Magray, J.:-- This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment dated 10.09.2012 passed by the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 1277/2011, dismiss­ing the writ petition. 2. The petitioner's case set up in the writ petition is that, in terms of order No. 254-57 dated 22.05.2009 issued by respondent No. 3 (Executive Officer), he was appointed as Cleaner in Class IV pay scale of Rs. 2550-3200 in the Mu­nicipal Committee, Ganderbal, against an available post 'in due course of law'. He claims that his service book was prepared and entries were made therein. For couple of months prior to 31.05.2010, he was attached with re­spondent No. 2 (Director, Urban Local Bodies, Kashmir), However, vide letter dated 31.05.2010, he was relieved by the said respondent with direction to report at Municipal Committee, Ganderbal, his original place of posting, for further duties. Appellant further averred in the writ petition that, in terms of the above order, he reported in the Municipal Committee, Ganderbal, but he was not being as­signed any proper job commensurate with his rank and position, nor was he paid salary thereafter. Apprehending that respondents might dispense with his services, he filed the writ petition seeking a writ of Mandamus com­manding the respondents, inter alia, to allow him to continue on the post of Cleaner and to pay him the withheld salary. The appellant also prayed for a writ of prohibition to direct the respon­dents not to terminate, remove or dis­turb his services. 3. In response, the respondents in their objections took the stand that none of the legal, constitutional or fun­damental rights of the petitioner had been violated or infringed; that the pe­titioner seeks a relief dehors the law; that in view of the embargo on filling up of posts or making engagements on casual or consolidated basis imposed vide Government order No. 214-HUD of 2008 dated 23.05.2008, any exercise of any functionary of engaging individu­als at any level is rendered incompe­tent and that respondent No. 3 did not have the power to undertake such an exercise; that the petitioner's appoint­ment was dehors the aforesaid Govern­ment order and that, since the peti­tioner had not challenged the said Gov­ernment order, he cannot seek any consideration in violation thereof. 4. 4. The learned Writ Court dismissed the writ petition, observing and hold­ing as under: "If any recruitment is to be made against Class IV post, due selection process is required to be followed. While going through the order (su­pra), on which the foundation of the writ petition has been laid, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that pe­titioner came to be engaged without following due procedure established under law. The order has been passed in the interests of administra­tion as if the Executive Officer was passing order of transfer. The order on the face of it is dehors rules and without any competence. It is a back door entry." 5. In this appeal, the judgment of the learned Writ Court is challenged mainly on two grounds: first, that in terms of Schedule 1-B of the Civil Ser­vice Regulations, the Executive Officer, being a Class IV Officer, was compe­tent to make the appointment of the appellant on a class IV post; and sec­ond, that the appointment of the appel­lant having been made on temporary basis, Government order No. 214-HUD of 2008 dated 23.05.2008 does not ap­ply and that the appointment of the appellant is governed by the J&K Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1961 and, hence, not dehors the Rules. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the mat­ter. 7. Before we advert to the conten­tions raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it needs a mention that the appellant has made a specific averment in the writ petition that his appoint­ment was made "in due course of law". The phrase "in due course of law" is synonymous to "in due process of law" and "in accordance with the law of the land". The law of the land man­dates that a public post can be filled up only in accordance with the procedure laid down in the relevant recruitment rules. 8. The Municipal Committee, Ganderbal, is the creation of a Statute, namely, the Jammu and Kashmir Mu­nicipal Act, 2000 (for short the Act). Section 307 of the Act relates to the posts in Municipality and appointments thereto. 8. The Municipal Committee, Ganderbal, is the creation of a Statute, namely, the Jammu and Kashmir Mu­nicipal Act, 2000 (for short the Act). Section 307 of the Act relates to the posts in Municipality and appointments thereto. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec­tion 307 provide as under: "(1) Subject to the provisions con­tained in this Act and any other con­dition of services prescribed by the Government by notification, the Mu­nicipality may with the previous ap­proval of the Government or any other officer authorized in this behalf, ap­point such officers and servants as it considers necessary for the efficient discharge of its duties. (2) The qualifications, method of re­cruitment, salaries, leave, allowances and other conditions of service, includ­ing disciplinary matters of such offic­ers and servants shall be such as may be prescribed" The Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 307 and all other enabling provisions of the Act has made the Rules called as the Jammu and Kashmir Urban Local Body Insti­tutions (Management) Service Recruit­ment Rules, 2008 (for short the Rules of 2008). Rule 5 of the Rules of 2008 prescribes the qualification and method of recruitment. It reads as un­der: "(1) No person shall be eligible for appointment or promotion to any post in any class, category or grade in the service unless he/she possesses the qualification as laid down in Sched­ule-Hand fulfils other requirements of recruitment as provided in the rules and orders for the time being in force. (2) Appointment to the service shall be made: (a) by direct recruitment; or (b) by promotion; or (c) partly by (a) and partly by (b) in the ratio and in manner as mentioned against each post in Schedule -II; Provided that all posts to be filled up by promotion/direct recruitment shall be referred to the Departmental Promotion Committee(s)/ Selection Agency as the case may be." In Schedule-II appended to the aforesaid Rules, the post of Cleaner is shown to be Class VI, Category (c) post. The method of recruitment is pre­scribed 100% by direct recruitment and the minimum qualification for di­rect recruitment is prescribed as Matric. 9. The proviso appended to Rule 5 of the Rules of 2008, quoted hereinabove, unambiguously prescribes that all posts to be filled up by direct recruitment shall be referred to Selection Agency. The claim of the appellant is that he was appointed on 22.05.2009. 9. The proviso appended to Rule 5 of the Rules of 2008, quoted hereinabove, unambiguously prescribes that all posts to be filled up by direct recruitment shall be referred to Selection Agency. The claim of the appellant is that he was appointed on 22.05.2009. The Rules of 2008 have been promulgated vide SRO 417 dated 18.12.2008; meaning thereby that as on the date the appel­lant claims to have been appointed, the Rules of 2008 were in operation. Admit­tedly, the post was not referred to the Selection Agency. Consequently, the appellant's appointment has not been made in accordance with the mandate of proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules of 2008. Any appointment made in contraven­tion of the aforesaid Rule and without observing the procedure established by law cannot, but be dehors the Rules. Since the appointment was made in total disregard of the aforesaid provi­sion of the Rules of 2008, it cannot, but be termed as a backdoor appointment. 10. The issue of appointments made dehors the rules has come up before the Supreme Court umpteen times. In Satchidananda Misra v State of Orissa, (2004) 8 SCC 599 , Rules had been made in 1979 and the appoint­ments made in 1980 under the 1973 rules. The Supreme Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment held as under: "It is an admitted position that the provisions of the 1979 Rules were not followed and the appointments made in 1980 were after the said Rules had been enforced. ... This, in our opin­ion, is an illegality which strikes at the root of the appointment and, there­fore, it is beyond the scope of the leg­islature to validate such illegal ap­pointments as any such appointment w9ould violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution..." 11. In a recent judgment in Bhupendra Nath Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2013) 2 SCC 516 , the Apex Court has again had the occasion to deal with the issue. While referring to some of the earlier judgments, it was observed and held as under: "53. In University of Kashmir v Mohd. Yasin [ (1974) 3 SCC 546 ] this Court expressed the view that an equitable ground does not clothe an appoint­ment with a legal status. Similar view was also expressed in Swapan Kumar Pal v. Samitabhar Chakrabor3ty [ (2001) 5 SCC 581 ]. 54. In University of Kashmir v Mohd. Yasin [ (1974) 3 SCC 546 ] this Court expressed the view that an equitable ground does not clothe an appoint­ment with a legal status. Similar view was also expressed in Swapan Kumar Pal v. Samitabhar Chakrabor3ty [ (2001) 5 SCC 581 ]. 54. In State of Haryana v. Haryana Veterinary and AHTS Assn., [(2000) 8 SCO 4], a three-Judge Bench, after x-ray of the relevant rules, came to hold that when appoints are made in violation of the recruitment rules, the said appointments cannot be treated to be regular. 55. The aforesaid authorities clearly lay down the principle that when there is violation of the recruitment rules, the recruitment is unsustain­able..." In paragraphs 61, 63 & 64 of the judgment, the Apex Court observed as under: "61. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to reiterate the oft stated principle that the State is a model employer and it is required to act fairly giving due regard and respect to the rules framed by it. But in the present case, the State has atrophied the rules. Hence, the need for hammer­ing the concept. 62.... 63. In State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] (SCC p. 18 para 6) the Constitution Bench, while dis­cussing the role of State in recruitment procedure, stated that if rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accor­dance with the rules, for the State is meant to be a model employer. 64. In Mehar Chand Polytechnic v. Anu Lamba [ (2006) 7 SCC 161 ] (SCC p. 166, para 16) the Court observed that public employment is a facet of right to equality envisaged under Ar­ticle 16 of the Constitution of India and that the recruitment rules are framed with a view to give equal op­portunity to all the citizens of India entitled for being considered for re­cruitment in the vacant posts." 12. In view of the recruitment rules in the instant case, as quoted above, and the fact that appointment of the appellant was made in 2009 when the recruitment Rules were framed in 2008, applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, no exception can be taken to the judg­ment of the learned Writ Court, hold­ing that the appointment of the appel­lant was dehors the Rules and, there­fore, a backdoor appointment. 13. Mr. B. A. Bashir, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the appellant, while inviting our attention to the or­der of appointment, contended that it manifestly shows that the order was passed with approval of the Director, Urban Local Bodies, Kashmir, and, therefore, was validly issued. The ar­gument is fallacious and misconceived simpliciter. No amount of tacit or ex­press connivance at an illegality can validate an action otherwise dehors the Constitutional mandate and the Rules governing the subject. 14. Mr. Bashir, learned Senior coun­sel, further contended that the ap­pointment of the appellant-writ peti­tioner being temporary, there was no requirement of following the procedure for making such appointments as es­tablished under law. Again the argu­ment is noted only to be rejected. The Rules of 2008 do not contemplate mak­ing of temporary appointments. Even if it were so, law is settled that even while making temporary appoint­ments, the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has to be ob­served in letter and spirit. Reference to Rule 5 sub-rule (2) of J&K Civil Ser­vices (Temporary Service) Rules 1961 by Mr. Bashir, therefore, is misplaced. It may be observed here that the Rules of 1961 were framed in context of the provision of temporary appointments then contained in Rule 14 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956 which provided continua­tion of a temporary / ad hoc appoint­ment until the selections were made and cases were conceivable that a tem­porary appointee could be continued for years. Reference in this context may be made to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Thomas Masiah v State of J&K, 2004 (2) JKJ 197 , wherein the Court has traced the purport of the 1961 Rules. Therefore, the Temporary Rules of 1961 have no application in the instant case. Reference in this context may be made to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Thomas Masiah v State of J&K, 2004 (2) JKJ 197 , wherein the Court has traced the purport of the 1961 Rules. Therefore, the Temporary Rules of 1961 have no application in the instant case. The contention of learned coun­sel for the appellant as to competence of respondent No. 3 to make appoint­ment of the appellant is also not ten­able because the appointment was made in total disregard of the recruit­ment rules. 15. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the appoint­ment of the appellant was dehors the prescribed Rules and, therefore, illegal. Appellant is seeking a command in the nature of Mandamus to compel the re­spondents to perpetuate an illegality. A writ of Mandamus cannot be issued to perpetuate an illegality and this Court cannot issue directions that a mistake be perpetuated on any ground whatsoever. Accordingly, we do not see any ground to interfere with the judg­ment of the learned Single Judge. 16. Before parting with this judg­ment, we may make a reference to, and quote, the first prayer made in the present Letters Patent Appeal hereunder: "By issuance of Writ of Certiorari the impugned judgment dated 10.9.2012 passed by Learned Single (sic for Learned Single Judge) (Annexure A/1) may be set aside." The memorandum of appeal is shown to have been settled by Mr. B. A. Bashir, Senior Advocate, who has signed it as such. We assume that the prayer seeking issuance of writ of certiorari for setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge is a mis­take that has crept in by a sheer over­sight and is a bona fide mistake. We treat it as such. 17. This appeal is, accordingly, dis­missed alongwith the connected CMP(s), however, without any order as to costs. Interim direction, if any passed and subsisting shall stand va­cated.