Article 190(4) is far-fetched and misconceived. Therefore, it is to be held that the State Legislature has power and privilege to suspend a member for more than sixty days and it does not in any way offend Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India. 51. Questions (d) and (e): According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that denial of salary and other consequential benefits to the writ petitioners highlights Article 195 and Section 12 and Section 12A of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act. The learned Senior Counsel contends that by a proceeding under privilege of breach, there is no enabling power to deny salary and other benefits of a member. The learned Senior Counsel contends that by a proceeding under privilege of breach, there is no enabling power to deny salary and other benefits of a member. For making the above submission, the learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1980 SC 2147 (para 72(1) (Maru Ram and others Vs. Union of India and others). 52. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that the impugned proceedings are ultra-virus to Article 80(4) and 191 read with the provisions relating to the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners have a right to choose a member of Rajya Sabha in their capacity as member of Legislative Assembly. Rajya Sabha Elections are contemplated in July, 2013 and the petitioners have a right to elect a member of their choice in the elections. However, the impugned proceedings taken under the pretext of breach of privilege, impair the right to vote for the Rajya Sabha and therefore, on this ground, the impugned proceeds are liable to be set aside. 53. I am unable to accept this submission also. Provisions relating to salary, etc. of an expelled or a suspended member came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal's case. In that case also, it was contended that the provisions in the Constitution relating to salary and the term for which they serve in the House are the constitutional rights of the members and the power of expulsion by terminating their membership violates these constitutional rights. The relevant provisions are, Article 106 on the subjects of salary and Article 83(2) in relation to the duration of the House of Parliament. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the argument by holding that they are not constitutional rights and therefore, it cannot be contended that provisions relating to salaries and duration of the House would have supremacy over the power of expulsion of the House. The following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court could be usefully referred to in this regard. "154. Similar arguments were made in K.Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secy., Govt. of Madras. In that case, certain Members of Parliament were detained by the Government of Madras and one of the grounds on which they challenged their detention was the violation of their constitutional rights. "154. Similar arguments were made in K.Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secy., Govt. of Madras. In that case, certain Members of Parliament were detained by the Government of Madras and one of the grounds on which they challenged their detention was the violation of their constitutional rights. In support of this contention, the petitioners relied on various provisions relating to Members and proceedings of Parliament including Articles 79, 85, 86 and 100. They claimed that they continued to exercise all the "constitutional rights" that flow from membership unless the member is disqualified. The contention was that: (AIR p.662, para 11) "If a Member of Parliament incurs a disqualification, he may cease to be such Member, but if he continues to be qualified to be a Member, his constitutional rights cannot be taken away by any law or order". This Court rejected this argument holding that (AIR p.664, para 18) "...they are not constitutional rights in the strict sense, and quite clearly, they are not fundamental rights at all". (emphasis supplied) 155. Although this case involved detention and the arrest of the Members of Parliament, which are matters relating to a field distinct from that of the rights claimed in the cases at hand, we are of the view that the logic in the case applies equally to the present situation. In this case certain provisions regarding Members and their functioning within Parliament were held not to create independent rights which could be given supremacy over a legal detention. Similarly, in the present case, where there is a lawful expulsion, the Members cannot claim that the provisions relating to salaries and duration of the House create such rights for the Members that would have supremacy over the power of expulsion of the House. 156. With specific reference to the power of expulsion, a similar argument with respect to the duration of the Legislative Assembly of a State was rejected by the Madras High Court in K.Anbazhagan. The High Court rightly held that such a provision could not negate the power of expulsion. It stated: (AIR p.303, para 73) "Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because Article 172 provided for a period of five years to be the duration of the Legislative Assembly each member must necessarily continue to be a Member for five years irrespective of the other provisions of the Constitution". 157. It stated: (AIR p.303, para 73) "Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because Article 172 provided for a period of five years to be the duration of the Legislative Assembly each member must necessarily continue to be a Member for five years irrespective of the other provisions of the Constitution". 157. As far as the provision for the duration of the House is concerned, it simply states that the normal duration of a House is to be five years. It cannot be interpreted to mean that it guarantees to the Members a term of five years. The respondents have correctly pointed out that a Member does not enjoy the full five-year term under various circumstances; for example when he or she is elected mid-term, when the term of the House is cut short by dissolution, when the Member stands disqualified or the seat is rendered vacant. We find that a correct view in this regard has been taken in K.Anbazhagan in line with the view expressed by this Court in K.Anandan Nambiar. If the provisions mentioned by the petitioners were actually to create rights in respect of Members, then each of the above situations would be liable to be challenged for their violation. This quite obviously is not what is intended by the Constitution. Expulsion is only an additional cause for the shortening of a term of a Member. 158. Further, as far as the provision relating to the salary of the Member is concerned, it is quite absurd to claim that because the Constitution makes a provision for salaries, the power of the House to expel is negated since the result would be that the Member would no longer be paid. Salaries are obviously dependent upon membership, and the continuation of membership is an independent matter altogether. The termination of membership can occur for a variety of reasons and this is at no point controlled by the fact that salaries are required to be paid to a Member. 159. Thus, in our view, the above provisions do not negate the power of expulsion of the House, and there is no inconsistency between the House's power of expulsion and the said provisions. (iii) The right of the constituency to be represented and the right to vote." 54. 159. Thus, in our view, the above provisions do not negate the power of expulsion of the House, and there is no inconsistency between the House's power of expulsion and the said provisions. (iii) The right of the constituency to be represented and the right to vote." 54. In 2012 (3) CTC 449 (cited supra), identical question arose for consideration before this Court and this Court in the above judgment held that placing an elected member under suspension is the cause and all other things are its consequences. After referring to Raja Ram Pal's case, the learned Judge who decided Vijayakant's case held that an elected member who is de-barred by virtue of an order of suspension from discharging his duties and functions, may have to suffer all the consequences that go with the office. Therefore, the argument that the impugned proceedings violate Article 195 and Sections 12 and 12(A) of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act are untenable and unacceptable. 55. Similarly, the reliance placed on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1980 SC 2147 (Para-72) is also not applicable to the facts of the present case and therefore, the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-72 of the above judgment are not useful to the case of the writ petitioners herein. 56. Similarly, contending that the impugned proceedings are ultra-virus to Article 80(4) and 191 read with provisions relating to Representation of People's Act, 1951, is also not acceptable for the simple reason that placing a member under suspension is the cause and all other things are its consequences. Once it is held that the House has the power and privilege to expel or suspend a member for committing breach, then, it is for the house to decide what would be the punishment that should be given to the member. Once a punishment is given and a resolution is passed thereafter and there is no violation of any constitutional and fundamental rights affecting the person who is to be suspended, then he / she has to face the consequences including the denial of salary, attending the House, function as a member of the House, etc. Once a punishment is given and a resolution is passed thereafter and there is no violation of any constitutional and fundamental rights affecting the person who is to be suspended, then he / she has to face the consequences including the denial of salary, attending the House, function as a member of the House, etc. Once a Member is suspended for a period and during the period, if any intervening circumstances arise, then, as a suspended member, he is not entitled to participate in those events in his capacity as a member of the House. Denial of salary and the other privileges like voting in an election are not constitutional rights nor the fundamental rights and in such circumstances, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that as these rights are affected, the impugned proceedings are violated and are liable to be set aside. Therefore, the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners in this regard are rejected.