JUDGMENT : G.S. Patel, J. 1. In keeping with the views we expressed in our judgment in Family Court Appeal No. 29 of 2003, (S v Y, decided on 23rd August 2013) in this matter, too, we have deliberately masked the names and identities of the parties so as to protect their privacy. 2. On 4th February 2002, the Family Court at Pune dismissed two petitions. One, P.A. 118 of 1998, was filed by the wife, N, for restitution of conjugal rights. The other, P.A. 280 of 2001, was filed by the husband, V, seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Both parties having filed separate appeals, these are decided together by this common judgment. 3. V and N were married on 25th December 1996 in Pune by Hindu Vedic rites and ceremonies. They have no children. V is the youngest of three brothers. He serves in the Telecom Department in Mumbai, where his family is based and where his brothers, too, work. He lives with his parents in a one-room-kitchen flat in Kurla. N is a clerk the Irrigation Department of the Government of Maharashtra. She and her family come from Pune. Her father is, or, at the relevant time, was an auto-rickshaw driver in Pune. It seems that before marriage, N agreed that she would seek and obtain a transfer from Pune to Mumbai where she and V would live together. This, as we shall see, was to become the pivotal determinant in their marriage. 4. After marriage, N commuted between Mumbai and Pune on weekends and holidays. This was evidently unviable. V and N quarrelledabout the infrequency and irregularity of her visits. The marriage began to disintegrate. On 29th June 1997, the parties separated. There are conflicting versions about the nature and circumstances of this parting of ways, but that it did happen is not in dispute. V filed a Petition for divorce in the Civil Court, Thane. That court lacked territorial jurisdiction and V withdrew his Petition. On 5th February 1998, N filed a Petition No. 118/98 before the Family Court in Pune seeking restitution of conjugal rights. A few months later, on 18th December 1998, V filed Petition No. 242/99 for divorce before the Family Court in Mumbai. N applied to this Court for a transfer of V’s divorce Petition to the Pune Family Court. On 5th February 1998, N filed a Petition No. 118/98 before the Family Court in Pune seeking restitution of conjugal rights. A few months later, on 18th December 1998, V filed Petition No. 242/99 for divorce before the Family Court in Mumbai. N applied to this Court for a transfer of V’s divorce Petition to the Pune Family Court. At that time, V’s deposition was being taken in Mumbai. This Court directed that his deposition be completed in Mumbai and that his Petition be thereafter transferred to the Pune Family Court. This was done. V’s Petition was renumbered as P.A. No.280/2001 in the Family Court at Pune. 5. N’s pleadings in support of her case for restitution of conjugal rights are that she constantly strived to maintain a balance between her job and her marriage. Immediately after marriage in December 1996, she took an extended leave from her job till January 1997. In that time, she lived with V in Mumbai. She then returned to Pune where she worked and thereafter travelled to Mumbai to be with V whenever she had leave. In February and March 1997, V went with her to Pune. In March 1997, she stayed with V in Mumbai for an entire week. She says that though this rhythm was a strain, she coped as best she could, and was a devoted, affectionate and loyal spouse. V was, she says, unappreciative of her struggle. He criticized her constantly. In April and May 1997, she was unwell. She had an abortion. She told V about this, but he did not care to visit her. In May 1997, V came to see her at her office in Pune, and quarrelled with her. They returned to Mumbai and stayed there for a week, making a trip to Nasik to attend V’s friend’s wedding in that time, and then went on a short holiday. She confirms that the couple agreed that she would try and get herself transferred to Mumbai and that, in the interregnum, she would visit Mumbai as often as she could. She says that she attempted this, but a job transfers is not easy, and is not within her control. Between June and October 1997, she tried to visit and call V in Mumbai, but he remained elusive. In October 1997, when she visited Mumbai, she found the matrimonial home locked; she was not told of this. She says that she attempted this, but a job transfers is not easy, and is not within her control. Between June and October 1997, she tried to visit and call V in Mumbai, but he remained elusive. In October 1997, when she visited Mumbai, she found the matrimonial home locked; she was not told of this. She claims that there is nothing amiss with the marriage; that she is ready to live with V at a place of his choosing; and that she suspects that others have prejudiced him against her. She therefore claims to be entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. This is not only her petition but is also, in substance, her defence to V’s divorce petition. 6. V’s case on ‘cruelty’ by N is that contrary to the pre-nuptial understanding between the parties, N did not apply for a transfer to Mumbai from Pune, but instead insisted that V move to Pune and set up home with her there. He does not dispute that N had an abortion, but says he was informed of this only after the fact. N is, he says, a quarrelsome and disagreeable person; there was constant bickering with him and his parents over trivial matters. In June 1997, N left the matrimonial home with all her belongings and returned to Pune. He went to see her there a few days later, but was confronted with demands that he shift to Pune himself, her parents even threatening him. Though they did travel to Nashik to attend his friend’s wedding, N continued to demand that he move to Pune. When she came to Mumbai in June 1997, she did so without telling him in advance; he was visiting his brother in Thane at the time. She called him, but only to say that she was leaving, taking her belongings with her. He says her conduct constitutes cruelty, and therefore seeks a divorce. 7. This is also his response to her petition for restitution of conjugal rights, but with some significant differences. For instance, though he says in his divorce petition that N was pregnant and had an abortion, in his Written Statement to her petition for restitution of conjugal rights, he claims that the marriage was never consummated. He says he was told by others that she had, and continued to have, an extra-marital relationship with someone else. 8. For instance, though he says in his divorce petition that N was pregnant and had an abortion, in his Written Statement to her petition for restitution of conjugal rights, he claims that the marriage was never consummated. He says he was told by others that she had, and continued to have, an extra-marital relationship with someone else. 8. These are the pleadings on which issues were struck. Both parties led evidence. They examined themselves, and each also led the evidence of their respective fathers. 9. At the heart of this discord is the matter of N continuing to work and live in Pune and shuttling between Pune and Mumbai, and of her applying for a transfer to Mumbai. That everyone knew that N had a job in Pune is not disputed. V deposed that there a prenuptial understanding that N would obtain a transfer to Mumbai, where she would then live with V in the matrimonial home (Examination-in-chief of V, para 1). Despite this, when asked, she said she had not even applied for a transfer. This was a few months after their marriage in February 1997 (Examination-in-chief of V, para 2). She asked him instead to move to Pune himself. He declined, saying that he could not uproot his parents. This conversation was repeated in June 1997, both sides sticking to their positions (Examination-in-chief of V, paras 5 and 6.). V was cross-examined on this aspect of the matter. That cross-examination does not assist N, for V says: (Cross-examination of V, para 17). “17. I am not aware as to what efforts respondent has taken in getting transfer to Bombay. When I tried to find out procedure of transfer from the Respondent she did not inform me about the same. When I offered to make efforts for the transfer, Respondent did not accept the same and told me that she would try to get her transfer.” 10. That there was in fact a pre-nuptial understanding that N would get a transfer to Mumbai is something that she admits in her own examination-in-chief. She says that when the marriage was arranged, V and his family knew that she had a job in Pune. That there was in fact a pre-nuptial understanding that N would get a transfer to Mumbai is something that she admits in her own examination-in-chief. She says that when the marriage was arranged, V and his family knew that she had a job in Pune. Then comes this testimony: (Examination-in-chief of N, para 1) “At that time it was decided that after marriage I should get transfer to Mumbai as per rules of the Government.” In cross-examination, too, N’s testimony is unequivocal: (Cross-examination of N, para 6) “6. ... It is true that at the time of settlement of marriage I was fully aware that I will have to reside in Mumbai. It is true that prime condition of [V] at the settlement of the marriage was that after marriage I should get my transfer to Mumbai. At the time of settlement I have idea to them that period of about one year would be required for my transfer from Pune to Mumbai. I have not yet filed application for my transfer from Pune to Mumbai.” {Emphasis supplied} We need to note here that the last line, emphasized above, is missing in the typed copy of the R&P, but before us Learned Counsel for the parties both agreed that the original record did in fact have that line. 11. The evidence of V’s father, too, makes it clear that the only complaint against N was that she did not get a transfer to Mumbai. He says the family will accept nothing less than her giving up her Job (Cross-examination of PW2, V’s father, para 9). This is also V’s own testimony (Cross-examination of V, unnumbered para at page 109 of the R&P). 12. This much is clear: before the marriage, it was agreed that N would seek a transfer to Mumbai (All witnesses accept this in terms, including N’s father (cross-examination at para 3). She did not do so. She assigns no reasons for this. Whether or not this constitutes ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of the law, and whether this is sufficient to defeat N’s case for restitution of conjugal rights are the questions we must consider. Both Ms Mutalik, Learned Counsel for V, and Mr. Shastry, Learned Counsel for N, treated these issues of N’s transfer, and her failure to apply for it, as determinative of the final outcome in both petitions. Both Ms Mutalik, Learned Counsel for V, and Mr. Shastry, Learned Counsel for N, treated these issues of N’s transfer, and her failure to apply for it, as determinative of the final outcome in both petitions. N’s claim for restitution of conjugal rights necessarily requires that an affirmative finding be returned that V withdrew himself from her company without just and reasonable cause. She founds this claim on the basis of what is, to all intents and purposes, allegations of V’s being indifferent towards her; of not being in the matrimonial home when she visited; and of not returning her calls. As to the specifics, V’s evidence is that he does not know who paid for the abortion, and that he did not enquire; (Cross-examination of V, unnumbred para at p. 103 the R&P.) and admits that he did not give her any gifts (Cross-examination of V, para 14). But this is not evidence of V’s withdrawal from N’s society. There seems very little doubt that whenever they were together — travelling to Nasik or Pune, or spending time together in Mumbai — the couple lived as man and wife (Cross-examination of V, para 18). In his reply to N’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights, V makes an allegation that the marriage was not consummated. This is unsupported by his testimony and is directly contrary to his own petition for divorce, in which he admits that he knew she was pregnant and that the two had had conjugal relations (Cross-examination of V, para 17). There is, too, the matter of N’s admission in cross-examination that at the time when the marriage was arranged, she was told that she would have to live in Mumbai and, for that purpose, seek a transfer from Pune; and that she agreed to this (Cross-examination of N, para 6). The physical separation between the two was a matter known in advance. V cannot be said to have ‘withdrawn’ himself from N’s company and society only on this account. N’s case that V was not present in Mumbai on one weekend when she visited is an isolated instance, not a course of conduct that could be said to constitute a withdrawal by him from her society sufficient to support a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. N’s case that V was not present in Mumbai on one weekend when she visited is an isolated instance, not a course of conduct that could be said to constitute a withdrawal by him from her society sufficient to support a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. There is, therefore, no evidence at all to support N’s case that V withdrew himself from her society without just or reasonable cause. Once that is not established, N’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights must fail, and the Learned Single Judge in the Trial Court rightly dismissed it. 13. But the Trial Court also dismissed V’s Petition for divorce on the grounds of cruelty. It seems to have been persuaded to arrive at this conclusion largely on account of V’s pleadings that he had been told by others, whom he did not examine, that N had an extramarital affair. The Trial Court found these pleadings scurrilous. Certainly they are unsupported by the slightest shred of evidence. The Trial Court decried the very making of these allegations and, in our view, rightly. These are allegations conceived in anger and delivered malice. They are baseless, as is V’s attempt in pleadings to claim that the marriage was never consummated, an allegation later defeated by his own testimony (ibid). 14. What precisely is the nature of V’s case on cruelty? It rests on a single circumstance, viz., N’s failure and refusal to abide by her commitment to seek a job transfer to Mumbai where she could be with V in the matrimonial home. We have already noted that this is a matter that N admits in her evidence, though not in her pleadings. Is this admission fatal to N’s defence to the divorce petition, as Mrs. Mutalik would have us hold? Does it fall within the legal definition of ‘cruelty’ as a matrimonial wrong? Mrs. Mutalik asks that we see this not as a mere omission or oversight in performing a routine task or act, but about a deliberate and wanton refusal to abide by a solemn commitment given well before marriage. Mrs. Mutalik says that N’s refusal is indicative of a course of conduct, an approach to the marriage and speaks to her complete disregard and lack of concern for the marriage. 15. We must disagree. Underlying Mrs. Mrs. Mutalik says that N’s refusal is indicative of a course of conduct, an approach to the marriage and speaks to her complete disregard and lack of concern for the marriage. 15. We must disagree. Underlying Mrs. Mutalik’s submissions is the hypothesis that it is the bounden duty of a wife, as a legal obligation, to extirpate herself from her settled life and job to follow her husband. Her needs, wishes and desires must be relegated to second place, suborned to the husband’s personal and family needs. Her identity, as it were, is only as a wife, not as an independent woman with her own job and earning. It was, therefore, N’s duty and obligation to move to Mumbai. We cannot accept a submission based, even implicitly, on such premises. This is a thoroughly retrograde view, one that undermines a fundamental premise of parity and equality in marriage. 16. Cruelty as a matrimonial wrong, the Supreme Court has held, has an inseparable nexus with human conduct. The social strata or milieu to which the parties belong, their chosen way of life, respective temperaments and emotions, are all factors that must be weighed while assessing the act of ‘cruelty’ alleged in support of a petition for divorce (Vishwanath Agrawal v Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 ). To find for the husband, we must have evidence of a course of conduct beyond the ordinary trials and tribulations of any marriage, something of sufficient gravity and weight. This conduct need not be physical. A consistent pattern of indifference or neglect would, in a given case, suffice (ManishaTyagi v Deepak Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339 ). Mrs. Mutalik submits that this is just such a case, and that N’s conduct shows precisely this level of indifference or neglect on her part. 17. We are not of a mind to accept this submission. N has not denied that there was such a pre-nuptial understanding. She also does not prevaricate about her failure to apply for a transfer. She does say that such matters take time, and are never assured. Her evidence appears to us to be straightforward and honest. Why she did not apply for a transfer is a matter of speculation, not evidence. There is nothing to indicate that this failure on her part, if it can be called that, stemmed from any sense of disgruntlement with her marriage or her husband. Her evidence appears to us to be straightforward and honest. Why she did not apply for a transfer is a matter of speculation, not evidence. There is nothing to indicate that this failure on her part, if it can be called that, stemmed from any sense of disgruntlement with her marriage or her husband. To term this as cruelty would, in our view, be wholly unreasonable. There is nothing in law that supports such a view. 18. We are far less impressed by V’s pleadings and testimony. As the Trial Court points out, that he should even consider stooping to making allegation of infidelity against N, and, too, claiming that the marriage was never consummated when his own evidence is to the contrary reflects far more poorly on him than on her (Cross-examination of V, unnumbred para at p. 106 of the R&P). There is, too, the evidence of his manifest indifference: not caring about her health when she suffered an abortion, his lack of knowledge about who paid for those expenses, his admission that he did not even offer to bear those costs, and more (Cross-examination of V, para 18 at pp. 102–103 of the R&P.). On her part, she seems to have struggled to maintain a life-work balance, shuttling between Pune and Mumbai at every opportunity, taking time off to travel with V and be with him whenever she could. In support her petition for restitution of conjugal rights, she deposed that she would apply for a transfer, but not give up her job (Examination-in-chief of N, para 5). This was in 2004. Even as late as this, and though it cannot shore up her claim for restitution of conjugal rights, the evidence indicates her willingness to continue with the marriage. To say, therefore, that there was cruelty on her part is, in our view, entirely incorrect. The Trial Court was, therefore, justified in dismissing V’s petition for divorce as well. We have no hesitation in upholding the Trial Court’s dismissal of V’s divorce petition as well. 19. The result is unfortunate. The parties have been apart now for some 16 years. We are told that V has re-married during the pendency of these appeals. That is something he could not have done, and throws into jeopardy yet another life; yet, it is of his making. 20. Faced with this, Mrs. 19. The result is unfortunate. The parties have been apart now for some 16 years. We are told that V has re-married during the pendency of these appeals. That is something he could not have done, and throws into jeopardy yet another life; yet, it is of his making. 20. Faced with this, Mrs. Mutalik urges us to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court in exercise an inherent power, ex debito justitiae, and dissolve the marriage on the grounds that it has irretrievably broken down following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Naveen Kohil v Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 ) and Durga Prasanna Tripathi v Arundhati Tripathy (2005) 7 SCC 353 ) Regrettable though it may be, we cannot do so. As a first Appellate Court, we are not vested with plenary jurisdiction. We must decide, and decide only, within the parameters of what the statute permits. The statute does not permit a court to dissolve a marriage on account of its irretrievable breakdown. This may be done by the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers and jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, but that is a jurisdiction exclusively vested in the Supreme Court (Anil Kumar Jain v Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415 ; Manish Goel v Rohini Goel, (2010) 4 SCC 393 ). If V’s actions or conduct caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, then he cannot be allowed to seek dissolution on that ground (NeelamKumar v Dayarani, (2010) 13 SCC 298 ). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recently held that “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. It is a weighty circumstance, but one of many, that the court will take into account in deciding whether or not to order a severance of the marital tie; but this, too, is a power that only the Supreme Court can properly exercise under Article 142 of the Constitution of India (K. Srinivas Rao v D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 ). 21. Both appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.