Judgment : Abdul Nazeer, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order in W.P.No.81584/2010 dated 6.4.2011 whereby the Learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and has set-aside the order passed by the Labour Court, Gulbarga, in Ref.No.50/2006 dated 25.9.2009. 2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are as under: "Devendrappa was the husband of the first appellant and father of the other appellants. He had been working with the North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation (for short ‘Corporation’), Bidar Division, Bidar as a Driver. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and it was alleged that he had remained unauthorisedly absent for duty from 25.3.1994 to 27.7.1994. After holding an enquiry, the disciplinary authority had dismissed him from service on 22.6.1995. Devendrappa died on 23.12.1995. His wife and children challenged the order of dismissal by filing a claim petition under Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘Act’ for short) in KID No.151/2000 before the Labour Court, Gulbarga. The Labour Court dismissed the claim petition on 31.12.2002 on the ground of limitation and also on merits." 3. The appellants again raised an industrial dispute before the competent authority. Since the conciliation failed, the mater was referred to the Labour Court, Gulbarga, for adjudication wherein it was numbered as Ref.No.50/2006. The Labour Court by Order dated 25.9.2009 has allowed the reference in part. The order of dismissal of the workman was set-aside and the Corporation was directed to pay the terminal benefits to the appellants. 4. The Corporation challenged the said order by filing a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.81584/2010 mainly on the ground that the reference made by the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act was incompetent inasmuch as the Labour Court had already dealt with the matter on merits. Accepting the said contention, the Learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition by Order dated 6.4.2011 and has quashed the award of the Labour Court in Ref.No.50/2006 dated 25.9.2009. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellants would contend that the claim petition filed by the appellants under Section 10(4-A) of the Act before the Labour Court in KID NO.151/2000 was barred by time. The Labour Court ought to have dismissed the petition on the ground of delay alone. The Labour Court should not have passed the order on merits since the claim petition was invalid. The Labour Court ought to have dismissed the petition on the ground of delay alone. The Labour Court should not have passed the order on merits since the claim petition was invalid. Thus, the order of the Labour Court in dismissing the claim petition on merits is a nullity. That is why the claimants raised a dispute again before the competent authority. Since the conciliation failed, the matter was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act. The Labour Court on reference has held that the dismissal of the workman was invalid. Learned Single Judge without taking note of the fact that the order of the Labour Court in Section 10(4-A) proceedings was a nullity, has allowed the writ petition. 6. It is further argued that the Industrial Disputes Act is a social welfare legislation enacted to promote peace and thwart exploitation in industries. It must receive broad interpretation. In this connection, he has relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in SMT. DHANALAKSHMI AND ANOTHER vs. THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS (ILR 1999 KAR 269). He has also relied on the decision of this Court in KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT COPRORATION vs. KHALEEL AHMED AND ANOTHER (ILR 2002 KAR 3827), in support of his contention that the remedy under Section 10(4-A) has to be availed within six months. The order passed by the Labour Court under Section 10(4-A) of the Act on merits is totally without jurisdiction. Therefore, the 2nd claim petition under Section 10(1)(c) was maintainable. 7. On the other hand, Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the Labour Court has dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Section 10(4-A) not only on the ground of limitation but also on merits. The appellants have not challenged the said order. Thus, it has attained finality. The said order is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction. Thereafter, they have raised a dispute before the competent authority, which is not permissible in law. Therefore, the Learned Single Judge is justified in quashing the order of the Labour Court in Ref.No.50/2006 dated 25.9.2009. 8. The appellants have not challenged the said order. Thus, it has attained finality. The said order is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction. Thereafter, they have raised a dispute before the competent authority, which is not permissible in law. Therefore, the Learned Single Judge is justified in quashing the order of the Labour Court in Ref.No.50/2006 dated 25.9.2009. 8. Section 10(4-A) has been inserted by Karnataka Act No.5/1988 w.e.f. 7.4.1988, which provides for a more expeditious remedy to the workman enabling him to redress his grievances without undergoing the ordeal of approaching any Labour Union and without approaching the State Government for referring his case to the Labour Court. The right created under this provision is coupled with a condition that an individual workman has to prefer an application before the Labour Court within the time frame of six months fixed by the Legislature. It is a statutory condition precedent for exercise of the right and the availment of remedy under this Section. An application filed beyond the period of six months prescribed under this provision cannot be entertained by the Labour Court. This position has been made clear by this Court in KHALEEL AHMED’s case (supra). 9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is peremptory in nature. It imposes a duty on the Court to dismiss the applications, which are barred by limitation even if the plea of limitation is not raised. If the claim petition is barred by time, the Court or an adjudicating authority has no power or authority to entertain such an application and decide it on merits. As stated, even in the absence of such a plea by the respondent or opponent, the Court or the authority must dismiss such an application if it is satisfied that the same is barred by limitation. 10. It is settled that an order can be said to be without jurisdiction and a nullity if the Court passing the order exercised a jurisdiction which it did not have. A mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The lack of jurisdiction in the Court passing the order must be patent on its face in order to enable the Court to take cognizance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction. A mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The lack of jurisdiction in the Court passing the order must be patent on its face in order to enable the Court to take cognizance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction. The distinction thus exist between an order passed by the Court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and an order of the Court, which is merely illegal and not in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. 11. In BALVANT N. VISWAMITRA AND OTHERS vs. YADAV SADASHIV MULE (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. AND OTHERS ( (2004) 8 SCC 706 ), the Apex Court has drawn a distinction between a void decree and a decree which is wrong, incorrect and irregular. It has been held that where a Court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or making an order, a decree or order passed by such Court would be without jurisdiction, non est and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the Court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass a decree or make an order. Such defect has always been treated as basic and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a Court or an authority having no jurisdiction is a nullity. Validity of such decree or order can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or collateral proceedings. 12. In the present case, the claim petition filed by the appellants under Section 10(4-A) of the Act was clearly barred by limitation. However, the Labour Court while holding that the application is barred by time has also dismissed the claim petition on merits. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the order of the Labour Court in dismissing the claim petition on merits is a nullity when the application under Section 10(4-A) was filed beyond the period of six months? 13. In ITTYAVIRA MATHAI vs. VARKEY VARKEY ( AIR 1964 SC 907 ), the Supreme Court was considering the validity of a decree where the suit was barred by time. Yet, the Court decreed it. 13. In ITTYAVIRA MATHAI vs. VARKEY VARKEY ( AIR 1964 SC 907 ), the Supreme Court was considering the validity of a decree where the suit was barred by time. Yet, the Court decreed it. The Apex Court has held that if the suit was barred by time and yet the Court decreed it, the Court would be committing an illegality and therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set-aside by preferring an appeal against it. The Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong and that even though it decided wrong, it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be opened to challenge on the basis of nullity. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are as under: “Where a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the party passes a decree it cannot be treated as a nullity and ignored in subsequent litigation even if the suit was one barred by time. If the suit was barred by time and yet, the Court decreed it, the Court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set-aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled that a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong, it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. Courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities. Courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities. It is true that S.3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory and that it is the duty of the Court to take notice of this provision and give effect to it even though the point of limitation is not referred to in the pleadings. Even so it cannot be said that where the Court fails to perform its duty, it acts without jurisdiction. If it fails to do its duty, it merely makes an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity.” 14. In BHAWARLAL BHANDARI vs. UNIVERSAL HEAVY MECHANICAL LIFTING ENTERPRISES ( (1999) 1 SCC 558 ), the Apex Court has held as under: “Even if the decree was passed beyond the period of limitation, it would be an error of law or at the highest, a wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate proceedings and not by the executing Court which was bound by such decree.” 15. It is thus clear that the decision of the Court or an authority is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction if the proceedings has been instituted after the prescribed period. It is only when there is a defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of a subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court or authority to pass the decree/order. Such a defect is incurable. Validity of such order can be challenged at any stage, even in collateral proceedings. 16. In the present case, it is true that the application filed under Section 10(4-A) was beyond the period of limitation. The Labour Court has dismissed the application on the ground of delay and also on merits. The Court did not lack jurisdiction to pass an order. A mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The order passed under Section 10(4-A) is at best a wrong, incorrect or irregular order. The said order cannot be ignored by the parties. The Court did not lack jurisdiction to pass an order. A mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The order passed under Section 10(4-A) is at best a wrong, incorrect or irregular order. The said order cannot be ignored by the parties. Since the appellants have not taken steps to have the error corrected, the erroneous order will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity. The Learned Single Judge is right in holding that since the order passed under Section 10(4-A) has attained finality, the Labour Court could not have ignored it in the second round of litigation. 17. In SMT. DHANALAKSHMI’s case (supra) relied on by the Learned Counsel for the appellants, it has been held that Industrial Disputes Act is a social welfare legislation enacted to promote peace and thwart exploitation in industries and that it must receive broad interpretation. In the present case, the appellants have failed to challenge the order passed under Section 10(4-A). They could not have raised a dispute again contending that the order passed under Section 10(4-A) is a nullity. Therefore, this decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 18. We do not find any merit in this Appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.