JUDGMENT 1. Heard Mr. A. F. Diniz, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. J. P. Mulgaonkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2 to 4 and Mr. V. Rodrigues, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent nos. 5 to 7. 2. The relevant facts to decide the above petitions are that the petitioners' father namely late Govind Javlo Gaonkar was recorded as tenant in Form I & XIV in the records of rights in respect of agricultural property surveyed under survey no.297/13 of Loliem Village. The subject matter of the property in Writ Petition No. 792 of 2009 is the property surveyed under no.297/13 whereas the subject matter of the property in Writ Petition No. 793 of 2009 is the property surveyed under No. 297/14 of Village Loliem. The respondent no.1 filed an application to the learned Mamlatdar of Canacona praying inter-alia that the petitioners' father be declared as not a tenant of the suit paddy field and the Talathi of the Loliem Village be directed to delete the name of the petitioners' father from the survey records. It is further contended by the petitioners that the respondent no.1 taking advantage of the illiteracy of the father of the petitioners who had no knowledge of English and on the pretext that his no objection on an affidavit was required to transfer his ownership right to the respondent nos.2 to 4, took his signature on such affidavit and filed it before the learned Mamlatdar of Canacona Taluka. The learned Mamlatdar took a typed statement of the petitioners' late father wherein it was stated inter-alia that he never cultivated the said paddy field at any time and that he had no objection to delete his name from the survey records. On the same day, a statement of the landlord Sudhakar D. Prabhudesai was also taken wherein he claimed that he was cultivating the suit paddy field personally for last many years. By an order dated 07.07.1995, the learned Mamlatdar held that the petitioners' late father was not a tenant in respect of the property surveyed under no.297/13 and 297/14 of Loliem Village and accordingly the Talathi was directed to delete his name. The late father of the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Dy. Collector of Quepem in October, 1996 and an order came to be passed by the learned Dy. Collector rejecting the said appeal on 30.06.2000. The late father of the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Dy. Collector of Quepem in October, 1996 and an order came to be passed by the learned Dy. Collector rejecting the said appeal on 30.06.2000. A revision bearing case No. TNC/REVISIOIN/102/2000 was filed by the petitioners before the learned Administrative Tribunal against the said order. By an order dated 13.10.2009, the learned Tribunal dismissed the said revision petition. Being aggrieved by the orders passed in the above petitions, the petitioners have filed the above Writ Petitions. 3. The essential grounds raised by the petitioners in the above Writ Petitions are that the learned Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the respondent no.1 or pass the impugned order on 07.07.1995 as he was not appointed as a Mamlatdar under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (herein after referred to as “the said Tenancy Act of 1964'). It is further the contention that such appointment came only on 22.10.1996 i.e. after passing the impugned order and as such the impugned order passed by the Dy Collector as well as by the learned Tribunal have no basis and deserve to be quashed and set aside. 4. Mr. A. F. Diniz, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has pointed out that on going through the definition of the word “Mamlatdar” in terms of the said Tenancy Act, 1964 such Mamlatdar is a person who is notified to perform such function. The learned counsel has thereafter taken me through the notification issued after coming into force of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, and pointed out that only the Joint Mamlatdar, AKs and other persons referred to therein have been appointed as Mamlatdars whereas the Mamlatdar who has passed the impugned order in the present proceedings was not included therein. The learned counsel further pointed out that the source of the jurisdiction of an authority is on the basis of the appointment in terms of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 and unless and until such appointment is made, the question of claiming that the Mamlatdar had jurisdiction to entertain the application for negative declaration does not arise. The learned counsel further pointed out that the source of the jurisdiction of an authority is on the basis of the appointment in terms of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 and unless and until such appointment is made, the question of claiming that the Mamlatdar had jurisdiction to entertain the application for negative declaration does not arise. The learned counsel further pointed out that as the Mamlatdar who has passed the impugned order had no jurisdiction to pass such orders as he was not appointed to perform such function, the impugned order cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2002(6) Supreme 43 in the case of BhargavKrishna Patil V/s State of Maharashtra, 2005(7) SCC 791 in the case of HarshadChiman Lal Modi V/s D.L.F. Universal Ltd., 2009(12) SCC 280 in the case of Muthavalliof Sha M. D. W. S. J. Syed Zakrudeen and Anr., V/s Syed Zindasha and others, 1990(supp) SCC 777 in the case of Jainendrakumar Vijaykumar Badjato V/s State of Maharashtra, the judgment passed in First Appeal No. 118 of 87 in the case of N. B. Dhargalkar V/s Suvarna Industries by its sole proprietor, and (1990) 2 SCC 271 in the case of State of Karnataka and others V/s K. V. Khader. The learned counsel further pointed out that as the learned Mamlatdar has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, the order passed by such authority is a nullity and deserves to be quashed and set aside. The learned counsel has taken me through the impugned order and pointed out that the orders cannot be sustained as such order have been passed without the statutory sanction in terms of the said Tenancy Act of 1964. 5. On the other hand, Mr. V. Rodrigues, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent nos. 5 to 7 has pointed out that the Mamlatdar has been appointed as the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in terms of the said Tenancy Act of 1964. The learned Additional Government Advocate further pointed out that as such notification has been issued, there is no bar for the Mamlatdar to perform the function of the Mamlatdar. The learned Additional Government Advocate as such submits that such objections of the petitioners has no substance. Mr. The learned Additional Government Advocate further pointed out that as such notification has been issued, there is no bar for the Mamlatdar to perform the function of the Mamlatdar. The learned Additional Government Advocate as such submits that such objections of the petitioners has no substance. Mr. V. Rodrigues, learned Additional Government Advocate further pointed out that the provisions of sub-section (15) of Section 2 of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 is to appoint other persons other than the Mamlatdar to perform the function of the Mamlatdar. The learned counsel further pointed out that in such circumstances, there was no need of any notification to the Mamlatdar to perform the function of the Mamlatdar in terms of the said Tenancy Act of 1964. The learned counsel further submits that in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Mamlatdar does not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for negative declaration of tenancy filed by the respondents. The learned counsel further submits that the contention of Mr. Diniz, learned counsel deserves to be rejected. 6. Mr. J. P. Mulgaonkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2 to 4 has supported the impugned order. The learned counsel pointed out that even assuming that there is no appointment in terms of sub-section (15) of Section 2 of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that on the day when the Mamlatdar has passed the impugned order he was a de facto Judge and such orders cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court reported in (1981) 3 SCC 133 in the case of Achanti Sreenivasa Rao and others V/s State of Andhra Pradesh, and of this Court reported in 2012 (2) Bom. C.R. 481 in the case of Vijay @ Ambadas Dattatraya Pawar Vs. Ramappa Ambannappa Masare & Ors. The learned counsel further submits that as there was a practice of Mamlatdars entertaining said applications under the provisions of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 for quite sometime, it is not open to this Court to unsettle the impugned order on the ground that there was no notification appointing the Mamlatdar to perform such function. The learned counsel further submits that as there was a practice of Mamlatdars entertaining said applications under the provisions of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 for quite sometime, it is not open to this Court to unsettle the impugned order on the ground that there was no notification appointing the Mamlatdar to perform such function. The learned counsel further submits that in any event in the year 1996 an appointment has been made empowering the Mamlatdar to perform the function of the Mamlatdar and as such the impugned order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. The learned counsel as such submits that the petitions be rejected. 7. Upon hearing the learned counsel and on going through the records, the only point to be considered in the present Writ Petitions is whether the Mamlatdar who has passed the impugned order in the present proceedings had jurisdiction to pass such orders. 8. In order to appreciate the said contention, it would be appropriate to refer to the definition of “Mamlatdar” in terms of the said Tenancy Act of 1964. Section 2(15) of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, 'Mamlatdar', means any Officer appointed by the Government to perform the duties of a Mamlatdar under the Act. 9. On going through the said definition, in order to perform the duties of a Mamlatdar under the said Tenacy Act of 1964, the person has to be appointed by the Government to perform such duties. In the present case, by a Notification no. RD/TNC/M/RTN/12/65/Sec.2(15)/67, in exercise of powers conferred by clause 15 of Section 2 of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, the Government appointed the Awal Karkuns in each Taluka to perform the duties of the Mamlatdar under the said Act. Thereafter, by another Notification bearing no. RD/TNC/12/65/69 dated 06.01.1970, the Government in exercise of same powers under the said Tenancy Act of 1964, appointed the Joint Mamlatdar in the District of Goa to perform the duties of the Mamlatdar for the purpose of the said Act. Hence, it is not in dispute that in terms of said provision under Section 2 (15) of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, there was no notification issued by the Government empowering the Mamlatdars of each Taluka to perform such duties. Hence, it is not in dispute that in terms of said provision under Section 2 (15) of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, there was no notification issued by the Government empowering the Mamlatdars of each Taluka to perform such duties. The only persons who have been appointed in terms of the said provisions at the relevant time were the Awal Karkuns and the Joint Mamlatdars. On the face of such admitted position, we will have to examine as to whether the Mamlatdar could perform such duties without being appointed by the Government to perform such duties under the said Tenancy Act of 1964. 10. Shri V. Rodrigues, learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the Respondent nos. 5, 6 and 7, being confronted with such position, sought to rely upon a Notification bearing no. RD/TNC/SO/168/66-69 dated 28.03.1969 which, inter alia, provides that in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 43 of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu, appointed Mamlatdars in the territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, as Agricultural Land Tribunals in the area with their respective jurisdiction and to invest them with the powers to perform the duties and functions of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 within the area under their respective jurisdiction. Shri Rodrigues, learned Addl. Government Advocate, has submitted that in view of the said Notification and as the Mamlatdars were appointed as Agricultural Lands Tribunals under the said Tenancy Act of 1964, naturally, the Mamlatdars was empowered to perform the duties provided under the said Act. 11. In order to appreciate the said submission, one will have to consider what are the duties earmarked to an Agricultural Lands Tribunal in terms of the said Tenancy Act of 1964. Tribunal is defined under clause 2(24) of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, to mean the Tribunal constituted under the Act. The said Notification has conferred on the Mamlatdar the powers of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in terms of Section 43(2) of the said Tenancy Act of 1964. It would be pertinent to note that on perusal of the provisions of the said Act, there are specific functions earmarked to a Mamlatdar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in terms of the provisions of the said Tenancy Act of 1964. It would be pertinent to note that on perusal of the provisions of the said Act, there are specific functions earmarked to a Mamlatdar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in terms of the provisions of the said Tenancy Act of 1964. For example, in terms of Section 32, the compensation for any improvements are to be determined by the Tribunal so also all other disputes which are otherwise not prescribed can be determined by such Tribunal. Hence, the contention of the learned Addl. Government Advocate, Shri Rodrigues, that as the Mamlatdar has been permitted to perform the duties of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal he is also entitled to perform the duties of the Mamlatdar under the said Tenancy Act of 1964, cannot be accepted. In the present case, the proceedings were initiated under Section 7 of the Said Tenancy Act of 1964 which is within the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar in terms of the said Act. Hence, such dispute cannot be said to be one which is not otherwise prescribed in the Act which could be dealt with by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. 12. The next contention of Shri V. Rodrigues, learned Addl. Government Advocate, is that what is provided in clause 15 of Section 2 of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, is to empower other officers other than Mamlatdar to perform such duties under the said Act. I am afraid that the said contention cannot be accepted. The provisions of Section 2(15) of the said Tenancy Act of 1964, clearly provides that a Mamlatdar is an officer who has to be appointed by the Government to perform the duties of a Mamlatdar under the said Act. Hence, unless there is an appointment, a Mamlatdar cannot perform such duties as provided under the said Tenancy Act of 1964. 13. In the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. K. V. Khader (supra), it has been inter alia observed that an Order which is contrary to the mandate of the Act, is void and non est. In the said case before the Apex Court, a notification for the purpose of making a change in the records of Janbadi Register from the work “redeem” to “unredeemed” was to be effected by the Chief Commissioner. But, however, such changes were made pursuant to an Order of the Commissioner. In the said case before the Apex Court, a notification for the purpose of making a change in the records of Janbadi Register from the work “redeem” to “unredeemed” was to be effected by the Chief Commissioner. But, however, such changes were made pursuant to an Order of the Commissioner. It was held therein that as the predicates of the provisions of the requirements of law to effect such changes have not been complied with in terms thereof by a notification by the Chief Commissioner, such Order is void and non est and no presumption of correctness can be drawn to such entries. Hence, in case the orders passed by the authorities under the said Tenancy Act of 1964 are not passed in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, such Orders have no legal effects and cannot be sustained. 14. Even the Division Bench of this Court in the case of N. B. Dhargalkar Vs. Suvarna Industries (supra) was dealing with a case to find out what is the effect of a decree passed by the Civil Court which had proceeded with the procedure provided under Order 37 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code without being empowered by the High Court to exercise such powers. The learned Division Bench has found that a decree passed by such Court which was so not empowered could not proceed to decide the suit by following the procedure under Order 37 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code and as such set aside the judgment and decree passed by such Civil Court. 15. The jurisdiction is the power, right and authority to take cognizance and decide the matter according to law. It means the authority on which a Court has to decide the matters that are placed before it. The Court will lack jurisdiction in case there is no authority conferred in terms of the Act to decide and proceed with such action. The statute giving jurisdiction to the Tribunal or other officers must be strictly construed and the procedure prescribed therein must be followed exactly. Hence, no officer has power to perform the duties as a Mamlatdar under the said Tenancy Act, 1964 unless and until such power is strictly conferred in terms of the statute. The statute giving jurisdiction to the Tribunal or other officers must be strictly construed and the procedure prescribed therein must be followed exactly. Hence, no officer has power to perform the duties as a Mamlatdar under the said Tenancy Act, 1964 unless and until such power is strictly conferred in terms of the statute. In the present case, as already noted above, the Mamlatdar who passed the impugned order was not appointed by the Government to perform the duties as stipulated under the said Tenancy Act of 1964 and as such the orders passed by the learned Mamlatdar cannot be sustained. 16. It would also be pertinent to note that the learned Administrative Tribunal while disposing of Tenancy Revision Application No. 50/1996 by an order dated 25.07.1996 had taken a view, though upon a concession of the learned counsel, that as the Mamlatdar was not appointed to perform the function of the Mamlatdar in terms of Section 2(15) of the said Tenancy Act, 1964, only the Joint Mamlatdar and other persons so appointed were empowered to perform such duties. It appears that immediately thereafter a notification No.1/96-RD(4536) dated 22.10.1996 came to be issued conferring such functions in terms of Section 2(15) of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 to all the Mamlatdars in the State of Goa. Though it is sought to be contended by the learned Additional Government Advocate that the said notification has not been gazetted and has no legal effect which is disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners nevertheless, it appears that the State Government had in fact accepted the position and had proceeded to issue such notification. The contention of Shri Rodrigues, learned Additional Government Advocate, that the said notification was superfluous as according to him, the Mamlatdar was already empowered to perform the duties of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and, as such, was entitled to adjudicate the dispute has not been accepted for the reasons as stated herein above. Hence, such contention of Mr. Rodrigues, learned Additional Government Advocate is unsustainable. 17. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the impugned Order was passed by the learned Mamlatdar who had no jurisdiction at the relevant time to perform the duties provided in the Tenancy Act of 1964 as there was no such appointment by the Government. Hence, such contention of Mr. Rodrigues, learned Additional Government Advocate is unsustainable. 17. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the impugned Order was passed by the learned Mamlatdar who had no jurisdiction at the relevant time to perform the duties provided in the Tenancy Act of 1964 as there was no such appointment by the Government. Having regard to the subsequent notification of the year 1996 and keeping the contention of the parties open with regard to the validity thereof, I find it appropriate in the interest of justice to quash and set aside the impugned Orders passed by the authorities below and remand the matter to the learned Mamlatdar to proceed in accordance with law and ensure that Mamlatdar so appointed deals with the case. The merits of the dispute between the parties have not been gone into as the learned Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order at the relevant time as the predicates of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 have not been complied with. All contentions on merits of both the parties are left open. The contention of Mr. Mulgaonkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2 to 4 also cannot be accepted as in the present case there was no initial appointment of the learned Mamlatdar in terms of Section 2(15) of the said Tenancy Act of 1964 which can be said to have been vitiated thereafter. 18. In view of the above, I pass the following : ORDER (i) The impugned Orders dated 07.07.1995 passed by the learned Mamlatdar in Case Nos. TNC/MAM/108/94 and TNC/MAM/91/95 as well as the Orders dated 30.06.2000 passed by the learned Dy. Collector, Quepem in Case Nos. TNC/APPL/43/96 and TNC/APPL/44/96 and the Orders dated 03.03.2009 and 13.10.2009 passed by the learned Administrative Tribunal in Case Nos. TNC/REVISION/102/2000 and TNC/REVISION/103/2000 are quashed and set aside. (ii) The Case Nos. TNC/MAM/108/94 and TNC/MAM/91/95 are restored to the files of the learned Mamlatdar. The learned Mamlatdar shall proceed with the said proceedings in the light of the observations made herein above after hearing the parties in accordance with law. (iii) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. (iv) The parties are directed to appear before the learned Mamlatdar on 11.11.2013 at 3.00 p.m. (v) The Petitions stand disposed of accordingly.