Judgment : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. SUBMISSIONS: 2. Mr. Atrey, learned counsel for petitioners in this writ petition, has submitted synopsis dated 23.09.2013 and the very first question raised is: “(i) Whether the ICAR and the institutes under its control including the petitioner No.2, is an “industry” under Sec.2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? 3. It appears that the said question was specifically raised and decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of DuryodhanHiraman Ingole & ors.. vs.. Indian Council Agriculture Research & anr.; 2009 (4) Bom.C.R. 107. This Court, in paragraph nos. 31 and 31 observed thus: “31. The learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be termed as industries and, therefore, the provisions of industrial law would not at all be attracted. For this purpose, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma reported in : (1997) IILLJ 625 SC. Physical Research Laboratory was a Trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and was financed by the Department of Space, Government of India. After considering the question as to what is industry as discussed in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, reported at : (1978) ILLJ349SC, the Court found on facts that the Physical Research Laboratory was engaged in power research in space science. The Labour Court had also found that the work carried on by the Physical Research Laboratory was not connected with production, supply or distribution of material or goods or services. The research is not conducted for the benefit of anyone else and the object of research is to obtain knowledge only for the benefit of Department of Space. In these peculiar facts, the Court held that Physical Research Laboratory was not an industry. 32. The analogy cannot, however, apply to the case of the present respondents. The question as to what amounts to an industry has been settled for over thirty years now. In The Workmen of Indian Standards Institution v. The Management of Indian Standards Institution, reported at : (1976)ILLJ33SC , a majority of the Supreme Court held that the Indian Standards Institution was an industry. The question as to what amounts to an industry has been settled for over thirty years now. In The Workmen of Indian Standards Institution v. The Management of Indian Standards Institution, reported at : (1976)ILLJ33SC , a majority of the Supreme Court held that the Indian Standards Institution was an industry. The various tests laid down by the majority in that case were later considered and affirmed by a seven-Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, reported in : (1978)ILLJ349SC. Applying those tests to the activities of the respondents, it cannot be said that the respondents are not industry. The research carried on by the respondents is for the benefit of agriculturists and not for the purpose of only non-material gain of knowledge. In any case, whatever may be the higher objective with which the Institution is established, if the workmen employed have to put up a work, which would be akin to an industry, they would be covered by the industrial law, since they cannot be said to have joined the Institution as missionaries with an altruistic object and furthering knowledge of mankind. For them, it is a means of survival. In view of this, the arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondents based on the decision in Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma, have to be rejected.” 4. Mr. Atrey, learned counsel for the petitioners, further contended that the said judgment was put to challenge in Letters Patent Appeal No.464/2009 decided on 23.11.2010. However, he submitted that in the said Letters Patent Appeal, the point about petitioner not being an “Industry” was not raised and, therefore, there was no occasion for the appellate Court to examine the validity of the said finding recorded in para nos.31 and 32. He further submits that he still wants to challenge the finding of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT)-cum-Labour Court holding the petitioner to be an “Industry”. 5. I have gone through the judgment recorded by the leaned Single Judge of this Court and in particular findings recorded in paragraphs 31 and 32. I am in agreement with the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge about the I.C.A.R. being an “Industry” and I do not see any reason to differ with the said finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. I, therefore, hold in line with the said reasoning and confirm the finding recorded. I am in agreement with the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge about the I.C.A.R. being an “Industry” and I do not see any reason to differ with the said finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. I, therefore, hold in line with the said reasoning and confirm the finding recorded. In addition, Mr. Atrey invited my attention to the amended para 2(A), 2(B) and 12(A) to 12(D) of the petition so also rules and bye-laws of the I.C.A.R. He also referred to the judgment in the case of Physical Research Laboratory ..vs.. K. G. Sharma; AIR 1997 SC 1855 in support of his statement that the petitioner is not an Industry. So far as the pleadings above referred are concerned, the same are being made in this petition for the first time. Insofar as the decision in the case of Physical Research Laboratory supra is concerned, the same was considered in the said decision. As regards HimanshuKumar Vidyarthi and ors. (supra) is concerned, the said judgment is distinguishable because in that case, the petition was filed directly in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and neither any pleading nor any evidence was recorded for holding the establishment to be not an Industry. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the issue was framed by the Industrial Tribunal. All the pleadings were raised and evidence, oral as well as documentary, was led. Hence, the decision in the case of HimanshuKumar Vidyarthi and ors., is not applicable. 6. For the above reasons, therefore, concurring with the view taken by this Court in DuryodhanHiraman Ingole & ors.. vs ..Indian Council Agriculture Research & anr., I hold that the finding recorded by the CGIT-cum-labour Court holding it to be an Industry is legal, correct and proper. 7. Learned counsel for the parties have now been asked to proceed to argue the matter on merits. 8. Next, Mr. Atrey, learned counsel for the petitioners, fairly stated that after admission of the petition and interim order made by this Court, the workmen have been in the employment of the establishment and even now, those who were working are continued in the employment. Mr. 8. Next, Mr. Atrey, learned counsel for the petitioners, fairly stated that after admission of the petition and interim order made by this Court, the workmen have been in the employment of the establishment and even now, those who were working are continued in the employment. Mr. Atrey, further submitted that there is an error of law committed by the CGIT-cum-Labour Court, Nagpur in that he has acted contrary to the mandate of Section 10 (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act in going beyond the ambit and scope of reference that was made by the Central Government to the Tribunal, which is wholly impermissible. According to Mr. Atrey, operative part of the order directing framing of the scheme for regularization of service, grant of continuity of service and other benefits are all the orders, which could not have been made by the CGIT since there was no reference before it. 9. Per contra, Ms Jaipurkar, learned counsel for the respondents-workmen, vehemently opposed the argument and argued supporting the impugned judgment and award that the CGIT-cum-Labour Court has relied upon the Supreme Court Judgment for framing of the scheme etc. and it is in this context the orders of regularization have been made, which should not be interfered with. She further argued that since the employees have been working from 1985 onwards, there is no reason why the employer should not regularize their services in the light of the various Supreme Court judgments in such types of cases. She further argued that as a matter of fact, before the reference proceedings had been finalized during the conciliation proceedings, the issues were about the reinstatement and regularization in service but unfortunately, the Central Government made reference only with reference to the termination of service and reinstatement and she fairly stated that it is the fact that the said order making reference was not put to challenge for incorporating the aspect of regularization in the said reference. CONSIDERATION: 10. The reference that was made by the Central Government to the CGIT-cum-Labour Court reads thus: “The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi by exercising the powers conferred by Clause (D) of Sub Section (1) and Sub Section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has referred this dispute vide order No. L-42011/27/2000/IR(DU) DT. 30.06.2000 on the following schedule. 30.06.2000 on the following schedule. THE SCHEDULE Whether the action of the management of National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources, through it's Officer In-charge, Regional Station, Akola and Chairman/Director, New Delhi in terminating the services of Sau.Shobha W/o Manikrao Dhore and other 17 workers (and other 29 as per list) w.e.f.15.01.2000 is legal, proper & justified? If not, to what relief the said workmen are entitled? 11. Perusal of the above reference clearly shows that Central Government referred only the issue; termination of services w.e.f. 15.01.2000; and the question, whether the termination of the workers as per the list was legal, proper and justified and whether the workmen were entitled to any relief. Perusal of the reference does not anyway shows that the Central Government had asked the tribunal to decide anything more than what is recorded. However, the tribunal has made the following order which I quote thus: ORDER The action of the management of the National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources through it's Officer Incharge, Regional Station, Akola in and the Chairman/Director in discontinuing the services of Shobha M. Dhore and 18 ors. w.e.f. 15.01.2000 is not legal and proper. It is unjustified. Shobha M. Dhore and 18 other namely (1) Sau. Babybai Sureshchandra Asare (2) Sau. Vatsalabai w/o Sambhaji Wasnik (3) Sau. Kantabai w/o Sheshrao Tayade (4) Gokarnabai w/o Shriram Malghan (5) Sau. Narmadabai w/o Shatrughna Gaikwad (6)Kamlabai w/o Kisanrao Janjal (7) Pramila wd/o Ramkrishna Murumkar (8) Sau. Saraswati Bhaskar Magar (9) Sau Indira Onkar Pathak (10) Sau. Vimal Namdeorao Khandare, (11) Kamlabai w/o Murlidhar Olambe (12) Sau. Baby w/o Subhash Hiwrale (13) Vilas Vasantrao Damodar (14) Rampal Jiwanlal Gujar (15) Dashrath Pundlik Bochare (16) Namdeo Santar Khandare (17) Bhagwan Sampat Ambhore (18) Shankar Murlidhar Olambe should be provided work on National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources, Akola within 3 months of this order. The management is also directed to maintain proper record of the attendance of these workmen and the copy of the record of attendance should also be provided to the workmen. The management should also take step to absorb these 19 workmen as regular employees and regularise the services so that they may get the benefit of continuity in service and other benefits arising out of it. The reference is disposed of accordingly with the above directions. 12. The management should also take step to absorb these 19 workmen as regular employees and regularise the services so that they may get the benefit of continuity in service and other benefits arising out of it. The reference is disposed of accordingly with the above directions. 12. Perusal of the above order of the tribunal clearly shows that second para of the order i.e. the direction about regularization, benefit of continuity in service and other benefits etc. could not have been made particularly in the light of Section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act. I quote section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act thus: Section 10(4) in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to 4[ a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be] shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. 13. Thus, looking to the language of section 10(4) and the reference that was made by the Central Government, it is crystal clear that the tribunal committed error in making further order of regularization in services etc. after finding the termination to be not legal and proper, which was obviously de hors the reference actually made. Hence, the second operative part of the impugned order cannot be supported since it is in violation of section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The directions for regulation, benefits of continuity of service and other benefits are not at all incidental to the issue of validity of termination w.e.f. 15.01.2000. At the same time, since the workmen are in employment for over 30 years, it is for the employer to decide the issue of regularization for which purpose, this Court is not in a position to issue directions or order nor the CGIT-cum-Labour Court had any such authority. However, it is for the workmen as well to avail of such a remedy for the said part as is available in law. 14. However, it is for the workmen as well to avail of such a remedy for the said part as is available in law. 14. In the result, I pass the following order: ORDER (i) The impugned judgment and order dated 16.12.2002 passed by CGIT-cum-Labour Court as regards regularization of service of workmen, is set aside being in violation of Section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (ii) The employer is at liberty to make such arrangement about regularization, if so advised, and the workmen are also at liberty to take such steps for regularization of their services as are available in law. (iii) No order as to costs.