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2013 DIGILAW 2068 (BOM)

Sudhakar s/o Trimbakrao Kalmegh v. Seth Bansidhar Dahigaonkar

2013-10-04

A.B.CHAUDHARI, Z.A.HAQ

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Judgment : (Z.A. Haq, J.) 1. This Letters Patent Appeal arises out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant – employee and upholding the order passed by the School Tribunal by which the appeal filed by the appellant – employee was dismissed. 2. The appellant was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the School administered by respondent no.1 – Society, by the order dated 15th of July, 1994, on probation for the period of two years. According to the appellant, he continued in service till 7th of September, 1998 and his services were terminated orally w.e.f. 8th of September, 1998. The submission of the appellant is that he was appointed after following the prescribed procedure. 3. The appellant had filed Appeal No.136 of 1998 before the School Tribunal challenging the termination of his services. The Tribunal framed three issues as laid down by this Court in the case of Anna Manikrao Pethe..vs.. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal Amravati and Aurangabad Division reported in 1997(3) Mh.L.J. 697 and answered them as follows – In view of the finding that the appointment of the appellant was not granted approval by the Education Officer, the Tribunal had dismissed the appeal. 4. The appellant had challenged the order passed by the Tribunal before this Court in Writ Petition No.4020 of 2000, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court by the judgment dated 25th of June, 2001. The appellant has challenged the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in this Letters Patent Appeal. 5. We have heard Shri Anil Mardikar, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr.Sambhare, learned Advocate for the respondents and have examined the record. 6. Shri Mardikar, learned Advocate for the appellant, has submitted that the Tribunal has given finding that the appointment of the appellant was made as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and the Rules framed thereunder. According to the learned Advocate, it is an admitted fact that the post in which the appellant was appointed was reserved for the candidate belonging to Scheduled Tribe, but at the time of the interview, no candidate from Scheduled Tribe was available and therefore, the appellant was appointed. According to the learned Advocate, it is an admitted fact that the post in which the appellant was appointed was reserved for the candidate belonging to Scheduled Tribe, but at the time of the interview, no candidate from Scheduled Tribe was available and therefore, the appellant was appointed. According to the appellant, he belongs to “Kunbi” Other Backward Class and therefore, the appointment of the appellant was as per the provisions of Rule 9(9) (a) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 and the appointment of the appellant was on probation for the period of two years. To substantiate the submission, Shri Mardikar, learned Advocate for the appellant, has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ShakuntalaGanpatsa Shirbhate..vs.. Industrial Weaving Co-operative Society reported in 1994 Mh.L.J. 218 and judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of KankavaliShikshan Sanstha and ors. ..vs.. M.R.Gavali and ors. reported in 2006(1) Mh.L.J.713, in which the Scheme of Rule 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private School (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 is considered and it is held that if the post is reserved for a candidate belonging to a particular category of Backward Classes, and if the candidate from that Backward Class is not available, the post may be filled in by selecting a candidate from the other remaining categories, as specified in sub-rule 7, and that appointment has to be treated on probation. The learned Advocate for the appellant has further submitted that the Tribunal has rightly considered this issue in paragraph nos.8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the order and has given a finding that the appointment of the appellant is as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Act and the Rules 9(9)(a) of the Rules of 1981. 7. Shri Mardikar, learned Advocate for the appellant, has submitted that the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Tribunal only on the ground that the appointment of the appellant is not granted approval by the Education Officer and in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Anna Pethe’s case (supra) that if the finding on the issue is in the negative, the appeal of the employee has to be dismissed. According to the learned counsel, the Tribunal has committed an error. According to the learned counsel, the Tribunal has committed an error. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court reported in 2007(1)Mh.L.J. 597 (St.Ulai High School and anr. ..vs.. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh) in which it is held in paragraph No.13 that neither the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools Act, 1977, nor the Rules framed thereunder mandate the grant of approval by the Education Officer as a condition precedent to a valid order of appointment. It is also held that the requirement of approval relates to the disbursal of grant in aid and is a matter between the management and the State and want of approval will not invalidate an order of appointment. It is further held that the judgments of the Division Benches of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe..vs.. Presiding Officer and ShailajaAshokrao Valse..vs.. State of Maharashtra (supra) to the extent that they hold that an appeal is not maintainable before the Tribunal at the behest of an employee, whose appointment has not been approved, do not reflect the correct position in law and are overruled. Shri Mardikar, learned Advocate for the appellant, has submitted that in view of this legal position, the order of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the appointment of the appellant is not granted approval by the Education Officer, is unsustainable in law and has to be set aside and the reliefs prayed for by the appellant have to be granted. 8. Shri Sambhare, learned Advocate for respondent nos.1 and 2, has submitted that the appointment of the appellant was temporary and the appellant was appointed in the post reserved for the Scheduled Tribe candidate. According to the learned Advocate for the respondent nos.1 and 2, the Education Officer had rightly granted the approval to the appointment of the appellant for the specific periods from 15th of July, 1995 till 30th of April, 1996; from 22nd of October, 1996 till 30th of April, 1997 and from 1st of August, 1997 till 30th of April, 1998 and the Tribunal was right in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant relying on the judgment of this Court in Anna Pethe’s case on the ground that the appointment of the appellant is not granted approval by the Education Officer. 9. We have considered the submissions of the respective parties. 9. We have considered the submissions of the respective parties. The Tribunal has specifically held that the appointment of the appellant was made as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. In coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal has considered the provisions of Rule 9(9)(a) of the Rules of 1981 and has recorded the finding that the appellant belongs to “Kunbi” Other Backward Class and as the candidate from Scheduled Tribe, for which the post was reserved, was not available, the appellant was rightly appointed. The findings of the Tribunal are in consonance with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of ShakuntalaShirbhate and KankavaliShikshan Sanstha. The respondent nos.1 and 2 have accepted these findings and have not challenged it. Even at the time of the hearing of this Letters Patent Appeal, the respondent nos.1 and 2 were not in a position to point out that the findings of the Tribunal that the appointment of the appellant was made as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, are not proper or unjustified. In our view, the Tribunal having come to the conclusion that the appointment of the appellant was proper and as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, there could not have been any other conclusion except that the appellant had acquired the status of the confirmed employee as per the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act and the services of the appellant could not have been terminated on the ground that the appointment of the appellant was temporary and the Education Officer had not granted approval to the appointment of the appellant. We further find that the Education Officer had granted the approval to the appointment of the appellant for the period from 15th of July, 1995 till 30th of April, 1996, from 22nd of October, 1996 till 30th of April, 1997 and from 1st of August, 1997 till 30th of April, 1998. The Education Officer overlooked the provisions of Rule 9(9)(a) of the Rules, 1981 and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of ShakuntalaShirbhate and KankavaliShikshan Sanstha and has not given approval to the appointment of the appellant for probation period and onwards. The Education Officer overlooked the provisions of Rule 9(9)(a) of the Rules, 1981 and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of ShakuntalaShirbhate and KankavaliShikshan Sanstha and has not given approval to the appointment of the appellant for probation period and onwards. The error committed by the Education Officer cannot have adverse effect on the entitlement of the appellant and cannot give a right to the respondent nos.1 and 2 to terminate the services of the appellant. Therefore, the termination of the services of the appellant on the ground that the appointment of the appellant is not granted approval by the Education Officer is unjustified and cannot be sustained. Hence, we pass the following order. 10. Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 25th of June, 2001 in W.P.No.4020 of 2000 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court as well as order dated 21st of June, 2000 in Appeal No.136 of 1998 passed by Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati are set aside. Appeal No.136 of 1998 is partly allowed. Respondent nos.1 and 2 in Appeal No.136 of 1998 shall reinstate the appellant in his original post held by him before termination and shall grant continuity of service without any monetary benefits within a period of one month from today. Relief of back wages is refused. No order as to costs.