JUDGMENT 1. - The instant appeal presented under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 read with rule 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 assails the order dated 13.9.2013 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16732/2013, whereby the operation of the order dated 5.9.2013 has been kept in abeyance. 2. We have heard Ms Naina Saraf, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. S.N. Kumawat, learned Additional Advocate General as well as Mr. Rajeev Surana, learned counsel for the respondent No.8/writ petitioner. 3. The pleaded facts in brief, in the bare essentials, have to be outlined at the threshold. The aforementioned writ proceeding was instituted by the respondent No.8 seeking the following reliefs: "By an appropriate writ, order and direction, the order dated 5.9.2013 may kindly be quashed and set aside and the action of the respondent not staying the suspension of Sarpanch Maharaji Devi Gurjar, Gram Panchayat Rendayal, Panchayat Samiti Gangapur City, Distt. Sawai Madhopur may kindly be declared to be illegal, arbitrary, unjustified and unconstitutional; By an appropriate writ, order and direction the expeditious directions may be given to expeditious proceedings u/s 38(1) of the Panchayat Raj Act and also take action pertaining to the misappropriation of the Government property and siphoning of fund of lodging an appropriate criminal proceedings; By an appropriate writ, order and direction the cost of the entire litigation be awarded to the petitioner; Any other order(s) as this Hon'ble High Court may deem fair and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present writ petition be also passed in favour of the humble petitioner and against the respondents." 4. it would appear from the above extract that the writ petitioner sought in substance two principal reliefs: (i) Annulment of the order dated 5.9.2013, whereby the suspension of the appellant as Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Rendayal, Panchayat Samiti, Gangapur City, Sawai Madhopur, had been kept in abeyance by adjudging the same to be illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional; and (ii) Direction for expeditious conduct of the proceedings under Section 38(1) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, (for short hereinafter referred-to as 'the Act") involving the allegation of misappropriation of Government property and siphoning of public funds, levelled against the appellant. 5. 5. The writ petitioner while introducing himself to be a citizen of the Country, disclosed that he had filed a complaint against the present appellant in the capacity of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Rendayal, Panchayat Samiti Gangapur City, District Sawai madhopur, accusing her of being involved in the misappropriation of Government funds/property in connection with the developmental projects within her territorial jurisdiction. According to him, on o the said complaint submitted before the Nayab Tehsildar, Wazirpur, he (Nayab Tehsildar) conducted a preliminary enquiry and submitted a report on 19.12.2012 substantiating the allegations made. The preliminary enquiry report dated 19.12.2012 was laid before the jurisdictional Sub Divisional Magistrate, who in turn forwarded the same to the Chief Executive Officer, Zila s Parishad, Sawai Madhopur by his letter dated 5.2.2013. The then Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur thereafter addressed a letter dated 5.4.2013 to Under-secretary (Enquiry), Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Rajasthan, for taking further action under Section 38 of the Act. 6. According to the writ petitioner, alongwith the said letter, a format of the memorandum of charges was also dispatched. Letter dated 26.4.2013 was also written by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad to the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur aiongwith the aforementioned preliminary enquiry report as well as the proposed memorandum of charges for necessary action. The writ petitioner has averred that it was thereafter that the appellant approached high political functionaries and submitted various representations to scuttle the ongoing process. Meanwhile the Divisional Commissioner vide his letter dated 23.7.2013 addressed to the Secretary, Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Secretariat, Jaipur, recommending suspension of the appellant appending thereto all relevant documents on the issue. This letter inter alia mentioned that by communication dated 14.5.2013, the memorandum of charges had been issued to the appellant. In terms thereof, recommendation was made under Section 38(4) of the Act to place her under suspension. 7. In reply, Under-secretary (Enquiry) vide his letter dated 27.8.2013 addressed to the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, conveyed the approval of the Government to the proposal to place the appellant under suspension. In terms thereof, recommendation was made under Section 38(4) of the Act to place her under suspension. 7. In reply, Under-secretary (Enquiry) vide his letter dated 27.8.2013 addressed to the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, conveyed the approval of the Government to the proposal to place the appellant under suspension. According to the writ petitioner being apprehensive of the outcome of the persistent efforts that were being made by the appellant to stall and/or reverse the progress of events in her favour, he got addressed an advocate's notice, amongst others, to the Chief Secretary of the State and the Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt, of Rajasthan, Department of Rural and Panchayati Raj narrating the factual background and insisted that appropriate action as contemplated under Section 38 of the Act be taken against her by thwarting the possible political interference. While the matter stood at that, by communication dated 5.9.2013 impeached in the writ petition, the approval as conveyed by the letter dated 27.8.2013 to place the appellant under suspension, was kept in abeyance. 8. Noticeably in the writ proceeding, the appellant was not impleaded as a respondent and it was subsequent thereto that at her instance and on her prayer, she was arrayed as respondent No.8 by this Court. The learned Single Judge by order dated 13.9.2013 admitted the writ petition and issued notice to the respondent No.5 i.e. Undersecretary (Enquiry), Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Secretariat, Jaipur. It was, amongst others, recorded in the said order that prior to the communication dated 5.9.2013, by order dated 4.9.2013, appellant had been put under suspension. 9. After her impleadment, the appellant filed an application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution seeking vacation/modification of the above order dated 13.9.2013 and also filed reply to the averments made in the writ petition. She while questioning the locus of the writ petitioner, imputed malafide intention to him in not impleading her as a respondent in the writ proceeding. She averred that while the scrutiny of her demur with regard to the locus of the writ petitioner was pending, he filed an application for modification of the interim order dated 13.9.2013, which was eventually not pressed. However, the application filed by her under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India remained pending. She averred that while the scrutiny of her demur with regard to the locus of the writ petitioner was pending, he filed an application for modification of the interim order dated 13.9.2013, which was eventually not pressed. However, the application filed by her under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India remained pending. While denying the allegation of misappropriation of Government funds/property in undertaking the public projects under her supervision in the capacity of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Rendayal, Panchayat Samiti Gangapur City, Distt. Sawai Madhopur, she asserted in substance that the enquiry administered by the Nayab Tehsildar was not authorised in terms of Section 38 of the Act and further the disclosures therefrom are not correct. 10. While pleading that she had, therefore, submitted objections against the same before the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, which had been overlooked and a recommendation for her suspension under Section 38(4) of the Act had been made, she asserted that the Secretary, Department of Rural and Panchayati Raj, after taking note of all relevant aspects eventually issued the order dated 5.9.2013. According to her, the enquiry conducted by the jurisdictional Nayab Tehsildar had been under political influence. That a separate enquiry was conducted by the concerned JTA/JEn., who on investigation had found the allegations to be unsustainable, was mentioned by her. She admitted to have approached the Secretary, Department of Rural and Panchayati Raj to make him aware of the enquiries undertaken at the behest of political quarters, whereupon according to her, the departmental minister on analyzing the anomalies and incongruities in the enquiry report, required a fresh enquiry to be made by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur and consequently the order dated 5.9.2013 was issued. She further admitted to have submitted her reply objection to the chargesheet pursuant to the letter dated 14.5.2013, which according to her was not taken into consideration before the grant of approval of the proposal for placing her under suspension vide order dated 27.8.2013. She averred that the order dated 5.9.2013 by no means was a final one and that there was even no cause of action to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. She averred that the order dated 5.9.2013 by no means was a final one and that there was even no cause of action to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. That inspite of an earlier instruction of the concerned Secretary conveyed in his letter dated 3.5.2013 to hold a preliminary enquiry into the matter by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur, as endorsed by the departmental minister, it was not done, was stated as well. 11. In this pleaded backdrop, Ms Naina Saraf has emphatically argued that for want of locus standi of the writ petitioner, the writ proceeding is not maintainable and the order dated 13.9.2013 is, therefore, unsustainable in law and on facts. That the institution of the writ proceeding is malafide, which is writ large from the fact that the appellant was not impleaded as a party, she asserted that at all relevant times, where the writ petition was filed, the process was confined only to exchange of official communications and as no final decision on the issue has yet been taken, in any view of the matter, the challenge to the order dated 5.9.2013 was inconceived. Reiterating that the arrangement of keeping the suspension of the appellant in abeyance, is only by way of an interim measure and is subject to the final decision that would be taken in the matter on completion of the preliminary enquiry by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur, she urged that the writ petition is prematured as well. She argued by referring to Section 38(1) and (4) and Rule 22 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, (for short hereinafter referred-to as "the Rules") that no enquiry as no date having been initiated under Section 38(1) of the Act, the appellant could not have, in any view of the matter, been placed under suspension by invoking Section 38(4) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, in terms of Rules 22, the departmental minister was authorised to require the jurisdictional Chief Executive Officer to conduct the preliminary enquiry and, thus, no remonstrance on this court is entertainable in law. In this regard, she referred as well, amongst others, to Rule 336 of the Rules delineating the powers and functions of the Chief Executive Officer. In this regard, she referred as well, amongst others, to Rule 336 of the Rules delineating the powers and functions of the Chief Executive Officer. The following decisions were relied upon: (i) Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad, (2012) 4 SCC 407 ; (ii) State Bank of Patiala v. Vinesh Kumar Bhasin (2010) 4 SCC 368 ; (iii) Ramjilal v. State of Raj., 1985 RLR 644 ; (iv) Surendra Kumar Garg v. The State of Rajasthan, RLW 2005(1) Raj 478 ; (v) Smt. Vimla Devi Vyas v. State "SBCWP No.99/2008 decided on 3.3.2009 ; and (vi) Mahavir Singh Sarpanch v. State of Haryana, (1993) 105 PLR 655 . 12. Mr. Rajeev Surana, learned counsel for the respondent No.8 (writ petitioner), per contra, has urged that the instant appeal having been preferred against the interim order, it is not maintainable in law. He has urged further that as on the basis of the enquiries conducted by the Nayab Tehsildar, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur and on the acceptance of the enquiry report, memorandum of charges had been issued to the appellant to which she has submitted her reply, the enquiry contemplated under Section 38(1) of the Act has commenced and, thus, the decision to place her under suspension as conveyed by letter dated 27.8.2013 and the order dated 4.9.2013 to the said effect, are in valid compliance of the relevant provisions of the Act and, thus, the order dated 5.9.2013 is apparently illegal and prompted by collateral considerations at the behest of the departmental head. According to him, having regard to the reliefs prayed for and the demonstrable public element involved in it, the writ petition ought not to be dismissed as not maintainable for want of locus standi of the writ petitioner. When queried by this court, learned counsel submitted that presently, the charge of the office of the Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Rendayal, Panchayat Samiti Gangapur City, Distt. Sawai Madhopur, lies entrusted to the Deputy Sarpanch of the said institution. 13. Mr. When queried by this court, learned counsel submitted that presently, the charge of the office of the Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Rendayal, Panchayat Samiti Gangapur City, Distt. Sawai Madhopur, lies entrusted to the Deputy Sarpanch of the said institution. 13. Mr. S.N. Kumawat, learned Additional Advocate General, while referring to the original records pertaining to the process, has argued in substance that on a prima facie consideration of all relevant aspects, the departmental minister on 3.5.2013 and on 2.9.2013, instructed that a fresh enquiry be conducted by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur and, thus, pending completion of the enquiry and submission of report thereafter, the decision to keep the appellant under suspension, had been kept in abeyance. According to the learned counsel no memorandum of charges has yet been served on the appellant and, thus, no enquiry under Section 38(1) of the Act has been initiated. While reiterating that the writ petitioner lacks locus standi to maintain the writ proceeding, Mr. Kumawat has submitted that the order dated 5.9.2013 would, by no means, come in the way of the conduct of the fresh preliminary enquiry as ordered and necessary action on the basis of the outcome thereof would be taken in accordance with law. Following decisions have been relied upon: (i) State of Orissa v. M/s Mesco Steels Ltd., 2013(1) WLC (SC) Civil 561 ; (ii) Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 465 ; and (iii) Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P., (2001) 4 SCC 734 . 14. We have extended our thoughtful consideration to the pleaded facts, the documents on record as well as the arguments advanced. 15. The instant appeal, to reiterate, has been presented against the order dated 13.9.2013 passed in the aforementioned writ petition. Thereby the petition has been admitted and notice has been issued to the respondent No.5, making it returnable within a period of two weeks. Incidentally, by another order of the even date, rendered in S.B. Civil Misc. Stay Application No.14144/2013 arising out of the said writ petition, the operation of the order dated 5.9.2013 has been stayed. Be that as it may, to start with, whereas the appellant has questioned the locus standi of writ petitioner, he has challenged the maintainability of the appeal on the ground of having been preferred against an interlocutory order. 16. Stay Application No.14144/2013 arising out of the said writ petition, the operation of the order dated 5.9.2013 has been stayed. Be that as it may, to start with, whereas the appellant has questioned the locus standi of writ petitioner, he has challenged the maintainability of the appeal on the ground of having been preferred against an interlocutory order. 16. The cavil on the maintainability of the appeal need not detain us for long. 17. In Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Limited v. Alok Kotahwala, 2013(2) WLC (Raj) 381 , a coordinate Bench of this court, after a comprehensive survey of the relevant decisions on this facet of the debate and with particular reference to Rule 134 of the Rules of Rajasthan High Court, 1952, (for short hereinafter referred-to as "the Rules") did conclude that an intra court appeal against an interlocutory order passed staying the acquisition proceedings of the land in question and giving liberty to the State Government to restart the proceedings for the purpose of land acquisition in accordance with law, was maintainable. In arriving at his conclusion, not only did their lordships refer to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, AIR 1981 SC 1786 that an order refusing to appoint a receiver or to grant an ad interim injunction is a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent, the interpretation of the term "judgment" in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, 2006(5) SCC 399 , that it would include one which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of the parties with regard to all or any matters in controversies, may spell finality in regard to some collateral matter affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties, was also taken note of. That in this decision, interlocutory orders that would finally decide a question or issue in the main case or an issue which would materially and directly affect the decision in the main case of a collateral issue or a question, not the subject matter of the main case, would be judgments for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent, was anounced. 18. 18. The decision of this court in D.B. Sogani v. Akhil Bharatiya Bank of Rajasthan Karmchari Sangh, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 64/2000 , is of no avail to the writ petitioner, as the same is vis-a-vis Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, since repealed, the objection to the maintainability of the appeal is, therefore, rejected. 19. vis-a-vis the aspect of the locus standi, the relevant facts disclose that the process involved had been set in motion by a complaint filed by the writ petitioner before the Nayab Tehsildar, Wazirpur alleging in substance conscious and deliberate contraventions of the prescribed norms, by the appellant, in undertaking certain public projects in the capacity of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Rendayal, thus, indulging in acts of corruption and siphoning of public funds for illegal gain. As would be detailed hereinafter, preliminary enquiries were conducted by the Nayab Tehsildar, Wazirpur and the jurisdictional J.En., whereafter following due consideration of the reports and other materials on record, the memorandum of charges was issued against the appellant for regular enquiry and eventually by the letter dated 27.8.2013, Under-secretary (Enquiry) conveyed the approval of the Government to the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, to place her (appellant) under suspension. At the intervention of the departmental minister, however, a fresh enquiry having been ordered by him to be conducted by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur, the approval of such suspension was kept in abeyance vide the communication dated 5.9.2013, impugned in the writ petition. The appellant has asserted want of locus standi of the writ petitioner contending principally that he, by no means, ought to be permitted to be a party in the ongoing exercise as her adversary in a lis. The maintainability of the writ petition has been impeached on this count. 20. The writ petitioner on the other hand has asseverated that having regard to the officer held by the appellant and the supervening public interest involved in the issues raised by him constituting the subject matter of the complaint, he is competent to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court, more particularly in the demonstrable background of uncalled-for political intervention to stifle and/or nix the factual probe necessary to be concluded to ensure and sustain transparency and sanctity of a public office. 21. Various authorities have been cited by the parties, which deserved due reference. 22. 21. Various authorities have been cited by the parties, which deserved due reference. 22. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir (supra), one of the charges against the appellant, who was the President of the Municipal Council, was that he did not call for a general body meeting for a period of three months as required under Section 1 (1) of the enactment involved and that he had accepted fresh tenders at high rates for incomplete work of laying down pipeline for water supply, the process was initiated on the basis of a complaint by the respondent No.5. In the proceeding that followed, he (complainant/ respondent No.5) sought to add new grounds to which the appellant raised objection. Eventually, the appellant was disqualified. He unsuccessfully challenged the decision to that effect before the jurisdictional High Court. He approached the Hon'ble Apex Court. On the limited aspect of permissibility of association of the respondent/complainant in the enquiry proceeding, it was observed by their Lordships that he could not be construed to be a party to the lis and at the most, he could lead evidence as a witness. Further, the complaint filed by him could at the most be pressed into service as a material exhibit in order to collect evidence to find out the truth. It was held that he could not claim the status of an adversarial litigant. It was underlined that ) under the grab of being a necessary party, a person cannot be permitted to make a case as that of general public interest. It was observed that a person having a remote interest cannot be permitted to be a party in the lis as one, who wants to be a party in a case, has to establish that he/she has a proprietary right which has been or is threatened to be violated. There Lordships were of the view that a person cannot be heard as a party, unless he answers the description of aggrieved party. 23. In this appeal, the facts do not related to the institution of a writ proceeding by the complainant against perceived political intervention having the potential of reversing the progress of a process, already instituted and undertaken under a statutory enactment and furthered upto a particular stage. 24. 23. In this appeal, the facts do not related to the institution of a writ proceeding by the complainant against perceived political intervention having the potential of reversing the progress of a process, already instituted and undertaken under a statutory enactment and furthered upto a particular stage. 24. In Ramjilal (supra), the prayer of the complainant seeking impleadment in a writ proceeding instituted by the petitioner therein questioning his suspension following a preliminary enquiry on the complaint was refused on the ground that vis-a-vis the impugnment, the State Government was the only necessary and proper party. 25. In Surendra Kumar Garg (supra), the appellants as writ petitioners did question the decision of the State Government to drop the charges levelled against the respondent No.3, Sarpanch of the concerned Gram Panchayat. An enquiry to that effect was initiated on the basis of a complaint filed by the appellants. vis-a-vis the aspect of locus, it was held that once the complaint was made, the role of the complainant was over and that he/she would not have any interest left with the matter to get acquainted with the further development of the proceedings. 26. Here as well, no imputation of unwarranted political interventions to muzzle a process already underway in terms of the relevant law was involved. The appellant had sought to question the ultimate decision in the enquiry. 27. In Vimla Devi Vyas (supra), the petitioner therein was similarly served with a chargesheet levelling the allegation that he had failed to convene the requisite meeting in time and when so done, had failed to incorporate in the agenda items a representation made by certain councillors. She was, pending completion of the enquiry, placed under suspension. On her challenge, the order of her suspension was interfered with and enquiry was directed to be concluded expeditiously whereafter on the completion of the process, she was removed from her office. As a consequence, the charge of her office was handed over to Smt. Shakuntala as the officiating Chairperson. In the writ petition filed by the petitioner questioning her removal, Smt. Shakuntala filed an application for impleadment, which was rejected on the ground that she neither had a direct lis with the petitioner nor her (petitioner) removal from office was a consequence of any vested right of hers (Shakuntala) or any declaration thereof. In the writ petition filed by the petitioner questioning her removal, Smt. Shakuntala filed an application for impleadment, which was rejected on the ground that she neither had a direct lis with the petitioner nor her (petitioner) removal from office was a consequence of any vested right of hers (Shakuntala) or any declaration thereof. That Smt. Shakuntala came to hold the office of Chairperson of concerned Municipal Board in fortuitous circumstances and that there was no legal right vested in her to do so and further as the subject matter of scrutiny in the writ petition was essentially one between the petitioner and the State Government for which her presence was not necessary, was noted. The application was rejected. 28. According to us, the facts as obtain in the present proceedings are distinguishable from those in the aforementioned reported decision. 29. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan's case (supra), a caste certificate had been issued by the competent authority to the appellant. After nine years, the respondent No.5 filed a complaint questioning the validity thereof on the ground that the appellant had obtained employment by exercising misrepresentation and that he did not actually belong to the Scheduled Tribes category. The complaint was rejected and aggrieved thereby, the respondent No.5 successfully challenged the order of rejection before the jurisdictional High Court, which by its decision remitted the matter to the concerned scrutiny committee directing it to hear all the parties concerned in accordance with law. The complainant before the scrutiny, committee having examined several witnesses behind his back, the appellant did submit an application for recalling three of them for the purpose of cross examination. He also prayed for time to file his reply as permitted by the relevant rules and also to call for certain records to ascertain the genuineness of the certificate impugned. The matter reached the Apex Court, as the applications stood undecided. 30. He also prayed for time to file his reply as permitted by the relevant rules and also to call for certain records to ascertain the genuineness of the certificate impugned. The matter reached the Apex Court, as the applications stood undecided. 30. It was held in this factual backdrop that under ordinary circumstances, when a person has no concern with the case at hand, cannot claim to have any locus standi to raise any grievance whatsoever but in exceptional circumstances, if the actual persons aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy, inarticulation or poverty, are unable to approach the court and a person, who has no personal agenda or object in relation to which, he can grind his own axe, approaches the court, then the court may examine the issue and in exceptional circumstances, even if his bona fides are doubted but the issue raised by him, in the opinion of the court, requires its consideration, the court may proceed suo motu in such respect. Their lordships observed further that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by the writ petitioner that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the authorities, while observing that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding unless he satisfies the authority/court that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons, it was outlined that whenever any public interest is involved, the court must examine the case to ensure that it is genuinely involved; 31. In Vinoy Kumar's case (supra), vis-a-vis the aspect of standing in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, their lordships observed that generally speaking, a person shall have no locus standi to file a writ petition, if he is not personally affected by the impugned order or his fundamental rights have neither been directly or substantially invaded not is there any imminent danger of such rights being invaded or his acquired interests having been violated ignoring the applicable rules. The exception to the general rule is only in cases where the writ applied for is a writ of habeas corpus or quo warranto or filed in public interest. 32. The exception to the general rule is only in cases where the writ applied for is a writ of habeas corpus or quo warranto or filed in public interest. 32. In Village Panchayat, Calangute v. The Additional Director of Panchayat-ll, AIR 2012 SC 2697 , while dwelling upon the scope and ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it was reiterated that persons other than those claiming fundamental right, can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder. While highlighting that the Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, it was enunciated that it was implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. Their lordships further in clear terms elucidated that a personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest and can also relate to interest of a trustee. That the expression "ordinarily" used in the Article indicates that a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter, was underscored. 33. The concept of locus standi has witnessed and experienced considerable liberalization in the recent past. In S.R Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 their Lordships while tracing the evolution of judicially perceived notion of locus, observed that individual rights and duties with transition of time are giving their place to meta-individual, collective, social rights and duties of classes or groups of persons. It was proclaimed that the task of national reconstruction has brought about enormous increase in developmental activities defining more and more a new category of rights in favour of large sections of the people and imposing a new category of duties on the State and the public officials with a view to reaching social justice to the common man. As a consequence of conferment of socio economic rights and imposition of public duties on the State and other authorities for taking positive action, situation often arises in which single human action can be beneficial or prejudicial to a large number of people, thus rendering entirely inadequate the traditional scheme of litigation as merely a two party affair. As a consequence of conferment of socio economic rights and imposition of public duties on the State and other authorities for taking positive action, situation often arises in which single human action can be beneficial or prejudicial to a large number of people, thus rendering entirely inadequate the traditional scheme of litigation as merely a two party affair. It was held that in cases of this kind, it would not be possible to say that any specific legal injury is caused to an individual or a determinate class or group of individuals and what results in such exigency is public injury to an indeterminate class of persons. The duty which is breached in such cases/situations is owed by the State or a public authority, not to any specific or determinate class or group of persons, but to the general public. 34. Their Lordships held that such duty a comprehended is not correlative to any individual right and if the same is allowed to go unredressed because there is no one, who has suffered a specific legal injury, so entitled to participate in the proceedings pertaining to the decision relating to such public duty, the failure to perform such public duty would go unchecked, eventually promoting disrespect for the rule of law. That it would also open the doors for corruption and inefficiency because there would be no bridle on the exercise of such public power except what may be provided by the political machinery, which at best would be able to exercise only a limited control or partake in misuse or abuse of power, was observed. Their Lordships were of the view that in that perspective, the new social collective rights and interests created for the benefit of the deprived sections of the community would be rendered meaningless and ineffectual. 35. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 , their lordships, while fathoming the plentitude of the scope and content of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, observed as hereunder: ''38. We have no doubt that in competition between courts and streets as dispenser of justice, the rule of law must win the aggrieved person for the law court and wean him from the lawless street. We have no doubt that in competition between courts and streets as dispenser of justice, the rule of law must win the aggrieved person for the law court and wean him from the lawless street. In simple terms, locus standi must be liberalised to meet the challenges of the times Ubi jus ibi remedium must be enlarged to embrace all interests of public minded citizens or organisations with serious concern for conservation of public resources and the direction and correction of public power so as to promote justice in its triune facets." Having regard to the varying contextual facts in the authorities adverted to hereinabove and preponderant judicial enunciations enumerated therein, we are of the view that the writ petitioner ought not to be nonsuited for want of locus standi. The frame work of the writ petition and the reliefs prayed for, do have a pronounced flavour of public element, which in our comprehension ought not to be lightly effaced and rendered non est. The decisions cited on behalf of the appellant relate to facts distinguishable from that in hand and in view of the overwhelming public interest that is sought to be pursued, the analogy of the reasonings contained therein does not clinch this issue in her favour. This is more sc as an undervalue facet of sacrosanctity of a public office of a grass root level in institution of self Government is involved. The objection with regard to locus standi, therefore, fails. 36. A prima facie scrutiny of the pleaded facts and the documents on record would, however, reveal that on the complaint lodged by the writ petitioner, alleging contravention of the prescribed norms by the appellant in undertaking the execution of the various public projects and indulging in act of corruption and misuse of office, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Nayab Tehsildar, Wazirpur, who on 19.12.2012 forwarded the report to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Gangapur City. The letter dated 5.2.2013 of the latter authority addressed to the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur reveals that a parallel enquiry was also done by the jurisdictional J.En. and a suggestion was made that a regular departmental enquiry be undertaken. The letter dated 5.2.2013 of the latter authority addressed to the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur reveals that a parallel enquiry was also done by the jurisdictional J.En. and a suggestion was made that a regular departmental enquiry be undertaken. The Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur by his his letter dated 5.4.2013 forwarded the necessary documents aiongwith the proposed memorandum of charges to the Undersecretary (Enquiry), Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Govt, of Rajasthan, for necessary action. As would be evident from the contents of the letters dated 5.2.2013 and 5.4.2013, the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur was of the view that the enquiry conducted till then had disclosed irregularities in the execution of the works in connection with the public projects by the appellant as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Rendayal, Panchayat Samiti Gangapur City. This authority subsequent thereto on 26.4.2013 also forwarded the relevant documents aiongwith the enquiry report to the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur Division, aiongwith the same memorandum of charges vis-a-vis the appellant. The Undersecretary (Enquiry), Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Govt, of Rajasthan, vide his letter dated 7.5.2013 thereafter required the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur to initiate action under Section 38 of the Act and get the regular enquiry conducted and thereafter refer back to the Government for approval of the action construed to be necessary. It was thereafter that the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur vide his letter dated 23.7.2013 addressed to the Commissioner and Secretary, Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Secretariat, Jaipur, communicating that on receipt of the complaint with regard to execution of works against prescribed norms, lack of devotion to duty, corruption and siphoning of public funds by the appellant, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur, who had opined vide his letter dated 26.4.2013 that charges have been found to be proved. That on 14.5.2013, memorandum of charges in terms of Section 38 of the Act had been issued and that the appellant had not submitted her reply, was also mentioned. Recommendation was also made for placing her under suspension as contemplated in Section 38(4) of the Act. Vide letter dated 27.8.2013 of the Undersecretary (Enquiry), Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Govt, of Rajasthan, the approval of the State Government for placing the appellant under suspension was conveyed. 37. Recommendation was also made for placing her under suspension as contemplated in Section 38(4) of the Act. Vide letter dated 27.8.2013 of the Undersecretary (Enquiry), Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Govt, of Rajasthan, the approval of the State Government for placing the appellant under suspension was conveyed. 37. The official records produced by the State respondents reveal that thereafter by order dated 4.9.2013, the appellant was placed under suspension. It was at that stage that on 29.8.2013, the file was recalled by the departmental minister and on 2.9.2013, it was ordered that a fresh enquiry be conducted, as had been ordered by him on 3.5.2013 and 6.8.2013. It was further ordered that till such enquiry was concluded, the State Government's approval of the proposal to place the appellant under suspension be stayed. The letter dated 5.9.2013 impugned in the writ proceeding was issued thereafter. The fact remains however that on passing of the interim order dated 13.9.2013, this order dated 5.9.2013 has now been stayed and admittedly the charge of office of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Rendayal, Panchayat Samiti Gangapur City, Distt. Sawai Madhopur is with the Upsarpanch. 38. A bare perusal of the endorsements dated 3.5.2013 and 6.8.2013 appearing on the body of letters dated 3.5.2013 of Shri R.K. Meena, Parliamentary Secretary, Urban Development & Housing and 27.8.2013 of the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, referred to hereinabove, though mention about an enquiry to be conducted, these nowhere require that the same ought to be done only by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur. In other words, It was only on 2.9.2013 after the State Government had accorded its approval to the proposal for placing the appellant under suspension that the departmental minister in his endorsement of that date i.e. 2.9.2013 insisted on an enquiry to be conducted by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur. The above revelations prima facie demonstrate that a conscious decision had been taken by the State Government to grant approval to the recommendation for suspension of the appellant under Section 38(4) of the Act on 27.8.2013. By then, as the contemporaneous letters would demonstrate enquiry reports aiongwith other relevant documents were available with the concerned authority of the Government to take a decision in this regard. 39. By then, as the contemporaneous letters would demonstrate enquiry reports aiongwith other relevant documents were available with the concerned authority of the Government to take a decision in this regard. 39. Sections 38(1) and (4) of the Act the Rule 22(1) and (2) of the Rules, occupying the centre stage of the debate, are quoted below : "38. Removal and Suspension.-(l) The State Government may, by order in writing and after giving him and opportunity of being heard and making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary, remove from office any member including a Chairperson or a Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, who - (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such; or (b) is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or any disgraceful conduct: Provided that any enquiry under this sub-section may, even after the expiry of the term of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned be initiated or, if already initiated before such expiry, be continued thereafter and in any such case, the State Government shall, by order in writing, record its findings on the charges levelled. (4) The State Government may suspended any member including a Chairperson or a Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under Sub-section (1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offense involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a Court of law and such person shall stand debarred from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned while being under such suspension : Provided that the State Government may also suspend any Panch on the recommendation of the Ward Sabha or a Sarpanch on the recommendation of the Gram Sabha, but the State Government shall do so only when a resolution to that effect passed by a Ward Sabha, or a Gram Sabha, as the case may be, is referred by the State Government to the Collector for convening a special meeting of the Ward Sabha or the Gram Sabha, as the case may be, for finally ascertaining the wished of the members and the members present in the meeting so convened by the Collector and presided over by his nominee, reaffirm the resolution seeking suspension of the Panch or the Sarpanch, as the case may be, by a majority of two-third of the members present and voting : Providing further that no resolution seeking suspension of the Panch or Sarpanch shall be moved or passed before the completion of a tenure of two years by a Panch or a Sarpanch, as the case may be. 22. Procedure of enquiry. - (1) Before taking any action under sub-section (1) of section 38, where on its own motion or upon any complaint, the State Government may ask the Chief Executive Officer or any other office to get a preliminary enquiry done and to send his report to the State Government within one month. (2) If, upon consideration of the report received as aforesaid or otherwise, the State Government is of the opinion that action under Sub-Section (1) of Section 38 is necessary, the State Government shall frame definite charges and shall communicate them in writing to the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson or Member of the Panchayati Raj Institution together with such details as may be deemed necessary. He shall be required to submit a written statement within one month admitting or denying the allegations, giving his defence, if any and whether he desires to be heard in person. 40. The appellant in her pleadings has admitted to have been served with a copy of the memorandum of charges dated 14.5.2013 to which she had replied. That she had submitted representations while the process was in progress, is also admitted by her. To reiterate, the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur in his letter dated 23.7.2013 addressed to the Commissioner and Secretary, Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Secretariat, Jaipur, on which the departmental minister on 6.8.2013 had ordered for enquiry, did mention that a preliminary enquiry had been undertaken by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur and that according to this authority, the charges brought against the appellant were found proved. A bare perusal of this letter in particular demonstrates that with the issuance of the memorandum of charges dated 14.5.2013 by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur, the enquiry as contemplated under Section 38(1) of the Act, had commenced. Having regard to the scheme of Section 38 of the Act and Rule 22 of the Rules, as outlined hereinabove, the decision to suspend the appellant under Section 38(4) of the Act was, thus, neither impermissible nor incompetent. Noticeably, Rule 22(1) of the Rules reveals that the preliminary enquiry contemplated therein can be conducted by an officer other than the Chief Executive Officer as well. 41. The process having been taken to the stage as contemplated in ' Section 38(4) of the Act, in our considered opinion, it could not have been backtracked in the manner done and that too, without recording any convincing reason in support thereof. To reiterate, the departmental minister by his note dated 2.9.2013 insisted that a fresh enquiry need be conducted by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sawai Madhopur because he had intended to do so on previous two occasions i.e. 3.5.2013 and 6.8.2013, which however is belied by the records. To reiterate, though he had ordered enquiry to be made, he did not specify the same ought to be conducted by the Chief Executive Officer. The approval for placing the appellant under suspension was recorded thereafter i.e. 27.8.2013. This belated intervention of the departmental minister in our comprehension cannot be approved. To reiterate, though he had ordered enquiry to be made, he did not specify the same ought to be conducted by the Chief Executive Officer. The approval for placing the appellant under suspension was recorded thereafter i.e. 27.8.2013. This belated intervention of the departmental minister in our comprehension cannot be approved. The process of law as mandated by Section 38 of the Act and Rule 22 of the Rules having been furthered in the course, as legislatively intended, no impediment without any justifiable reason ought to be permitted at the instance of the political executive in utter disregard thereof. We are, thus, of the view that no interference with the order dated 13.9.2013 impugned in the instant appeal is called-for. 42. Resultantly, the appeal stands dismissed. We make it clear that the observations made and the findings arrived at, are strictly in the context of the limited issues raised in the appeal and would have no bearing on the final adjudication of the writ petition. *******