JUDGMENT M.S. Sonak, J. 1. Admit. With the consent of the learned counsel, the appeal is taken up for hearing and final disposal. 2. This Appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 17 February 2012 of a learned Single Judge, allowing the Respondent's Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and setting aside an arbitral award dated 19 July 2007 awarding an amount of Rs.39,31,656/- with interest to the Appellant. The award has been set aside primarily, on the ground that the claims were barred by the law of limitation and, in any case, were deemed to have been abandoned by the Appellant. 3. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The Appellant was awarded a contract for construction of earth work in embankment / cutting and construction of minor Bridges on 16 September 1991. The work was required to be completed by 30 April 1993, which date was extended upto 31 January 1994. On account of alleged unsatisfactory performance, the Respondent terminated the contract by a notice dated 5 February 1994, which was admittedly received by the Appellant. Neither the Appellant, nor its representatives remained present to take joint measurements scheduled on 7 February 1994 and therefore measurements were taken ex-parte and the balance work was got executed through other contractors at the risk and cost of the Appellant. 4. One of the Partners of the Appellant addressed a communication dated 19 October 1994 to the Respondent stating that he has set-up a business in Bahrain and that further correspondence in respect of the work executed by the Appellant be sent to an address in Bahrain. During the period between 5 February 1994 and 20 March 2006 correspondence was exchanged between the parties, however, there is a dispute as regards the despatch and receipt of such correspondence. Ultimately, the Appellant by a communication dated 20 March 2006 raised various claims against the Respondent, including inter alia the claim that the termination of the contract by a notice dated 5 February 1994 was illegal, null and void. The claim was raised after a lapse of almost 12 years from the notice of termination of the contract, which was admittedly received by the Appellant. A reference was made to an arbitral tribunal comprising of three Arbitrators. The claim was raised after a lapse of almost 12 years from the notice of termination of the contract, which was admittedly received by the Appellant. A reference was made to an arbitral tribunal comprising of three Arbitrators. A majority, comprising of two Arbitrators overruled the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent on the issue of limitation/abandonment of claim and awarded an amount of Rs.39,31,656/- with compound interest against the claim of 'Risk and Cost component' withheld by the Respondent. The third Arbitrator, however, submitted a dissenting Note, upholding the preliminary objection regards bar of limitation/abandonment. The award of the arbitral tribunal was delivered on 19 July 2007. 5. The Respondent, thereafter filed an Arbitration Petition under Section 34 of the Act, questioning the award dated 19 July 2007. The petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court by a judgment and order dated 17 February 2012 holding inter alia that the Appellant's claim was barred by limitation and/or that the claims were deemed to have been abandoned. The arbitral award dated 19 July 2007, was accordingly set aside. This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 17 February 2012 of the learned Single Judge. 6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant made the following submissions, in support of the Appeal. (a) Reconciliation of the amount towards the final bill continued upto the preparation of the last final bill dated 2 February 2006, which was eventually forwarded by the Respondent to the Appellant by a letter dated 15 February 2006. From this date, i.e., from 15 February 2006, the claims made by the Appellant-Contractor on 20 March 2006 were well within the period prescribed under Clause 63.1.3 of the contract and accordingly the claims were neither barred by law of limitation, nor could be said to have been abandoned by the Appellant. (b) In any case, in terms of Section 43(3) of the Act, the arbitral tribunal has the power to extend time to take steps to commence arbitral proceedings and such a power is deemed to have been exercised by the arbitral tribunal in overruling the preliminary objection based upon the bar of limitation/abandonment of claim raised by the Respondent. (c) Since by a communication dated 19 October 1994, the Appellant had furnished a new address, no cognizance could be taken of the correspondence allegedly sent to the old address. (c) Since by a communication dated 19 October 1994, the Appellant had furnished a new address, no cognizance could be taken of the correspondence allegedly sent to the old address. In any case, there is no material on record which establishes either the despatch or receipt of such correspondence. In particular, the communication dated 9 August 1997 upon which the learned Single Judge has placed reliance was neither desptached nor received even at the old address and in any case, the said communication is not an intimation of the preparation of the final bill. The inference drawn by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the new address was only an alternate address and that the remaining Partners continued with business activities from the old address is perverse and unsustainable. 7. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, made the following submissions: (a) Clauses 63.1.1 and 63.1.3 of the contract operate in distinct fields. Clause 63.1.1, inter alia requires a Contractor after 90 days, but within 180 days of his presenting his final claim on disputed matters, to demand in writing that the disputes or differences be referred to Arbitration. Clause 63.1.3, on the other hand, deals with waiver of claims, if not made within a period of 90 days from the receipt of intimation from the Corporation that the final bill is ready for payment. (b) The cause of action, accrued to the Appellant upon receipt of the notice of termination dated 5 February 1994. Accordingly, the claim, if any, had to be raised by the Appellant within a period of three years from the date of receipt of the notice of termination dated 5 February 1994. The claims raised on 20 March 2006 are ex-facie barred by limitation and could not have been entertained by the arbitral tribunal. (c) The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are supported by the material on record and there is no perversity. (d) The arbitral award, to the extent, that it overrules the objections based upon limitation/abandonment and holds that the termination of contract was improper, is vitiated by errors apparent on face of record. 8. (c) The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are supported by the material on record and there is no perversity. (d) The arbitral award, to the extent, that it overrules the objections based upon limitation/abandonment and holds that the termination of contract was improper, is vitiated by errors apparent on face of record. 8. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, reference is required to be made to clauses 63.1.1, 63.1.2 and 63.1.3 of the Contract, which read as follows: “63.1.1 - In the event of any dispute or difference between the parties hereto as to the construction or operation of this contract, or the respective rights and liabilities of the parties on any matter in question, dispute or difference on any account, or as to the with-holding by the Corporation of any certificate to which the Contractor may claim to be entitled to, or if the Corporation fails to make a decision within a reasonable time, then and in any such case, save the “excepted matters” referred to in clause 62 of these conditions, the Contractor after 90 days but within 180 days of his presenting his final claim on disputed matters, shall demand in writing that the dispute or difference be referred to arbitration.” “63.1.2 - The demand for arbitration shall specify the matters which are in question, dispute or difference. Only such dispute (s) or difference (s) in respect of which the demand has been made shall be referred to arbitration and other matters shall not be included in the reference.” “63.1.3 - If the Contractor does not prefer his specific and final claims in writing within a period of 90 days of receiving the intimation from the Corporation that the final bill is ready for payment, he will be deemed to have waived his claims and the Corporation shall be discharged and released of all liabilities under the contract in respect of these claims.” 9. Clauses 63.1.1 and 63.1.2 deal with reference of disputes to Arbitration. Clause 63.1.1, inter alia requires a Contractor after 90 days, but within 180 days of his presenting his final claim on disputed matters, to demand in writing that the dispute or difference be referred to Arbitration. Clauses 63.1.1 and 63.1.2 deal with reference of disputes to Arbitration. Clause 63.1.1, inter alia requires a Contractor after 90 days, but within 180 days of his presenting his final claim on disputed matters, to demand in writing that the dispute or difference be referred to Arbitration. Clause 63.1.2, provides that the demand for Arbitration shall specify the matters, which are in question, dispute or difference and only such disputes or differences in respect of which the demand has been made shall be referred to Arbitration. Under Clause 63.1.3, the Contractor must prefer his final claim within 90 days of receiving intimation that the final bill is ready for payment, else he will be deemed to have waived his claims. 10. In the present case, there is no dispute whatsoever that the Appellant received the notice of termination of contract dated 5 February 1994, in the month of February 1994. The Appellant's primary claim, as raised in its communication dated 20 March 2006 and the claim statement filed thereafter, concerns the legality of the termination of contract. The arbitral award , in terms holds that the termination of the contract by the notice dated 5 February 1994 was illegal and on that basis, proceeds to award an amount of Rs.39,31,656/- withheld by the Respondent towards 'Risk and Cost component'. Thus it is clear that the foundation of the claim of the Appellant was the alleged illegality of the notice of termination dated 5 February 1994. Hence, Counsel for the Respondent is right in her submission that the cause of action for raising a claim accrued to the Appellant in February 1994 itself and any claims made in this regard in March 2006 are barred by the law of limitation. 11. The communication dated 20 March 2006 and the claim statement filed before the arbitral tribunal makes it clear that the Appellant has raised several claims, including inter alia as to whether the Appellant had completed 97% of the works and had been paid therefor ; execution of additional work and payment at enhanced rates ; encashment of Bank Guarantee and forfeiture of security deposit; and whether summary final bill drawn is legal and correct. Thus it is apparent that the claims raised by the Appellant are not restricted to the preparation of the final bill. Thus it is apparent that the claims raised by the Appellant are not restricted to the preparation of the final bill. In fact, the foundation of the claim of the Appellant concerns the termination of the contract by the notice dated 5 February 1994. In such circumstances, the Appellant cannot be permitted to extend the period of limitation based upon the communication dated 15 February 2006, by styling such communication as an intimation that the final bill is ready for payment. In fact, by the communication dated 15 February 2006, the Respondent demanded an amount of Rs.1,40,233/-from the Appellant. Relying upon Clause 63.1.3, the Appellant is not justified in raising claims after a lapse of almost twelve years from the date of accrual of the cause of action. Clause 63.1.3 operates in an area different and distinct from Clauses 63.1.1 and 63.1.2. Clause 63.1.3 applies to a situation where the claim though raised within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, may be deemed to have been waived/abandoned by the Contractor, where a Contractor fails to make any specific and final claim in writing within a period of 90 days of receiving intimation that the final bill is ready for payment. This Clause does not entitle a Contractor to raise claims which are otherwise barred by the law of limitation. Unless the Appellant were to succeed in the basis and foundation of its claim, i.e., the illegality of the notice of termination, there would arise no question of variation in the final bill. In this view of the matter, we see no merit in the submission made on behalf of the Appellant. 12. Even if we were to accept the submission of Counsel for the Appellant regarding the communication by the Respondent to the old address and the alleged non-receipt thereof by the Appellant, the conclusion recorded by the learned Single Judge is not liable to be faulted. This submission cannot apply to the receipt of the notice of termination. There is no dispute whatsoever that the notice of termination was received by the Appellant in February 1994 and as such the cause of action accrued to the Appellant in the month of February 1994 itself and the claim made in March 2006 was barred by limitation. 13. This submission cannot apply to the receipt of the notice of termination. There is no dispute whatsoever that the notice of termination was received by the Appellant in February 1994 and as such the cause of action accrued to the Appellant in the month of February 1994 itself and the claim made in March 2006 was barred by limitation. 13. The finding of the learned Single Judge that the material on record does not indicate that all business activities at the old address were totally discontinued cannot be faulted. By a letter dated 19 October 1994, one of the Partners did inform the Respondent that he is setting up business in Bahrain. However, in various other letters addressed by the very same Partner, there is a reference to the Kerala address as well. In any event, it is not the case of the Appellant that all the Partners had relocated themselves to Bahrain. The Respondent by its notice dated 5 February 1994 had already terminated the contract. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Respondent was obliged to address any further correspondence at the Bahrain address. Admittedly, the Appellant did not make specific and final claims in writing during the period between February 1994 until March 2006. The case of the Appellant, that it did not receive any communication from the Respondent cannot be accepted. The material on record does indicate despatch of communications by R.P.A.D. at the Kerala address. In case of P.T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job (2005) 6 Supreme Court Cases 478), the Supreme Court, relying upon the provisions of the Post Office Act 1898, Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of Evidence Act, 1872, has held that where a notice was correctly addressed and despatched under intimation by the Post Office, and the notice was returned as 'unclaimed', there is a presumption of law that such notice has been served upon the addressee. 14. The submission of Counsel based upon Section 43 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 also does not appeal to us. Firstly, the provisions of Section 43(3) do not empower the arbitral tribunal to extend limitation. 14. The submission of Counsel based upon Section 43 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 also does not appeal to us. Firstly, the provisions of Section 43(3) do not empower the arbitral tribunal to extend limitation. Secondly, the provisions do not empower even a Court to extend the period prescribed in the Limitation Act, but only empower the Court to extend time for such period as it thinks proper for taking steps to commence arbitral proceedings within a time fixed by the agreement. Thirdly, there was no application made by the Appellant invoking the provisions of Section 43(3), assuming that they were attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Fourthly, there is no order made by the arbitral tribunal exercising powers under Section 43(3) of the Act, assuming that it had such powers. 15. In the circumstances, we find no error in the judgment and order dated 17 February 2012 of the learned Single Judge of this Court. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.