JUDGMENT 1. -This writ petition is directed against the judgment dated 18.12.1997 passed by the Board of Revenue, which has reversed the order dated 7.8.1991 of the Sub Divisional Officer and the order dated 30.6.1994 of the Revenue Appellate Authority, whereby the injunction was granted in favour of the defendant-petitioner in a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents. The Board of Revenue has relying on its earlier judgment in Hanumanaram v. Danaram, 1996 RRD 100 , held that the defendant would not be entitled to order of injunction if he has not filed counter claim or cross-objection or counter suit. 2. Shri J.P. Goyal, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, in assailing the aforesaid judgment of the Board of Revenue, has argued that the defendant can be granted an injunction against the plaintiff. The only restriction is that the injunction can be claimed by the defendant only when and where the relief claimed arises out of the cause of action disclosed by the plaintiff or is incidental to it. Learned Senior Advocate for the defendant-petitioner, in support of the argument, has relied on the judgment of this Court in Rattu v. Mala and another, AIR 1968 Rajasthan 212 . He also relied on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Dr. Ashis Ranjan Das v. Rajendra Nath Mullick, AIR 1982 Calcutta 529(1) and that of Karnataka High Court in Suganda Bai v. Sulu Bai and others, AIR 1975 Karnataka 137(1) . Learned Senior Advocate for the defendant-petitioner further argued that the status quo order passed by this Court in the present case has been operating for last fifteen years and dispute has not been decided so far. The Sub Divisional Officer may be directed to decide the suit itself within the time bound. 3. Shri Satya Narain Kumawat, learned Counsel for the respondents opposed the writ petition. He was however unable to cite any contrary law to the one cited and relied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the aforesaid judgments. 4. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.This Court in Rattu (supra) while relying on the judgment of the Madras High Court in Sivakami Achi v. Narayana Chettiar, AIR 1939 Mad 495 and in B.F. Varghese v. Joseph Thomas, AIR 1957 Trav. Co. 4. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.This Court in Rattu (supra) while relying on the judgment of the Madras High Court in Sivakami Achi v. Narayana Chettiar, AIR 1939 Mad 495 and in B.F. Varghese v. Joseph Thomas, AIR 1957 Trav. Co. 286 , held that the defendant too can apply for injunction against the plaintiff under Order 39 of the C.P.C. The Calcutta High Court in Dr. Ashis Ran/an Das (supra) held that in a suit filed by the plaintiff the defendant can apply for an interlocutory injunction under Order 39 of the C.P.C. against the plaintiff only if the relief claimed by the defendant arises out of the plaintiffs cause of action or is incidental to it. The Calcutta High Court therein relied on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Suganda Bai v. Sulu Bai, AIR 1975 Kant 137 (supra) which also held that only where the relief claimed by the defendant arose out of the plaintiffs cause of action or was incidental to it that the defendant could apply for an interlocutory injunction against the plaintiff. In Carter v. Fey, 1894 (2) Ch. 541 , the plaintiffs action was for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from carrying on a particular business within a certain limit in Winchester. On the same day the plaintiff moved for an, interlocutory injunction. The defendant entered appearance and thereafter, gave a notice for an interlocutory injunction restraining the plaintiff from using the name of the defendant in carrying on the business of the plaintiff. Both the motions were dismissed in the First Court. On an appeal by the defendant, Lindley L.J. held that the defendant was not entitled to any interlocutory injunction if the same is not in any way comprised in or incidental to the plaintiffs cause of action. In fact, the Karnataka High Court also for laying down the aforesaid proposition of law, relied on the judgment in Collision v. Warren, (1901) 1 Ch. 812 , where Buckley, J., after referring to a number of earlier decisions of the English Courts, quoted Lopes, L.J., in Carter v. Fey, (1894) 2 Ch. In fact, the Karnataka High Court also for laying down the aforesaid proposition of law, relied on the judgment in Collision v. Warren, (1901) 1 Ch. 812 , where Buckley, J., after referring to a number of earlier decisions of the English Courts, quoted Lopes, L.J., in Carter v. Fey, (1894) 2 Ch. 541 at p. 545, "The question is this - whether the defendant can move for an injunction against the plaintiff without filing a counter-claim or issuing a writ in a cross-action. In my opinion, he can in some cases, but only in cases where the defendant's claim to relief arises out of the plaintiffs cause of action, or is incidental to it." 5. The High Court of Allahabad in Central Warehousing Corporation v. Prabhu Narain Singh and another, AIR 2003 All 223 , also dealt with the matter where temporary injunction was claimed by the defendant in a suit of the plaintiff out of the cause of action pleaded by him. Trial Court rejected the application on the ground that no interlocutory order could be granted on such application by the defendant. The High Court in those facts held as under:- "Ordinarily, no temporary injunction can be granted where no such final relief for injunction could have been granted. In the present case the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 have not filed any counter-claim and as such no decree of injunction as final relief can be granted in their favour. It has therefore to be examined whether an interim mandatory injunction against the plaintiff for handing over the goods in his possession to the defendants Central Warehousing Corporation can be granted in the absence of a counterclaim. Temporary injunction can be granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. as well as under Section 151, C.P.C. Rule 2 Order 39 is not applicable to the facts of this case, Order 39, Rule 1 has three Clauses (a), (b) and (c) which cover the circumstances in which a temporary injunction can be granted under that Rule. Clauses (b) and (c) relate to injunctions against certain Acts of the defendant and, therefore, under these Clauses it is only the plaintiff who is entitled to seek injunction. Clauses (b) and (c) relate to injunctions against certain Acts of the defendant and, therefore, under these Clauses it is only the plaintiff who is entitled to seek injunction. Clause (a) however relates to injunction where the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree. Clause (a) of Order 39, Rule 1 is wide enough to cover the grant of injunction in favour of the defendant against the plaintiff. Under Order 39, Rule 1 the Court is empowered to pass order for preventing waste of the property." 6. The High Court of Madras in Sivkami Achi v. Narayana Chettiar, AIR 1939 Mad 495 , reversed the view taken by the Court below that an application under Order 39, Rule 1 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be made on behalf of a defendant, holding it to be erroneous. It observed that if the Lower Court had taken trouble of reading the said provision, especially the words ''by any party", used therein, it would have come to a different conclusion. 7. The High Court of Kerala in Sathyabhama Amma v. Vijaya Amma, AIR 1995 Ker 74 , also dealt with similar issue in a revision petition filed at the instance of the plaintiff contending that Order 39, Rule 1 C.P.C. does not provide for an application for temporary injunction by the defendant against the plaintiff, and such application was incompetent and allowing such application was illegal and unsustainable. It was contended that said Clause (c) of Rule 1 Order 39 C.P.C., inserted by amendment in the C.P.C. in 1976, with addition of words "or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit", in the last portion of the Rule, makes it clear that a defendant in such a suit is not entitled to seek injunction against the plaintiff. Argument was that Clause (c) actually explains and controls Clauses (a) and (b) and a reading of Clause (c) together with the afore-quoted last portion of Clause (c) of Rule 1 Order 39 of the C.P.C., makes it clear that only a plaintiff is entitled to seek an injunction and not the defendant against the plaintiff. Argument was that Clause (c) actually explains and controls Clauses (a) and (b) and a reading of Clause (c) together with the afore-quoted last portion of Clause (c) of Rule 1 Order 39 of the C.P.C., makes it clear that only a plaintiff is entitled to seek an injunction and not the defendant against the plaintiff. Repelling the argument it was held by the Court in para 8 of the judgment, as under, "8. This argument cannot be accepted. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) deal with different situations and they stand independently. Clause (a) deals with the situation where the property in dispute in the suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold or delivered in execution of a decree. Clause (b) deals with the situation where the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding the plaintiff. Clause (c) deals with the situation where the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to the property in dispute in the suit. In all these different situations, the remedy or relief also is provided. In a situation covered by Clause (a), if the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted etc. by any party to the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such objectionable act. In that situation, either the plaintiff or the defendant is entitled to seek for the relief of temporary injunction. May be, that in the two other situations covered by Clauses (b) and (c) it is only the plaintiff who is entitled to seek the injunction against the defendant. The argument that Clause (c) controls the other two Clauses, or that by inserting Clause (c) and adding the words "or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing any injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the Suit", Clauses (a) and (b) stand controlled or explained, cannot be accepted. The insertion of the words quoted supra in the last part of the Rule also does not make matters different. Those words only relate to Clause (c) where threat of dispossession of the plaintiff or injury to the plaintiff in relation to the property in dispute is contemplated." 8. The insertion of the words quoted supra in the last part of the Rule also does not make matters different. Those words only relate to Clause (c) where threat of dispossession of the plaintiff or injury to the plaintiff in relation to the property in dispute is contemplated." 8. In view of the above, it is clear that Clause (a) of Rule 1 Order 39 C.P.C. relates to injunction where the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted or alienated "by any party to the suit" or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree. Clause (a) of Order 39, Rule 1 is therefore wide enough to cover the relief of injunction being granted even to defendant against the plaintiff in his own suit. However, Clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 1 Order 39 C.P.C. relate to injunction against certain Acts of defendant himself, therefore, under these Clauses it is only the plaintiff who is entitled to injunction against defendant and not vice-versa. It must therefore be held that there is no absolute bar for grant of injunction in favour of the defendant even in the suit filed by the plaintiff, if the defendant is able to make out a case with reference to Clause (a) of Rule 1 Order 39 C.P.C. The only restriction is that injunction in favour of the defendant can be granted against the plaintiff in his own suit, without there being any counter claim, only when and where the relief claimed arises out of the plaintiffs cause of action or is an incidental thereto. 9. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 18.12.1997 passed by the Board of Revenue is set aside. The status quo with regard to disputed property, which was continued throughout the pendency of this writ petition, shall be maintained by the parties during pendency of the civil suit. The Sub Divisional Officer is directed to decide the revenue suit within one year from the date copy of this order is produced before him.With that direction, the writ petition stands allowed. This also disposes of the stay application.Petition allowed. *******