Judgment : Revati Mohite Dere, J. 1. By this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner takes exception to and prays for quashing of the order of detention, passed under the provisions of Section 3(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange And Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as `COFEPOSA'), by the Principal Secretary i.e. respondent No.1, and further prays that the respondents be restrained from detaining the petitioner. The petition has been filed at the pre-execution stage and the order of detention has not yet been executed. 2. At the outset, it would be necessary to advert to the orders passed by the earlier Bench of this Court, after the petition was filed on 30th March, 2011. This Court, on 18th April, 2011, granted time to the learned A.P.P. appearing for respondent No.1 to obtain instructions as to whether an order of detention had been passed and that, if such an order had been passed, the same was to be placed before the Court. Pursuant to the said order, the learned A.P.P. on 19th April, 2011, placed before the Court, the record from the Office of the Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Maharashtra, in which, it was revealed that on 11th February, 2011, an order of detention had been passed against the petitioner. As recorded in the order dated 19th April, 2011, it appears that the said detention order was forwarded by the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Maharashtra, for service on the proposed detenue to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, PCB, CID, Mumbai. The Report of the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Preventive), CB CID, Mumbai dated 14th February, 2004 indicated that the petitioner had absconded. The report indicated that on the website of the Mumbai Police, information about the detention order had already been displayed. It was noted from the file, which was placed before this Court, that a copy of the detention order had not been forwarded to the respondent No.2 for its execution. Accordingly, time was granted to the learned A.P.P. to bring on record the detention order as well as the report of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, PCB, CID, Mumbai. However, no ad-interim relief was granted. On 3rd May, 2011, after service of the affidavit-in-reply by the learned A.P.P. and after hearing the parties, leave to amend the petition forthwith, came to be granted. However, no ad-interim relief was granted. On 3rd May, 2011, after service of the affidavit-in-reply by the learned A.P.P. and after hearing the parties, leave to amend the petition forthwith, came to be granted. The order dated 3rd May, 2011, reads thus: “1. ….. 2. ….. 3. Rule. 4. ….. 5. The main challenge in this petition is to the order of detention dated 11.02.2011 passed under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 by the Secretary (Appeals & Security), Home Department, Government of Maharashtra. The said order has not yet been served on the detenue and the affidavit in reply filed by Mr. Pralhad Jagtap, Police Inspector attached to the PCB Crime Branch, Bombay Police, indicates that after 14.02.2011 till 24.04.2011 no steps, whatsoever, were taken either by the DCB, CID, Unit-9 or by the Respondent No.2 who initiated the proposal for detention, to serve the detention order on the detenue in case the said authority was satisfied that he was absconding. In addition, the record placed before us, as of now, does not indicate that along with the detention order any further documents regarding the reasons for detention and the material relied upon, were served or sought to be served on the detenue. 6. Hence, by way of interim relief, stay to the operation of the detention order dated 11.02.2011 till the next date. 7. …..” In view of the aforesaid, this Court, by way of an interim relief, was pleased to stay the operation of the detention order dated 11th February, 2011, till the next date. Time was granted to the respondents to file their affidavit-in-reply. In view of the amendment, the petitioner thereafter, impugned the detention order dated 11th February, 2011, bearing No.PSA/1211/CR-2 SPL 3(A) which came to his knowledge on 3rd May, 2011, and prayed for quashing of the said order of detention which was issued under Section 3 (i) of the COFEPOSA. 3. As far as the maintainability of the Writ Petition before execution of the detention order is concerned, the same is maintainable and is no more res integra. 3. As far as the maintainability of the Writ Petition before execution of the detention order is concerned, the same is maintainable and is no more res integra. At the outset, we may state that the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended before us that the case of the petitioner is covered by three out of the five grounds set out in the case of Additional Secretary to the Government of India & Ors. vs. Alka Subhash Gadia & Anr. (1992 Supp (1) SCC 496)Therefore, the short question, which arises for consideration in the present petition, is whether the case of the petitioner falls within any of the five grounds carved out, in the case of Alka Gadia's case (supra). Before adverting to the grounds culled out by the petitioner for seeking quashing of the detention order at the pre-execution stage, it would be apposite to set out the five grounds laid down by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case (supra), in order to appreciate, whether the case of the petitioner falls within any of the five grounds as stated in Alka Gadia’s case (supra). It is held in Alka Gadia’s case (supra), that it is only when the Courts are prima facie satisfied, that any of the following five grounds exist, the Courts can interfere. The five grounds are as follows: (i) That the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed. (ii) That it is sought to be executed against a wrong person. (iii) That it is passed for a wrong purpose. (iv) That it is based on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds. (v) That the authority which passed it, had no authority to do so. We are conscious of the fact, that the Apex Court has considered the scope of interference at the pre-execution stage, having regard to Alka Gadia's case (supra), in Subhash Popatlal Dave vs. Union of India & Anr. in Writ Petition (Cri.) 137/2011 dated 16th July, 2013. However, as the petitioner has urged that his case is covered by three out of the five grounds set out in Alka Gadia's case (supra), we proceed to decide the same. 4. Before adverting to the grounds on which quashing of the detention order at the pre-execution stage is sought, it will be necessary to advert to the facts of the present case. 4. Before adverting to the grounds on which quashing of the detention order at the pre-execution stage is sought, it will be necessary to advert to the facts of the present case. The petitioner, is a business man, dealing in the business of importing mobile accessories. The petitioner is the Proprietor of J.J. Enterprises. On 11th June, 2010, a telephonic message was received from ACS/Courier Cell, Import, CSI Airport, Mumbai, informing them about an import package which had arrived from Hong Kong, by Jet Airways. It was informed that M/s.TNT (I) Pvt. Ltd., an authorized courier company had filed Courier B/E. No. 012343 / 10th June, 2010 under IGM No.2477 of Jet Airways (I) Pvt. Ltd., in which at item No.8, the goods were grossly mis-declared as “Mobile Accessories” valued at Rs.9,570, whereas, on examination of the same, it was found to contain approximately 34500 pieces of memory chips for mobile phones of 2 GB. On receipt of the said information, the Officers of Air Intelligence Unit (AIU) went to the Courier Import Hall, where Courier Cell Officers were present, who handed over the said package to the Air Intelligence Unit. Panchas were called and in their presence the package was examined. The senders details were shown as “S. F. Telecom AV 1205 Aug WO HOUSE WOCHE, Shatin” and the receivers details were shown as “J.J. Ent BMC MARKET, 9 FL, Shop No.46, BAPITASTA ROAD, VILE PARLE (W), Mumbai–56 IN”. The description of the goods were shown as mobile phone accessories valued at 200 US $. The description, quantity and value of goods were found to differ with the goods mentioned in the courier bill of Entry No.2477 presented by M/s.TNT (I) Pvt. Ltd. On examination of the six boxes, contained in one cardboard box in the presence of the panchas, a total of 34500 pieces of memory cards were seized from various boxes. The memory cards were valued at Rs.250/- per piece, the total value of which was Rs.86,25,000/- (CIF) and Rs.1,29,37,500 (LMV). Pursuant to the seizure, statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, came to be recorded. A team of Officers was sent vide a Search Warrant to search the business premises of the consignee at Shop No.46, Municipal Market, Ground Floor, Baptista Road, behind Shree Devi Restaurant, Vile Parle (West), Mumbai – 400 056. Pursuant to the seizure, statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, came to be recorded. A team of Officers was sent vide a Search Warrant to search the business premises of the consignee at Shop No.46, Municipal Market, Ground Floor, Baptista Road, behind Shree Devi Restaurant, Vile Parle (West), Mumbai – 400 056. As the premises were found locked, on inquiry, it was found that the said premises were owned by one Shri Ritesh Lanjewar. Shri Ritesh Lanjewar's statement came to be recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, wherein he inter alia stated, that the premises, although belonged to him, was being used by the petitioner for the last two months. He informed the residential address of the petitioner and gave the petitioner's mobile number as 9892444330. Accordingly, the officers went to the residential address of the petitioner, however, were informed that the petitioner was out of station. The office premises came to be sealed with paper seal in the presence of Panchas and a summon came to be issued to the petitioner to appear on 11th June, 2010, which was received by the petitioner’s wife. Statements of various persons came to be recorded. A letter dated 14th June, 2010 was sent by the petitioner to the Authorities, by fax, expressing his inability to appear, pursuant to the summons dated 11th June, 2010, as he was in Gujarat. A letter dated 12th June, 2010 was also sent by the petitioner, Proprietor of J.J. Enterprises to the Commissioner of Customs, CSI Airport, Mumbai, stating, that they had placed a purchase order dated 7th June, 2010 for various mobile accessories, which was confirmed by M/s. S.F. Telecom and AVCTR, Hong Kong vide their letter dated 8th June, 2010. He had enclosed a copy of the letter dated 11th June, 2010 wherein, M/s. S.F. Telecom stated that there was a mistake of shipping a wrong consignment which was meant for an Indonesian client and requested for re-export of the said goods. The letter of M/s. S.F. Telecom was sent from fax No.0085223676393 to J.J. Enterprises. A letter dated 12th June, 2010 was also received by fax on 14th June, 2010 addressed to the Commissioner of Customs, CSI Airport, Mumbai from M/s. S.F. Telecom & AV CTR, Hong Kong, requesting to re-export the consignment. The letter of M/s. S.F. Telecom was sent from fax No.0085223676393 to J.J. Enterprises. A letter dated 12th June, 2010 was also received by fax on 14th June, 2010 addressed to the Commissioner of Customs, CSI Airport, Mumbai from M/s. S.F. Telecom & AV CTR, Hong Kong, requesting to re-export the consignment. On inquiry, it was revealed that it was a local number and the said number was installed in 706, Servant of India Society, S.V. Patel Road, Girgaon, Mumbai – 400 004. Despite summons dated 11th June, 2010, 21st June, 2010 and 29th June, 2010, the petitioner did not appear before the Customs Authorities. On 1st July, 2010, the petitioner moved the Sessions Court, Mumbai, for anticipatory bail. The Sessions Court granted him anticipatory bail vide order dated 27th July, 2010, stating that the petitioner shall not be arrested by the Air Intelligence Unit of Customs Department, for the offence punishable under Section 135(1)(a) or Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act without giving him 72 hours notice in writing. The petitioner appeared before the Customs Authorities and his statement came to be recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, wherein, he inter alia stated; that he had taken the premises at Shop No.46, B.M.C. Market, Ground Floor, Baptista Road, Vile Parle (West), Mumbai – 400 056 from Shri Ritesh Lanjewar on a monthly rent of Rs.3,000/- and had paid an amount of Rs.10,000/- (Rs.9000/- as advance rent and Rs.1000/- as deposit); and that, there was no formal Rental Agreement between them. He further stated that he had received correspondence from the overseas shipper on 11th June, 2010 at Baroda, which he had submitted to the Customs Authorities. However, the letter did not show any sign of having received it through fax. The bank statement of J.J. Enterprises with Dena Bank, Vile Parle (West) Branch, showed a balance of Rs.4,773/- as on 28th June, 2010 and that there never was any amount more than Rs.7,000/-, which was his opening balance. The business premises of J. J. Enterprises was searched under a search warrant on 21st June, 2010. Although nothing incriminating was found; it was noticed that there was no office furniture or fixtures in the said office. The residential premises of the petitioner was also searched and certain documents were seized under a panchanama. The business premises of J. J. Enterprises was searched under a search warrant on 21st June, 2010. Although nothing incriminating was found; it was noticed that there was no office furniture or fixtures in the said office. The residential premises of the petitioner was also searched and certain documents were seized under a panchanama. One of the document, was the original fax letter dated 10th July, 2010 received from M/s. S.F. Telecom and AVR CTR Hong Kong and one fax which was allegedly sent by the shippers from fax No.23821992. On verification, it was found that the said fax number belonged to one H.W. Kane, 706, Servant of India Society, S.V. Patel Road, Girgaon, Mumbai. The petitioner also stated that on 21st July, 2010, he had placed an order for US $ 900 for mobile accessories to the overseas shipper but could not give any satisfactory reply as to why the shipper had reflected the amount, as US $ 200. With regard to the original fax received by the petitioner from M/s. S. F. Telecom and AV CTR, he replied that he had given the original copies to his Advocate and that he would submit the same in a couple of days, but, however failed to do so. On further inquiry, it was revealed that even earlier, on 19th April, 2010 and 30th April, 2010, two more consignments were imported by the petitioner through TNT Express (I) Pvt. Ltd. On perusal of the documents which were submitted by TNT Express (I) Pvt. Ltd., it was found that the earlier consignments of April, 2010 were also imported from the same shipper of Hong Kong and the goods were declared as, `Mobile accessories'. Although, on the delivery notes, the receivers' names were different, the signature appeared to have been done by the same person. The statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act of the two Ground Service Agents, show that they had delivered one consignment each on 21st April, 2010 and on 3rd May, 2010 at the Office of J.J. Enterprises and had collected customs duty of Rs. 7,374/- and Rs. 1,312/- respectively. This was further fortified by the e-mails received by TNT Express (I) Pvt. Ltd. from their counterpart at the origin dated 15th June, 2010, that the contact number of one Mr. J was 9920383714. 7,374/- and Rs. 1,312/- respectively. This was further fortified by the e-mails received by TNT Express (I) Pvt. Ltd. from their counterpart at the origin dated 15th June, 2010, that the contact number of one Mr. J was 9920383714. On 18th June, 2010, Rick Chan vide his e-mail informed that the new number of J was 9892444330. The subscriber of the said mobile was found to be the petitioner, and therefore, Mr. J was the petitioner. On further intelligence being collected, it was found that the petitioner was involved in an earlier case of smuggling of valuable stereos, electronic items and other dutiable goods from Hong Kong through the courier mode and was clearing it clandestinely, in connivance with a courier firm, M/s. Fedex in 2004. The seizure value of the consignment imported and illegally cleared through Customs was ascertained at Rs.62,57,080/- (CIF) and Rs. 1,03,80,860/-(LMV). He was arrested in the said case vide File No. SD/INT/AIU/34/2004 AP `C' and the said case is at the stage of trial. The petitioner on being questioned regarding discrepancy in the value as US $ 200 against the order value of US $ 900, in the June consignment, was unable to explain the same. As far as, the earlier two courier consignments of April were concerned, he has stated to have received only one parcel, though both the delivery notes bear the stamp of J.J. Enterprises in addition to other documentary evidence of import of the two earlier consignments. He has also stated that the order was for mobile accessories and that he had destroyed the documents for the cleared consignment. Similarly, serious discrepancies were found in the alleged fax sent by M/s. S.F. Telecom and TVR Hong Kong to the Customs Authorities for re-exporting the goods, stating, that their logistic department had made a mistake of shipping a wrong consignment, which was meant for an Indonesian client. The Authorities found that the fax was fabricated for several reasons. In view of the material collected, a show-cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner under Section 124 of the Customs Act on 9th December, 2010. The Authorities found that the fax was fabricated for several reasons. In view of the material collected, a show-cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner under Section 124 of the Customs Act on 9th December, 2010. It was alleged in the said show-cause notice that the petitioner of M/s. JJ Enterprises had hatched a conspiracy in connivance with the overseas exporter, M/s.S.F. Telecom & TVR, Hong Kong to import high value memory cards into India and that he had attempted to clear the goods clandestinely through a courier firm, M/s.TNT Express (I) Pvt. Ltd. knowing that the goods were liable to confiscation under Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962. It was alleged that after the consignment was seized, the petitioner disappeared and appeared only after manipulating and generating documents to show that the goods are wrongly shipped. The investigations revealed that M/s.TNT Express (I) Pvt. Ltd. knowingly violated the provisions of Courier Importers and Exports (Clearance) Regulations, 1998 and the Customs Act, 1962 and had thus rendered the goods liable to confiscation under Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962. Accordingly, the petitioner was also stated to be liable for criminal action under Section 112 of the Customs Act. The petitioner filed his reply denying all the allegations set out in the show-cause notice. The Commissioner of Customs vide order dated 11th January, 2013 passed an order imposing a penalty of Rs.15 lakhs on the petitioner, the proprietor of M/s.J.J. Enterprises and a penalty of Rs.One lakh on TNT Express (I) Pvt. Ltd. and the seized memory cards which were collectively valued as Rs.86,25,000/- (CIF) and Rs.1,29,37,500 (LMV) were held to be liable for confiscation under Section 111 (d) (I) (l) and (m) of the Customs Act, 1962. In the meantime, prior to the aforesaid Order dated 11th January, 2013 passed by the Commissioner of Customs, the Detaining Authority had, on the basis of the proposal received from the Commissioner of Customs, who had recommended invocation of COFEPOSA, issued the order of detention vide order No. M/s.2010/CR-1/SPL-3(8) dated 12th February, 2011, in exercise of the powers conferred on him under Section 3 (i) of the COFEPOSA. According to the petitioner, he approached this Hon’ble Court on 30th March, 2011 on learning that the Inspecting Officer SAFEMA/NDPS, Mumbai had sent a letter to the Chairman of the Society where the petitioner’s wife had a flat. According to the petitioner, he approached this Hon’ble Court on 30th March, 2011 on learning that the Inspecting Officer SAFEMA/NDPS, Mumbai had sent a letter to the Chairman of the Society where the petitioner’s wife had a flat. As stated aforesaid, vide Order dated 3rd May, 2011, this Court granted rule and interim relief. 5. At the outset, before dealing with the grounds relied upon by the petitioner, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner has sought for interference of this Court at the pre-execution stage, relying on three of the five grounds/contingencies set out in Alka Gadia's case (supra). It would, also be apposite to refer to the case of the State of Maharashtra vs. Baburao Gavande (2008) 3 SCC 613 ), wherein, the Apex Court had in para 63 observed thus: “63. …............. As a general rule, an order of detention passed by a Detaining Authority under the relevant 'preventive detention' law cannot be set aside by a Writ Court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the Court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances specified in Alka Subhash Gadia. The Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that this is a 'suspicious jurisdiction' i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken 'with a view to preventing' a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. Interference by a Court of Law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule and such an exercise can be undertaken by a Writ Court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order.” It is thus evident, that as a general rule, an order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the `preventive detention' law cannot be set aside by a writ court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage, unless the Court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. Interference by a Court at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule, an exercise which is undertaken with extreme care, caution and circumspection. Interference by a Court at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule, an exercise which is undertaken with extreme care, caution and circumspection. In the light of the aforestated facts and the settled legal position with regard to the detention order challenged at the pre-execution stage, we proceed to examine the grounds raised by the petitioner. 6. We have heard Mr. Shoaib Memon, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. J. P. Yagnik, the learned A.P.P. for the State. It is urged by Mr.Shoaib Memon, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the case of the petitioner is covered by three of the five grounds/contingencies set out in Alka Gadia’s case (supra) i.e. ground No. (ii) - that the detention order is sought to be executed against a wrong person, ground No. (iii) - that it is passed for a wrong purpose and ground No.(iv) - that it was passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds. As far as the ground of delay in execution of the detention order is concerned, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded, that delay in execution of the detention order, cannot be a ground for quashing the detention order, at the pre-execution stage as the same is not covered by any of the exceptions set out in Alka Gadia’s case (supra). The learned A.P.P. has relied on Alka Gadia's case (supra) and other cases to show the scope of interference in writ jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the pre-execution stage. It was urged, that a detenue cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus, if he does not surrender and is not served with the order of detention and the grounds in support of the same. It was also contended that the petitioner's case does not fall under any of the five contingencies set out in Alka Gadia's case (supra), and that no ground for interference at the pre-execution stage was made out. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised three grounds in support of his submission for quashing the detention order at the pre-execution stage, stating that the three grounds are squarely covered by three out of the five contingencies set out in Alka Gadia's case (supra). 8. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised three grounds in support of his submission for quashing the detention order at the pre-execution stage, stating that the three grounds are squarely covered by three out of the five contingencies set out in Alka Gadia's case (supra). 8. The first ground raised by the petitioner for quashing of the detention order at the pre-execution stage, is that his case falls in ground (ii) of Alka Gadia's case (supra) i.e. the detention order is sought to be executed `against a wrong person'. In order to appreciate the petitioner's contention, it is necessary to reproduce ground (B) of the petition, which reads thus: “B. Because the petitioner has not imported the seized goods. The goods have been wrongly shipped at the petitioner's name, which fact is duly admitted by the overseas supplier in its letter addressed to the Customs department with a copy marked to the petitioner. The allegations of the custom department are totally false, concocted and baseless. There is no evidence to connect the petitioner with the said shipment in any manner. The department has not annexed/forwarded the documents with the show cause notice which the petitioner has duly handed over during investigation clearly showing that the petitioner has no nexus with the said shipment in question.” In reply to the aforesaid ground, Shri Nandkumar Jantre, Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Maharashtra, has stated that the Authorities have been able to successfully establish that the seized goods belonged to the petitioner as he had, in his statement, dated 21st July, 2010 stated, that he had placed an order for US $ 900 to the overseas shipper. It was further stated that when confronted with the invoice of the subject consignment which was for US $ 200, the petitioner was unable to give any satisfactory reply as to why the invoice reflected an amount, as US $ 200. During his statement dated 14th September, 2010, the petitioner on being asked about the original fax received by him from M/s. S.G. Telecom & AV CTR, had stated, that he had given original copies to his Advocate and he would submit the same in a couple of days. During his statement dated 14th September, 2010, the petitioner on being asked about the original fax received by him from M/s. S.G. Telecom & AV CTR, had stated, that he had given original copies to his Advocate and he would submit the same in a couple of days. On being specifically asked, regarding the evidence of correspondence between the petitioner and the overseas shipper, the petitioner had stated that he had a fax confirmation report and that he would submit the same in a couple of days, however, the petitioner did not submit the same till the culmination of the investigation. It is stated that a letter dated 12th June, 2010 was received by fax on 14th June, 2010 addressed to the Commissioner of Customs, CSI, Airport, Mumbai from M/s. S.F. Telecom and A.V. & C.T.R., wherein a request for re-export of the subject consignment was made. On scrutiny of the said fax, it was observed that the same was sent through a local fax number, thus implying that the subject consignment was booked by the petitioner and that he had fabricated documents to hide his ownership of the goods and scuttle the investigations. It was stated, that the investigations in the instant case clearly revealed the complicity of the petitioner; that he had knowledge of the same and that he had attempted to smuggle high value memory cards by declaring the same as mobile charges and accessories. The petitioner, in his rejoinder to the reply, stated that the owner of the goods, who made a mis-shipment, i.e. M/s. A.V.Telecom of Hong Kong had taken all steps to have their goods released, but the goods were ultimately forfeited by the Customs Department. The petitioner further stated, that nothing turns on the fact that he had placed an order of USD$ 900 and the invoice for USD$ 200. As regards the allegation of not providing the original fax as alleged, the petitioner stated that he had given the original fax from SFR Telecoms to his Advocate for the purpose of his Anticipatory Bail Application, and that, nothing much turns on the same, as the original fax is nothing but a printout on a thermal paper which lasts only for a couple of days. The petitioner has further stated, that he had handed over the xerox copy of the said fax made from a printout along with the Transmission Report and that the Customs Authorities had verified that, the said fax was intact when received, from a Hong Kong Telephone number. According to the petitioner, he had relied upon the affidavit of M/s. S.F. Telecom, who represented their case before the Customs Authority for re-export of the Consignment as well as for provisional release. It is alleged that the Customs Authority was not interested in the same and in order to frame the petitioner, had alleged, that the said fax were sent from a local number of Girgaon. The petitioner has alleged that he had informed the Authorities that this number was very much in existence in Hong Kong, with a prefix of the International Code, however, the Authorities did not take any efforts to verify the said Hong Kong number, nor did they record any statements to ascertain whether such a fax was sent. It was further submitted by the petitioner in his rejoinder, that not only were the goods claimed by the exporting party, but the same were also seized prior to the alleged delivery. The petitioner denied that the fax of S.T. Telecom received on 14th June, 2013, was from a local Number 23821992, and that, on verification, it was allegedly found to belong to H. W. Kane of the Servant of India Society. It was stated that the fax dated 12th June, 2010 at 14.26 hours and the fax number on the same was shown as 0085223676393, which is a Hong Kong number and that the concerned officer had purposely drafted the show-cause notice in order to mislead, and that the same is evident from the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer. The petitioner has denied that he had attempted to smuggle high value memory cards, and has stated that the case against him was false. 9. With regard to the first ground raised by the petitioner that his case falls under the 2nd exception of Alka Gadia’s case (supra), that ‘it is sought to be executed against a wrong person’, we find on a perusal of the reply filed by Shri Jantre, the rejoinder of the petitioner thereto and the documents relied on, that it was the petitioner, to whom the consignment was to be delivered. This is borne out not only from the show-cause notice issued to the petitioner and documents but also from the order of the Commissioner of Customs passed on 11th January, 2013, annexed by the petitioner to his rejoinder, which shows that penalty of Rs.15 lakhs has been levied on the petitioner. Although an appeal has been filed against the said order, we find that the ground raised that it was issued `against a wrong person' is devoid of any merit in the light of the material on record to show, that it was the petitioner, who was to receive the courier containing the memory chips. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner had absconded after the consignment was seized and did not appear before the Customs Authorities despite summons being issued, till he was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court. The veracity of documents cannot be gone into as it raises several disputed questions of fact. Suffice to say, that we are satisfied that the consignment was meant to be delivered to the petitioner; that he was unable to offer an explanation as to why there was a discrepancy in the invoice; that the alleged fax sent by M/s. S. F. Telecom was doubtful; and that the petitioner had absconded and had tried to evade summons. 10. The second contention raised by the petitioner for quashing of the detention order at the pre-execution stage is, that his case falls under the 3rd exception as set out in Alka Gadia's case (supra) i.e. the detention order is passed 'for a wrong purpose'. Ground (G) of the petition, reads thus: “G. Because after the order of the Hon'ble Sessions Court, Bombay, the department was given opportunity to arrest the petitioner, if required provided a 72 hours prior notice in writing prior to arrest is given to the petitioner, the Custom Department (AIU) chose not to arrest the petitioner. It necessarily implies that there was no tangible ground available with the Customs (AIU) to arrest the petitioner. It is humbly submitted that in the circumstances, the customs department not arresting the petitioner, the natural implication is that there is no need to issue any order of detention under COFEPOSA, when the need to arrest the petitioner in the first instance, did not arise in the mind of the Department. It is humbly submitted that in the circumstances, the customs department not arresting the petitioner, the natural implication is that there is no need to issue any order of detention under COFEPOSA, when the need to arrest the petitioner in the first instance, did not arise in the mind of the Department. The purported invocation clearly reflects the malafidely and oblique motive and wrong purpose of the department.” In response to the said ground, Shri Nandkumar Jantre has, in his reply, stated that the Customs Department (AIU) had chosen not to arrest him, is incorrect, inasmuch as the petitioner was absconding since the day of seizure till he was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court on 1st July, 2010. It is stated, that the petitioner produced himself for investigation only on 7th July, 2010, as, pursuant to the anticipatory bail granted, the petitioner was to be intimated in writing 72 hours prior to his arrest. It is stated that, prosecution can be launched even though no arrest had been made in the preliminary investigation. Investigations revealed that the petitioner was a habitual offender, and being a habitual offender, his past antecedents were also taken into consideration for initiating COFEPOSA action and his preventive detention under COFEPOSA was stated to be necessary and justified. The petitioner in rejoinder to the aforesaid reply denied his past antecedents, and that he was a habitual offender. He stated that the adjudication order by the Customs Authorities had exposed the fallacies of the Customs Department and that the order of the anticipatory bail was self explanatory. He has stated that the earlier detention order issued against him in 2004 was on insufficient grounds, and the sole purpose of passing the detention order was because the previous order was declared illegal. We have perused the detention order, dated 11th February, 2011, issued by the Principal Secretary i.e. respondent No.1, and find, that the order was passed by the Authority, competent to exercise the powers conferred on it, under Section 3(i) of the COFEPOSA. It is also evident that the order was passed “under the Act i.e. COFEPOSA”, since the Detaining Authority was satisfied that the detention of the petitioner was necessary “with a view to preventing him in future from smuggling goods”, and therefore, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the detention order was `for a wrong purpose'. It is also evident that the order was passed “under the Act i.e. COFEPOSA”, since the Detaining Authority was satisfied that the detention of the petitioner was necessary “with a view to preventing him in future from smuggling goods”, and therefore, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the detention order was `for a wrong purpose'. It is evident from the facts, that the petitioner had indulged in smuggling activities and in the past, a case was registered against him. It is pertinent to note, that merely because the detenue is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence, would not, by itself, debar the Government from taking action for preventive detention, and therefore, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of a criminal prosecution, will not vitiate the order. The order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behavior of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Considering the ground raised by the petitioner, the reply and rejoinder thereto, it is evident that they raise disputed questions of fact, which cannot be entertained, much less examined and decided. 11. Therefore, the petitioner's contention cannot be accepted that, the detention order was passed `for a wrong purpose’, as we find that there is ample material to show the complicity of the petitioner. His contention that the Customs Air Intelligence Unit had chosen not to arrest him, does not merit consideration in view of the fact that his anticipatory bail application was not granted on merits. From the affidavit filed by the concerned Officers including the Inspector, it is evident that the petitioner was trying to evade arrest and was absconding from the date of seizure of the goods till he was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court. Investigations also revealed that the petitioner was a habitual offender and taking into consideration the said fact, action under COFEPOSA came to be initiated and his preventive detention under COFEPOSA was felt necessary. In the affidavit dated 25th April, 2011, filed by the Police Inspector Shri Pralhad N. Jagtap, he has clearly set out that he tried to serve the detention order on the petitioner, however, the detenue was not available. Accordingly, station diary entries were also made. In the affidavit dated 25th April, 2011, filed by the Police Inspector Shri Pralhad N. Jagtap, he has clearly set out that he tried to serve the detention order on the petitioner, however, the detenue was not available. Accordingly, station diary entries were also made. A perusal of the affidavit shows that the Inspector, on receipt of the detention order at the Office on 11th February, 2011 along with the Officers of the Air Intelligence Unit and a team of P.C.B. Crime Branch visited the residence of the petitioner, however, the petitioner was not found to be at home and on inquiry with the wife of the petitioner, were informed that he was out of station. The team again visited the residence of the petitioner on 20th April, 2011 and on 25th April, 2011, however the detenue/petitioner was not found at his residence and accordingly, necessary entries were made in the station diary. It appears that despite strenuous efforts to search the detenue, he was not found, nor did the petitioner’s wife and brother disclose the whereabouts of the petitioner. It was thus evident, that the petitioner was trying to evade the execution of the detention order. From the show cause notice, it is evident that the petitioner was an habitual offender, indulging in smuggling activities and it was with a view to preventing him in future from smuggling goods, that the detention order was passed. The ground raised by the petitioner, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be said to be `for a wrong purpose', inasmuch as, it is passed `with a view to preventing the petitioner in future from smuggling goods.' Therefore, we are of the opinion, that it cannot be said that the detention order was passed “for a wrong purpose”. 12. The third contention raised by the petitioner is, that his case is covered by the 4th exception set out in Alka Gadia's case (supra) i.e. the detention order `is based on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds'. Ground (K), reads thus: “K. Because the purported invocation of COFEPOSA against the petitioner is with ulterior motive and for wrongful purpose passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds. The petitioner is in no manner concerned with the said goods purported to be seized by the respondent. The petitioner has no lean and has neither declared any right in respect of the said goods. The petitioner is in no manner concerned with the said goods purported to be seized by the respondent. The petitioner has no lean and has neither declared any right in respect of the said goods. The petitioner has clearly in his statement recorded by the Custom Department has stated that it has no nexus, link with the seized goods confiscated by the Customs Department.” In response to the said ground, Shri Nandkumar Jantre has, in his reply, denied the allegations made by the petitioner, that COFEPOSA was invoked against the petitioner with an ulterior motive and for a wrongful purpose, passed on vague, extraneous and on irrelevant grounds. It was stated that the Sponsoring Authority was successful in establishing that the seized goods belonged to the petitioner and the nexus between the overseas shipper and the petitioner was also established. It was further stated that, while initiating COFEPOSA action against the petitioner, his past antecedents were also taken into consideration as he was found to be involved in a similar smuggling activity in the year 2004. The petitioner in his rejoinder to the aforesaid reply has denied any nexus between the Overseas Shippers and petitioner. It was stated that the respondents could not have considered the past matter, as the earlier detention order dated 19th July, 2005 was scrutinized by the Advisory Board and set aside. It was stated, that the 2004 case was a false case and as the Customs Authority was unable to make any progress, the petitioner was being victimized. 13. The petitioner has sought to contend that the order which was passed `was vague, extraneous and on irrelevant grounds'. It was also contended that the goods were seized at the Airport, prior to its delivery to the petitioner and not from the custody of the petitioner, and as such the petitioner cannot be remotely connected with the same. We find, that there is enough material on record to show, that the goods seized, belonged to the petitioner and that it was the petitioner, who had attempted to smuggle high value memory cards and was to receive the courier, containing the memory chips. The goods which were seized were meant to be delivered to the petitioner. We find, that there is enough material on record to show, that the goods seized, belonged to the petitioner and that it was the petitioner, who had attempted to smuggle high value memory cards and was to receive the courier, containing the memory chips. The goods which were seized were meant to be delivered to the petitioner. Infact, the order passed by the Commissioner of Customs, produced by the petitioner, in his affidavit-in-rejoinder, cannot be lost sight of, which shows that a penalty of Rs.15 lakhs was imposed on the petitioner and this also shows the complicity of the petitioner. We find, that while initiating action against the petitioner under the COFEPOSA, his past antecedents, that he was involved in smuggling activities in April, 2010 and in a similar smuggling activity in the year 2004, were considered and it was felt, that the detention of the petitioner was necessary “with a view to preventing him in future from smuggling goods”. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the order was passed on `vague, extraneous and on irrelevant grounds', is devoid of merit. 14. Considering the grounds on which the detention order is sought to be quashed at the pre-execution stage and the law relating thereto, we are satisfied that none of the grounds i.e. (ii), (iii) or (iv) as set out in Alka Gadia’s case (supra) are attracted in the present case. We, therefore, cannot make an exception to the general rule in this case by quashing the order of detention at the pre-execution stage. Accordingly, we find no merit in this petition. The petition is rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. 15. Before parting, we clarify that all observations made by us in this Judgment are only for the purpose of deciding the petition at the pre-execution stage and should not be understood to have expressed any opinion one way or the other. It is made clear that after execution of the detention order, if the action is challenged by the detenue, the Court will decide the same strictly in accordance with law on its own merits, uninfluenced by the observations made in this Judgment.