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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 193 (HP)

Basant Ram v. State of H. P.

2013-03-23

DEV DARSHAN SUD

body2013
JUDGMENT The appellant challenges his conviction under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) (ii) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred as ‘the Act’). 2. The appellant was charged for offences, as aforesaid, on the allegations that a complaint had been lodged by PW6 Atma Ram that the appellant was posted as Patwari in Patwar Circle, Sehali. On 30.8.2008 when the complainant asked the appellant to complete the work of mutation etc., a demand of Rs. 2000/- was made by him. FIR Ext.PW2/A was filed by the complainant where after the formalities of constituting/organizing the trap party, treating the currency notes with Phenolphthalein powder, demonstration of mixing the liquid with sodium carbonate whereupon colour of the liquid changed to pink were completed. 3. The learned trial Court has convicted the accused on the grounds that though two witnesses namely the complainant PW6 Atma Ram and shadow witness PW7 Chet Ram have turned hostile, but nonetheless they admitted the filing of First Information Report Ext.PW2/A, their evidence is substantiated by Ext.PW5/B gift deed and Ext.PW6/B, Ext.PW6/C, Ext.PW6/D and Ext.PW6/E, which were the memos of seizure prepared by the police. The learned trial Court lastly invokes the presumption under Section 20 of the Act to hold that the appellant-accused had in fact been caught red handed with the tainted money and in this eventuality, he was sentenced. 4. Adverting to the case of the prosecution, complainant PW6 Atma Ram states that he was working as painter; he is also an agriculturist. He was having 3/4 bighas of land in village Marathu. Damodar was his younger son and married in village Satohal with the daughter of one Dhanu, who had land holdings in village Satohal. Dhanu had executed a general power of attorney for this land (again said gift deed Ext.PW5/B) in favour of Damodar Dass. Dhanu, who had gifted the land to the brother of the complainant, and appointed him (the complainant) as his special power of attorney for the purpose of carrying out the necessary corrections/entries in the revenue record. He says that he asked the accused to enter the mutation on the basis of the gift deed whereupon he was informed by the accused that he (accused) had performed his duty and now it was for the Tehsildar to sanction the mutation. No demand of money was made by the accused. He says that he asked the accused to enter the mutation on the basis of the gift deed whereupon he was informed by the accused that he (accused) had performed his duty and now it was for the Tehsildar to sanction the mutation. No demand of money was made by the accused. At this stage, he was declared hostile and subjected to extensive and searching cross examination by the prosecution. He admits that in FIR Ext.PW2/A he had stated that mutation, pursuant to gift deed Ext.PW5/B, was pending. The date for mutation had been fixed for 30.8.2008. He had gone to the accused; when he had made a demand for Rs. 2000/-for having the mutation sanctioned/incorporated in the revenue record. He admits portion ‘A’ to ‘A’ in Ext.PW2/A (FIR) as the version disclosed by him to the police. Subsequently, he admits the formation of trap party and demonstration of mixing the two liquids etc. as also the manner in which the currency notes were handed over to the accused. He says that since he was directed not to shake hands with anybody, therefore when he entered the room of the accused, he sat down there. He took out the four currency notes and made an effort to hand them over to the accused, but he refused to accept them. As a consequence, he placed the currency notes on the table of the accused and left the Patwarkhana. The accused followed him and directed him to take these currency notes lying on the table of the accused. In the meantime, the police party entered the room. After coming out from the room, he signaled to the police that the accused has not accepted the bribe money. He does not admit the factum regarding the hand wash and mixing of two solutions etc. as he was outside the room. He denies that four currency notes of the denomination of Rs.500/- each were recovered by the police after search of the accused. He also denies that this currency is the same which was handed over by him to the police at the time of making the complaint. Though, he admits that numbers etc. have been tallied. He denies that four currency notes of the denomination of Rs.500/- each were recovered by the police after search of the accused. He also denies that this currency is the same which was handed over by him to the police at the time of making the complaint. Though, he admits that numbers etc. have been tallied. He also admitted the signatures on the memos Ext.PW6/C, Ext.PW6/D and Ext.PW6/E. But in cross examination by learned counsel for the accused, he says that he is illiterate and when he visited the accused in connection with mutation, he was informed by him that he had performed his duty and now the mutation is to be verified by the Tehsildar and not by him. 30.8.2008 was the date fixed by the Naib Tehsildar for sanctioning the mutations of the area and a number of people had gathered there. 5. PW7 Chet Ram is the brother of PW6 Atma Ram who was associated as a shadow witness. After admitting the factum of execution of the gift deed, he says that his brother PW6 Atma Ram had complained to the police that the accused was demanding Rs. 2000/- from him for entering the mutation in the revenue records. He says that he does not remember anything about any demonstration which was given to this witness by the police. He was declared hostile. He was also subjected to searching cross examination where he admits his signatures on memos Ext.PW6/A and Ext.PW6/B. He says that the police vehicle was parked at a distance of 100-150 metres from the Patwarkhana His brother had entered the room where the accused was sitting. The room was not visible from where he was standing. He denies that the illegal gratification was handed over in his presence. He further states in cross examination by learned counsel for the accused that he went inside the Patwarkhana after half an hour after the police had gone in. He does not know anything about the proceedings and that Ext.PW6/A to Ext.PW6/F were not read over to him. 6. The learned trial Court on this evidence, which states that the tainted currency notes were recovered from the appellant, convicted him. He does not know anything about the proceedings and that Ext.PW6/A to Ext.PW6/F were not read over to him. 6. The learned trial Court on this evidence, which states that the tainted currency notes were recovered from the appellant, convicted him. The learned Court proceeds that the receipt/acceptance of the bribe money has been proved from the positive result of phenolphthalein powder and sodium carbonate, as well as the statement of PW9 M.C. Lal Singh and PW11 Inspector Hemant Kumar and is corroborated by Ext. PW6/C, Ext.PW6/D and Ext.PW6/E. In this eventuality, the learned trial Court invokes the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. 7. Before adverting to the legal application of Section 20 of the Act, I will consider the evidence of two witnesses namely PW9 MC Lal Singh and PW11 Inspector Hemant Kumar, who were the members of the raiding party. PW9 Lal Singh states that when the pre-arranged signal was given by PW6 Atma Ram, he went to the Patwarkhana and according to the directions issued by the Investigating Officer he caught hold of the accused by his right arm and C. Rajender caught hold of him from his left arm. Thereafter PW11 Hemant Kumar Investigating Officer had the hands of the accused washed in a plastic bowl and thereafter sodium carbonate was mixed in that water which turned pink. The packet containing currency notes was taken into possession vide Ext.PW6/D. The accused was asked to remove his pant. The inner pocket of the pant was washed and when the water, with which the pant was washed was mixed with sodium carbonate powder, the colour of this water turned pink. Mutation Ext.PZ, gift deed Ext.PW5/B were taken into possession. 8. PW11 Inspector Hemant Kumar corroborates the evidence of PW9 Lal Singh who says that the raid was conducted on the pre-arranged signal given by the shadow witness. When read with the evidence of PW6 Atma Ram and PW7 Chet Ram, I do not find any corroboration on material points. No prearranged signal was given as is apparent and evident from the statements of PW6 Atma Ram PW7 Chet Ram. The statement of PW6 is that the signal was given by him to the police that money was not accepted by the accused when he came out after placing the money on the table of the accused. No prearranged signal was given as is apparent and evident from the statements of PW6 Atma Ram PW7 Chet Ram. The statement of PW6 is that the signal was given by him to the police that money was not accepted by the accused when he came out after placing the money on the table of the accused. PW7 nowhere states that the money was offered or that he gave the prearranged signal to the police party that the accused had accepted the money. In so far as the three memos (recovery memos Ext.PW6/C, Ext.PW6/D and Ext.PW6/E) are concerned, they cannot be used as corroborating the evidence of the prosecution. The best evidence is that of the complainant as also of the shadow witness, which in this case is diametrically opposite to the case set up. 9. Adverting to the invocation of Section 20 of the Act, the law on this point is now well settled. In V. Venkata Subbarao vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P. (2006) 13 SCC 305 the Court holds:- “24. Submission of the learned counsel for the State that presumption has rightly been raised against the appellant, cannot be accepted as, inter alia, the demand it self had not been proved. In the absence of a proof of demand, the question of raising the presumption would not arise. Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides for raising of a presumption only if a demand is proved. It reads as under: "20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration:-(1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 or clause (a) or clause(b) or sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration)or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate." 25. Furthermore, even in such a case, the burden on an accused does not have to meet the same standard of proof, as is required to be made by the prosecution. 26. In M.S.Narayana Menon vs. State of Kerala. (2006) 6 SCC 39 , this Court held : (SCC P.55, para 45) "Moreover, the onus on an accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution. It may be compared with a defendant in a civil proceeding." 27. In Union of India v. Purnandu Biswas, (2005) 12 SCC 576, it was opined: (SCCp.585, para36) "In this case demand of illegal gratification by the respondent has not been proved. Furthermore, Section 20 of the Act is not attracted as the respondent had been charged for commission of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act."” (pp. 310 & 311) 10. In Om Parkash vs. State of Haryana (2006) 2 SCC 250 the Court holds that the presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be used unless the demand is proved. The Court holds:- “22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the defence story setup by the appellant cannot be said to be wholly improbable. Furthermore, it is not a case where the burden of proof was on the accused in terms of Section 20 of the Act. Even otherwise, where demand has not been proved, Section 20 will also have no application. (Union of India v. Purnandu Biswas (2005)12 SCC 576 and T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 )” (atp.255) (emphasis supplied.) 11. The law has been aptly summed up in C.M. Girish Babu vs. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala (2009) 3 SCC 779 holding: “18. In Suraj Mal Vs. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 4 SCC 725 , this court took the view that (at SCC p.727, para 2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. 19. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. 19. The learned counsel for CBI submitted that the onus of proof was upon the appellant to explain as to how he came into possession of the amount recovered from him during the trap. The argument of the learned counsel is obviously based on Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which reads as under: “20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.- (1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 of Section 11 or clause (a) or clause(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (2)Where in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7, or as the case may be without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Sections (1) (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no interference of corruption may fairly be drawn”. 20. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Sections (1) (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no interference of corruption may fairly be drawn”. 20. A three-Judge Bench in M. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 691 while dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance of gratification and prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification, observed:(SCC p.700, para24) “24 we think it is not necessary to deal with the matter in detail be cause in a recent decision rendered by us the said aspect has been deal with at length. (Vide Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 571 .) The following statement made by us in the said decision would be the answer to the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel: (SCC p.577, para12) “12.The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted “as motive or reward' for doing or for bearing to do any official act. So the word “gratification” need not be stretched to mean reward be cause reward is the out come of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like gratification or any valuable thing'. If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or for bearing to do an official act, the word “gratification” must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it.” 21. It is we settled that the presumption to be drawn under Section 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. It is we settled that the presumption to be drawn under Section 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. If the accused fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has proved that the accused received the amount towards gratification. 22. It is equally we settled that the burden of proof placed upon the accused person against whom the presumption is made under Section 20 of the Act is not akin to that of burden placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. “4………It is we established that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence of proof his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, of course, the test prescribed in deciding whether the prosecution has discharged it son us to prove the guilt of the accused; but the same test cannot be applied to an accused person who seeks to discharge the burden placed upon him under Section 4 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case. It is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur verdict of guilty. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e.; that of establishing on the whole case the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”(emphasis supplied) (See V.D.Jhingan Vs. State of U.P. AIR p.1764, para4).” (pp.784-786). 12. This is the established law. What has to be proved is not mere recovery of money but also that demand was made and the money paid pursuant to that demand. State of U.P. AIR p.1764, para4).” (pp.784-786). 12. This is the established law. What has to be proved is not mere recovery of money but also that demand was made and the money paid pursuant to that demand. I do not find any such evidence on record to establish these facts because the evidence of the complainant and the shadow witness is that no money was demanded by the accused and when the money was placed on the table by the complainant, the accused refused to accept it, came out and told the complainant to take it back. Signal was given by this witness that no amount was accepted. I find that the learned Special Judge is in grave error in invoking this presumption. 13. I also find that the appreciation of evidence of both the complainant PW6 Atma Ram as also of shadow witness PW7 Chet Ram by the learned Special Judge is not in consonance with the established principles. It is well established that it is not merely one portion of the evidence which is to be relied upon but it is the entirety of the statement which has to be considered. In C. Magesh and others vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 645 the Supreme Court holds: “45. It may be mentioned herein that in criminal jurisprudence, evidence has to be evaluated on the touchstone of consistency. Needless to emphasise, consistency is the keyword for upholding the conviction of an accused. In this regard it is to be noted that this Court in the case titled Suraj Singh vs. State of U.P. (2008) 16 SCC 686 has held : (SCCp.704, para14) “14. ’21… The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy;…the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.’” 46. In a criminal trial, evidence of the eyewitness requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated its creditability. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that “man is guilty until proven so”. Hence utmost caution required to be exercised in dealing with situations where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the court. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that “man is guilty until proven so”. Hence utmost caution required to be exercised in dealing with situations where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the court. There must be string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistency evidence amongst all the witnesses.” (p.655) 14. On the question of hostile witnesses, the settled principle is that their evidence cannot be discarded if it supports the prosecution on material particulars, but all that I need say is that barring the lodging of First Information Report, the witnesses do not admit any other incriminating fact. I find that the learned trial Court places reliance only on Ext.PW2/A which is the First Information Report and uses this as a chain in the events to convict the appellant. Here again the learned trial Court was in grave error. It has been settled in more than one decisions of the Supreme Court that information recorded under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a substantive piece of evidence. In Apren Joseph alias Current Kunjukunju & others vs. The State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1 the Supreme Court holds:- “11. Now first information report is a report relating to the commission of an offence given to the police and recorded by it under Section 154 Cr.P.C. As observed by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja ILR 1945 Lah 1 = (AIR 1945 PC 18) the receipt and recording of information report by the police is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. Nor does the statute provide that such information report can only be made by an eye witness. First Information report under S. 154 is not even considered a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate or contradict the informant’s evidence in court. But this information when recorded is the basis of the case set up by the informant. ……..” (at p. 5) 15. Subsequently in Nanhku Singh vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 491 the Court reiterates this very principle and holds: “7……..In the first place it may be noticed that F.I.R. is not a substantive piece of evidence. But this information when recorded is the basis of the case set up by the informant. ……..” (at p. 5) 15. Subsequently in Nanhku Singh vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 491 the Court reiterates this very principle and holds: “7……..In the first place it may be noticed that F.I.R. is not a substantive piece of evidence. It is an information of a cognizable offence given under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if there is any statement made therein it can only be used for the purposes of contradicting and discrediting a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. In the second place the statement given by the informant need not necessarily be an eye witness account of what he has actually seen…….” (at p. 493) 16. These principles find reiteration in subsequent decision of the Supreme Court i.e. in Baldev Singh and another vs. State of Punjab (1995) 6 SCC 593 it holds:- “10. ……..There are innumberable decisions of this Court dealing with the above aspects of the FIR. Mention may be made of a few important decisions of this Court on the subject-Ram Kumar Pandey vs. State of M.P. (1975)3 SCC 815 , Bishan Dass v. State of Punjab (1975) 3 SCC 700 , Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P. (1975)4 SCC 153 ; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh AIR 1981 SC 1252; State of Haryana v. Sher Singh (1981)2 SCC 300 ; State of U.P. v. Ballab Das (1985)3 SCC 703 , Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1988) 1 SCC 712 and Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab (1990)4 SCC 692 . Stated briefly, the FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence, it is only relevant in judging the veracity of prosecution case and the value to be attached to it depends on the facts of each case. Only the essential or broad picture need be stated in the FIR and all minute details need not be mentioned therein. It is not a verbatim summary of the prosecution case. It need not contain details of the occurrence as if it were an “encyclopaedia” of the occurrence. It may not be even necessary to catalogue the overt acts therein. Not mentioning of some facts or vague reference to some others are not fatal……” (at p. 599) 17. It is not a verbatim summary of the prosecution case. It need not contain details of the occurrence as if it were an “encyclopaedia” of the occurrence. It may not be even necessary to catalogue the overt acts therein. Not mentioning of some facts or vague reference to some others are not fatal……” (at p. 599) 17. In Sohan Lal alias Sohan Singh and others vs. State of Punjab (2003) 11 SCC 534 the Supreme Court holds:- “10. The learned counsel thereafter contended that if Bansi Ram’s testimony is not believable, then the whole of the FIR becomes doubtful and the case against the accused necessarily collapses. We cannot accept this. It may be probable that Bansi Ram might have given information to the police which was exaggerated and added things which, probably, he did not learn from Kamlesh Rani on 1-4-1996. It is possible that seeing Kamlesh Rani in the hospital, after suffering extensive burns to the extent of 80 per cent, Bansi Ram might have suspected the in-laws of Kamlesh Rani as having murdered her. The first information report is only a report about the information as to the commission of an offence; it is not a substantive evidence, as the police has yet to investigate the offence. If Bansi Ram’s was the only testimony in support of the prosecution, then perhaps the counsel was right. We find, however, that the prosecution strongly relied on two declarations, one made to Naib Tehsildar Lakhbir Singh (PW6) on 2-4-1996 as well as the statement made by Kamlesh Rani under Section 161 CrPC recorded on 7-4-1986 by Satnam Singh, ASI, both of which can be treated as dying declarations. (at p.541-542) 18. I need not multiply precedent further, but I must notice the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay vs. Rusy Mistry and another AIR 1960 SC 391 holding:- “7…….The first information report is the information recorded under S. 154 of the Cr.P.C. It is an information given to a police officer relating to the commission of an offence. It is also an information given by an informant on which the investigation is commenced. It must be distinguished from information received after the commencement of the investigation which is covered by Ss. It is also an information given by an informant on which the investigation is commenced. It must be distinguished from information received after the commencement of the investigation which is covered by Ss. 161 and 162 of the Cr.P.C. It is well settled that the first information report is not substantive evidence, but can only be used to corroborate or contradict the evidence of the informant given in court or to impeach his credit. It follows that a Judge cannot place such a report before the jury as substantive evidence, but can only refer to that portion of it which had been used for one or other of the aforesaid purposes.” (at p. 395) 19. The other decisions relied upon viz. Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad and others Vs. State of Maharashtra (1972)1 SCC 107 , Dharma Prama Bhagare vs. The State of Maharashtra (1973) 1 SCC 537 and Shanker vs. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 851 are to the same effect. As noticed supra, the first information report only sets the law in motion but does not prove the commission of the offence where the report can not be said to be substantive evidence. I need not deal with the contention that statement under Section 161 of Cr.PC can be used by the accused for his advantage/benefit and not by the prosecution to seek conviction of the accused. This is but stating the obvious and does not require any precedent. 20. I also note at this juncture that the special power of attorney which formed the basis of granting the authority to complainant PW6 Atma Ram has not been produced on record of the case. The donor and donee of the land have also not been produced. On this, it is submitted by learned Additional Advocate General that they may not be necessary considering the nature of authority which was granted to the complainant. 21. The mutation Ext.PZ stands entered at Sr. No. 364 and signed by the accused on 26.8.2008 and thereafter it has been verified by the Kanungo on 28.8.2008. In this eventuality, it becomes difficult to hold that the accused would be making any demand for performance of an act which was beyond his control and which had to be performed by the Tehsildar. No. 364 and signed by the accused on 26.8.2008 and thereafter it has been verified by the Kanungo on 28.8.2008. In this eventuality, it becomes difficult to hold that the accused would be making any demand for performance of an act which was beyond his control and which had to be performed by the Tehsildar. When the evidence is considered in its entirety, I do not find (a) that any demand was made by the accused; (b) acceptance of the tainted money. I find that the evidence of the prosecution is contrary to what the charges are. In this eventuality, judgment of the learned trial Court is set aside. Bail bonds furnished by the accused shall stand discharged. Fine paid be refunded.