Judgment : G.S. Patel, J. 1. The Petitioner (“Mrs. Nair”) is an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa. She practices in the name of her firm, M/s JMB Partners, formerly M/s Mohana Nair Associates. Till the events occasioning this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India overtook her, she was among the lawyers empanelled with the Indian Bank, Mumbai. Through her firm, she provided various legal services to Indian Bank, including giving legal opinions on titles to immovable property. It is the context of one such set of transactions, involving a group of constituents or borrowers from Indian Bank, that Mrs. Nair finds herself accused of various criminal offences by the 1st Respondent, the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”). The CBI acted suo-motu in filing a First Information Report on 30th June 2008. This was initially filed only against the then Chief Manager of the Indian Bank, one C. Sakhtivel, and others but not Mrs. Nair, alleging, inter alia, cheating and forgery. A few months later, on 22nd November 2008, the CBI recorded the statements of Indian Bank’s Senior Manager, Audit Inspections & Marketing, Harshad Vinod Chandra Shah, and of another bank employee, one D.A. Xavier. Further statements were recorded later that year and again in 2009. On 3rd December 2009, the Indian Bank refused sanction to prosecute Sakhtivel, the Chief Manager of its King’s Circle Branch. On 31st May 2011, a charge-sheet was filed against various persons. Mrs. Nair was named Accused No.8, but the charge-sheet excluded some of those against whom the FIR was first filed. Mrs. Nair says she has been wrongly accused, that she is innocent of all wrong-doing and seeks an order quashing this charge-sheet as against her. 2. From 1988, when Mrs. Nair was appointed to the Indian Bank’s panel of Advocates, she was entrusted with diverse matters. These included matters in this Court, in the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Mumbai and in other courts. When asked, she also gave the Indian Bank legal opinions, prepared drafts of documents relating to the bank’s lending transactions, investigated immovable property titles, issued title certificates and so on. Her client list includes several other banks and corporations. She says there has never been a complaint about the quality of her work. 3. When asked, she also gave the Indian Bank legal opinions, prepared drafts of documents relating to the bank’s lending transactions, investigated immovable property titles, issued title certificates and so on. Her client list includes several other banks and corporations. She says there has never been a complaint about the quality of her work. 3. In 2003–2004, she was asked by Indian Bank’s King’s Circle Branch, Mumbai, to give her legal opinion in relation to the title documents for five row houses in Friends Cooperative Housing Society, Airoli, Navi Mumbai. These row houses were said to have been purchased by five different individuals, who had approached Indian Bank’s King’s Circle Branch for housing loans. The five individuals submitted separate title documents. The Chief Manager of the branch concerned sought Mrs. Nair’s legal opinion on each of the five sets of title documents sent on to her. She was not required to cause a search to be taken in the land records, but was only asked to opine on the documents forwarded to her. On examining the documents, Mrs. Nair found that additional documents, common to all five cases, were required. She called for these. Some were sent to her. She gave five separate opinions. In these she out the documents placed before her and also listed those not provided. Her opinions were stated to be based on the documents provided (notably, the builders’ letter that the properties involved were encumbrance-free) and contained caveats, being said to be subject to the documents not provided, on which she rightly declined to express any opinion. Her opinions also said that valid mortgages could be created “if the original of the Agreement for Sale” and certain other documents were deposited with the Bank. 4. It seems that the borrowers also submitted the same title documents to four other banks — State Bank of India, Allahabad Bank, Dena Bank and Corporation Bank — to obtain loans. Four of the five banks were defrauded by the borrowers. The CBI launched prosecutions (There is a separate charge-sheet filed in regard to the loans taken from the other banks). Among those involved at various stages in the transactions between the Indian Bank and the borrowers were valuers on that bank’s panel, and its own officers. Indian Bank refused sanction to prosecute its own officers, and there was no prosecution against the empanelled valuers. Among those involved at various stages in the transactions between the Indian Bank and the borrowers were valuers on that bank’s panel, and its own officers. Indian Bank refused sanction to prosecute its own officers, and there was no prosecution against the empanelled valuers. The CBI also did not proceed against the lawyers who acted for the other defrauded banks. 5. We are not here concerned with the details of this fraud or the various transactions, but only with the case sought to be made out by the CBI against Mrs. Nair. We must note here that the panel Advocates for the other banks gave statements to the CBI explaining the procedure they followed. Briefly, these explanations or statements are to the effect that Advocates are not required to make ‘site visits’, nor to meet builders/developers; that their opinions as to title are always only ever based on the documents furnished to them, and, further, that land records are only checked if specifically required by their clients (viz., the banks). The CBI seems to have accepted these statements and chosen not to proceed against those advocates. Mrs. Nair’s opinions, appended to the petition, (Pages 70 to 92, including the request letters from Indian Bank) demonstrate that she, too, followed the same procedure. We have not been shown anything to distinguish Mrs. Nair’s work from that of the other lawyers. She alone stands accused. 6. What is the CBI’s case against Mrs. Nair? She has been accused of various acts of “omission and commission” and of conspiring with the borrowers. That portion of the charge-sheet that is against Mrs. Nair lists the following six heads of charge, viz., that: (3Charge-sheet dated 31.5.2011, Ex. “A” to the Petition, p. 49; at p. 53L) (i) She failed to establish the identity of the property; (ii) She failed to establish the links in the chain of the title; (iii) She failed to obtain all consents, permissions, no objection certificate for transfer of the property; (iv) She failed to confirm whether encumbrance certificate was obtained by accused borrower from Land Registration authorities for the last 13 years; (v) She failed to confirm the municipal and property tax paid by accused borrower; (vi) The legal scrutiny report give on prescribed format of the bank are not completed in all respects. A seventh ‘charge’, not in the charge-sheet, but listed in the Affidavit in Reply 1st June 2012 in a manner that suggests it is a charge, says this: (vii) The Petitioner failed to search with Sub-Registrar office and has also not verified from the copies of the deeds available with Registrar as there is no such practice is not tenable. This is not even in the original complaint by Harshad Vinod Chandra Shah, the Senior Manager, Audit, Inspection & Marketing of Indian Bank. 7. It is on this basis that the CBI proposes to prosecute Mrs. Nair for criminal conspiracy, cheating and forgery under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (The charge-sheet mentions Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC). We must note that Mrs. Nair stands accused in four of the five transactions in question. For the fifth, she has been cited only as a witness. 8. We have, with the assistance of Mr. Dada, Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, seen the opinions given by Mrs. Nair. In each of these, she clearly states that the originals of the documents are required for creating any security against a loan. The opinions are also said to be specifically “subject to what is stated hereinabove”, a reference to the preceding paragraph or paragraphs, in which she sets out that essential documents were not given to her. Mr. Solanki, Learned Advocate appearing for the CBI, insisted that Mrs. Nair’s ‘omissions’, as he called them, were deliberate and intentional, and indicated sufficient criminality in intent, design and execution to warrant prosecution. He attempted to establish a link between the borrowers, the errant officer of Indian Bank (for whose prosecution the bank refused sanction) and the borrowers. 9. Unfortunately for Mr. Solanki, the CBI’s reach exceeds its grasp. Mrs. Nair’s opinions were sufficiently caveated. They were based on documents given to her by her clients. She could not be expected to conjure up new and additional material not sought or given to her by Indian Bank. There is nothing to show that she ever had any form of contact, direct, indirect, express or implied, with a single one of the borrowers. The bank did not once ask her to certify or vouch for the authenticity of the title documents given to her. Indian Bank did not commission her to cause a search to be taken in the land registries. The bank did not once ask her to certify or vouch for the authenticity of the title documents given to her. Indian Bank did not commission her to cause a search to be taken in the land registries. Had it done so, the scope of her work might have been very different. She was only asked if, in her professional opinion, the documents supplied to her were sufficient for the creation of equitable mortgages as security and the advancement of loans to the borrowers. It is not possible to conclude that she was wanting — and criminally wanting — in her professional work by stretching the contours of the brief to her to include items and matters not specifically sought as Mr. Solanki would have us do. None of the six ‘charges’ formed any part of her brief. 10. The CBI’s case against Mrs. Nair is riddled with more holes than a colander. It has not proceeded against any of the other lawyers who too were engaged by other banks and which, too, were similarly defrauded, though those lawyers did exactly the same work in the same manner as Mrs. Nair. Statements taken by the CBI show that the bank’s personnel’s own view was that the errant officers acted contrary to Mrs.Nair’s opinion in disbursing loans (Statements of Indian Bank’s Senior Manager, Audit Inspections & Marketing (Mr. Harshad Shah), para 6, petition page 63; and its Chief Manager (Mr. D. A. Xavier), internal pages 16, 20, 21). The bank’s officers do not allege criminality by Mrs. Nair. They say that there should have been a 30-year search report, overlooking that no such report had been sought, but there is still no allegation that Mrs. Nair conspired or colluded with the borrowers. This is the foundation of the CBI’s case. Therefore, even the CBI did not itself initially contemplate action against Mrs. Nair — the CBI’s request for sanction to prosecute Indian Bank’s Chief Manager only says that he and other officials of the bank did not follow her legal opinion (Paper-book, p. 167. The Chief Manager of Indian Bank, C. Sakhtivel, was punished in departmental proceedings with a reduction of pay by two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of two years, etc. This is said to be a major penalty). What seems to have completely escaped the CBI is that Mrs. The Chief Manager of Indian Bank, C. Sakhtivel, was punished in departmental proceedings with a reduction of pay by two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of two years, etc. This is said to be a major penalty). What seems to have completely escaped the CBI is that Mrs. Nair’s opinion clearly recommended the delivery of original documents to the bank as a precondition for the disbursement of any loan. If the bank’s officer chose to advance loans on photocopies, Mrs. Nair cannot be pilloried for this. Crucially, Mrs. Nair was not among those against whom the FIR was filed; she was introduced as an accused only later. Nowhere in the charge-sheet or, for that matter, in the Affidavit in Reply, do we find the slightest hint of any cogent material indicating any mens rea on the part of Mrs. Nair. 11. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hardeo Singh v State of Bihar, (2000 Cri L J 2978) Mr Solanki suggested that, at least for the purposes of Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, it is sufficient if there is some connecting link or factor between the accused and the fellow conspirators. It need not be iron-clad. That Mrs. Nair gave an opinion is, in his submission, sufficient. We disagree. The link must be one that connects the various persons accused in the conspiracy. It must be shown that the fraudsters had some nexus or dealings, perhaps even an indirect connection, with Mrs. Nair. Of this there is simply no evidence, and Mr. Solanki could show none apart from pointing out that she had given a set of opinions when requested. We understood his submission to mean, essentially, that “she could not have given the opinion that she did but for her having some connection with the accused borrowers”. This is clutching at straws. It proceeds on the assumption that Mrs. Nair’s opinions are legally wrong or infirm. The CBI’s own material shows to the contrary, for its case was, at first, based on recorded statements, that the bank’s officer did not act in conformity with her opinion, a statement that posits that her opinion was, in fact, correct. This is clutching at straws. It proceeds on the assumption that Mrs. Nair’s opinions are legally wrong or infirm. The CBI’s own material shows to the contrary, for its case was, at first, based on recorded statements, that the bank’s officer did not act in conformity with her opinion, a statement that posits that her opinion was, in fact, correct. The Supreme Court later dealt with precisely the issue of Section 120-B in a case against an advocate, and held that a criminal conspiracy is not established on mere suspicion, surmise or inference unsupported by cogent and acceptable evidence (CBI v K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC 512 ). In this case, the entire argument is based not on any material but on extrapolation, surmise, and conjecture. Such fevered imaginations have no place in criminal law. 12. Mr. Solanki’s reliance on State of MP v S. B. Johari ( 2000 CrLJ 944 ) is similarly misplaced. That decision only says that at the time of framing of charges, only a prima-facie view is necessary to determine whether there is sufficient ground to proceed; an appreciation of evidence is not required. In this case, there is not even a hint of anything remotely resembling a prima-facie case against Mrs. Nair; nor can Johari be mis-read to suggest that every and any allegation, no matter how wayward or fanciful, must be investigated; or that the moment an allegation is made, a prima-facie case must be held to have been made out. Were that so, Section 482 would be rendered entirely otiose. 13. This argument is, in fact, defeated by the Mr. Solanki’s next submission, which is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v Vangaveeti Nagaiah (2009 All MR (Cri) 2466 (S.C.). That decision in terms held that a complaint that does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive may be quashed in exercise of a High Court’s discretion under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The case against Mrs. Nair fits all three descriptions: it is entirely frivolous, thoroughly vexatious and undeniably oppressive. 14. Mr. Dada is, in our view, completely justified in contending that if ever there was a case that demanded the exercise of discretion under both Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, this is it. Nair fits all three descriptions: it is entirely frivolous, thoroughly vexatious and undeniably oppressive. 14. Mr. Dada is, in our view, completely justified in contending that if ever there was a case that demanded the exercise of discretion under both Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, this is it. The principles underlying the exercise of such a discretion are now well settled by a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court. Of the list of illustrative categories of cases set out in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335) where such discretion can properly be exercised, the first, third and fifth apply squarely to this case. Even if taken at their face, and accepted in their entirety, the allegations against Mrs. Nair do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out even a vestige of a case against her (Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 ). No material discloses the commission of any offence by her. To the contrary: the allegations against her are both absurd and inherently improbable. There is no ground whatever for proceeding against her. The Affidavit in Reply does not help. It only makes preposterous that which was, in its inception, absurd. It is, in our view, very likely that Mrs. Nair is being victimized and that the entire criminal proceeding against her is actuated by mala fides and malice. Nothing else explains her being singled out for such special treatment when other lawyers who did exactly the same work following precisely the same protocols were excluded, their explanations being found to be adequate. 15. Our powers to quash such proceedings are wide, albeit guided. We must endeavour to secure the ends of justice and prevent the abuse of the process of any court (Gian Singh v State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 ). Where there is no possibility of a trial resulting in a conviction—and in this case, there is not even the remotest possibility of a conviction—then forcing a person to withstand a trial whose outcome is foregone conclusion is not only an exercise in futility, but amounts to a misuse of the criminal law to oppress the innocent (Shiji v Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 ). That can never be permitted. 16. That can never be permitted. 16. The entire matter can be concluded simply by following the principles in Narayana Rao, (Supra)cited by Mr. Dada. There, as here, an Advocate was sought to be prosecuted. There, as here, the case against the advocate was on “mere suspicion and surmises … not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.” In that case, too, the advocate was not named in the FIR, and there was no specific reference to his role with the other accused. The Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the Court to ascertain whether there is any prima-facie material; and this, and nothing more, has been our endeavour as well. Unless we find that there is at least a prima-facie case against an advocate who gave an opinion—a ‘best judgment assessment’, as it were, based on her knowledge of the law, her appreciation of the facts and her reading of the documents— that he played an active role in the fraud alleged, we cannot but conclude that there is no case to be made out against that advocate. 17. It seems to us unlikely that the CBI was unaware of the Supreme Court’s decision in Narayana Rao (Supra). That it chose to ignore that decision defies comprehension. The Narayana Rao decision was delivered on 21st September 2012. A year later, before us, the CBI persisted in arguing to the contrary though the matter before us appears to be on all fours with the Supreme Court decision. We expected rather more fairness in approach from a premier investigative agency. A factor that differentiates this case from Narayana Rao is that here there were other banks involved, as were their lawyers. Those lawyers did no more and no less than Mrs. Nair. Yet she alone was singled out. The CBI does not explain why this should have been so, or whether the other advocates acted differently, or Mrs. Nair failed to do something they did, or why their statements to the CBI as to their professional conduct were found sufficiently exculpatory but hers were not. 18. We believe that this is a fit case for the award of costs against the CBI and in favour of the Petitioner, and that these costs should not be illusory. For three long years, the Petitioner has had her till then unsullied professional reputation besmirched, and for no good reason. 18. We believe that this is a fit case for the award of costs against the CBI and in favour of the Petitioner, and that these costs should not be illusory. For three long years, the Petitioner has had her till then unsullied professional reputation besmirched, and for no good reason. That they have done so is plain. It stares us in the face. For no fault of her own, the Petitioner has lost a client (perhaps all to the good, given the Indian Bank’s equally deplorable conduct). But she has also had to suffer the slings and arrows of a truly outrageous fortune at the hands of the CBI. However, since in the very similar case of Narayana Rao, the Supreme Court did not impose costs, we follow suit and stay our hands. We do so just this once. Should happenstance bring another such case before us, the CBI will not find us quite so accomodating. 19. The Writ Petition succeeds and is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (b). The Charge Sheet No.2 in CBI Case No. RC/B1/2008/A0016 CC Case No.458 of 2011 pending on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai is quashed but only as against the Petitioner. The matter to proceed against the other accused. 20. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this order.