JUDGMENT Subhasis Talapatra, J. 1. This is an appeal by the convict under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 6-9-2007 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur in case No. 79 (ST/U) of 2006 convicting the appellant to undergo the rigorous imprisonment for 3 (three) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- and in default thereof to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months for commission of offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The essential fact may briefly be introduced at the outset. By the written Ejahar (Ext. 1) allegations as leveled against the appellant disclosed a case under Section 498-A/304-B of the I.P.C. and thus R.K. Pur P.S. Case No. 184/2008 was registered and taken up for investigation. 2. As alleged in the Ejahar that the marriage was solemnized between the appellant with one Suhena Begam as per Muslim Shariyat. After 8/9 months from the date of marriage the appellant and his father Majid Miah and mother started pressurizing her for realizing a sum of Rs. 7,000/- from her father's house as dowry and as the demand was not satisfied Suhena Begam used to be beaten up and ultimately on 22-4-2006 she was driven out from the matrimonial home in a state while she was carrying 5 (five) months pregnancy. It has been categorically stated that on 25-4-2006 the appellant appeared in person to realise the amount so demanded but the father in law and the brother in law, Malu Miah (the informant), could not meet that demand. After that, the appellant took back the informant's sister, since deceased, sounding that they would not see her face again as he would kill her. The informant (the PW-1) received one information on 8-5-2006 at about 6 O' clock in the afternoon that the appellant having assaulted his sister set her ablaze by pouring kerosene and she got severe burn injuries. The local people brought her sister in the TSD Hospital, Udaipur and on the same night Suhena Begam (the sister of the PW-1) died succumbing to the injuries. On the following day i.e. on 9-5-2006 the written Ejahar was lodged in the Police Station with an explanation that the informant was busy with his sister's treatment and later on for transporting the dead-body. 3. On the following day i.e. on 9-5-2006 the written Ejahar was lodged in the Police Station with an explanation that the informant was busy with his sister's treatment and later on for transporting the dead-body. 3. On completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the appellant under Section 498-A/304-B of the I.P.C. on finding a prima facie case against the appellant. On taking the cognizance, the case was committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur who transferred the case to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur for proceeding in accordance with law. On 13-3-2007 the charge against the appellant was framed under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the I.P.C. to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 5 documents (Ext. 1 to Ext. 5) and for the appellant 6 witnesses were examined. 4. Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant strongly contended that the finding of the conviction has been returned by the Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur fully relying on the oral testimony of PWs-1, 2 & 6 but their statement to a greater extent according to Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel cannot be admitted in the evidence in terms of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act which provides the clause in exception to the hearsay rules. 5. Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel having reference to the decision of the Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa as reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 461 submitted that the statement of the deceased must relate to the cause of death or to any of the circumstances of transaction prosecution which resulted in her death else no other statement cannot be accepted in view of the hearsay rule. 6. To buttress his contention Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant further submitted that the charge under Section 304B of the I.P.C. has fallen through for want of evidence. It would be apposite to extract the finding of the trial Court in this regard:- Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety, I am firmly of the view that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge u/s. 304B of the Indian Penal Code against the accused and hence he is acquitted of the said charge. It would be apposite to extract the finding of the trial Court in this regard:- Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety, I am firmly of the view that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge u/s. 304B of the Indian Penal Code against the accused and hence he is acquitted of the said charge. However, the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charge u/S. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code against the accused, Abdul Mannan alias Mannan Miah, beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, he is convicted on the said offence. Taking out a limb of that finding Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel submitted that since the allegation has been disjuncted from the dowry death and the statement as purportedly made to the PWs-1, 2 and 6 cannot be accepted in view of the hearsay rule. The finding of conviction under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. as returned by the trial Court should be interfered by this Court. 7. Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel relied on Inderpal v. State of M.P. as reported in 2002 Cri LJ 926: (2001 AIR SCW 5092), where it has been held that:- 7. Unless the statement of dead person would fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in evidence. In order to make the statement of a dead person admissible in law (written or verbal) the statement must be as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstance of the transactions which resulted in her death, in cases in which the cause of death comes into question. By no stretch of imagination can the statements of Damayanti contained in Exhibit P7 or Exhibit P8 and those quoted by the witnesses be connected with any circumstance of the transaction which resulted in her death. Even that apart, when we are dealing with an offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. disjuncted from the offence under 306, IPC the question of her death is not an issue for consideration and on that premise also Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act will stand at bay so far these materials are concerned. 8. Even that apart, when we are dealing with an offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. disjuncted from the offence under 306, IPC the question of her death is not an issue for consideration and on that premise also Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act will stand at bay so far these materials are concerned. 8. He further referred a decision of the Apex Court in Gananath Pattnaik (supra) where it has been held that:- Another circumstance of cruelty is with respect to taking away of the child from the deceased. To arrive at such a conclusion, the trial Court has referred to the statement of PW-5, who is the sister of the deceased. In her deposition recorded in the Court on 4-5-1990, PW-5 had stated: 'On 3-6-1987 for the last time I had been to the house of the deceased i.e. to her separate residence. Sworna, Snigdha Sima Apa, baby Apa accompanied me to her house on that day. At that time the deceased complained before us as usual and added to that she said that she is being assaulted by the accused now-a-days. She further complained before us that the accused is taking away the child from her, and that her mother-in-law has come and some conspiracy is going against her (the deceased). She further told that 'mate au banchei debenahin.' Such a statement appears to have been taken on record with the aid of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act at a time when the appellant was being tried for the offence under Section 304-B and such statement was admissible under clause (1) of the said section as it related to the cause of death of the deceased and the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death. Such a statement is not admissible in evidence for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and has to be termed as being only a hearsay evidence. Section 32 is an exception to the hearsay rule and deals with the statements for declarations by a person, since dead, relating to the cause of his or her death or the circumstances leading to such death. If a statement which otherwise is covered by the hearsay rule does not fall within the exception of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, the same cannot be relied upon for finding the guilt of the accused. 9. Mr. If a statement which otherwise is covered by the hearsay rule does not fall within the exception of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, the same cannot be relied upon for finding the guilt of the accused. 9. Mr. A Ghosh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State while refuting the submission of Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant categorically submitted that the PW-1 stated in the Ejahar (Ext. 1) that 'accused Mannan asked to give money of dowry, since we could not make provisions for money he forcibly took my sister away from our house at about 10 O'clock at night and threatened that we would not see my sister's face again (he) would kill my sister.' Therefore, this piece of evidence cannot be stated to be hearsay evidence. It is direct regarding the demand and the cruelty so exerted for releasing the money. The said piece of evidence cannot be stated to be hearsay within the provision of Section 60 of the Evidence Act. 10. He further referred to the statement made in the Ejahar as corroborated by the PW-2 while stating in the Court that 'about 10/12 days before the death, my daughter was driven out from her matrimonial home. Then she took shelter in our house. After about 3-4 days one day my son-in-law suddenly appeared in our house and took my daughter away forcibly." The PW-6 also stated in the Court that 'on 25-4-2006 Mannan Miah came to our house and took away Suhena with him forcibly as my father could not give him money as per his requirement. After 4/5 days my sister died of burn injuries. The PW-7 according to Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State has also corroborated of that evidence by stating that "before 7/8 days of the death of Suhena one day Mannan Miah came to our house and took away Suhena forcibly from our house as her father could not fulfill his demand." 11. On appreciating the rival pleas, it is required a short assessment of the evidence on record be made by this Court. It appears that the informant (PW-1) stated that at the time of marriage as per demand of the bridegroom they paid dowry. The conjugal life was peaceful for about 8-9 months and thereafter on demand of a sum of Rs. It appears that the informant (PW-1) stated that at the time of marriage as per demand of the bridegroom they paid dowry. The conjugal life was peaceful for about 8-9 months and thereafter on demand of a sum of Rs. 7,000/-, the appellant started treating the deceased (Suhena Begam) with cruelty. The deceased narrated her plight to them when she visited their house. He categorically stated that on 22-4-2006 when her sister was carrying 5 months pregnancy she was severely beaten by the appellant and thereafter she was driven out from their house. Then his sister took shelter in their house. On 21-5-2006 the accused suddenly came and took her sister away forcibly asking them to arrange money so demanded by him immediately, failing which, it would be the last visit of his sister at her parental home. On 8-5-2006 they got the information that Suhena received burn injuries and thereafter he lodged the F.I.R. on the following day. He identified the F.I.R. In the cross-examination he denied all the suggestions and stood firm on his statements. 12. The PW-2, namely, Salema Bibi who is the mother of the deceased also narrated that at the time of marriage they had given the dowry as per demand and how her daughter was subjected to torture by the appellant on demand of Rs. 7,000/-. She also stated that 'about 10/12 days before the death, my daughter was driven out from her matrimonial home. Then she took shelter in our house. After about 3-4 days one day her son-in-law suddenly appeared in our house and took her daughter away forcibly. At the time of departing, her son-in-law told that this was the visit of her daughter at her parental home. After about 3 days her daughter died of burn injuries. She further stated that she learnt from her daughter that the appellant had illicit relation with her elder sister-in-law (brothers' wife). But in the cross-examination it was found that the statement that she made in the examination in chief regarding of the appellant's visit about 10/12 days before her death was not appearing in the previous statement as recorded under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. 13. The PW-3 namely, Tazir Islam was examined as he scribed the written Ejahar. He stated nothing of the relevance except admitting the signature appearing on the written Ejahar (Ext. 1). 14. P.C. 13. The PW-3 namely, Tazir Islam was examined as he scribed the written Ejahar. He stated nothing of the relevance except admitting the signature appearing on the written Ejahar (Ext. 1). 14. One Dibyendu Chakraborty was examined as the PW-4 who stated that he carried the injured, Suhena Begam along with her husband, mother-in-law and brother-in-law in an auto rickshaw to the TSD Hospital, Udaipur. The other parts of his evidence are not very relevant. But in the cross-examination he stated that he did not find any marital discord between Mannan and his wife. 15. The PW-5, namely, Idan Gazi stated in the Court that Suhena Begam was his sister-in-law. On 25-4-2006 he visited the house of his in laws for taking back his wife and he met Mannan Miah there. Mannan told him that his father-in-law did not pay him money as per his requirement so he was taking back his wife. He further stated that the Mannan told him that his wife would not visit his parental home any longer. But such statement was not found in the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. when it was shown to the PW-5 during the cross-examination and at that time the witness volunteered that he went to his in laws' house on 24-5-2006 and in fact he met Mannan on the road. But no such statement available in the statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr. P.C. by the Investigating Officer. 16. The PW-6 (brother of the deceased, Suhena Begam) stated that after 8/9 months of her marriage with the appellant one day Suhena came to their house and requested his father to give a sum of Rs. 7,000/- as demanded by her husband. But his father had no fund to part with as he purchased a tractor. Since they could not fulfill the demand Suhena was subjected to torture by her husband. He also narrated that the appellant had illicit relation with his elder brothers' wife when that was detected by his sister, she started receiving ill treatment. He also categorically stated that on 25-4-2006 Mannan came to their house and took away Suhena forcibly as his father could not give him money as per his requirement. But the said statement was not found in his previous statement recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 of the Cr. He also categorically stated that on 25-4-2006 Mannan came to their house and took away Suhena forcibly as his father could not give him money as per his requirement. But the said statement was not found in his previous statement recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. Similarly the statement that she was subjected to torture by the appellant as her father could not satisfy the demand has not found place in the previous statement. Even the episode alleged to occur on 25-4-2006 did find not place in the previous statement. He however, denied all the suggestions made in the cross-examination. 17. The PW-17, namely Farid Miah was examined by the prosecution, he is a related witness. He stated that in the same line of the PW-2 that 'about 10/12 days before the death, my daughter was driven out from her matrimonial home. Then she took shelter in our house. After about 3-4 days one day the appellant suddenly appeared in their house and took away Suhena forcibly as her father could not fulfill his demand. On that particular day, Suhena came to our house in a casual visit. After 7/8 days of the said incident Suhena died of burn injuries. He did not find any member from the matrimonial home of Suhena at the hospital. But no such statement that Suhena was subjected to torture by her husband for failure to bring money from her parental home was found available. However, he was firm when he was cross-examined on the issue that the appellant took Suhena forcibly from their house for her failure to realise the demand of her husband. 18. The PW-8 namely Sri Ramendra Mandal is a constable who was deputed to guard the dead body of Suhena at the TSD Hospital and on completion of the Post-Mortem Examination, the dead body of the deceased and the burnt wearing apparels were handed over to him and he produced the same to the Investigating Officer who prepared the seizure list (Ext. 2). He identified the burnt wearing apparels as Ext. MO-1 series. 19. Dr. Abhijit Dutta was examined as the PW-9 since he conducted the Post-Mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. 2). He identified the burnt wearing apparels as Ext. MO-1 series. 19. Dr. Abhijit Dutta was examined as the PW-9 since he conducted the Post-Mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. He stated that a medical team was formed for the post-mortem examination of the deceased and he was one of the medical officers of that team who conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. He stated that the cause of death of the deceased as found by the medical team was due to 100% burn-injury. He identified the Post-Mortem Report (Ext. 3) and the signatures thereon. 20. The PW-10, Sri Pinaki Samanta was the Investigating Officer who stated that how he conducted the investigation and recorded the statement of the witnesses. He also stated that he also examined the U.D. case No. 30/2006 (Ext. 5) which was initially registered by the police. He however, could not shed light in the cross-examination regarding the final outcome of the UD case. 21. In defence, the appellant examined himself and stated that on 8-5-2006 on hearing the cry of his mother he rushed to his house and found that the neighbouring people had been trying to extinguish the fire by pouring water on his wife. Thereafter, his wife was taken to the TSD hospital, Udaipur with severe burn injury on her person for medical treatment. He stated that his in laws took the dead body of his wife from the hospital for performing her last rights. He also stated that relation with his deceased wife was loving but admitted that on casual visit he used to go to his-in-laws' house. He also however, admitted that he visited his in laws' house never. However, in the cross-examination he stated that 7/8 days before the death, his wife went to her parental home but he denied the fact that he brought back his wife from the parental home forcibly saying that it was her last visit. 22. The DW-2, Tapati Begam stated that Suhena was his god daughter. Suhena never made any complaint against her husband and in laws. On the fateful day, on hearing the hue and cry she rushed and found that Suhena was ablaze and the neighbouring people had been trying to extinguish the fire. 22. The DW-2, Tapati Begam stated that Suhena was his god daughter. Suhena never made any complaint against her husband and in laws. On the fateful day, on hearing the hue and cry she rushed and found that Suhena was ablaze and the neighbouring people had been trying to extinguish the fire. She stated that when she was brought to the hospital on her asking Suhena told her that she herself set fire on her body by pouring kerosene on her body but she did not disclose the reason for setting herself on fire. She specifically stated in the cross-examination that Suhena had no sense when she was brought for treatment in the hospital. 23. The DW-3 namely, Jyotsna Begam stated that Suhena never made any allegation against her husband to her as the close-door neighbour. On the fateful day, she also rushed to the place of occurrence and found that the villagers were trying to extinguish the fire. She also stated in the cross-examination that the entire body of Suhena was burnt. 24. The DW-4 is the another neighbouring witness namely, Marjina Begam stated that Suhena never made any allegation against her husband to her. In the cross-examination she stated that she had not been on visiting term with the accused as their relationship with the accused was not cordial. 25. One Sahatul Miah was examined as the DW-5 and he was a neighbour of the accused. He also appeared on the place of occurrence. He stated in the Court that he had never seen Abdul Mannan quarrelling with his wife. 26. The DW-6 Maman Miah is the neighbourhood witness who stated that he had never seen Abdul Mannan quarrelling with his wife. He denied that the suggestion that for the cordial relation with the appellant he deposed in the Court falsely. 27. On refuting the evidence and on the face of the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, the contentious points those require re-appreciation by this Court are whether the statement as made by the PW-1, PW-3 and PW-6 are the hearsay evidence within the meaning of Section 60 of the Evidence Act and whether the statement can be accepted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act for returning the finding of the conviction under Section 498A of the I.P.C. 28. In view of the decisions in Gananth Pattnaik (supra) this Court would definitely accept the proposition as advanced by Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that since the charge under Section 304(B) of the I.P.C. has fallen through for want of evidence. The statements so referred by this Court or by Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the state cannot be treated as the statement accepted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act but if those statement are within the ambit of Section 59 of the Evidence Act read with Section 60 of the Evidence Act. 29. The appellant while deposing in the Court as the DW-1 did not make any statement that whether 7/8 days prior to the death of Suhena (the deceased) he visited in laws house for bringing back the Suhena or not. Curiously this Court finds that he mixed the words to deny a suggestion by stating that 'it is not a fact that I took my wife back to my house forcibly from my in laws house saying that it was her last visit'. Therefore, there is a scope of presumption that he visited the house on the referred date and as the presumption has been corroborated by the PW-2 and the PW-6 categorically, the Court is not inclined to give weightage to the oral testimony of the PW-7. The PW-1 was at the first instance filed the Ejahar he narrated the episode and succinctly stated that 'on coming to our house on 25-4-2006, the accused Mannan asked to give money of dowry, since we could not make provisions for money he forcibly took my sister away from our house at about 10 O'clock at night and threatened that we would not see my sister's face again that is, (he would kill my sister). He proved that statement in the Court and in the cross-examination he was not wavering on the said statement. Similarly the PW-2 also corroborated that part of the statement in the Ejahar without any wavering and stood for the cross-examination. The PW-6 also corroborated that part of the statement and stood unscathed in the cross. This piece of the evidence being direct proves the unlawful demand and cruelty. This oral statement is direct, not hearsay at all. Similarly the PW-2 also corroborated that part of the statement in the Ejahar without any wavering and stood for the cross-examination. The PW-6 also corroborated that part of the statement and stood unscathed in the cross. This piece of the evidence being direct proves the unlawful demand and cruelty. This oral statement is direct, not hearsay at all. Therefore, that part of the evidence is not required to be examined in the touchstone as laid under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. For failure of proving the charge under Section 304-B of the I.P.C. this evidence cannot be treated to have denuded of its evidentiary value. The another aspect of the matter even if not raised may be of some relevance. Whether the PW-1, 2 & 6 being the related witnesses their testimonies are liable to be discarded if not corroborated from the independent witnesses. The law in this regard is well settled even though there is no inflexible rule that on the basis of the testimony as advanced by the related witnesses no finding of the conviction can be returned. It has been held that if the evidence is provided by the related evidence are found trustworthy on cautious evaluation, the finding of conviction can well be returned on their basis. 30. In Hukum Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan as reported in (2000) 7 SCC 490 : (2000 AIR SCW 4416), the Apex Court held that:- The Sessions Court refused to believe the testimony of those witnesses on the erroneous perception that they are 'interested witnesses'. The only premise for dubbing them as 'interested witnesses' is that they were the kith and kin of the deceased. Why should such witnesses be termed as interested witnesses? If they had seen the occurrence they would certainly have the interest to bring the offenders of the murder of their breadwinner to book. Normally the kith and kin of the deceased, if they had seen the occurrence would not absolve the real offenders and involve innocent persons in that murder. Vide Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 , Guli Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1974) 3 SCC 698 : ( AIR 1974 SC 276 ) and Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158 : ( AIR 1977 SC 472 ). 31. A careful scrutiny is necessary because the relatives have a tendency to exaggerate. 31. A careful scrutiny is necessary because the relatives have a tendency to exaggerate. This Court placed those oral testimonies to stricter scrutiny, particularly when the defence did not make any attempt to explore why the deceased set ablaze by pouring kerosene in the matrimonial home. When the DW-1, the appellant herein was examined as the witness, he was the best person to shed a light on that aspect of the matter for discharging the onus as provided under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. As such this Court should not accept the analogy as advanced by Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that these statements are hit by the hearsay rule and cannot be accepted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. According to this Court the concern is highly misplaced as the oral testimonies of the PW-2 and the PW-6 are direct in nature and those clearly come within the meaning of Section 59 of the Evidence Act read with Section 60 of the Evidence Act. Thus, this Court finds no infirmity in the finding of conviction so returned by the trial Court and accordingly this appeal is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.