JUDGMENT 1. The appellant herein was the defendant and respondent herein was the plaintiff before the trial Court. The present second appeal has been filed by the defendant/appellant herein as against the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court in A.S.No.86 of 2003, dated 11.04.2005, whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned trail Court in O.S.No.6325 of 1988, dated 09.08.2001, was reversed. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the second appeal are given as under:- The plaintiff is the absolute owner of a land in Survey No.1696/1, measuring about 17 grounds and 925 sq.ft. in Veeraperumal Mudali Street, Mylapore, Madras-4. Out of the said land, an extent of 3 grounds and 802 sq.ft. was let out to one Narasimhalu Chetty and he was paying the land rent to the plaintiff temple. After his death in the year 1960, his widow Jayalakshmi Ammal was the tenant of the said piece of land, who was also paying the land rent till her death in the year 1975. In the meanwhile, the said Jayalakshmi Ammal, by a settlement deed dated 20.01.1975, settled 875 sq.ft. of land (suit property) out of 3 grounds and 802 sq.ft. in 60/1, Veeraperumal Mudali Street, Mylapore, Madras-4, in favour of Selvanayaki Ammal, therefore, it is claimed by the plaintiff-temple that the settlement deed executed in favour of one Selvanayaki Ammal/defendant is non-est ab initio and unenforceable in law, since the temple land cannot be alienated by a stranger. Hence, the plaintiff temple prayed for a direction to the defendant for delivery of possession of the land measuring 875 sq.ft. comprised in R.S.No.1696/1, Veeraperumal Mudali Street, Mylapore, Madras-4. 3. The defendant, in her written statement, averred that the suit is not maintainable, since the managing trustee of the plaintiff temple was removed from the post. Further, it is stated that as per Section 11 of the Madras City Tenantts Protection Act, the plaintiff temple should have issued the statutory notice for termination, since the land is Governed by the Act. The defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property even before the settlement and she put up a superstructure and residing in the suit property since the death of the said Jeyalakshmi Ammal, widow of one Narasimhalu. Therefore, it is stated that the plaintiff has no right to evict the defendant from the suit property. The defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property even before the settlement and she put up a superstructure and residing in the suit property since the death of the said Jeyalakshmi Ammal, widow of one Narasimhalu. Therefore, it is stated that the plaintiff has no right to evict the defendant from the suit property. Even the plaintiff was aware of the execution of settlement deed by Jayalakshmi Ammal and on that score, it is further stated in the written statement that the defendant is not a trespasser, since the defendant also sought permission from the plaintiff temple by separate letter to raise mud walls and to change the thatched roof. 4. On the side of the plaintiff, one Purusothaman, Chairman of the temple was examined as P.W.1 and 9 exhibits were marked as Exs.A1 to A9. On the side of the defendant, the defendant herself was examined as D.W.1 and one Nagendra Rao was examined as D.W.2, and 21 exhibits were marked as Exs.B1 to 21. On the pleadings and the materials placed, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues: i. Has Thiru Purushothaman got right to represent the plaintiff trust? ii. Is the suit bad for non issue of notice under Section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act? iii. Is the confirmation deed dated 25.01.1975 is valid? iv. Is the suit affected by Res Extra Commercicum? v. Is the Court fee paid correct? vi. Is the defendant liable to handover possession to the plaintiff? vii. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled? 5. The learned trail Judge, on appreciation of evidence produced by both sides, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff temple is not entitled to the suit relief and thereby dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, when an appeal was preferred, the learned first appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court holding that the learned trail Court has failed to appreciate the recitals in Ex.B2-settlement deed dated 20.01.1975, wherein it has been clearly mentioned that only leasehold right was settled by the settlor in favor of the settlee. As against that, the present second appeal has been filed by the defendant. As against that, the present second appeal has been filed by the defendant. This Court, at the time of admission, framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration: "i. Whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in holding that the suit, as framed and filed by one U.Purushothaman, representing the plaintiff Devasthanam is maintainable? ii. Whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in holding that the appellant herein has not taken a definite stand regarding her status, while it is for the plaintiff Devasthanam to prove its case and not to rest its case on the weakness of the defence? iii. Whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in holding that the settlement deed executed by Jayalakshmi Ammal, widow of Narasimhalu Chettu dated 20.01.1975 is non-est in the eye of law, when no such relief has been sought for in the suit? iv. Whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in holding that the appellant is bound to prove her title to the suit property? v. Whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in holding that the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant, in view of the definite stand taken by the appellant in the subsequent pleadings and in her additional statement when the order permitting the appellant to file her additional written statement, not having been challenged by the Devasthanam? vi. Whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in holding that the appellant admitted the tenancy under the respondent by her own alleged correspondence, which is not proved by the respondent Devasthanam by any independent evidence? vii. Whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in decreeing the suit as prayed for when the respondent Devasthanam takes two contradictory stands, viz., claiming the appellant as a trespasser on the one hand and a tenant on the other?" 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant submitted that the lower appellate Court failed to apply the principle of estoppel as against the respondent, since the respondent Devasthanam, having issued the patta under the instruction of HR & CE based on the judgment rendered in a Civil case in O.S.No.1136/51, cannot deny the title of the owner recognized therein. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant submitted that the lower appellate Court failed to apply the principle of estoppel as against the respondent, since the respondent Devasthanam, having issued the patta under the instruction of HR & CE based on the judgment rendered in a Civil case in O.S.No.1136/51, cannot deny the title of the owner recognized therein. It was further pleaded that when the plaintiff has asked for only recovery of suit property on the ground that the defendant was a trespasser and attempted to put up a construction in the suit property, learned appellate Court, without there being any issue raised on the validity of the settlement dated 20.01.1975, executed by Jayalakshmi Ammal, widow of Narasimhalu Chetty, ought not to have held that the settlement deed was non-est in the eye of law. Finally, it was argued that when the plaintiff has come to the Court by filing a suit for delivery of possession, it is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove the title of the suit property by producing all the relevant documents including the crucial document Ex.A1-patta issued by the plaintiff in favour of the Narasimhalu Chetty. 7. In support of her submission, she has also relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another ( (2012) 8 SCC 148 ) to contend that the suit filed by the plaintiff for delivery of possession without seeking the relief of declaration of title of ownership of property against the defendant was not maintainable. To strengthen her argument, she further contended that when the plaintiff has already issued the patta-Ex.A1, they miserably failed to establish their case that they continued to be the owner even after the issuance of patta-Ex.A1. However, the learned first appellate Court, by relying upon Ex.B2-settlement deed, dated 20.01.1975, holding that the land in question is belonging to the plaintiff, wrongly decreed the suit. 8. Further, she has also relied upon a judgment of this Court in Chinnasamy v. Perumal ( 2000 (1) MLJ 682 ) to say that the plaintiff has to establish their case by producing relevant documents and they cannot pick holes in the defendant's case. With the aforesaid submissions, she prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court. 9. With the aforesaid submissions, she prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court. 9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that the suit land covered in R.S.No.1696/1 measuring to an extent of 17 grounds 925 sq.ft. in Veeraperumal Mudali Street, Mylapore, Madras-4, is absolutely belonging to the plaintiff temple. Out of the said land, when 3 grounds and 802 sq.ft. was let out to one Narasimhalu, he was paying the rent until his death in the year 1960 and thereafter, his widow Jayalakshmi Ammal was paying the rent till her death in 1975. Subsequently, it was found that the widow Jayalakshmi Ammal settled 875 sq.ft. out of 3 grounds and 802 sq.ft. in 60/1, Veeraperumal Mudali Street, Mylaporte, Madras suit property, in favour the defendant. Since the suit property originally belonged to the plaintiff temple and the same cannot be owned by any tenant either with permission or without permission of the trust, the suit was immediately filed on the ground that the defendant was the trespasser and she attempted to put up a construction in the suit property. On that basis, he prayed for dismissal of the second appeal. 10. Heard both sides. 11. As rightly pleaded by the learned counsel for the respondent, during the pendency of the suit, although the defendant filed a detailed written statement taking a defence that she was the tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the suit land, the very same tenant subsequently changed the defence claiming that she has absolute right over the suit property. Further, when the defendant filed an application under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act seeking a direction to sell the property, the same was dismissed, but, no appeal was preferred against the same, therefore, it goes to show that the defendant forfeited his right as statutory tenant, hence, it is not open to the defendant to challenge the title of the suit land belonging to the plaintiff anymore. Hence, the fifth, sixth and seventh substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant. 12. Hence, the fifth, sixth and seventh substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant. 12. While answering the fourth substantial question of law that the defendant is bound to prove the title of the suit property, it must be mentioned that the settlement deed dated 20.01.1975 executed by one Jayalakshmiammal in favour of the defendant/appellant herein also clearly shows that Narasimhallu Chetty, husband of Jayalakshmiammal, was having only limited leasehold right over the suit property alone, since during his life time, he had paid the rent till 1960 and thereafter, his wife Jayalakshmiammal paid the rent till her death in 1975 to the temple. In view of these admitted facts, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent, the suit land originally belonged to the plaintiff as admitted by the both parties. Whileso, even if the plaintiff temple accepts the case of the defendant, a mere question of executing a settlement deed dated 20.01.1975 for a portion of the land in favour of the defendant has to be held non-est in the eye of law, for the reason that the original tenant-Narasimallu Chetty, in whose favour a part of the land was leased out to an extent of 3 grounds and 802 sq.ft., was paying the rent to the temple till his life time, that is, upto 1960 and after his death, his wife Jayalakshmiammal continued in paying the rent until her death in 1975 and again, the said Jayalakshmiammal, widow of Narasimallu Chetty, without the permission of the temple, had executed the settlement deed, which is admittedly on 20.01.1975. Moreover, even from the settlement deed dated 20.01.1975, it is clear that the settlor was having only leashold right, therefore, the settlee-defendant cannot have any more right bigger than the leashold right in the suit property, therefore, the findings rendered by the first appellate Court that the plaintiff has proved his title for delivery of possession, being absolutely in order, cannot be found fault with. Accordingly, third and fourth substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant. 13. Accordingly, third and fourth substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant. 13. Again, another vital fact is that though the defendant initially filed her written statement taking a stand that she is the tenant, but, subsequently, in her additional written statement, it was claimed that she was having absolute right over the property, therefore, from this inconsistent stand, it could be seen that the defendant has forfeited his right as statutory tenant. Even when the defendant filed an application under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act seeking a direction to sell the property, the same was dismissed, but, she has not filed any appeal against that dismissal order and there is no explanation whatsoever given for not taking steps against the dismissal of the said application. Accordingly, the first and second substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant. 14. In fine, for the reasons stated above, this Court is inclined to dismiss the second appeal and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court is hereby confirmed. No Costs.