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2013 DIGILAW 20 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Ganpatlal Savabhai Godhana

2013-01-11

HARSHA DEVANI

body2013
JUDGMENT : Harsha Devani, J. By this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the applicant-State of Gujarat seeks condonation of delay of 1287 days caused in preferring the application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 19th March, 2008 passed by the learned Special Judge (ACB), Court No. 5, Ahmedabad city in Special Case No. 1 of 2003, whereby the respondent-accused came to be acquitted of the offences under Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1 )(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Mr. H. K. Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor drew the attention of the Court to the averments made in the memorandum of application as well as in the additional affidavit dated 23rd November, 2012 made by Mr. M. D. Mogal, In-charge Under Secretary, Legal Department, Gandhinagar as well as the affidavit in support of the said additional affidavit made by Mr. Bhaveshkumar S. Patel, Additional Public Prosecutor, City Sessions Court, Bhadra, Ahmedabad, to submit that the applicant has duly explained the delay caused in preferring the appeal. It was submitted that during the course of trial, the State was represented by one Mr. R. N. Modi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, who was due to retire at the relevant time. After the judgment came to be rendered on 19th March, 2008, the said Additional Public Prosecutor did not apply for a certified copy of the said judgment, as a result of which the office of the Public Prosecutor did not receive a copy of the judgment. Since the said Additional Public Prosecutor did not submit a certified copy of the said judgment at the relevant time, there was a delay in preferring the appeal. It was pointed out that after the resignation of Mr. Modi, when it came to the knowledge of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, City Sessions Court, Bhadra, Ahmedabad that the certified copy of the judgment had not been applied for, on the instructions of the learned Public Prosecutor, an application for obtaining a certified copy was made and thereafter, steps were taken for preferring the appeal. However, the concerned Public Prosecutor, who was handling the matter, was assigned additional work and as such, the present case had gone out of his sight and hence, there is some delay in rendering the opinion and sending the same to the Legal Department. However, the concerned Public Prosecutor, who was handling the matter, was assigned additional work and as such, the present case had gone out of his sight and hence, there is some delay in rendering the opinion and sending the same to the Legal Department. It was pointed out that the concerned Additional Public Prosecutor has, by filing an additional affidavit before this Court stated that the said fact and has pointed out that there was a delay in sending the opinion on account of oversight and overburden of work and that, henceforth, in future, he would take care to see that the opinions are forwarded to the Legal Department within the prescribed time limit. Under the circumstances, on account of default on the part of the concerned Additional Public Prosecutor, the applicant should not be penalized. It was submitted that it is settled legal position that in cases where there is a delay on the part of the Government, a certain amount of latitude is permissible. In the present case, there is no deliberate negligence on the part of the applicant in prosecuting the matter and as such, the delay deserves to be condoned. 2.1 In support of his submissions, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. T. Purushothama Rai v. K. G. Uthaya and Others, 2012 (3) SCALE 178 for the proposition that the purpose of the Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing the life span for legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused as a result of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack of mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. 2.2 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Godhra v. Lilavatiben Kodar Ranchhod and Others, 2002 (3) GLH 226 and more particularly to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, 1996 (3) SCC 371 : It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court be it by private party or the State are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is a ziomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression sufficient cause should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the course or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. 2.3 It was submitted that the State represents the collective cause of the community and should not be penalised for the lapses of some of its officers. In the present case, on account of the reasons more elaborately set out in the affidavits filed by the In-charge Under Secretary as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, delay has been occasioned in preferring the appeal. Such factors are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental organs and as such, a pragmatic approach is required to be adopted by the Court. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. V. Moideen Kunhi (dead) by LRs, AIR 2009 SC 2577 , wherein the Court had condoned the delay of more than 6500 days from original order and about 300 days from the order in review petition. It was submitted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as laid down in the decisions referred to herein above. Under the circumstances, the delay caused in preferring the appeal deserves to be condoned. 3. Vehemently opposing the application, Mr. It was submitted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as laid down in the decisions referred to herein above. Under the circumstances, the delay caused in preferring the appeal deserves to be condoned. 3. Vehemently opposing the application, Mr. Amit Nair, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the explanation which has been put forth by the applicant for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay is not plausible and does not explain the long period of delay which has been caused in preferring the application. It was submitted that though the impugned judgment and order was rendered on 19th March, 2008, a certified copy was not applied for till as late as on 28th January, 2009. Thus, the certified copy itself came to be applied for after a period of about ten months from the date of the decision. It was submitted that even thereafter, it took a period of about three years for the learned Additional Public Prosecutor to render his opinion as to whether or not an appeal is required to be filed against the impugned judgment and order. It was submitted that the explanation given by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the delay in sending the opinion occurred due to oversight and overburden, is too general in nature and cannot be accepted. It was submitted that the State being tire applicant, may be entitled to a certain degree of latitude, however, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be given a complete go-bye merely because the State Government is the applicant. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd., 2012 (1) GLH 670 , for the proposition that settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157 , for the proposition that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest. It was, accordingly, urged that the delay in the present case is not nominal, but is an inordinate delay of 1287 days. That no sufficient cause has been made out as envisaged under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and as such, the application being devoid of merits, deserves to be rejected. 4. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the respective parties and has perused the decisions cited at the bar. A perusal of the averments made in the memorandum of the application seeking condonation of delay reveals that the impugned judgment and order acquitting the respondent was passed on 19th March, 2008, an application for certified copy thereof was made on 23rd November, 2011, the same was ready for delivery on 1st December, 2011 and was actually obtained on 5th December, 2011. Thereafter, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Ahmedabad city forwarded the proposal to the Legal Department by a letter dated 9th December, 2011 which was received on 16th December, 2011 and the concerned Branch received it on 19th December, 2011. Thereafter, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Ahmedabad city forwarded the proposal to the Legal Department by a letter dated 9th December, 2011 which was received on 16th December, 2011 and the concerned Branch received it on 19th December, 2011. Thereafter, necessary file was prepared and put up by the Deputy Section Officer before the Joint Secretary on 20th December, 2012 who took a decision to prefer an appeal on 22nd December, 2011 and submitted the same before the Secretary and R.L.A. for approval thereof. Thereafter, instructions were issued to the Office of the learned Public Prosecutor, Gujarat High Court on 22nd December, 2011. However, since in the memorandum of application, the period between 19th March, 2011 to 23rd December, 2011 had not been explained, an additional affidavit came to be made by Shri M.D. Mogal, Incharge Under Secretary wherein it is stated that under the Law Officers Rules, the concerned Public Prosecutor is required to send a copy of the judgment with his opinion. In the present case, the concerned Public Prosecutor did not apply for the certified copy and did not send his opinion to the Legal Department; hence, the Legal Department was not aware of the passing of the impugned judgment. Subsequently, the aforesaid fact came to the knowledge of the learned Public Prosecutor who applied for a certified copy and forwarded the same along with his opinion on 9th December, 2011 which was received by the Registry of the Legal Department on 16th December, 2011. Another affidavit has been filed by Mr. Bhavesh Kumar S. Patel, Additional Public Prosecutor, wherein the facts are slightly differently stated. In the said affidavit, it is stated that the learned Additional Public Prosecutor who had conducted the case, gave his resignation vide letter dated 19.8.2008. He did not apply for the certified copy of the judgment dated 19.3.2008. Subsequently when it came to the knowledge of the office of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the certified copy had not been applied for, on the instructions of the main Public Prosecutor, an application for certified copy was made on 20.1.2009 and a copy of the judgment was obtained on 24.4.2009. Subsequently when it came to the knowledge of the office of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the certified copy had not been applied for, on the instructions of the main Public Prosecutor, an application for certified copy was made on 20.1.2009 and a copy of the judgment was obtained on 24.4.2009. Thus, while in the memorandum of application as well as in the affidavit filed by the In-charge Under Secretary, it has been stated that the application for certified copy came to be made on 23rd November, 2011, in the affidavit filed by the concerned Additional Public Prosecutor, it is stated that an application for obtaining the certified copy was made on 20th January, 2009. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further stated that he is working as an Additional Public Prosecutor since 17.9.2008 and that he has been assigned additional work to give opinions in a number of matters and that at the relevant time, many Sessions cases were required to be conducted before the learned Additional City Sessions Judge and as such, he was overburdened. That in addition to his normal work, he was also required to conduct cases in the Evening Court due to which, his work load has increased, and therefore, due to being overburdened, he had lost sight of the receipt of the judgment in the present case. Later on, when it came to his knowledge, he gave his opinion on 9th December, 2011. 5. From the facts noted herein above, it is apparent that though the judgment and order impugned in the appeal was rendered on 19.3.2008, a certified copy thereof was not applied for till 20th January, 2009. However, having regard to the facts stated that the concerned Additional Public Prosecutor had resigned and had not applied for the certified copy and not given his opinion thereof, the explanation to that extent may be said to be quite plausible. However, from the affidavit filed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it is evident that the certified copy of the judgment was obtained on 24.11.2009, however, the opinion along with the certified copy was forwarded by him only on 9.12.2011, after a period of more than two and half years. The sole explanation given for the purpose of such delay is that the concerned Additional Public Prosecutor was overburdened with work and as such, he has lost sight of the matter. The sole explanation given for the purpose of such delay is that the concerned Additional Public Prosecutor was overburdened with work and as such, he has lost sight of the matter. In the opinion of this Court, the said explanation is not a plausible one and does not merit acceptance. On the facts emerging from the record, it cannot be said that the appeal has not been filed despite due diligence having been exercised on the part of the officers concerned. In the present case, apparently, this is a case of negligence, inasmuch as, despite the fact that the impugned judgment and order was delivered on 19.3.2008 and a certified copy thereof was obtained on 24.4.2009, the same was not sent to the Legal Department along with the opinion of the concerned Public Prosecutor till 9.12.2011. It appears that despite the fact that two affidavits in support of the application have been made, the correct facts have still not been brought on record inasmuch as, in the memorandum of application, it is stated that the certified copy was applied for on 23rd November, 2011 and that the legal opinion was obtained on 9.12.2011, which fact is not borne out from the affidavit filed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 6. At this juncture, it may be germane to refer to the decisions on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the respective parties. On behalf of the applicant, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. T. Purushothama Rai v. K. G. Uthaya and Others (supra), wherein the Court has held thus: 13. On the question of limitation and delay this Court in the case of N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing the life span for legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused as a result of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused as a result of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context, this Court observed as follows: "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court." 7. In State of Karnataka v. Y. Moideen Kunhi (dead) by LRs and Others (supra), the Supreme Court held thus: 18. The case at hand is a classic example where the circumstances are the same. More than 4000 acres of land are involved out of which, according to the State, nearly 3500 acres constitute forest land. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skillful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. 19. The expression 'sufficient cause' as appearing in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the 'Limitation Act') must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as was noted by this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major etc. 19. The expression 'sufficient cause' as appearing in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the 'Limitation Act') must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as was noted by this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 . Para 8 of the judgment reads as follows: '8 The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In Re. National Bank of Wales Ltd., (1899) 2 Ch. 629 at p.673 observed, though in a different context: "Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In Re. National Bank of Wales Ltd., (1899) 2 Ch. 629 at p.673 observed, though in a different context: "Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them." 8. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (supra), the Supreme Court held thus: 18. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bone fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. In cases involving the State and its agencies/ instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest. 9. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 , the Supreme Court held thus: 13. Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion? 9. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 , the Supreme Court held thus: 13. Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion? The High Court in its order having noticed the relevant fact in categorical terms held that there was no substance in the plea that it was unaware about the judgment and award passed by the Reference Court since it was a party before the Reference Court and contested the matter. The High Court also found that the decision of the Joint Secretary to acquiesce was communicated to the beneficiary of the acquisition and therefore, its plea about the unawareness of the award and decision taken by the Government cannot be accepted. The High Court in its order emphatically rejected the ground raised by the respondent in that regard. In such view of the matter can it be said that the High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction? 14. It is true that the power to condone the delay rests with the Court in which the application was filed beyond time and decide whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay and ordinarily the superior Court may not interfere with such discretion even if some error is to be found in the discretion so exercised by the Court but where there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay but the delay was condoned, it is a case of discretion not being exercised judicially and the order becomes vulnerable and susceptible for its correction by the superior Court. The High Court having found that the respondent in its application made incorrect submission that it had no knowledge of the award passed by the Reference Court ought to have refused to exercise its discretion. The High Court exercised its discretion on wrong principles. In that view of the matter, we cannot sustain the exercise of discretion in the manner done by the High Court. 10. In Office of the Chief Post Master General & Others v. Living Media India Ltd. and Another (supra), the Supreme Court held thus: 12. It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with Court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. 11. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. 11. On an overall view of the above referred decisions shows that what is laid down is that settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. Even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State. 12. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. 13. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant, must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government make out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. 14. Examining the facts of the present case in the light of the above principles, it is not the case of the applicant that the delay has been occasioned on account of the acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers. 14. Examining the facts of the present case in the light of the above principles, it is not the case of the applicant that the delay has been occasioned on account of the acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers. From the facts noted herein above, it is apparent that this is a case of either lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the Government. The explanation that since the learned Additional Public Prosecutor was overburdened with work and, therefore, could not forward a certified copy of the impugned judgment along with his opinion, is certainly not a plausible explanation and does not explain away a delay of more than one thousand days. True it is that the length of delay is no matter; however, acceptability of the explanation is certainly the criterion. In the present case, as noted herein above, the explanation tendered by the applicant cannot be said to be an acceptable one, hence, no case is made out for condoning the delay. Besides, the present case pertains to a matter under the Prevention of Corruption Act involving an individual whom the trial Court, after appreciating the evidence of record, has acquitted. Thus, the matter does not involve any great public interest and on the other hand the delay caused in preferring the appeal causes serious prejudice to the respondent. 15. It may be noted that the learned Additional Public Prosecutor had strongly urged that the matter be examined on merits before throwing it out on the ground of delay. Though, while considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court is not required to enter into the merits of the appeal, this Court had considered the request made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and examined the merits of the case and found that apart from the fact that the case does not involve any public interest, the same is also not a meritorious case. 16. In the aforesaid premises, no case has been made out so as to justify condonation of an inordinate delay of 1287 days. The application, therefore, fails and is, accordingly, rejected. Rule is discharged. Application dismissed.