A.K. Pathak, J.:-- 1. Aggrieved by the Award dated 2nd February, 2001 of Labour Court-VI, Delhi petitioner has preferred this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Industrial Adjudicator has directed the petitioner to reinstate respondent Nos. 1 and 2 with full back wages and continuity of service. 2. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 raised industrial dispute which was referred by the Secretary (Labour) to Labour Court for adjudication in the following terms:- “Whether the services of Shri Ghanshyam and Sh. Dharam Veer have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management, all if so, to what relief are they entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect” 3. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed statements of claim separately. Respondent No. 1 alleged that he joined the petitioner on 28th December, 1988 as a daily wager. Respondent No. 2 claimed that he joined the petitioner on 21st May, 1987 as a daily wager. Both of them alleged that they had been working in the engineering department of petitioner as a Carpenter and Beldar respectively under the supervision of Junior Engineer-Shri Suresh Bhaskar and Assistant Engineer-Shri Chander Mani till they were illegally terminated on 20th January, 1992 and 21st February, 1992 respectively. They worked with the petitioner continuously for 240 days without any break in service in each completed year of their service. Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘the Act’, for short) was not complied with by the petitioner. Demand notice was served on the petitioner on 20th February, 1992 and 4th March, 1992 respectively, but to no effect. Hence, it was prayed that they be reinstated with continuity of service and back wages. 4. In written statement, petitioner denied that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 joined on the dates as mentioned in their statements of claim. It was denied that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had worked upto 20th January, 1992 and 21st February, 1992 respectively. Petitioner denied that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had worked continuously for 240 days in each completed year without any break of service. It was alleged that respondents had not even specified the number of officials under whom they worked for the alleged period. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had performed work as a daily wagers against a non regular post, thus, no notice was required to be served on them. Respondent Nos. It was alleged that respondents had not even specified the number of officials under whom they worked for the alleged period. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had performed work as a daily wagers against a non regular post, thus, no notice was required to be served on them. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 worked with the petitioner till the availability of job and on completion of work their services were not required. 5. Parties led their respective evidence. On scrutiny of evidence adduced by the parties Industrial Adjudicator has, inter alia, held that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had performed 240 days of continuous service in the year preceding their termination. This finding was returned solely on the basis of affidavits of the respondents. It was further held that termination was illegal for non compliance of Section 25F of the Act. It was further held that petitioner had not produced any documentary evidence in the shape of Muster Roll, payment voucher etc. to indicate that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had not worked with it for 240 days, thus, an adverse inference was to be drawn against them. 6. I find the view taken by the Industrial Adjudicator to be perverse and contrary to well settled legal position. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had alleged that they had worked for 240 days in a year, thus, burden to prove this fact rests on respondents. Their bald statements in this regard was not sufficient and something more was required in the shape of documentary evidence or for that matter statement of their co-worker. It is a cardinal principle of law as envisaged under the Evidence Act, 1872 that onus to prove a fact lies upon such person who alleges the same. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002) 3 SCC 25 , Supreme Court has held thus ‘in our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. In Surendranagar Distt. Panchayat and Anr. v. Gangaben Laljibhai and Ors. 2006 (6) SCALE 408 , Supreme Court held that the burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer. Similar is the view expressed in Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar (2002) 8 SCC 400 . 7. In the light of above discussions, writ petition is allowed and impugned Award is set aside.