JUDGMENT Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. 1. Both the Appeals arise from a judgment and order of a learned Single Judge dated 4 February 2013 on Chamber Summons which were taken out by the Appellant for revoking the leave which was granted by the learned Single Judge under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Both the learned Counsel have urged before the court the facts of the first of the two appeals and are agreed that since the issue is similar, the judgment will govern both the appeals. 2. The Appellant in both the Appeals is the original First Defendant. The Appellant availed of financial facilities from Future Capital Holdings Limited, the Seventh Respondent (the Original Seventh Defendant). The Second, Third and Fourth Respondents furnished personal guarantees. Though the original loan facilities were provided to the First Defendant by the Seventh Defendant the Plaintiff claims under a Deed of Assignment dated 3 August 2012 by which the loan facilities and all the receivables, rights and benefits of the Seventh Defendant have been assigned to the Plaintiff. A loan facility agreement was entered into between the First and the Seventh Defendant on 11 July 2012. The claim in the suit is for the recovery of an amount of Rs.125 crores which is claimed to be due and payable to the Plaintiff or, alternatively, to the Seventh Defendant. The Plaintiff seeks in prayer (c) of the plaint a declaration of the existence of a valid and subsisting mortgage of immovable properties. The Plaintiff seeks, in the event that it is held that a valid mortgage by deposit of title deeds has not been created, a decree for specific performance of the agreement to create a mortgage by depositing title deeds. On this basis, the Plaintiff has sought the enforcement of the mortgage by the sale of properties and the application of the net sale proceeds in satisfaction of the claim of the Plaintiff. In the alternate, and in the event that specific performance is refused, the Plaintiff has sued for damages quantified at Rs.300 crores. Consequential reliefs have been claimed in the suit. 3. The suit was presented on 23 August 2012. After the suit was presented an application was made for leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent on 23 August 2012 which was granted. The suit has been lodged on 25 August 2012 before the registry. 4. Consequential reliefs have been claimed in the suit. 3. The suit was presented on 23 August 2012. After the suit was presented an application was made for leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent on 23 August 2012 which was granted. The suit has been lodged on 25 August 2012 before the registry. 4. An application was made before the learned Single Judge for revocation of the leave which was granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The Chamber Summons for revocation has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 4 February 2013. 5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants submits that: (i) Leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent has to be taken prior to the receipt of the plaint by the court and leave if taken subsequently is not proper. In the present case the learned Single Judge has observed in paragraph 7 of the judgment that the petition seeking leave under Clause 12 was filed after the suit was filed. Hence leave could not have been granted; (ii) Leave under clause 12 cannot be granted if the Plaintiff has sought title in which case the issue of title has to be decided; (iii) No leave under clause 12 can be granted where a suit is for damages; (iv) Before leave can be granted, the cause of action must enure to the benefit of the Plaintiff. Where the cause of action has accrued in favour of one of the Defendants, no leave can be granted; and (v) The clause of jurisdiction in the loan facility agreements excludes by implication the jurisdiction of all other courts other than those at Hyderabad. Though the clause of jurisdiction recognises a non exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts of Hyderabad, the words “non exclusive” will render the entire clause redundant. Hence parties must be construed to have had the intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction only on the courts at Hyderabad. 6. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is thus : “12. Though the clause of jurisdiction recognises a non exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts of Hyderabad, the words “non exclusive” will render the entire clause redundant. Hence parties must be construed to have had the intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction only on the courts at Hyderabad. 6. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is thus : “12. Original jurisdiction as to suits.- And We do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try and determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land or other immovable property such land or property shall be situated, or in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or, in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business, or personally work for gain, within such limits; except that the said High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court at Bombay, or the Bombay City Civil Court.” 7. Clause 12 empowers this court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction to receive, try and determine suits of every description if (i) in the case of “suits for land or other immovable property” such land or property be situated within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction or (ii) in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen either (a) wholly; or (b) if the leave of the court shall first have been obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction, or (iii) if the Defendant at the time of commencement of the action resides, carries on business or personally works for gain within such limits. Two facets of clause 12 merit emphasis. First in the case of a suit for land or other immovable property the land or property has to be situated within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction. Two facets of clause 12 merit emphasis. First in the case of a suit for land or other immovable property the land or property has to be situated within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction. Second in all other cases, the cause of action ought to have arisen either wholly within the local limits of that jurisdiction or if it has arisen in part within the local limits then it is necessary that the leave of the court shall have been first obtained. If the suit is for land or other immovable property then no question of the grant of leave arises because the condition precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction to receive, try and determine the suit is that the land or property must be situated within the local limits. The question of the grant of leave arises in other cases where though the cause of action has not arisen wholly within the local limits it has arisen in part within those limits. In such a situation what clause 12 mandates is that leave shall first have been obtained of the court. 8. The expression “shall be empowered to receive” and the subsequent expression “shall have been first obtained” have been considered in several decisions. In Rampurtap Samruthroy v. Premsukh Chandamal (ILR (1890) 15, Bom. 93) it was held that the leave required under clause 12 of the Letters Patent must be granted if at all at the time of acceptance of the plaint and cannot be granted afterwards. The judgment of Justice Telang in Rampurtap (supra) was followed by a Division Bench in Devidatt v. Shriram (1928) 30 (sic) BLR 236) where it was held that the obtaining of leave is a condition precedent to the entertainment by the court of a suit in which the cause of action arises in part outside jurisdiction. The words “empowered to receive” have been construed to mean that the court in its original civil jurisdiction has no jurisdiction even to receive a plaint where only a part of the cause of action has arisen within the local limits of its jurisdiction unless leave would have been first obtained. In Ramgopal Chunilal v. Ramsarup Baldevdas (1934) 36 BLR 84) the Division Bench distinguished between the presentation of a plaint and admission or receipt of the suit. In Ramgopal Chunilal v. Ramsarup Baldevdas (1934) 36 BLR 84) the Division Bench distinguished between the presentation of a plaint and admission or receipt of the suit. The Division Bench held that the plaint even where leave is required is presented when it is handed over by the Plaintiff or by his agent to the proper officer in the office of the Prothonotary. If leave is required the plaint must be submitted to the Chamber Judge and leave must be obtained under clause 12. When leave is obtained, the officer in the office of the Prothonotary would admit the plaint if it is in order. The obtaining of the leave of the judge and admission of the plaint would not affect the presentation of the plaint for the purposes of the Limitation Act. All these judgments were adverted to by a learned Single Judge of this court in Quadricon Pvt. Ltd. v. Bajarang Alloys Ltd. (AIR 2008 Bombay 88). In that case Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. J. Vazifdar held as follows: “From the above judgments, one thing is clear. As held in Rampurtab's case, the leave must be granted at the time of acceptance of the plaint and cannot be granted afterwards. This judgment was affirmed by the Division Bench in Devidatt's case holding that the leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent is a condition precedent to the maintenance and entertainment of the suit and that the leave of the Court should be first obtained i.e. obtained before the institution of the suit. The judgment in Noorjahan's case also inter-alia held that the leave cannot be granted after the suit has been instituted.” 9. Rule 44 of the Bombay High Court Original Side Rules stipulates that all plaints shall be verified within the local jurisdiction before one of the officers of the court appointed in that behalf. Rule 45 stipulates that a plaint in which the leave of the court is to be applied for shall except in cases of special urgency be lodged for examination with the officer attending on the Judge in Chambers before 4.15 p.m. on the day previous to its being presented to the Judge. Rule 47 deals with the admission of a plaint and provides that when a plaint is admitted, the words “Admitted this day” shall be endorsed thereon and signed by the Prothonotary and Senior Master by one of his assistants. Rule 47 deals with the admission of a plaint and provides that when a plaint is admitted, the words “Admitted this day” shall be endorsed thereon and signed by the Prothonotary and Senior Master by one of his assistants. The Rules therefore make a distinction between the presentation of a plaint and its admission. The presentation takes place even before the judge in chambers is moved for leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It is upon the grant of leave that the Prothonotary would thereafter proceed to admit the plaint under the provisions of Rule 47. 10. In the present case the plaint was verified on 23 August 2012. After the plaint was presented, it was moved before the Judge in Chambers for the grant of leave on 23 August 2012. Leave was granted. The plaint was thereafter lodged on 25 August 2012 and was admitted by the Prothonotary and Senior Master on 16 January 2013. Hence it is clear that before the plaint was lodged on 25 August 2012, leave of the Judge in Chambers was duly obtained on 23 August 2012. The provisions of clause 12 of the Letters Patent were therefore duly complied. 11. The suit in the present case is for the recovery of a debt due and owing to the Plaintiff. Prayer (a) is for a declaration that a sum of Rs.125 crores was due and owing to the Plaintiff or, alternatively, to Defendant No. 7 or such of them jointly or severally as the court may find entitled. Prayer (b) is for a decree in the sum of Rs.125 crores. Prayer (c) is for the declaration of the existence of a valid and subsisting mortgage in respect of the properties at Exhibit Q-1, while prayer (d) is for a declaration of a valid and subsisting mortgage in respect of the properties of the Fifth Defendant described in Exhibit GG. 12. The judgment of a bench of seven learned Judges of this court in Hatimbhai Hassanally v. Framroz Eduljee Dinshaw (AIR 1927 Bombay 278 (Full Bench) ) holds that the primary element in a mortgage suit is the debt and not the security. Consequently the primary or substantial object of a mortgage suit is the payment of the debt and the sale of the property is sought ancillary to the final end of such a suit namely the payment of the mortgage debt. Consequently the primary or substantial object of a mortgage suit is the payment of the debt and the sale of the property is sought ancillary to the final end of such a suit namely the payment of the mortgage debt. Consequently a mortgage suit of that nature has been held not to be a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. A mortgagee's interest in such a suit has been held to comprise of two elements: (i) the right to sue the mortgagor personally for the mortgage debt; and (ii) the right to realise the debt by sale of the mortgaged property. Hence it has been held that a mortgage suit would not meet the description of a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. 13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants does not dispute this position in law. However it has been urged that prayer clause (f) would bring the suit within the description of a suit on title and hence it has been submitted that the suit in essence is a suit for land. 14. We do not find any merit in the submission. Prayer clause (e) which precedes prayer (f) is without prejudice and in the alternative to prayer (c) which seeks a declaration of the existence of a valid and subsisting mortgage. Prayer (e) states that without prejudice and in the alternative to prayer (c) and in the event that it is held that a valid and effective mortgage by deposit of title deeds has not been created on the properties at Exhibit Q-1, the First and Second Defendants may be ordered and decreed to specifically perform the agreement to create a mortgage in favour of the Plaintiff by deposit of title deeds. The relevant averment in paragraph 38 of the plaint is that though the First and Second Defendants had agreed to create equitable mortgages by deposit of title deeds described in Exhibit Q-1 and a memorandum of deposit of title deeds was executed by the Second and Fifth Defendants the documents of title remained to be deposited with the Plaintiff and those documents had not been deposited despite representations and assurances. Prayer (e) therefore seeks performance of the agreement to create a mortgage. Prayer (e) therefore seeks performance of the agreement to create a mortgage. Similarly prayer (f) calls upon the Fifth Defendant to perform the agreement to create a mortgage in favour of the Plaintiff by perfecting its title to the properties at Exhibit 'GG'. It is impossible to accept the submission that either prayers (e) or (f) would constitute a suit on title or a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Nor do the words 'by perfecting title' in prayer (f) change that position. What those prayers postulate is a decree for performance of the agreement to create a mortgage. If a suit on a mortgage, as has been held in Hatimbhai's case does not constitute a suit for land, it would not be possible to hold that a suit seeking performance of an agreement to create a mortgage would constitute a suit for land. 15. Similarly prayer (i) seeks a decree of damages in the amount of Rs.300 crores in the event of specific performance being refused. There is absolutely nothing in the judgment in Hatimbhai's case which would lead us to conclude that a suit for damages would not fall within the description of those suits under clause 12 in respect of which leave of the court can be granted where a part of the cause of action has accrued within the jurisdiction of the court. The observations of Marten, C.J. in paragraph 43 of the judgment refer to two alternative meanings of a suit for land; one being a suit to obtain or recover land and the other a suit which substantially involves the recovery of land or its equivalent. All that the learned Chief Justice held was that for the purpose of that case, it was not necessary to insist on the former meaning and the alternative meaning which introduces the qualification of “substantially” may yet be adopted for testing whether a mortgage suit is a suit for land within a meaning of clause 12. In that context the observations clarify that the court was not speaking of a suit relating to or concerning foreclosure, specific performance or damages. These observations do not indicate that there is any finding of the court to the effect that a suit for damages would not fall within the description of those suits where leave of the court under clause 12 can be granted. These observations do not indicate that there is any finding of the court to the effect that a suit for damages would not fall within the description of those suits where leave of the court under clause 12 can be granted. On the contrary clause 12 of the Letters Patent deals with two categories; the first being suits for land or other immovable property and the second all other cases. A claim for damages would not fall outside the latter. 16. The real issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the parties had by necessary implication excluded the jurisdiction of other courts save and except for the civil court at Hyderabad. The relevant clause pertaining to jurisdiction is in the following terms : “25. Parties irrevocably agree that only the Courts and tribunals of competent jurisdiction at Hyderabad, India shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction in relation to any dispute or difference between the parties including any question as to whether or not any dispute or difference shall have arisen.” Now in the present case clause 25 stipulates in the first instance that “only the courts” and tribunals of competent jurisdiction at Hyderabad shall have jurisdiction. But equally clause 25 postulates that this jurisdiction would be “non exclusive”. Hence it is evident that while in the present case the parties have on the one hand used the expression “only” yet in the very same clause they have clarified that the conferment of jurisdiction on the courts at Hyderabad would be on a non exclusive basis meaning thereby that this would not exclude the jurisdiction of other competent courts. 17. The entire body of the law on the subject has been revisited in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Swastik Gases P. Ltd. vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2013 (8) Scale 433). In that case, clause 17 of the contract contained an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration while clause 18 stipulated that the agreement shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court at Kolkata. Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. M. Lodha delivered the main judgment of two learned Judges comprising of a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court and held as follows : “..... Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. M. Lodha delivered the main judgment of two learned Judges comprising of a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court and held as follows : “..... The question is, whether parties by virtue of clause 18 of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been excluded. For answer to the above question, we have to see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive', or 'exclusive jurisdiction' have not been used but his, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties – by having clause 18 in the agreement – is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts....” In the concurring judgment Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur held as follows: “........in the jurisdiction clause of an agreement, the absence of words like “alone, “only”, “exclusive” or “exclusive jurisdiction” is neither decisive nor does it make any material difference in deciding the jurisdiction of a court. The very existence of a jurisdiction clause in an agreement makes the intention of the parties to an agreement quite clear and it is not advisable to read such a clause in the agreement like a statute. The very existence of a jurisdiction clause in an agreement makes the intention of the parties to an agreement quite clear and it is not advisable to read such a clause in the agreement like a statute. In the present case, only the Courts in Kolkata had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties.” 18. In the present case the court must have due regard to all the relevant terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties. This is all the more necessary because though clause 25 uses the expression “only” it also uses the expression “non exclusive”. Some light can be cast on the intent of the parties by reading the agreement as a whole. The term loan agreement dated 11 July 2012, as noted earlier, contains a clause of jurisdiction stating only the courts and tribunals of competent jurisdiction at Hyderabad shall have non exclusive jurisdiction. The schedule to the agreement prescribes that payment of the loan instalments was to be made at Mumbai. The facilities agreement dated 17 January 2012 provides in clause 25.1 (e) as follows:- “All payments to the Facility Agent shall be made to such accounts and in such amount as may be specified by the Facility Agent from time to time.” The invoice of the Respondent, “Exhibit YY” to the plaint, dated 22 June 2012 specifically provides that payments would be made to a designated bank account in HDFC Bank in Mumbai. Now it is in this background, that in paragraph 51 of the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that in terms of the loan agreements under which the interest and amounts were outstanding and due, repayment of the loan amounts was to be made and was agreed to be made to the Seventh Defendant and now to the Plaintiff in Mumbai. The Plaintiff has relied on clause 25.1 (e) of the facilities agreement dated 17 January 2012 under which all payments were to be made to such accounts as specified by the facility agent. According to the Plaintiff the facility agent (the Seventh Defendant) has stipulated in its invoices raised from time to time that remittance be made to the account in HDFC Bank, Mumbai. According to the Plaintiff the facility agent (the Seventh Defendant) has stipulated in its invoices raised from time to time that remittance be made to the account in HDFC Bank, Mumbai. Hence it has been averred that payment has been made by the First Defendant and has been received by the Plaintiff in Mumbai and hence the agreement dated 17 January 2012 has been performed in Mumbai. Reading the agreement as a whole, it is clear that the intent was not to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the civil courts at Hyderabad. Ordinarily, the parties in arriving at a jurisdictional clause conferring jurisdiction on courts at a particular place would intend to confer exclusive jurisdiction for otherwise the jurisdictional clause would be redundant. Hence, as the Supreme Court has held, even the absence of words such as “alone” or “only” is not decisive. In this case, parties have a jurisdictional clause and they have used the word only. However, they specifically used the expression “non exclusive” in the same clause. Accepting the case of the Appellant would require the Court to ignore or excise the words “non exclusive”. This is impermissible and such a course should not lightly be adopted where the other parts of the agreement especially, do not support such a construction. The ouster of jurisdiction must be specific. That is not so here. 19. The learned Single Judge was correct in holding that the place where a contract is executed, the place where the contract is to be performed as well as the place where a breach takes place all constitute an intrinsic element of the cause of action. Hence since a part of the cause of action had occurred within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this court it was held that the grant of leave under clause 12 was in order. We find no reason to interfere with that finding in appeal. The finding is based on the material on the record. Finally we also hold that there is no merit in the contention that no cause of action enured to the benefit of the Plaintiff. We find no reason to interfere with that finding in appeal. The finding is based on the material on the record. Finally we also hold that there is no merit in the contention that no cause of action enured to the benefit of the Plaintiff. The entire cause of the Plaintiff is based on the premise that there is a valid assignment dated 3 August 2012 under which the loan facilities and all the receivables, rights and benefits of the Seventh Defendant have been duly and validly assigned to the Plaintiff (Paragraph 1 of the plaint). On the face of the plaint, it cannot be hence concluded that no cause of action has been pleaded. 20. We clarify that all observations contained in the present judgment are confined to the limited issue of whether leave under clause 12 was validly granted and will not come in the way of an adjudication of the rights and contentions of the parties including on the issue as to the validity of the deed of assignment. Learned Counsel have stated that since the facts of both the appeals are similar, both shall be governed by the same judgment. No point has separately urged in the companion appeal. 21. For these reasons we hold that the learned Judge was justified in holding that leave under clause 12 was validly granted and the Chamber Summons for revocation were lacking in merit. There is no merit in the Appeals. The Appeals shall accordingly stand dismissed.