Judgment :- 1. During the year 2000, the petitioner was working as Inspector of Police attached to Pattukottai Police Station in Thanjavur District. On the complaint of one Thirunavukkarasu, on 6.11.2000 at 6.00 a.m., he registered a case in Crime No.960/2000 for the offence under Section 399 of IPC against a total number of eight accused of whom the 3rd respondent herein is the 1st accused. The 3rd respondent was arrested by the petitioner in connection with the said case on 6.11.2000 and thereafter, he was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Pattukottai for remand. Accordingly, the learned Judicial Magistrate remanded him to judicial custody for 15 days. The 3rd respondent, thereafter, filed a petition before the learned Judicial Magistrate seeking bail. The said petition was, however, dismissed by the learned Judicial Magistrate on 8.11.2000. Thereafter, he filed a petition before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Thanjavur seeking bail. The learned Sessions Judge granted bail to the petitioner by order dated 16.11.2000 imposing certain conditions. Accordingly, the 3rd respondent was released from jail and thereafter, he had to comply with the conditions imposed by the learned Sessions Judge. In the said case, on completing the investigation, the petitioner laid a final report before the learned Judicial Magistrate against the accused on 15.11.2000 wherein he had reported that the offences allegedly committed by the 3rd respondent and other accused were only punishable under Sections 147, 148 and 427 of IPC. Admittedly, these offences are bailable. Section 399 of IPC was not included in the final report. The learned Judicial Magistrate, Pattukottai took cognizance on the said final report in C.C.No.135/2001. It appears from the records that the 3rd respondent and others filed petitions before the learned Judicial Magistrate in CMP Nos.541 and 805/2003 seeking discharge from the said case. The learned Judicial Magistrate, Pattukottai by order dated 19.6.2003 discharged the accused including the 3rd respondent from the case. 2. Meanwhile, the 3rd respondent preferred a complaint to the 1st respondent/Tamil Nadu Human Rights Commission on 7.5.2003 alleging that a serious human rights violation had been committed by the petitioner against the 3rd respondent. The learned Judicial Magistrate, Pattukottai by order dated 19.6.2003 discharged the accused including the 3rd respondent from the case. 2. Meanwhile, the 3rd respondent preferred a complaint to the 1st respondent/Tamil Nadu Human Rights Commission on 7.5.2003 alleging that a serious human rights violation had been committed by the petitioner against the 3rd respondent. According to the complainant, though on investigation, it came to light that the offences allegedly committed by the 3rd accused and others were punishable only under Sections 147, 148 and 427 of IPC which are bailable, when the petitions for bail came up for hearing before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Pattukottai as well as before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Thanjavur, the petitioner did not bring to the notice of the court that the offences were bailable, as a result, according to the complainant/3rd respondent, he was put in jail and even after release on bail, he had to undergo the ordeal of complying with certain conditions which could be imposed in respect of non-bailable offences. Thus, the act of the petitioner, according to the 3rd respondent, amounts to serious human rights violation and therefore, appropriate orders should be passed by the Human Rights Commission. 3. Before the 1st respondent, the petitioner contended that it is true that he investigated the case and arrested the accused/3rd respondent and later on, he was remanded to judicial custody by the learned Judicial Magistrate. It is true that on completing the investigation, he came to know that the offences said to have been committed by the 3rd respondent and others are only bailable. But, still, according to the petitioner, he formed an opinion on completing the investigation that the offence under Section 399 had not been committed by any of the accused even on 6.11.2000 itself. But, he has stated that he produced the Case Diary before the then Assistant Public Prosecutor for opinion. His opinion was obtained belatedly. Thereafter, he filed a charge sheet in the case on 15.11.2000. Then, it took time for the learned Judicial Magistrate to accept the final report and then to take cognizance. Thus, according to him, he had not violated the Human Rights of the 3rd respondent. 4. Before the 1st respondent/Human Rights Commission, the above documents were filed and witnesses were also examined. Then, it took time for the learned Judicial Magistrate to accept the final report and then to take cognizance. Thus, according to him, he had not violated the Human Rights of the 3rd respondent. 4. Before the 1st respondent/Human Rights Commission, the above documents were filed and witnesses were also examined. The Human Rights Commission by order dated 5.9.2003 rejected the plea of the petitioner and held that by not informing the court of the Judicial Magistrate, Pattukottai and the Court of Sessions, Thanjavur that the offences were bailable and by allowing the 3rd respondent to be in jail for such a long time, the petitioner had violated the human rights of the 3rd respondent. Accordingly, the Human Rights Commission issued a direction to the Government of Tamil Nadu to pay a sum of Rs.50,000/- as compensation to the 3rd respondent and in turn to recover the same from the petitioner. The Human Rights Commission also directed the Government to initiate departmental action against the petitioner within one month. Challenging the said order of the 1st respondent, the petitioner is before this Court with this Writ Petition. 5. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the 2nd respondent and I have also perused the records carefully. 6. Though notice has been served on the 3rd respondent, he has not made appearance. There is no representation for him, despite his name has been printed in the Cause List. 7. At the outset, this Court raised a doubt in respect of the maintainability of this Writ Petition. This doubt is based on the judgment of this Court in Rajesh Das, I.P.S. S/o.Pranabandhu Das, Superintendent of Police, T.N.U.S.R.B., Chennai vs. Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission rep. by its Secretary, Chennai-14 and others reported in 2010 (5) CTC 589 wherein this Court has held that the Human Rights Commission is empowered under Section 18 of the Act to make certain recommendations and the said Commission has got no power either to adjudicate upon the issues or to pass any order. by its Secretary, Chennai-14 and others reported in 2010 (5) CTC 589 wherein this Court has held that the Human Rights Commission is empowered under Section 18 of the Act to make certain recommendations and the said Commission has got no power either to adjudicate upon the issues or to pass any order. This Court has however held that such a recommendation made by the State Human Rights Commission is not binding on the parties to the proceedings including the Government, however, the Government has an obligation to consider the recommendation of the Commission and act upon the same to take forward the objects of the Human Rights Act, the International Covenants and Conventions in the backdrop of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution within a reasonable time. This Court has also held that the challenge to such a recommendation is highly premature because the party against whom such a recommendation has been made by the Human Rights Commission is to wait for a decision from the Government. 8. But the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that to the facts of the present case, the view taken in Rajesh Das I.P.S. Case cited supra has got no application at all. According to him, here, what is questioned in the Writ Petition is the very jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to entertain the complaint. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that as per Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the Act'), the said Commission shall not enquire into any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the Act constituting the violation of Human Rights is alleged to have been committed. In the case on hand, according to the learned Senior Counsel, though the alleged Human Rights violations were committed prior to 14.12.2000, the complaint was preferred to the Human Rights Commission only on 7.5.2003 which is far beyond the period prescribed in Sub-Section 2 to 36 of the Act. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that as per Section 36(2) of the Act, the Human Rights Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Therefore, according to him, all the consequential proceedings including the impugned order of the Commission made on 5.9.2003 are liable to be set aside. 9. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that as per Section 36(2) of the Act, the Human Rights Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Therefore, according to him, all the consequential proceedings including the impugned order of the Commission made on 5.9.2003 are liable to be set aside. 9. Learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the 2nd respondent would, however, submit that though it is true that the actual human rights violations were committed on or before 16.11.2000, the fact that the offences were bailable and the fact that the same was not brought to the notice of the Sessions Judge, came to the knowledge of the 3rd respondent only after the final report was filed before the court. Therefore, according to him, from the date of knowledge which was in the year 2003, the complaint was preferred. Therefore, according to the learned Special Government Pleader, the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to entertain the complaint cannot be doubted. 10. I have considered the above submissions. 11. For better appreciation of the legal issues raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, let us, at the first, have a look into Section 36 of the Act which reads as follows: "36. Matters not subject to jurisdiction of the Commission – (1) The Commission shall not inquire into any matter which is pending before a State Commission or any other Commission duly constituted under any law for the time being in force. (2) The Commission or the State Commission shall not inquire into any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed." 12. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in N.C.Dhoundial vs. Union of India and others reported in (2004) 2 Supreme Court Cases 579 wherein in para Nos.15 and 16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "15. .... The language employed in the marginal heading is another indicator that it is a jurisdictional limitation. It is a settled rule of interpretation that the section heading or marginal note can be relied upon to clear any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision and to discern the legislative intent. 16. .... The language employed in the marginal heading is another indicator that it is a jurisdictional limitation. It is a settled rule of interpretation that the section heading or marginal note can be relied upon to clear any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision and to discern the legislative intent. 16. In fact, Section 36(2) does not mince the words and the language used is clear and categorical. The marginal note to the section is being referred to only to consider whether the bar created by Section 36(2) has a bearing on the power or jurisdiction of the Commission." Ultimately, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that what is prescribed under Section 36(2) of the Act is a jurisdictional limitation and therefore, beyond the said period prescribed in Section 36(2) of the Act, the Commission shall not have jurisdiction even to entertain any complaint and to hold enquiry. 13. In this case, admittedly, the alleged human rights violations were in the year 2000 whereas the complaint was preferred only in the year 2003. Thus, in my considered opinion, the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into the complaint after the said period prescribed in Section 36(2) of the Act. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader that the said period is to be reckoned from the date of knowledge has no basis. A plain reading of Section 36(2) of the Act will leave no doubt that the commencement of the period is only from the date of commission of the human rights violations and not from the date of the knowledge. Apart from this, in this case, the human rights violations alleged against the petitioner are not a continuing violations. Therefore, I concur with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into the complaint and to pass the impugned order. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the view taken in Rajesh Das I.P.S. Case cited supra has got no application to the facts of the present case because I am inclined to allow the Writ Petition since the impugned order is without jurisdiction on the part of the Human Rights Commission. 14. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order of the 1st respondent/Human Rights Commission is hereby set aside. No costs. 14. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order of the 1st respondent/Human Rights Commission is hereby set aside. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed.